JEWELLLW@VM.CC.PURDUE.EDU (Larry W. Jewell) (03/25/91)
From: "Larry W. Jewell" <JEWELLLW@VM.CC.PURDUE.EDU> >In article <1991Mar22.045134.24861@cbnews.att.com> (Craig E. Ward) writes >>The German battleships Gneisenau and Scharnhorst... >I've noticed this a couple of times. Everything I've read previous to your >postings has classed these ships as "cruisers" or "battlecruisers." [ 9 redundant quoted lines deleted - PLEASE watch your quoting, folks! -- CDR] "Jane's Fighting Ships of World War II" lists Scharnhorst and Gneisenau as German Battleships with the following: Armour: (unofficial) 12"-13" Belt amidships, 3"-4" ends, 12" Turrets. 6" Decks I wouldn't want to encounter plunging fire from either the "K.G. V" class or the "Iowa"s with that thin skin, but I seem to remember that they followed the philosophy of "fight or flee" command decisions; namely if you can't lick, run like hell. An estimated 29 speed would allow them to run from the K.G. V's (designed for 27 knots), the "Nelson" class (23 knots), and the "North Carolina"s ("over 27 knots"). When you compare them to the ships they COULDN'T out run you get a clear picture of when they were designed. The "Richelieu" class was designed for 30 knots (and reached 32 in trials). The "Iowas" were designed for 33 knots (acheived 35, [probably when they were looking for carriers off Leyte?]). Once again, the battlecruiser is outmoded before it is really ready for service. The United States tried to correct this with the "Alaska"s (rated at 33 knots) but that speed was obtained by having TWO INCH !! (sorry but, Lordy, what some people will do in wartime) deck armour! BTW: Jane's doesn't list ANY German ships as battlescruisers, do any of the later versions make this destinction? -- Larry W. Jewell direct replies to JEWELLLW@VM.CC.PURDUE.EDU "...before these weapons of the gods you must have seen how the proudest palaces and the loftiest trees fall and perish." HERODOTUS: Polymnia, Book 7, Chapter 10 (no, I didn't read it.)
wbt@cbema.att.com (William B Thacker) (03/25/91)
From: wbt@cbema.att.com (William B Thacker) I generally discourage followups on 50YA to sci.military, but this is a technological question, so I guess it fits. In article <1991Mar23.061805.5362@amd.com> cew@ISI.EDU (Craig E. Ward) writes: >In article <1991Mar22.045134.24861@cbnews.att.com> you write: >>The German battleships Gneisenau and Scharnhorst... > ^^^^^^^^^^^ >I've noticed this a couple of times. Everything I've read previous to your >postings has classed these ships as "cruisers" or "battlecruisers." A few people have enquired as to my referring the the German ships Scharnhorst and Gneisenau as battleships, rather than battlecruisers. There are certainly many references using the latter term for them, but others, which I consider more authoritative, term them battleships. From what I gather, "the battleship" camp seems to predominate, especially in recent publications. Battlecruisers were conceived just prior to WWI by Lord Fisher of the British Admiralty. He envisioned a ship armed as a battleship, but faster (near 30 knots, at a time when BB's made only 18-21 knots), so as to be able to outrun enemy BB's and catch and destroy the enemy cruiser (scout) force. The extra speed meant sacrificing the weight of armor, so battlecruisers were fragile. This pattern was followed by Britain and the US (and Japan, in the Kongo class), but not by Germany, which chose instead to accept a somewhat smaller caliber of gun to maintain better protection, but armor was still much weaker than that of contemporary German BB's. WWI showed that the German scheme worked better; several British battlecruisers exploded after being hit. Britain abandoned battlecruisers after HMS Hood, and the US cancelled plans for the Lexington class (though this was also helped by the Washington Treaty). Which brings us to Scharnhorst and Gneisenau. At 31 kts, they, too, were faster than contemporary battleships. Their armament was light, but this owes much to political requirements (Hitler wished to avoid angering Britain by mounting 15" guns, and 11" guns from the panzerschiffe construction were available without delay) as to limited displacement available). While the ships were weak on deck armor, they were not excessively so; and their vertical protection (side armor, turrets, barbettes, etc) were in the same class as any battleship of the period, including the Bismarcks. Hence, I don't feel these ships should be considered battlecruisers; instead, they should be seen as an attempt at a capital ship by a nation under strong political pressure to avoid entering a naval arms race. Germany never officially termed them anything but battleships; likewise, the French classed their Dunkerque class (which similarly adopted smaller-caliber guns for speed) as "batiments de ligne", i.e. battleships. On this basis alone, I side with the camp which continues use this term. - - - - - - - - valuable coupon - - - - - - - clip and save - - - - - - - - Bill Thacker AT&T Network Systems - Columbus wbt@cbnews.att.com "C" combines the power of assembly language with the flexibility of assembly language.
