[sci.military] How effective was the Stealth fighter?

prentice%triton.unm.edu@ariel.unm.edu (John Prentice) (04/06/91)

From: prentice%triton.unm.edu@ariel.unm.edu (John Prentice)


Much is being made of the effectiveness of the Stealth fighters,
based as far as I can tell mostly on the fact that we didn't lose any
and that they accomplished their missions.  But the same thing was
true of every other type of aircraft in the war.  I would therefore
question whether this war has provided us with any really valid
measure of the effectiveness of this technology, given that Iraqi
air defenses proved so ineffectual against everything.  I would comment 
that there is no denying that while the Stealth fighters flew a small 
percentage of the sorties, they accounted for a disproportionate amount 
of the destruction.  However, I would suggest that these statistics
alone don't tell you anything.  It may simply be because they were the 
first in and they had the best weapons.  The point is that I don't see 
a clear argument, given the anemic Iraqi defenses, for suggesting that 
the Stealth fighters performed a mission that ordinary aircraft were 
incapable of.  That is not to say Stealth didn't work, just
that this wasn't much of a test and therefore can't be used as a
persuasive demonstration of the effectiveness of the technology.  Are
there other measures that can be applied to argue that the Stealth
aircraft were better than non-Stealth aircraft in this conflict?

I haven't been following the various Stealth discussions, so I apologize
if this is hashing old ground.  In that case, just ignore it.

-- 
John K. Prentice    john@unmfys.unm.edu (Internet)
Dept. of Physics and Astronomy, University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, NM, USA
Computational Physics Group, Amparo Corporation, Albuquerque, NM, USA

wb9omc@ecn.purdue.edu (Duane P Mantick) (04/10/91)

From: wb9omc@ecn.purdue.edu (Duane P Mantick)


prentice%triton.unm.edu@ariel.unm.edu (John Prentice) writes:
>Much is being made of the effectiveness of the Stealth fighters,
>based as far as I can tell mostly on the fact that we didn't lose any
>and that they accomplished their missions.  But the same thing was
>true of every other type of aircraft in the war.  I would therefore

	I might take some exception to that statement in the sense
that as far as the other aircraft go, we DID lose some.

[a lot about why our weapons were better and were in first AND how poor
the Iraqi air defenses were deleted at the request of moderator]

	I might say that in light of your comment that our weapons
were better, perhaps then the Stealth fighter-bomber helped achieve
an important goal - air superiority.

	It is admittedly hard to compare the F117a to the F15(any variant),
if for no other reason than they are not designed the same, are not to
be used for quite the same mission.

(and in fact, comparisons to other aircraft as well....)

	The stated mission of the F117a is to strike strategically
significant targets while evading enemy radar, and to do so at night.
Since this mission was accomplished, according to the USAF, one could
assume that the aircraft as a system does work.

	Now, as far as the question "could the F15 Strike Eagle (as
an example) have done the same thing?" goes, I'd bet that an F15 looks
pretty much like a nice big tasty target to enemy radars.  That includes
missile lock ons from enemy aircraft - which in this case proved to be
pretty much a non-problem.  The F15 has as its defense - speed.  Speed
that the F117a does NOT have.  However, it is much more difficult to
launch precision guided munitions at Mach 1.8 or whatever the F15
can run at than it is from a subsonic platform, especially at ground targets.

	A more interesting comparison might be to the A10 Thunderbolt II.
Also a subsonic platform.  Decidedly NOT stealth.  :-)  What is the
difference?  Mission, for one thing.  The A10 is a tank killer first
and an armored emplacement killer second.  It's entire design was to
allow it to get hit and keep going - at the very LEAST, to return the
pilot if not to continue fighting.  I dare say that the F117a can
not take the abuse that an A10 can, if you plan to keep it in the air.
The A10 can use laser/TV guided missiles (Pave Penney system????) and
so probably can do some of the things the F117a can do.  I DON'T recall
the FLIR and DLIR ever being installed on an A10 - which means for the
A10 to do its work at night might well be about impossible.

	To sum up, we have aircraft that can cover what the F117a does,
but not stealthily and probably not as well at night.  Why night?
What could be more demoralizing, surprising and frightening than
bombs falling that you can't see from an aircraft that you can't see or
target?

