cga66@ihlpy.att.com (Patrick V Kauffold) (03/05/91)
From: cga66@ihlpy.att.com (Patrick V Kauffold)
>From a dim memory, I recall a story or TV piece on the Desert
Warfare School detailing how the "OPFOR" was equipped with some
borrowed Soviet equipment, and, using Soviet tactics, was able
to defeat the US forces during training exercises. If anyone
on the net knows more, I'd like to hear about it. (Looks like
there are enough undamaged T72s in US hands to outfit an OPFOR
brigade; should make for more realistic training. LtGen Kelley
called them "spoils of war.")
In the Gulf War aftermath, maybe we are being a bit too critical
of equipment differences, and not enough on training, leadership,
tactics, and such things as quality of the troops.
A hypothetical: if the Allied forces had been equipped with Soviet
equipment, and the Iraquis had US equipment, would the results
have been much different?
There are news reports that a Soviet general has declared their
entire air defense approach as discredited. I also noted, in
Martin Caidin's _The Tigers Are Burning_, that the Soviets used
a three-tier defense which looked very similar to the Iraquis
plan - in 1943! Doesn't say much for their tactical advancement
since then (or maybe success on the battlefield breeds stagnation
of tactics).denbeste@spdcc.com (Steven Den Beste) (03/06/91)
From: denbeste@spdcc.com (Steven Den Beste) In article <1991Mar4.205506.5700@cbnews.att.com> cga66@ihlpy.att.com (Patrick V Kauffold) writes: >From a dim memory, I recall a story or TV piece on the Desert >Warfare School detailing how the "OPFOR" was equipped with some >borrowed Soviet equipment, and, using Soviet tactics, was able >to defeat the US forces during training exercises. If anyone >on the net knows more, I'd like to hear about it. (Looks like >there are enough undamaged T72s in US hands to outfit an OPFOR >brigade; should make for more realistic training. LtGen Kelley >called them "spoils of war.") > >From "The Threat: Inside the Soviet Military Machine" by Andrew Cockburn, copyright 1983: "Civilians who drive on the public roads which crisscross Fort Hood, the enormous US Army base in the rolling countryside of central Texas, get used to passing tanks. Enormous steel vehicles, measuring about 25 feet long, 12 feet wide, and 10 feet high -- all tanks project an impression of raw power. ... Most of them are American, either M-60s, the main American tank for twenty years, or newer and larger M-1s, which emit a high-pitched whine from their gas-turbine engines, quite unlike the throaty rumble of the diesel-powered M-60s. Sometimes the passersby notice tanks that look different, un-American. These tanks are smaller and lower, with rounded egg-shaped turrets and a very long cannon that imparts a streamlined appearance missing from the more boxlike M-60s. It is not surprising that they should look different. They were designed and built in the Soviet Union. These Soviet tanks have reached Fort Hood by a long and roundabout route. Produced at the great plants in Kharkov or Nizhny Tagil, they were supplied by the Soviets to their Syrian and Egyptian allies in the Middle East. Thrown into battle against the Israeli army, they were captured undamaged and passed on to the U.S. Army as a small recompense for the vast shipments of American weaponry dispatched in the opposite direction. Along with other examples of captured Soviet equipment ... these tanks can give the U.S. forces hard data on the actual performance and characteristics of their enemy's equipment. However, they are used for more than mere education of the intelligence specialists. The Army maintains Opfors (Opposing Forces) units at bases around the country consisting of American soldiers who wear quasi-Soviet uniforms, operate and maintain the Soviet equipment and "fight" in exercises against ordinary U.S. units according to the precepts of Soviet tactical manuals. ...Seen up close, Soviet tanks project an air of sinister elegance. Like most Russian weapons, they look dangerous, unstoppable. But once one climbs inside, the perspective changes. All tanks induce, in this writer at any rate, a feeling of acute claustrophobia. Even when engaged in an exercise no more warlike than a spin about the Fort Hood firing range, members of a tank crew go about their duties in conditions more cramped than those of even the smallest sports car. ...A U.S. Army public affairs officer who once showed me around an M-1 commented briskly on the "unequalled space and comfort afforded the crew" by this, the army's most up-to-date tank. Even so, I could only think of how hellish it would be to be bolded up inside, hardly able to move, while unseed enemies outside were trying to kill me. Yet that M-1 had interior space of ballroom proportions compared to the Soviet T-62 tank I explored at Fort Hood. I was unable to find out what it is like to sit inside with the hatch closed because I am over 6 feet tall, and Soviet tanks are so small that there is no headroom for anyone taller than 5 feet 6 inches. ...A Soviet tank gun loader's job is not an enviable one. He must manhandle heavy, 50-pound, shells either from a rack near his feet or from the main storage area behind him into the breech of the main gun. To ram the shell home in the breech, he must get behind it and use both hands and then get out of the way very quickly before the gunner fires, since the gun recoils with lethal force. On a T-62, an automatic mechanism ejects the heavy casing of the spent shell through a small porthole in the rear of the turret each time the gun fires. But the casing often misses the porthole, in which case it ricochets back inside the tank. The commander has a metal guard to protect his head if this happens. The loader does not. The perils of his position are further increased if a device called a gyrostabilizer is switched on. This device is supposed to keep the gun trained on a target while the tank is moving, which means that the gun breech and turret can swing about unexpectedly, crushing the loader if he is not quick on his feet." The remainder of chapter 8, titled "Tanks and other armor" discusses the unreliability of the tank engines, their transmissions, and generally the over-all shitty engineering appearing throughout the design. Though now a little dated, this is a VERY interesting book - especially since now that the cold war is over it seems he was a lot closer to the truth then people at the time wanted to admit. (His contention was that the Soviet military was much less of a threat than the military-industrial complex wanted to admit, since such an admission would have decreased military spending in this country.)
