BXR307@CSC.ANU.EDU.AU (04/03/91)
From: BXR307@CSC.ANU.EDU.AU Not that it is all over bar the shouting in the Gulf, I was wondering if anybody else out there on the net, like me, had wondered about the surprising low casualties which had been suffered by the Coalition airforces during Operation Desert Storm? Last week I attended an a conference given here in Canberra at the Australian Defence Force Academy by the RAAF. The title of the conference was, "Conventional Airpower into the 21st Century: Smaller but Larger". At this conference a paper which piqued my curioristy was given by a Dr. John McCarthy on "Air Power as History". Why it piqued my curiousity was because of the statistics he produced for loss rates in past conflicts. Here is the part of the paper which was most interesting (reproduced with his permission): "...For operational aircrew, life has generally been hazardous and expectancy short. With the opening of the Battle of the Somme in July 1916, the RFC employed its aircraft at very low altitude to deliver attacks with machine guns and light bombs. Even without a major battle, RFC carried out two or three patrols a day. The introduction of the Albatros types in the spring of 1917 saw a British loss rate of some 30%. By the end of the war, Germany had lost 5,853 pilots killed, 7,302 wounded and 2,751 either taken prisoner or listed as missing. British figures were a little higher with 6,166 killed, 7,425 wounded and 3,212 take prisoner or listed as missing. If air to air fighting was relatively limited in the second war, and reasonably safe, ground attack sorties remained most dangerous. In 1943, it was expected that only 7% of aircrews flying strike sorties in Beaufighters would complete their operational tour. The high casualty rates of Bomber Command cannot be disguised. Of the 74,797 deaths caused by injury among members of the Royal Air Force to May 1945, just over 66% came from that one operational command. The chance of an individual surviving the two tour requirement while serving in it was one in fourteen. Examples of more recent air warfare might suggest that prospects of survival have not improved. India claimed to have destroyed 94 Pakistani aircraft in the seventeen day war in 1971. Sources conflict, but Israel claimed to have destroyed 442 aircraft and to have lost "several hundred" to Arab opposition in the nineteen day Yom Kippur war. During the "Rolling Thunder" air campiagn in Vietnam in 1972, the United States lost more than 900 aircraft to North Vietnam defences. The Falklands fighting resulted in an Argentinian attrition rate of between 15 and 22% of sorties flown. At the time of writing [14 March 1991] the Coalition forces in the Gulf had flown some 65,000+ sorties, for the loss of only 18 aircraft. This is a loss rate of only .02769%." And this is what piqued my curiorisity. Even in peacetime exercises of the intensity of Operation Desert Storm, loss rates would be much higher (I am not sure, exactly how much, but my memory seems to remember attrition rates of at least 1-2%) if nothing more due to accidents. As strikes flown during Desert Storm were against heavily defended targets, and I would presume integrated defense systems making extensive use of Flak and SAM's, why weren't the losses higher? I think it is obvious that the whole truth of the number of actual losses of aircraft during Desert Storm is yet to come out. What do others on the net think? [I doubt the air defenses were very integrated after the first night, and my understanding is that only F-117s went into Baghdad. Remember everyone, sci.military's charter is purely technical, so replies (preferably with references) detailing reasons why the loss per sortie was so low are welcome, opinions, discussions and flames regarding "whole truth of the number of actual losses" should go to alt.desert-storm. --CDR] Brian Ross
scott@sandstorm.Berkeley.EDU (Scott Silvey) (04/03/91)
>[I doubt the air defenses were very integrated after the first > night, and my understanding is that only F-117s went into > Baghdad. --CDR] Actually, I believe I recall more than one pilot being interviewd on TV who said they had flown over Baghdad (they weren't F117 pilots). I believe one was a Strike Eagle pilot who was on the first raid. Although I'm not positive about this, I'm pretty sure. He was describing the "Fourth of July" analogy and explaining how he had to force himself to concentrate on his mission because the AA fire was such an awesome sight. In any case, I would like to hear a confirmation either way on this question... [Me too. I believe that was Lt. Col Don Kline, who said "It was an awesome display, it truly was." I don't