Duane

prentice%triton.unm.edu@ariel.unm.edu (John Prentice) (04/11/91)

From: prentice%triton.unm.edu@ariel.unm.edu (John Prentice)


In article <1991Apr11.033856.5300@amd.com> wb9omc@ecn.purdue.edu (Duane P Mantick) writes:
>I might take some exception to that statement in the sense
>that as far as the other aircraft go, we DID lose some.

I phrased my question incorrectly and I am sorry for the confusion.  I am 
well aware that there were losses of other aircraft.  What I meant to 
convey was that the loses were very, very low, certainly not what one 
expects in a war (these loses were more on par with a training exercise).

>I might say that in light of your comment that our weapons
>were better, perhaps then the Stealth fighter-bomber helped achieve
>an important goal - air superiority.

But this is precisely the point.  Perhaps.  I am not trying to criticize
the Stealth fighter or the technology.  But there continue to be many
scientists both in and outside the defense establishment that question
how effective Stealth really is.  My question is really very simple.  One
would have hoped that the use of this technology in a war would settle
the question for good.  However, the statistics from this war would
appear to not tell us anything, simply because the losses of Stealth
versus non-Stealth are statistically insignificant.  All I am asking
is whether anyone knows of other measures that can be used to quantify
how well Stealth worked in this war.  

>	The stated mission of the F117a is to strike strategically
>significant targets while evading enemy radar, and to do so at night.
>Since this mission was accomplished, according to the USAF, one could
>assume that the aircraft as a system does work.
> [deletions...]
>	To sum up, we have aircraft that can cover what the F117a does,
>but not stealthily and probably not as well at night.  Why night?
>What could be more demoralizing, surprising and frightening than
>bombs falling that you can't see from an aircraft that you can't see or
>target?

None of this addresses the question however.  I am not arguing with the
mission of the F117, I am asking for some decent data that supports 
the fact that it can accomplish this mission.  Nobody can really question
that fact that this was a bit of a non-war.  The Iraqi air defenses
either ran away or proved ineffective.  The Iraqi ground troops were
easily routed.  Total allied loses in this conflict were about the same as when
that battleship gun turret blew up a few years ago in a training exercise.
This is not a criticism in any way of our performance there, far from it.  
But it does cast in doubt many lessons one would hope to draw from this
war and use to determine how well things would go against a more
sophisticated or determined enemy.  So my question is not meant to
be rhetorical or provocative.  It is meant to get past all the hype
and attempts to dress up our systems which inevitably occurs in the
wake of an easy victory and ask a question which is rather important in
preparing for the next war.

If in fact Stealth technology worked well and paved the way for our
air victory, then all I am asking for is a discussion of what evidence
there is to say that this was the only technology that could have done
this job.  Just saying that it accomplished its mission isn't enough in
this case since Stealth does not clearly stand out from the crowd in
survivability.  It is possible that Stealth also showed up on the Iraqi 
radar (it has been suggested that it is less valuable against less 
sophisticated radar.  There are some basic physical principals for example 
that say it shouldn't work that well against longer wavelength radar.  
None of those sleek shapes and abrupt corners matter much against long 
wavelength radar.) and there were other reasons that the Iraqi's were 
unable to knock these aircraft out.  I would hope and at least suspect 
that there are reasons to discount this argument and all I am asking 
is to hear them if in fact this is something anyone on the Net is in
a position to know about.

John
-- 
John K. Prentice    john@unmfys.unm.edu (Internet)
Dept. of Physics and Astronomy, University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, NM, USA
Computational Physics Group, Amparo Corporation, Albuquerque, NM, USA

swilliam@oasys.dt.navy.mil (Steve Williams) (04/12/91)

From: swilliam@oasys.dt.navy.mil (Steve Williams)


> All I am asking is whether anyone knows of other measures that can 
> be used to quantify how well Stealth worked in this war .... I am 
> asking for some decent data that supports the fact that it can accomplish 
> this mission.

Military speaking, you need to deliver the "knock-out punch" to start
the war, using the element of surprise.  Japan achieved the element
of surprise in their Pearl Harbor attack, resulting in maximum damage
to our bases and ships with minimum loss to its attacking planes.

The Steath fighters did exactly the same thing.  They slipped inside
the Iraqi defense undetected and delivered the knock-out punch to their 
military communication center which seriously impaired Iraq's ability 
to defend itself.  This was the Steath fighter's most valuable contribution
in the Gulf War.

> The Iraqi air defenses either ran away or proved ineffective.