henry@zoo.toronto.edu (Henry Spencer) (03/26/91)
From: henry@zoo.toronto.edu (Henry Spencer) >From: wbt@cbema.att.com (William B Thacker) > WWI showed that the German scheme worked better; several British >battlecruisers exploded after being hit... However, the statistical sample here is very small, and it is difficult to decide how much of this was the result of battlecruisers being used improperly, notably Beatty at Jutland leading his battlecruiser force into a pitched battle with comparable or superior vessels (something they were definitely not designed for). When used for their intended purposes -- scouting, and beating up on cruisers and such -- they were fairly successful, as in the Battle of the Falklands. The crucial rule was to remain out of range of heavy guns. One can argue, mind you, that battlecruisers were still basically an aberration: once the opposition too started using battlecruisers rather than cruisers for scouting, it became very difficult to do the assigned missions without risking heavy-gun engagements. -- "[Some people] positively *wish* to | Henry Spencer @ U of Toronto Zoology believe ill of the modern world."-R.Peto| henry@zoo.toronto.edu utzoo!henry
thornley@uunet.UU.NET (David H. Thornley) (03/27/91)
From: plains!umn-cs!LOCAL!thornley@uunet.UU.NET (David H. Thornley) In article <1991Mar25.064930.29465@amd.com> JEWELLLW@VM.CC.PURDUE.EDU (Larry W. Jewell) writes: > Once again, the battlecruiser is outmoded before it is really ready >for service. The United States tried to correct this with the "Alaska"s >(rated at 33 knots) but that speed was obtained by having TWO INCH !! >(sorry but, Lordy, what some people will do in wartime) deck armour! The Alaska class was not intended as a battle unit, but rather as a cruiser killer and super cruiser (i.e., a ship that can easily defend shipping against enemy cruisers by eliminating them, and one that can raid enemy shipping regardless of enemy cruiser defense). Remember that, when designed, it was not at all obvious that aircraft would take these traditional cruiser roles. When the ships were finally completed, they therefore had no real function. The deck armor was more like 3-3.7" armored deck, with a 1.5" upper deck. This was not designed to face battleship fire, or its own fire for that matter; the ship was designed to face enemy heavy cruisers, and that's what the deck armor was for. The Alaska class was not comparable in intention to the Scharnhorst class, but rather to the "pocket battleships" (which the Germans simply called "armored ships"). Consider the Alaska as the Graf Spee done right, and think what it would have done off Montevideo! DHT
silber@m.cs.uiuc.edu (Ami A. Silberman) (03/27/91)
From: silber@m.cs.uiuc.edu (Ami A. Silberman) [I had to trim the quote on this one too! :-( --CDR] henry@zoo.toronto.edu (Henry Spencer) writes: >However, the statistical sample here is very small, and it is difficult >to decide how much of this was the result of battlecruisers being used >improperly, notably Beatty at Jutland leading his battlecruiser force >into a pitched battle with comparable or superior vessels A major factor in the loss of the British BCs at Jutland was there extremely poor protection against magazine fire. The doors to the magazines were left open during firing, thus an explosion in either the turret of barbette could travel down the ammunition hoist and cause the magazine to detonate. (I think that the German powder either was less prone to being set off by accident, or they stored it better.) The Germans kept the doors closed, having learned their lesson when they nearly lost a BC at dogger bank to a magazine explosion. I think that they could also flood the magazines in less time than the British. Note that the British almost lost another of Beatties ships, it was saved only by flooding the magazine in the nick of time. I'm not sure where Invincible was hit, but both of Beatties ships were sunk due to turret/barbette hits. Note that the Germans did suffer severe damage as well, Vann der Tann lost all of her guns (mostly due to non-penetrating hits), Seydlitz took on so much water that she ran agground in her home port, and Lutzow had to be scuttled after the battle. ami silberman - janitor of lunacy