Eric_S_Klien@cup.portal.com (03/13/91)
From: Eric_S_Klien@cup.portal.com
"A hypothetical: if the Allied forces had been equipped with Soviet
equipment, and the Iraquis had US equipment, would the results
have been much different?"
Yes, we would have lost. The difference between US and Soviet
equipment is vast. With Soviet equipment you can't see your
opponent, nor can you hit him even if he sprays orange florescent
paint on his weapons. It is not the heavy armor that makes the M1A1
the most powerful weapon in the world, it is its ability to both see
and hit its target. The same goes for our airplanes whose precision
munitions basically won the war. Preliminary analysis shows that the
imprecise B-52s had almost zero effect in the war.
Eric Klienmaarrrk@gauss.ucsb.edu (Mark Erickson) (03/14/91)
From: maarrrk@gauss.ucsb.edu (Mark Erickson) In article <1991Mar12.233727.1299@cbnews.att.com> Eric_S_Klien@cup.portal.com writes: > >"A hypothetical: if the Allied forces had been equipped with Soviet >equipment, and the Iraquis had US equipment, would the results >have been much different?" > >Yes, we would have lost. > > [stuff deleted] Equipment is only as good as the people who use it, and the Iraqis did not appear to have their act together at all. I don't think that they could have maintained and used our equipment. The Israelis had Patriot missiles, but did not have the training necessary to defend their country without U.S. crews. --maarrrk
smpod@saturn.lerc.nasa.gov (Stefan) (03/15/91)
From: smpod@saturn.lerc.nasa.gov (Stefan) In Eric_S_Klien@cup.portal.com writes... >Preliminary analysis shows that the >imprecise B-52s had almost zero effect in the war. Where did you get this info? I read (NYT) that the B-52s were very effective in hitting area targets such as ammo and supply dumps but ineffective against point targets such as dug-in tanks which is to be expected.
adrian@cs.heriot-watt.ac.uk (Adrian Hurt) (03/18/91)
From: adrian@cs.heriot-watt.ac.uk (Adrian Hurt) In article <1991Mar14.040036.27807@cbnews.att.com> maarrrk@gauss.ucsb.edu (Mark Erickson) writes: > > Equipment is only as good as the people who use it, and the > Iraqis did not appear to have their act together at all. Perhaps, but superior equipment does give advantages. Otherwise, why not save millions of pounds (or dollars, for you ex-colonials :-) and buy Spitfires instead of Tornados (or B-17's instead of B-1's)? Returning to the specific question: if the U.S. had not had its smart weapons, Baghdad would look different today. Either it wouldn't have been attacked at all, or it would have been flattened. You don't go for specific buildings if your only surface-to-surface missile is a Scud. The results of tank battles would be different, given the relative armour thickness and weapon capability of the M-1 and T-72. Allied T-72's might have done more to Iraqi M-1's than Iraqi T-72's did to U.S. M-1's, though. The air war would probably still have been won by the Allies, since we would have made some use of the MiG-29's. Incidentally, that comment about buying Spitfires instead of Tornados does make me wonder - would an old Mosquito do well as a cheap stealth fighter? It's mostly wooden, so it doesn't reflect much radar. The few metallic areas could be covered with RAM, as they are on the F-117. And as it has old piston engines, the Mosquito doesn't show up so well to anything looking for IR. "Keyboard? How quaint!" - M. Scott Adrian Hurt | JANET: adrian@uk.ac.hw.cs UUCP: ..!ukc!cs.hw.ac.uk!adrian | ARPA: adrian@cs.hw.ac.uk
stevenp@decwrl.pa.dec.com (Steven Philipson) (03/19/91)
From: stevenp@decwrl.pa.dec.com (Steven Philipson) In article <1991Mar14.040036.27807@cbnews.att.com>, maarrrk@gauss.ucsb.edu (Mark Erickson) writes; > The Israelis had Patriot missiles, but > did not have the training necessary to defend their country > without U.S. crews. This is not at all clear. The January 28 issue of Aviation Week reported extensively on the Patriot. It noted that the Israelis had a combination of the original "PAC-1" and later "PAC-2" Patriot missiles. The latter had a larger warhead and improved fuse, which were both modifications for improved effectiveness against ballistic missiles. Israeli use of PAC-1 versions would imply lower effectiveness than units employing PAC-2 Patriots. Steve (the certified flying fanatic) stevenp@decwrl.dec.com
nolan@TWG.COM (03/28/91)
From: nolan@TWG.COM This week (26 March) PBS broadcast a NOVA program titled something like "Top Gun and Beyond", an examination of the high-technology weapons systems of the U. S. and how effective they were. In particular the program examined the human factor in these systems. One point that the program raised was that the crusty-old-fart Top Gun instructors in their obsolete equipment could outfly the trainees in their F-14s. Chuck Yeager, in his introductory cassette to his AFT2 flight simulator, says something similar. He'd rather fly against an inexperienced pilot in high-performance aircraft - the grizzled veteran in a baling-wire-and-bamboo contraption is the more formidable opponent. -- Nolan Hinshaw Internet: nolan@twg.com The Wollongong Group Dingalingnet: (415)962-7197 Piobairi Uillean, San Francisco