lenochs%drcoa1.decnet@drcvax.af.mil (DRCOA1::LENOCHS) (03/15/91)
From: "DRCOA1::LENOCHS" <lenochs%drcoa1.decnet@drcvax.af.mil>
Kevin Broekhoven wrote a piece about selection of weapons and targets.
As a preamble, let me recommend the current (13 March) 'Newsweek'
issue. A great piece on some of the behind the scenes stuff. Also, I
am going to use the US point of view for this discussion. Other
nations may have other priorities in their decision making process.
Kevin sez:
>i.e. why choose "air" bombardment over sea or land bombardment?
>Concentration of firepower? Command & Control? Protection of
>weapons-delivery "assets"?
The protection of delivery vehicles and (more importantly) their crews,
and getting the most effective weapon on the target are the two key
ingredients.
>Also, I got the impression that very limited use was made of field
>artillery, that it was used to harrass the troops defending the
>"Saddam line", rather than being used to deliver major amounts of
>destructive fire-power.
The amount of tube artillery and/or rockets that would be needed to
equal an air strike is *enormous*! A Mk-82 iron bomb is a 502 pound
warhead. An F-15E can carry 24 of them (total throw weight = 12,048
pounds). Even with a 200 pound warhead on a 155mm (which I doubt), it
would take 60 rounds to equal one F-15E run. (Artillery experts,
please step up and take your spot on this one.) A B-52 can carry over
100 Mk-82s. That is a throw weight of 50,200 pounds. You'd need a
*lot* of tubes to put all those rounds on the target in the same amount
of time.
The logistics of artillery demand moving the propellant to the gun as
well as the warhead. Because of the short (relatively) range of
artillery vs. airplanes, more assets are used up moving projos than
iron bombs. (I will not argue the maintenance aspect. Artillery
wins.)
Granted, once set up, the arty can continue firing, but return fire
limits the amount of time any one gun will remain stationary (of its
own free will!!).
>If multiple shells are going to be fired at a target, I would expect
>them to arrive in a single-modal, bi-variate x-y Gaussian
>distribution; the number of rounds used to destroy a target being
>calculated using the methods of quality-control for a stationary
>single target, or operations research (OR) to incapacitate a dynamic
>or multiple-point target.
?!?!? What'd he say ?!?!?
Loyd M. Enochs (ex-USAF) - Dynamics Research Corporation - Andover, MA
Munitions Maintenance, 1974-1980 - Computer Programmer/Analyst, 1980-1987
leverich@rand.org (Brian Leverich) (03/18/91)
From: saugus!leverich@rand.org (Brian Leverich) > > From: "DRCOA1::LENOCHS" <lenochs%drcoa1.decnet@drcvax.af.mil> > > The amount of tube artillery and/or rockets that would be needed to > equal an air strike is *enormous*! A Mk-82 iron bomb is a 502 pound > warhead. An F-15E can carry 24 of them (total throw weight = 12,048 > pounds). Even with a 200 pound warhead on a 155mm (which I doubt), it > would take 60 rounds to equal one F-15E run. (Artillery experts, > please step up and take your spot on this one.) A B-52 can carry over > 100 Mk-82s. That is a throw weight of 50,200 pounds. You'd need a > *lot* of tubes to put all those rounds on the target in the same amount > of time. > Actually, most analysts expect the <tonnage> of munitions the Air Force would deliver in a hot war to be a small fraction of the amount that would be shot by the Army. Estimates vary, but most analysts believe that <each> unconstrained heavy division augmented with the usual corps assets would shoot 2000-3600 tons per day fighting a heavy defense. That's well over 100 B-52 sorties per division day. The primary reason for the Air Force bombing mission is that the really lethal conventional Army munitions have historically had very short ranges - less than 30 miles. This may change with the advent of ATACMS (the Army Tactical Missile System, a MLRS-launched missile with a range many times 30 miles). > Granted, once set up, the arty can continue firing, but return fire > limits the amount of time any one gun will remain stationary (of its > own free will!!). Counterbattery fire may be rate-limiting to tube artillery, which shoots at a fairly low tons-per-minute rate and may have to scoot before they've really done much damage. This should be less of a problem for MLRS (multiple launch rocket system) batteries, because MLRS can ripple- fire 12 rockets (which is a lot of tonnage) and scoot. > >If multiple shells are going to be fired at a target, I would expect > >them to arrive in a single-modal, bi-variate x-y Gaussian > >distribution; the number of rounds used to destroy a target being > >calculated using the methods of quality-control for a stationary > >single target, or operations research (OR) to incapacitate a dynamic > >or multiple-point target. > > ?!?!? What'd he say ?!?!? Yes, sort of. There is an extensive literature describing mathematical modeling of interior and exterior ballistics, and how munitions interact with targets. The sophistication of the mathematics has really been a bit absurd in the past, at least in terms of describing how many rounds are consumed in combat. First of all, firepower (especially artillery) is used for all sorts of things besides killing targets; for example, denying terrain, pinning dug-in troops, reconnaissance by fire, etc. Because you can do so many wonderful things with fire, a trivial model of real-world ammunition consumption is that consumption = capacity of the log system. Second, with respect to artillery consumption, the observer calling in the fires historically hasn't known his (and, consequently, the target's) position within half a klick or more (many times the circular error probable of the gun itself). What happened in the real world is that the observer would walk the fire to the target, perhaps spending far more rounds than a naive accuracy-of-the-tube model would predict. (Perhaps the models will fit better now that position finding is becoming more sophisticated ...) Third, and continuing the effects of dynamics, fires are being made sequentially. Once you hit the target, the observer can tell you to move on to another target. The opposing force can return fire, causing you to have to scoot. Your targeting priorities can be changed. Etc. And there's more, but it's not worth wasting bandwith on. Cheers, B. "Simulate it in ROSS" Brian Leverich | Post: Resource Management Department Voice: (213) 393-0411 x7769 | The RAND Corporation Internet: leverich@rand.org | 1700 Main Street UUCP: uunet!randvax!leverich | Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138
chidsey@smoke.brl.mil (Irving Chidsey) (03/18/91)
From: Irving Chidsey <chidsey@smoke.brl.mil>
In article <1991Mar15.040039.9604@cbnews.att.com> lenochs%drcoa1.decnet@drcvax.af.mil (DRCOA1::LENOCHS) writes:
<
< Kevin sez:
<
< >If multiple shells are going to be fired at a target, I would expect
< >them to arrive in a single-modal, bi-variate x-y Gaussian
< >distribution; the number of rounds used to destroy a target being
< >calculated using the methods of quality-control for a stationary
< >single target, or operations research (OR) to incapacitate a dynamic
< >or multiple-point target.
<
< ?!?!? What'd he say ?!?!?
Gaussian = bell shaped, single-modal = one hump, x-y = along the ground,
bi-variate = eliptical ( i.e., the cross range errors probably do not = the
down range errors. Quality control and operations research people have
already figured out the necessary math.
Or were you just firing for effect at a dense pile of statistical
jargon in a non statistical newsletter? In sci.military it probably should
have been 'an SM, BVXYGD', and every one would have nodded, said of course,
and run to find their acronym dictionary.
Irv
--
I do not have signature authority. I am not authorized to sign anything.
I am not authorized to commit the BRL, the DA, the DOD, or the US Government
to anything, not even by implication. They do not tell me what their policy
is. They may not have one. Irving L. Chidsey <chidsey@brl.mil>