sb28+@andrew.cmu.edu (Stephen Spencer Black) (04/11/91)
From: Stephen Spencer Black <sb28+@andrew.cmu.edu> A great deal of speculation surrounds the failure of the Iraqi military to use chemical weapons(CW) agents during the Gulf War. The following is a discussion of the commonly suggested reasons for this failure. I would enjoy comments, ideas, or questions on chemical weapons in general or specifically on the Chemical Weapons Convention. While the use of CW agents against protected troops has significantly lower effectiveness than its use against civilians, it is irrational to believe that Iraq didn't use their CW capability because it wasn't the most efficient weapon systems available. CW loaded SCUD, al Hussain, and al Abbas missiles were never used because the Iraqis were unable to develop a viable proximity fuze. In order to effectively disperse the small payload of a CW warhead the bursting charge must be triggered at some optimal altitude above the target area. Factors such as wind speed and agent type must be considered. Because of the destruction of their CW production facilities Iraq was unable to replace CW weapon systems which had degraded since Jan 16. All Iraqi nerve agents are produced through the reaction of an organophosphorus compound and some acid (in their case Hydrocyanic acid or Hydrofluoric acid) If the final product of their manufacturing facilities was impure, containing either HCN, HF or some other active compound, it would speed the degradation of the CW agent. Iraq's nerve agents both break down in the reverse of their manufacturing process. All this chemistry results in a metallic container (shell, spray tank, warhead, or mine) which contains a highly corrosive liquid. Most materials which would normally be used to contain these compounds are unsuited for military use, ie glass and plastic. The metallic material are at best difficult to come by, ie Hastaloy B or C and other high nickle alloys. This adds up to a stockpile of armaments which not only have a reduced lethality, but are also dangerous for the delivery system crews. Control of CW usage was centralized. Once the air campaign began its near total suppression of C3I systems would have prevented release orders from reaching the front, or any where for that matter. Other reasons include: the destruction of delivery systems, fear of nuclear retaliation, and failure to move CW weapons into the Kuwait theater of operations. Refs: Wash. Post 7/3/91, Armed Forces Journal International 3/91, and Black, S., B. Morel, P. Zapf "Technical Aspects of Verification of the Chemical Weapons Convention" (Carnegie Mellon University, 1991) [ Please keep followups confined to the technical charter of the group, ideally with references. General discussion, opinions, and speculation should be directed to alt.desert-storm. --CDR] -- Stephen Black (412) 268-3006 Program on International Peace and Security c/o Chemical Weapons Arms Control Verification Project Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh, PA 15213