recall whether he overflew Baghdad or saw it from afar. --CDR] On Iraqi air defenses ... There are many factors contributing to the ineffectiveness of the Iraqi air defenses. First, most of the Iraqi fixed EWR (early warning radar) sites were knocked out after the first few raids. This allowed subsequent strikes to be short- notice suprises for the Iraqis during the rest of the war. Also, most of the Iraqi SAMs were old, outdated low-performance systems which were somewhat vulnerable to countermeasures. Although the Iraqi's had vast quantities of AAA, these were not often a factor since most allied raids were conducted above their effective altitude. When coaltion aircraft did fly into the AAA threat envelopes, the defending guns weren't often able to significantly damage the attackers, even though they managed to score some hits. Also, many of the raids were conducted at night-time when most of the AAA was virtually useless. Radar AAA is also subject to both active and passive electronic countermeasures as employed by ALQ pods, the EA-6 Prowler, and the EF-111 Raven. Also, much use was made of iron-hand support in which dedicated aircraft specifically engage and suppress local air defenses while other attack craft go after the real targets. Such missions often employ anti-radiation missiles like HARM which are very effective at attacking radar-emitting defense systems. And, of course, everyone knows the Iraqis chose not to use their air force, leaving the coalition with free roam of the skies. Scott
ab3o+@andrew.cmu.edu (Allan Bourdius) (04/03/91)
From: Allan Bourdius <ab3o+@andrew.cmu.edu> My guess as to why air losses were so low is as follows: 1) The Iraqis really didn't think we'd attack. 2) Several of their early warning radars and SAM sites were taken out by Tomahawks before any aircraft crossed the border. 3) None of the Iraqi's Surface to Air weaponry is the most up to date, i.e. we had the best information available on how to jam and/or trick the missile system. 4) The Iraqi air defense system was never designed to handle so many aircraft at one time. The largest air raid launched by Iran during that war had about 20 planes in it. We sent over 1000 in the first attacks. 5) The Iraqis were so stunned by the quick destruction of most of their air defense systems that those that remained operational had operators that feared turning on their radars because then they'd be attacked. and 6) The Iraqi air force was totally ineffective, meaning that we faced zero air to air threats. -- Allan Bourdius [MIDN 3/C (Marine Option)/Brother, Phi Kappa Theta Fraternity] ab3o+@andrew.cmu.edu or Box 4719, 5125 Margaret Morrison St., Pgh., PA 15213 Anything controversial in this post/mail are my own opinions, got it?!
smpod@venus.lerc.nasa.gov (04/04/91)
From: smpod@venus.lerc.nasa.gov In BXR307@CSC.ANU.EDU.AU writes... >[According to a paper given] by a Dr. John McCarthy on "Air Power as History". >... During the "Rolling Thunder" air >campiagn in Vietnam in 1972, the United States lost more than 900 aircraft >to North Vietnam defences. I find this loss hard to believe since Rolling Thunder was a campaign over North Vietnam that lasted only a few weeks. Most U.S. air losses were rotary- wing losses over South Vietnam. Are there any references that would confirm the 900 losses?
jokim@jarthur.Claremont.edu (John H. Kim) (04/04/91)
From: "John H. Kim" <jokim@jarthur.Claremont.edu> In article <1991Apr4.042539.12947@amd.com> ab3o+@andrew.cmu.edu (Allan Bourdius) writes: >5) The Iraqis were so stunned by the quick destruction of most of their >air defense systems that those that remained operational had operators >that feared turning on their radars because then they'd be attacked. I distinctly recall one reporter saying that the increased allied artillery fire just prior to the ground war had an extra bonus: Some of the Iraqi soldiers manning the air defenses mistook the artillery as the beginning of the ground war and turned on their radars to pick up the expected ground support aircraft. This was quickly followed by coalition bombs and HARMs. As for the accuracy of the Pentagon aircraft loss figures, I did a statistical analysis based on the POWs the Iraqis showed on TV. I've since deleted that analysis but here's the premise and result of it: Since the Pentagon released MIA names before the Iraqis showed the POWs on TV, any MIAs the Pentagon was keeping secret had a chance of showing up as a POW. All the POWs were on the MIA list, so I calculated the probability of this occurring if there actually were "secret" MIAs. The chances that the Pentagon was revealing only half the planes they lost was less than 1%. The chances that the Pentagon was revealing only 2 of every 3 planes lost was less than 5%. The two objections were: The Iraqis could be hiding such "secret" MIAs, which I dismissed because I couldn't think of any reason why they would want to do this. And the Pentagon could be withholding the names of any airmen whose planes went up in balls of fire and were definitely KIA. I recalled hearing somewhere that most pilots are able to bail out when their planes were hit, but I posted the question in sci.military. I never got a straight answer. -- John H. Kim | (This space to be filled when I jokim@jarthur.claremont.edu | think of something very clever uunet!jarthur!jokim | to use as a disclaimer)