The Iraqi air defenses didn't run away.  Because of the loss of Iraq's
military communication center, everything was in chaos for the Iraqi
defenders.  Hence, the Iraqi defense was ineffective.

> The Iraqi ground troops were easily routed.

For the same reason.  Because Iraq lost the military communication center,
Iraq never utilized its ground troops effectively.

> If in fact Stealth technology worked well and paved the way for our
> air victory, then all I am asking for is a discussion of what evidence
> there is to say that this was the only technology that could have done
> this job.

Knocking out Iraq's military communication center was probably the most
critical thing that the allied forces had to do.  Other types of planes
(non-steath planes) might have done the job, but the cost certainly
would have been much higher (in number of planes lost) and it would
have taken longer to do it (in number of attempted attacks), involving
more attack planes just for one target.

The Steath fighter's knocking out the military communication center 
using the "smart" bomb "guaranteed" the collapse of the entire Iraqi
defense.

If another type of plane was used for this attack, the Iraqi air defenders
would have been alerted, and the attack possibly would fail.

> ... Stealth does not clearly stand out from the crowd in survivability.

Most likely true.

> It is possible that Stealth also showed up on the Iraqi radar ...

Who knows?  If so, then why didn't Iraq react?

Beside, Iraq was in a dilemma.  Leaving the radars on will subject the
Iraqi radar stations to anti-radar missile attacks.  Leaving the radar 
off will leave the Iraqi defenders blind.  Consequently, the Iraqi
defenders risked switching their radars on whenever they suspected that 
enemy planes were coming in and leaving them off other times (which 
was most of the time).  Really, a hopeless situation for the Iraqi air 
defenders.  The loss of the communication center didn't help (the
communication center might have gotten info from other units that enemy
planes were on their way to Baghdad, for example).

> ... and there were other reasons that the Iraqi's were unable to knock
> these aircraft out.

What other reasons?  With the radars turned off most of the time, it
was a piece of cake for the Steath fighters operating in nights.

	[Remember everyone, sci.military's charter is *technical*,
	 lets not drift into general discussions; those should go
	 to alt.desert-storm.  This article is pushing it.  --CDR]

brian@uunet.UU.NET (brian douglass) (04/12/91)

From: edat!brian@uunet.UU.NET (brian douglass)


A couple of facts on F-117a performance.

When the bombing started on Baghdad, the F-117s were already over
the target at the designated hour.  Iragi air defenses around
Baghdad were on full tilt (Good French & Soviet radar), and they
saw nothing.  Baghdad still had its lights on after the first
wave was leaving.  You don't need to be fast (F-15), or survivable
(A-10) when you can't be heard, seen, or detected.

As a FIRST STRIKE delivery system, stealth technology is a knockout
punch.  Surprise is the best tactic to win in war and stealth gives
the airplane surprise once more.  (On the question of First Strike,
obviously the Iraqiis knew we were coming as Congress had
authorized force.  This was not a sneak attack like their invasion
of Kuwait.  Also, the U.S. still reserves the right for first use
of nuclear weapons and F-117s can deliver such munitions through
any air-defense.)

In the later stages of the air campaign, when targets were being
chosen very selectively in Baghdad, it was decided that only the
F-117 would be allowed back over Baghdad.  Accuracy was the reason.
Too many targets were too closely located to civilian centers and
pinpoint accuracy was needed.  In the famous Bunker Bombing that so
many civilians were killed, two bombs were dropped in a staggered
release.  The first cut through the roof and detonated on the top
floor.  The second bomb went through the hole created by the first
and then went down into the lower reaches of the bunker and
detonated, wiping out the military staff.  Interesting isn't it how so
quickly afterwards Saddam tried to worm out a peace arrangement.

Bottom line, the F-117 fulfilled every role it was designed for,
did so with flying colors, and brought its crews home.  No other
weapon in the Coalition inventory could have performed the role the
F-117 could.  Of course, I wouldn't expect the Nighthawk to take
out tanks, or provide CAS.  There are better, cheaper systems that
are optimized for such roles.  Afterall, it is a team affair and
everybody has their job to do.

-- 
Brian Douglass			brian@edat.uucp

euming@mrcnext.uiuc.edu (Lee Eu-Ming) (04/13/91)

From: euming@mrcnext.uiuc.edu (Lee Eu-Ming)


prentice%triton.unm.edu@ariel.unm.edu (John Prentice) writes:

>If in fact Stealth technology worked well and paved the way for our
>air victory, then all I am asking for is a discussion of what evidence
>there is to say that this was the only technology that could have done
>this job.

