moseley@titan.tsd.arlut.utexas.edu (Austin Moseley) (03/08/91)
From: moseley@titan.tsd.arlut.utexas.edu (Austin Moseley) Rumor has it that there will be *big* changes to the Reserves and National Guard as a result of the NTC and Ft. Hood fiascos. I was wondering what anyone has heard concerning changes. Rumor says that everyone will be tested soon, and those with a less than 10th grade ability in math and reading will be let go. There is a rumor that AT in the summer will be extended to two months instead of two weeks. I was wondering if any proposals have been made to make the Reserves more ready and capable. -Austin Moseley
cga66@ihlpy.att.com (Patrick V Kauffold) (03/14/91)
From: cga66@ihlpy.att.com (Patrick V Kauffold) > From: moseley@titan.tsd.arlut.utexas.edu (Austin Moseley) > Rumor has it that there will be *big* changes to the Reserves and > National Guard as a result of the NTC and Ft. Hood fiascos. I suspect that there will be some reorganization, revision of mission areas, and re-allocation of personnel. But Reserve force levels are set by statute and agreements with DOD service commands, and this process is EXTREMELY political. So this will provide an opportunity for extensive Congressional hearings and plenty of politicking behind the scenes by such interest groups as ROA, Navy League, etc. My guess is that there will be some reasonable functional changes as a result of the Gulf mobilization, plus some cosmetic changes, plus some politically motivated changes. > Rumor says that everyone will be tested soon, and those with a less > than 10th grade ability in math and reading will be let go. This will depend on the force levels in the Regulars and Reserves after the dust settles; if force levels drop (people get out, recruiting drops off), then standards drop. One thing is certain: the draft is dead. The AVF has been vindicated. > There is a rumor that AT in the summer will be extended to two months > instead of two weeks. The basic requirement for Reservists in pay status is 48 drill periods and 2 weeks ADT (with some variations for different mission areas). This is a statutory requirement, tied closely to the budget. There are some mission areas that routinely require more ADT, but people get paid for this training, and it tends to get $$$$. Budgets are going to be cut, so I doubt if there will be any push to increase training. 2 months? Who could do this and remain employed?
major@uunet.UU.NET (Mike Schmitt) (03/18/91)
From: bcstec!shuksan!major@uunet.UU.NET (Mike Schmitt) > From: cga66@ihlpy.att.com (Patrick V Kauffold) > > Rumor has it that there will be *big* changes to the Reserves and > > National Guard as a result of the NTC and Ft. Hood fiascos. > I suspect that there will be some reorganization, revision of mission > areas, and re-allocation of personnel. But Reserve force levels are > set by statute and agreements with DOD service commands, and this process > is EXTREMELY political. So this will provide an opportunity for extensive > Congressional hearings and plenty of politicking behind the scenes by > such interest groups as ROA, Navy League, etc. My guess is that there > will be some reasonable functional changes as a result of the Gulf > mobilization, plus some cosmetic changes, plus some politically motivated > changes. I think you'll see some sweeping changes - especially in the reserve component combat units - specifically the brigades. SecDef Cheney has stated that the "round-out" concept of a reserve component combat brigade 'assigned' as the third brigade of an active division, simply did not work as planned. Training and the NTC uncovered some serious deficiencies in combat readiness. No reserve component combat units were deployed to the Gulf. Active divisions that are tabbed for 'rapid-deployment' to trouble spots must be complete divisions. Reserve component combat brigades may be formed into divisions for follow-on deployments. > This will depend on the force levels in the Regulars and Reserves after the > dust settles; if force levels drop (people get out, recruiting drops off), > then standards drop. According to one report by the end of 1995 conventional forces would look like this, according to the new defense budget proposals submitted in February: The Army would cut down to 12 active divisions (down from 18) and six National Guard divisions (down from 10). The Air Force reduces to 15 active tactical fighter wings and 11 in reserve components (down from 24 and 12 today). The Navy would be reduced to 451 ships (down from 545); 12 aircraft carriers (loss of 1) and 11 active carrier air wings (down from 13) and no battleships. Marine Corps is unaffected. Its force structure is written into law, at three active divisions and three air wings. Reserve components will see about a 20% loss in authorized personnel. Strategic Sealift is to be boosted with an increase in the Ready Reserve Fleet. Airlift, however, will remain at current levels. (Well, they won't have that much to carry will they?) Mike Schmitt
cga66@ihlpy.att.com (Patrick V Kauffold) (03/19/91)
From: cga66@ihlpy.att.com (Patrick V Kauffold) > From: bcstec!shuksan!major@uunet.UU.NET (Mike Schmitt) > > SecDef Cheney has stated that the "round-out" concept of a reserve > component combat brigade 'assigned' as the third brigade of an active > division, simply did not work as planned. Training and the NTC uncovered > some serious deficiencies in combat readiness. No reserve component > combat units were deployed to the Gulf. Active divisions that are tabbed > for 'rapid-deployment' to trouble spots must be complete divisions. > Reserve component combat brigades may be formed into divisions for follow-on > deployments. Right - the deployment uncovered some serious gaps between readiness which was REPORTED pre-war, and what they were actually capable of doing. The most serious deficiencies I have seen in some reports point the finger at the leadership. Whether this invalidates the round-out aspect of "Total Force" remains to be seen. There have been reports that the Reserve units deployed performed very well, and in many cases performed near miracles. Note that the logistics effort leaned heavily on reserves. No reserve component combat units? You must mean only Army; there were a number of Air Force reserve units in combat, as well as Coast Guard and Navy. > Reserve components will see about a 20% loss in authorized personnel. This was already in the mill before the war. ROA is fighting this. Both sides will claim that the Gulf War has validated their respective positions. My guess is more like a 10% reduction over 5 years. > Strategic Sealift is to be boosted with an increase in the Ready Reserve > Fleet. Airlift, however, will remain at current levels. (Well, they won't > have that much to carry will they?) Still two big problems with the sealift: it isn't a necessity in peacetime, and the Navy doesn't like spending money for grubby cargo ships and tankers instead of glamorous carriers and submarines. Just to move a bunch of stuff for the Army and Marine Corps? And you don't get promoted by being the CO of an AUXILIARY. Junkyard Navy. Sealift has a real image problem. It may get a more serious look, but with the budget axe flying, this sector will be hard pressed to get any of those declining dollars. To boot, the Air Force will be glad to promise that it will be able to deliver the goods, just give us more C-17, C-whatever. Airlift proponents have a product they believe in.