shirriff@sprite.Berkeley.EDU (Ken Shirriff) (04/05/91)
From: shirriff@sprite.Berkeley.EDU (Ken Shirriff) A main reason for low Allied air losses is that the Iraqi air defenses were very poor, as was shown in the Iran-Iraq war. A few quotes from "The Gulf and the Search for Strategic Stability" (A. Cordesman, 1984) make this clear: "Neither side [Iran, Iraq] has shown much proficiency in sophisticated air defense. The Iranians discovered early in the war that small, low-flying F-4 formations could strike virtually at will anywhere in Iraq. It is clear that Iran was able to fly under [Iraqi defenses] and outmaneuver them without extensive use of sophisticated electronic countermeasures. "There is no doubt that the Iraqis -- all public claims to the contrary -- are deeply unhappy about the quality of the air defense radars and C3I systems they bought from the USSR. "It would seem that Iraq has bought the SA-2, SA-3, and SA-6 without getting the technical help, C3I links, sensors, and siting assistance to really make them effective. "The Iraqis have been forced to rely on earth mounds, other passive defenses such as barrage balloons, and AA guns to protect their cities, oil facilities, industries, and other rear installations. Ken Shirriff shirriff@sprite.Berkeley.EDU
scott@xcf.Berkeley.EDU (Scott Silvey) (04/06/91)
From: scott@xcf.Berkeley.EDU (Scott Silvey) shirriff@sprite.Berkeley.EDU (Ken Shirriff) writes: > "It would seem that Iraq has bought the SA-2, SA-3, and SA-6 without > getting the technical help, C3I links, sensors, and siting assistance to > really make them effective. I don't think the Iraqi's had many SA-6's. Those are pretty dangerous systems (though not very maneuverable, they are fast, long range, have a large warhead, and I believe they have optical or laser backup). However, if the Iraqis did have any, they probably didn't last very long after the first use... -- Scott Silvey scott@xcf.berkeley.edu
leem@jpl-devvax.Jpl.Nasa.Gov (Lee Mellinger) (04/11/91)
From: leem@jpl-devvax.Jpl.Nasa.Gov (Lee Mellinger)
In article <1991Apr4.042518.12876@amd.com> scott@sandstorm.Berkeley.EDU (Scott Silvey) writes:
:>[I doubt the air defenses were very integrated after the first
:> night, and my understanding is that only F-117s went into
:> Baghdad. --CDR]
:
:Actually, I believe I recall more than one pilot being interviewd on TV who
: said they had flown over Baghdad (they weren't F117 pilots). I believe one
: was a Strike Eagle pilot who was on the first raid.
:In any case, I would like to hear a confirmation either way on this question...
:Scott
A recent issue of AvLeak, last week I believe, had a statement by what
I remember was an Air Force official who said that ONLY F-117A's were
allowed to attack targets inside the city limits of Bahgdad. He also
related a story about an F-117A having an Iraqi Mirage F-1 on his 6
o'clock. He altered his course a few degrees and the Mirage kept to
the original heading, apparently never seeing him or picking him up on
radar.
--
Lee F. Mellinger Caltech/Jet Propulsion Laboratory - NASA
4800 Oak Grove Drive, Pasadena, CA 91109 818/393-5980 FTS 977-5980
leem@jpl-devvax.JPL.NASA.GOVCharles.K.Scott@dartvax.dartmouth.edu (Charles K. Scott) (04/13/91)
From: Charles.K.Scott@dartvax.dartmouth.edu (Charles K. Scott) In article <1991Apr4.042557.13016@amd.com> smpod@venus.lerc.nasa.gov writes: > I find this loss hard to believe since Rolling Thunder was a campaign over > North Vietnam that lasted only a few weeks. Most U.S. air losses were rotary- > wing losses over South Vietnam. Are there any references that would confirm > the 900 losses? I just looked up the official beginning and ending dates of "Rolling Thunder" in an Air Force history book. They quote the beginning date as March 65, and the ending date as November 68. That's two years and eight months. The 900 losses figure I've seen often, but it's usually referred to as the figure for total losses during the entire war. Scary enough though. Corky Scott