I think you are discussing two different things.  I'm quite sure that
the Allies could have won the war without the F117; there would have been
more losses and the war would have lasted longer.  However, the F117
outperforms other aircraft in terms of first strike capabilities because
it is stealthy.  Since the goal of US forces is to accomplish what the
president commands as quickly as possible, the F117 is needed as it helps
the US to accomplish its goals quicker.

Now, here is the real stickler as I see it.  'Quick' is not the only thing
considered when choosing a method of attack.  'Loss of life', 'International
effects', and yes even 'Cost' often come into play when choosing what our
force structure will be.  I personally think the US should build more high
tech weapons--I never met a weapons system I didn't like.  (Kinda hawkish,
eh? :) )  Unfortunately, I am not a member of our government, and, like
everyone else, can only voice my opinions on what should be considered when
developing a new weapon.

Now, to top it all off, think of who DOES make decisions about the validity
of weapons developments.  That's right, the senate armed forces comittee,
and they're cleared for all of that sensitive information that is withheld
from the public.  Since they base their judgements on the best data
available, and they decided to deploy the F117, I have to conclude that there
are good reasons for deploying it.  I know this is somewhat of an idealistic
view of the government, but I wasn't paying much attention to politics during
some of the large DoD scams after WW2/Vietnam, and I remain very optimistic
of them.

greg@sif.claremont.edu (Tigger) (04/13/91)

From: Tigger <greg@sif.claremont.edu>


In article <1991Apr12.055301.14403@amd.com>, prentice%triton.unm.edu@ariel.unm.edu (John Prentice) writes:
> It is possible that Stealth also showed up on the Iraqi 
> radar (it has been suggested that it is less valuable against less 
> sophisticated radar.  There are some basic physical principals for example 
> that say it shouldn't work that well against longer wavelength radar.  
> None of those sleek shapes and abrupt corners matter much against long 
> wavelength radar.) and there were other reasons that the Iraqi's were 
> unable to knock these aircraft out.

It is my understanding (though I am far from being an expert) that long
wavelength radar (such as weather radar) is indeed capable of detecting
a stealth aircraft.  However, long wavelength radar is not capable of
pinpointing an aircraft (stealth or otherwise) well enough to guide a
weapon (such as a SAM) to the target.  Knowing that an F-117A is somewhere
in a region the size of a respectable cloud just doesn't seem useful
unless you're shooting nukes, especially when the target is moving at
near-supersonic speed...

-- 
Greg Orman
greg@pomona.claremont.edu

stevenp@decwrl.pa.dec.com (Steven Philipson) (04/17/91)

From: stevenp@decwrl.pa.dec.com (Steven Philipson)


prentice%triton.unm.edu@ariel.unm.edu (John Prentice) writes;
> [...] However, the statistics from this war would
> appear to not tell us anything, simply because the losses of Stealth
> versus non-Stealth are statistically insignificant.

   The loss rates of all aircraft were low, but I haven't seen any
official statement that the *difference* in loss rates between were
statistically insignificant.  A large number of sorties and flight
hours were recorded.  Reported losses as I've seen them seem to indicate
that the rates *are* significantly different.  Could you please tell us
why you conclude that they are not?

-- 
Steve
stevenp@decwrl.dec.com

prentice%triton.unm.edu@ariel.unm.edu (John Prentice) (04/18/91)

From: prentice%triton.unm.edu@ariel.unm.edu (John Prentice)


stevenp@decwrl.pa.dec.com (Steven Philipson) writes:
>   The loss rates of all aircraft were low, but I haven't seen any
>official statement that the *difference* in loss rates between were
>statistically insignificant.  A large number of sorties and flight
>hours were recorded.  Reported losses as I've seen them seem to indicate
>that the rates *are* significantly different.  Could you please tell us
>why you conclude that they are not?

Look at the standard deviation for the number of combat
sorties flown.  In simple terms, if N were flown, a one sigma
deviation is the square root of N.  There were far fewer planes
lost that this, so the loss rate for Stealth was within a one
sigma deviation of the loss rate for everything else.  You should
be careful to take out mechanical failures in this analysis also,
though it won't change the results any.

