jem3@pyuxf.bellcore.com (John E McKillop) (03/29/91)
From: jem3@pyuxf.bellcore.com (John E McKillop) The following is from an article in the March 24th edition of the New York Times. Cooperation between U.S. forces and their Allies (???) in the Gulf dissolved at key points only to be quickly and quietly patched up by high-level compromises, battleground improvisation and a bit of good fortune. Examples abound: - Britain insisted on breaking away its armored forces from the U.S. Marines to join U.S. Army troops on the Saudi border for the main flanking attack. Exasperated American field commanders had to redraw battle plans to accommodate the change. -France refused early in the crisis to give its coalition partners information about the frequency and technical capabilities of radar- jamming pods on French-made Iraqi Mirage jets. U.S. Air Force planners dropped the issue to avoid a messy political confrontation. -As the ground offensive drew near, Syria expressed ambivalence about joining the armored thrust into Kuwait. Trying to cope with this, and anticipating problems resupplying Syria's Soviet-made equipment, U.S. planners accorded the forces a backup role. -Saudi Arabia initially refused to allow U.S. officials to interview captured Iraqi prisoners-of-war because Riyadh considered them "guests" and "fellow Arab brothers." -Egyptian, Saudi and Kuwaiti forces west of the U.S. Marines along the Saudi border with Kuwait were slow to adjust to an accelerated ground offensive after leading Marine units advanced faster than expected through Iraqi fortifications. This left the Marines with an exposed left flank. -Britain had five minesweepers clearing lanes off Kuwait, but London threatened to pull out the vulnerable wooden-hulled vessels unless the U.S. guaranteed more protection. American radar-jamming planes and U.S. Navy attack jets were diverted from other missions to cover the lightly- armed U.S. and British minesweepers. -The navies of some countries wanted to operate in the Persian Gulf; others only in the Red Sea. Some governments allowed their ships to fire warning shots; others did not. Some countries permitted their crews to board suspicious vessels; others did not. -The initial role for Syrian forces was to guard the U.S. Marines' rear flank in Saudi Arabia during the opening stages of the ground war. Only days before the war did the Syrians indicate a willingness to enter Kuwaiti territory. -The Egyptians, trained in rigid Soviet-style tactics, were slow to respond to an accelerated attack timetable on the first day of the ground war. General Schwarzkopf must have had a wonderful time. The following indicates the forces or medical teams sent to the Gulf region by the time the ground war started. Afghanistan: 300 ground troops Argentina: One frigate and one corvette Australia: One guided-missile destroyer, one frigate and a support ship Bangladesh: 2,000 ground trops Belgium: Two minehunters and a support ship Britain: 43,000 troops plus Army, Navy and Air Force units Canada: Three ships and 24 F/A-18s Czechoslovakia: 200 anti-chemical warfare specialists Denmark: One corvette Eqypt: 40,000 ground troops France: 16,000 troops plus Air Force and Navy units Greece: One frigate Gulf countries (Bahrain, Oman, Qatar & United Arab Emirates): 10,000 troops; ships and planes Hungary: Medical personnel Italy: Ships and planes Kuwait: 7,000 troops plus A-4 aircraft Morocco: 1,300 ground troops Netherlands: Two frigates and a supply ship New Zealand: Planes Niger: 500 ground troops Norway: One coast guard ship Pakistan: 11,000 ground troops Philippines: Medical personnel Poland: Two rescue ships Romania: Medical team and anti-chemical warfare specialists Saudi Arabia: 118,000 troops; planes Spain: One frigate and two corvettes Senegal: 500 ground troops Sierra Leone: 30 Medical personnel Singapore: Medical team South Korea: Planes Sweden: Field hospital and medical personnel Syria: 15,000 ground troops United States: MOre than 540,000 troops; Army Marines, Navy and Air Force Where were the Germans and Japanese???????? [Sitting at home the way the constitutions we wrote for them following WW II forced them to. Let me caution everyone that sci.military covers ONLY the technical aspects of warfare; I'm letting this through as representative of command & control difficulties in alliances, but if you must followup keep it technical! Political discussions shoudl go into alt.desert-storm. -- CDR]
pjj@cs.man.ac.uk (Pete Jinks) (04/05/91)
From: Pete Jinks <pjj@cs.man.ac.uk> >From: jem3@pyuxf.bellcore.com (John E McKillop) >- Britain insisted on breaking away its armored forces from the U.S. >Marines to join U.S. Army troops on the Saudi border for the main >flanking attack. I assumed that the major allied dispositions were sensible, i.e. roughly: light, fast troops (french, airmobile etc.) as flankguard heavy troops (US & UK armour etc.) in the flanking attack lighter, slower troops (arab etc.) diversionary move into Kuwait (I realise this was also political) marines keeping contact with the coast Given allied military intelligence, was there genuine danger of the marines coming under heavy armoured attack? Would they have had difficulty coping e.g. did they get seriously bogged down at Kuwait airport? How important was this compared to ensuring the success of the flank attack? Did UK armour cause other problems (eg. mixed supply, identification) that would have been lessened if they had stuck with the marines? >-Britain had five minesweepers clearing lanes off Kuwait, but London >threatened to pull out the vulnerable wooden-hulled vessels unless the >U.S. guaranteed more protection. American radar-jamming planes and U.S. >Navy attack jets were diverted from other missions to cover the lightly- >armed U.S. and British minesweepers. This seems like a good idea, unless taken to excess - the minesweepers were both important (didn't US ships hit mines?) & vulnerable. You also mention US minesweepers - did they refuse extra cover as being unnecessary? Does anyone have any more details on these reports ?