kevin@ccs.QueensU.CA (Kevin Broekhoven) (03/13/91)
From: kevin@ccs.QueensU.CA (Kevin Broekhoven)
Recent events in the Gulf must have impressed all of us with
the importance of "fire-power" and "air-power" as critical elements
in the prosecution of a modern war.
My limited understanding of warfare is that since the invention of
fire-arms, a major theme of military theory has been command, control,
and "concentration" of fire-power on unfriendly targets. I'm wondering
how military doctrine chooses the method of delivery of this awesome
modern fire-power to the enemy, and to what degree economic
considerations affect these decisions. i.e. why choose "air" bombardment
over sea or land bombardment? Concentration of firepower?
Command & Control? Protection of weapons-delivery "assets"?
(why do these guys sound more like accountants than warriors?)
In more detail, my questions are:
1. To what extent do the realities affecting transport of commercial
goods affect the transport of military "goods" on the scale we
saw in the Gulf War? For bulk transport, there is a commercial advantage
that favours sea over land over air.
Looking at the cost of munitions, air-dropped "dumb" bombs must be
cheaper than artillery, which in turn must be cheaper than "smart" bombs
or any type of missile.
I would expect then, that the cheapest way to hit a target would be via
large calibre artillery mounted on a sea vessel like a WWII battle
ship; if the target was out of range of sea-based artillery, I would
expect the next cheapest way would be to truck your ordinance overland
to an artillery unit and deliver it by howitzer; if the target
was out of range of either of these two delivery methods,
then you would go to
a flying bomb-rack like a B-52, delivering dumb bombs; and only if
all of the above were impractical, to a fighter/bomber with
missiles/smart bombs.
The impression I got from CNN was almost the reverse.
The majority of the action was from expensive
fighter/bomber delivery systems, and multiple rocket launcher systems.
I got the impression that the battle ships fired their guns on very
limited occasions, rather than cruising up and down the
Kuwaiti coast, wreaking havoc on the large Iraqui formations on the
beach, which were vainly waiting for an amphibious assault.
Also, I got the impression that very limited use was made of field
artillery, that it was used to harrass the troops defending the
"Saddam line", rather than being used to deliver major amounts of
destructive fire-power.
Could anyone imform me as to whether my impressions are correct, or
whether some other aspect of military technology/stragegy dictated the
use of air-power over cheaper systems. (obviously, strategic targets
deep in Iraq were out of range of land and sea based artillery, my
question relates to the "Saddam line" and Iraqui forces based near
the Kuwati beach)
2. On a related note, I was puzzled by CNN coverage of US and
British field artillery. On at least two types of self-propelled,
and towed artillery, the gun would fire, the barrel would decline,
perhaps to a horizontal positon, the crew would reload,
and the barrel would again incline and be fired.
My naive expectation would have been that after communication with a
forward spotter, and a few marker rounds, that the gun would go into
action "for effect", perhaps using an auto-loader to deliver a number
of rounds onto the target. If multiple shells are going to be fired
at a target, I would expect them to arrive in a single-modal, bi-variate
x-y Gaussian distribution; the number of rounds used to destroy a target
being calculated using the methods of quality-control for a stationary
single target, or operations research (OR) to incapacitate a
dynamic or multiple-point target.
Was the decline/incline activity a requirement for re-loading? For
re-calibration between shots at the same target? Or were they so
accurate that they were destroying a target with each shot, and
aiming at another target?
Or were other off-camera artillery pieces contributing to the salvo?
thanks in advance for any info on these topics,
Kevin Broekhoven Computing Centre
applications programmer Queens University K7L-3N6 (Canada)
Bitnet, NetNorth: BROEKHVN@QUCDN IP: kevin@ccs.QueensU.CA (130.15.48.9)
X.400: Kevin.Broekhoven@QueensU.CA Bell: (613) 545-2235 fax: 545-6798jtchew@csa2.lbl.gov (JOSEPH T CHEW) (03/15/91)
From: jtchew@csa2.lbl.gov (JOSEPH T CHEW) In article <1991Mar13.000742.4022@cbnews.att.com>, kevin@ccs.QueensU.CA (Kevin Broekhoven) writes... >1. To what extent do the realities affecting transport of commercial > goods affect the transport of military "goods" on the scale we >saw in the Gulf War? For bulk transport, there is a commercial advantage >that favours sea over land over air. Well, it depends on what you want to move, how far, and how fast. Theoretically you can do it all with aircraft, but life is too short and the air fleet is too small. You'll recall that we reacted quickly to the invasion by sending over some paratroopers to go sit in the sand. It's said that they were kinda nervous until some reinforcements arrived...with armor. One of the interesting procurement issues that will come out of the Gulf War is what to do about the airlift fleet. I understand that MAC just about flew the wings off their old, high-time C-141s, especially, and that the C-5s also got a good workout. McDonnell- Douglas, would-be producer of the C-17, must have a feeling of relief. Basically, aircraft are good for rapid deployment of light forces. The biggest airlifters carry one or two pieces of the heavy stuff (tank, howitzer, heavy helicopter, etc.) per trip. The biggest civilian passenger jets that can be commandeered seat less than 500 _civilians_ (probably fewer troops, depending on how much gear they take with them and how much they marry up with later on). I think you can get on the order of 10,000 on a troopship. If you're going somewhere in corps strength, especially with a lot of armor, it's nice to have sealift capability. There are two problems. One is that you need a place to offload. The other is that the modern Serious Merchant Marine (tm) is mostly containerized or Ro-Ro, whereas a lot of military stuff is "break-bulk" (reasonable, considering that there might not be a container port at the other end). Translation: the military