-- 
John K. Prentice    john@unmfys.unm.edu (Internet)
Dept. of Physics and Astronomy, University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, NM, USA
Computational Physics Group, Amparo Corporation, Albuquerque, NM, USA

eachus@aries.mitre.org (Robert I. Eachus) (04/18/91)

From: eachus@aries.mitre.org (Robert I. Eachus)


stevenp@decwrl.pa.dec.com (Steven Philipson) writes:
>prentice%triton.unm.edu@ariel.unm.edu (John Prentice) writes;
>> [...] However, the statistics from this war would
>> appear to not tell us anything, simply because the losses of Stealth
>> versus non-Stealth are statistically insignificant.
>
>The loss rates of all aircraft were low, but I haven't seen any
>official statement that the *difference* in loss rates between were
>statistically insignificant.  A large number of sorties and flight
>hours were recorded.  Reported losses as I've seen them seem to indicate
>that the rates *are* significantly different.  Could you please tell us
>why you conclude that they are not?...

   There are some significant differences in loss rates, and actually
the most important significant difference (the loss rate for Tornado
GCR aircraft) was apparently due to a tactical problem.  When the
tactics were changed the losses changed.

   All that said, the loss rate (and effectiveness) of the F-117A were
very significant, and made the air war look easy.  If you have a plane
you can send on missions where ANY OTHER aircraft will have an
unacceptably high loss rate, and they all come home, that tells you a
lot.  (I had nothing to do with the air war planning, but I've played
a lot of war games--err strategic simulations?--with some of those
that did...)

   Some of the targets that the F117A hit in the opening salvos of the
air war, were the type of strategic target where if intell tells you:
"Expect to lose 40% of the attacking aircraft, and you have about a
10% chance of mission success per sortie...", you figure out whether
to allocate one squadron or two.  I would guess that "opening night"
there were on the order of twenty strategic targets where getting them
all would make everything else a (relative) cakewalk.  Some were
allocated to F117As, some to Tomahawks, and the rest is history.

   A similar thing applies to the ground war.  It has been widely
reported that there were no M1A1s lost.  True, (actually, I think a
couple were banged up bad enough to require depot maintenance, but
anyway...) but this doesn't mean that the M1A1s weren't hit.  I'd be
surprised if there was a single M1A1 that saw action and didn't have
some scratches.  (And don't say, yeah but most of it was from rifles
and machine guns.  As a former TC, I can tell you just how much of me
was usually sticking out of a tank.  The fact that my crew would
probably do a very good job on any sniper that hit me would be VERY
cold cumfort.)

    It's just that the crews were trained well enough, and the weapons
were accurate enough and capable enough to do the job beyond the
effective range of the Iraqi weapons.  (And the Iraqis were dumb
enough to light those oil fires.) Tell a TC who has say five tanks
kills at an average range of two miles, and dents from T-72 sabot
rounds in his front slope, that he had it easy.  He probably won't
take your head off and put it back on the right way round, but I
assure you that he and his crew know just how "easy" the war was.

--
Robert I. Eachus

phil@brahms.AMD.COM (Phil Ngai) (04/19/91)

From: phil@brahms.AMD.COM (Phil Ngai)


eachus@aries.mitre.org (Robert I. Eachus) writes:
>Some were allocated to F117As, some to Tomahawks, and the rest is history.

My impression from launching Tomahawks at Russian ships in
the IBM-PC game Harpoon is that they are relatively easy
to shoot down. An Iowa class battleship carries about 32
of them and that's not enough to take care of more than
one or two Russian ships, at least in the game.

Anyone know how many Tomahawks got through in the Gulf War?

--
The best way to preserve your RKBA is to vote Libertarian.

stevenp@decwrl.pa.dec.com (Steven Philipson) (05/09/91)

From: stevenp@decwrl.pa.dec.com (Steven Philipson)


wb9omc@ecn.purdue.edu (Duane P Mantick) writes;
> I DON'T recall
> the FLIR and DLIR ever being installed on an A10 - which means for the
> A10 to do its work at night might well be about impossible.

   The A-10 did operate at night in the Gulf.  The April 22 issue of
Aviation Week reports that A-10's used imaging infrared Maverick
missiles and thus were able to indentify and destroy tanks at night.
(page 46).

   There have been proposals to install FLIR systems on A-10's, but
they have not reached production.  An installed FLIR would likely make
the A-10 more effective at night as the proposed systems are more
sensitive, have a wider field of view, and have higher resolution than
the Maverick seekers.

Steve
stevenp@decwrl.dec.com