Andrew.Stevens@prg.oxford.ac.uk (Andrew Stevens) (03/28/91)
From: Andrew Stevens <Andrew.Stevens@prg.oxford.ac.uk> plains!umn-cs!LOCAL!thornley@uunet.UU.NET (David H. Thornley) writes: >The Alaska class was not comparable in intention to the Scharnhorst >class, but rather to the "pocket battleships" (which the Germans >simply called "armored ships"). Consider the Alaska as the Graf >Spee done right, and think what it would have done off Montevideo! I would have to disagree with this on two points. Firstly, it is not at all clear that the Graf Spee performed badly at the river Plate. Fighting performance was seriously hampered by the lousy Germand shells of the time, and speed was badly impaired by a fouled bottom. Even then, the decisive factor in the Captain's decision to scuttle was mis-information from British intelligence that persuaded him the original force of three light cruisers had been reinforced by the heavy cruiser ``Cumberland''. Secondly, all the stuff I've read about Scharnhorst and Gneisenau suggests that the original design intent was precisely PanzerSchiffe ``done right''. I.e. designed without even the pretence of remaining within the 10,000 ton displacement ceiling imposed by treaty. The ships were however (even in Germany) considered something of a mis-design. Their size meant meant that it was not possible to use the Diesel power-plant that gave the Panzerschiffe the endurance necessary for the commerce-raider role. Simultaneously, their effectiveness as battleships was very limited due to the non-availability (at design time) of any main battery heavier than that used in the Panzershiff design. Indeed, it is interesting to note that WW.II German heavy warships were in general rather poorly designed in comparison with British or American ships of similar vintage. As well as lacking a really large calibre gun (until the end of the 30's) German designs lacked a lot of refinements introduced in the inter-war years: o Multi-purpose secondary batteries obviating the need for a separate battery of heavy A.A. armament. o Selective ``all or nothing'' armouring The Bismarck was thus barely (if at all) more capable than the (significantly smaller) British King George V class, and U.S. ships like the Alabama. The (abandoned) ``Graf Zeppelin'' aircraft carrier designs were, by all accounts, a complete disaster. -- Andrew Stevens Programmming Research Group JANET: Andrew.Stevens@uk.ac.oxford.prg
R2RS1%AKRONVM@vm1.cc.UAKRON.EDU (03/29/91)
From: R2RS1%AKRONVM@vm1.cc.UAKRON.EDU The flight of the Scarnhorst and Gneisenau from Brest up the English channel is beautifully described in a book called " Fiasco ". I forget the author but a title trace on any library's computer must get you to the book. Further I would like to add that when these two ships were built the German navy never had any ambitions of challenging the Royal Navy or launching a naval attack on Britain. In keeping with the tradition of the Graf Spee I think these ships were designed mainly for commerce raiding and swift hit and run attacks against convoys and light naval forces. In " The rise and fall of the third reich " W Shirer describes how the German navy embarked on a 10 year grand plan to build up a strong navy. This would have been accomplished by 1945. Admiral Raeder met Hitler before the invasion of Poland and explained the need to delay WWII till the German Navy was strong enough. But the landlocked mind of Hitler would'nt agree and the invasion of Britain " Operation SeaLion " as given up even before it started, as the Navy could'nt guarantee protection of the invasion force against the Royal Navy or even enough logistics to convey the assault force. -- R SUKUMAR R2RS1@VM1.CC.UAKRON.EDU THE UNIVERSITY OF AKRON DEPT OF MECHANICAL ENGINEERING