has to maintain its own fast-sealift fleet, because no private shipping company in its right mind is going to go back to break-bulk -- economics dictates containers. I'd say that the military, as opposed to commercial shipping, has the same problem but a much different way of looking at it. Cost is not the object; you work down on the physical and managerial limits. But this approach sometimes gives the same solution (namely, a ship). Usually several modes of transport are needed to move the goods from where they are to where they're needed, however. You seem to appreciate the main issue -- that an army has a huge logistics "tail" (a term that I find somewhat perjorative; "umbilical cord" is more like it). Some of the heroes of the Gulf War looked a lot more like stevedores and longshoremen, not to mention hastily called-up airline pilots from the Reserves, than soldiers. --Joe "Just another personal opinion from the People's Republic of Berkeley"
gary@gatech.edu (Gary Coffman) (03/18/91)
From: ke4zv!gary@gatech.edu (Gary Coffman) In article <1991Mar13.000742.4022@cbnews.att.com> kevin@ccs.QueensU.CA (Kevin Broekhoven) writes: >Command & Control? Protection of weapons-delivery "assets"? >(why do these guys sound more like accountants than warriors?) Because in a very real sense they *are* accountants. War is the art of delivering the proper amount of force on the proper objective at the proper time. It's primarily a shipping operation. DHL, FedX, UPS, and the US Military are basically oriented to the same mission. They must deliver, on time, every time. >1. To what extent do the realities affecting transport of commercial > goods affect the transport of military "goods" on the scale we >saw in the Gulf War? For bulk transport, there is a commercial advantage >that favours sea over land over air. The military would prefer to air express everything, but the realities are that some military supplies are too heavy, too bulky, or both to be air delivered. Also there is a chronic shortage of heavy airlift capability. For massive cargos, sea transport is still best both from an economic standpoint and from a speed standpoint. Rail, if available, is second best. Then truck and air bring up the rear. Both are limited in the size of cargos transported and by the amount of support labor and fuel that they require. >Looking at the cost of munitions, air-dropped "dumb" bombs must be >cheaper than artillery, which in turn must be cheaper than "smart" bombs >or any type of missile. >I would expect then, that the cheapest way to hit a target would be via >large calibre artillery mounted on a sea vessel like a WWII battle >ship; if the target was out of range of sea-based artillery, I would >expect the next cheapest way would be to truck your ordinance overland >to an artillery unit and deliver it by howitzer; if the target >was out of range of either of these two delivery methods, then you would >go to a flying bomb-rack like a B-52, delivering dumb bombs; and only if >all of the above were impractical, to a fighter/bomber with missiles/smart >bombs. > >The impression I got from CNN was almost the reverse. The US, being a rich country, has the luxury of spending money to save trooper's and civilian's lives. The battlewagons are limited to an effective range of 23 miles with their big guns. Considering the minefields in place in the Gulf, and the small number of mine- sweepers available to the Coalition, the battlewagons stayed out in cleared waters to avoid risking their several thousand man crews. In addition, the barrels of the big guns have a limited lifetime and no new barrels are being produced. Field artillery has the drawback that it, it's crew, and their support troops must come within range of enemy artillery to deliver it's load. So there is a risk of several casualties every time artillery is moved up into firing position. The B-52, doing high altitude bombing, ran virtually no risk from AAA and faced almost no enemy aircraft. Therefore it was ideal for delivering ordinance on the Iraqi military in the field. It lacks the pinpoint accuracy needed to deliver bombs on targets in populated areas. So the very expensive tactical aircraft went in with smart weapons to take out those targets. A straight tradeoff of costs versus casualties among friendlies and civilians with the scales heavily weighted toward minimum casualties. >2. On a related note, I was puzzled by CNN coverage of US and > British field artillery. On at least two types of self-propelled, >and towed artillery, the gun would fire, the barrel would decline, >perhaps to a horizontal positon, the crew would reload, >and the barrel would again incline and be fired. The British self-propelled guns were at least twenty years old and are not automatic. This is simply how they are worked. Rapid fire artillery is a problem due to barrel heating and the bulk and weight of the shells. This cooling pause is necessary. Normally, artillery fire is conducted by batteries in such a manner that one is firing while another is reloading. Thus keeping up a continous barrage. In Kuwait, it does indeed appear that artillery missions were limited to harrassment fire rather than massive barrages. From the tapes I've seen, it appears that the guns would move up, fire a few rounds, and move away quickly before counter battery fire could be brought to bear. Again, the overriding goal seems to have been to minimize friendly casualties. Gary
fritzs@microsoft.UUCP (Fritz SANDS) (03/20/91)
From: fritzs@microsoft.UUCP (Fritz SANDS) In article <1991Mar15.035911.9345@cbnews.att.com> jtchew@csa2.lbl.gov (JOSEPH T CHEW) writes: >Translation: the military has to maintain its own fast-sealift fleet, >because no private shipping company in its right mind is going to go >back to break-bulk -- economics dictates containers. Yeah, but it ain't going to happen, not in the volumes that they need, given budget realities. Let's flip it around. If the merchant marine has container and Ro-Ro ships available for wartime use, and the problem is that military gear is break-bulk because the destination may not have a container port -- how hard is it to fabricate a makeshift container-handling facility? On another logistics note -- how were most of the M1A1's transported to the Gulf -- airlift or sealift? Fritz Sands