sysmgr@king.eng.umd.edu (05/23/91)
From: <sysmgr@king.eng.umd.edu> carlo@gaia.gcs.oz.au (Carlo Kopp) writes: >>Both manufacturers management teams were examined. The Lockheed-lead team was >>better organized and had a solid approach to most aspects of the project. >>Northrop's cost-overruns and managerial problems with the B-2 program did not >>help. > >That is very much the Administration's party line on the matter. I >think you may want to look at a broader range of sources before you >make that kind of unqualified assertion. Oh? Why was Northrop being investigated by GAO? I suppose the "Washington Post" was mistaken about those reports a while back. >Again you ought to review your facts. There are outstanding commitments >to F/A-18C purchases regardless of the E/F model. The Navy appears to >have accepted the loss of new F-14D production in favour of F/A-18E/Fs >simply for reasons of cost (total life cycle cost in this instance - >notwithstanding Grumman's recent proposals for reduced purchase price), >ie it cannot afford more F-14Ds, AX development, F/A-18E/Fs, further >F/A-18C/Ds and initial NATF funding. Of course it can't. Let me spell it out for you. Grumman gets funded for F-14Ds and follow-on F-14s deriviative airframes (QuickStrike, up through Tomcat-21). The Navy takes a go-slow approach on AX development, having screwed it up once already, does not purchase F/A-18 E/F, limited F/A-18 C/D. Initial NATF funding gets put into enhancements for the F-14. Some of the money also comes from cancelling the B-2 bomber in favor of more F-14Ds, V-22 Osprey, and M-1 tanks. >Insofar as the B-2 goes, in terms of its development program it is >actually a rather mature design due the major airframe design revisions >carried out during the mid eighties in order to strengthen the >airframe for low altitude penetration. And this claim was also made with the B-1B during its pre-production stages. However, the avionics will never work to promised or designed spec, and there's the fuel-tank problems which grounded the B-1. All from a "mature" aircraft design which was flying in the mid-70s. >The only problem the B-2 has at >this time are grandstanding politicians to whom stealth is dangerous >black magic and who stand to gain political points by killing the >project. No Carlo, the problem is that the B-2 been touted as all things for all people at a price tag of nearly $800 million+ per plane. In a decade of finite resources, hard choices have to be made between gee-wiz and the mundane. Building the full fleet of B-2 bombers at projected cost, even with waving the inevitable price over-runs and the sensors which will have to be built to help it fulfill it's original advertised mission of hunting down mobile Soviet ICBMs, will leave little money for much else. >The A-12 program had similar problems to the sixties TFX program - >weight and integration. In all fairness these are generic to any large >airframe project where you are pushing the technology of the day to the >limit. Add to that the compartmentalising of the management structure >to accommodate the secrecy requirements of a 'black' program and you >are guaranteed to have problems. >Again, I suggest you look at some alternate sources and perhaps get the >contractors' story - I'm not convinced that the party line is the whole story >as you seem to imply. So, uh, why'd the two Navy officers get cashed in? Bad breath? The contractor, by stint of accepting the contract, should have had the resources available. Not to conduct R&D and gain experience at taxpayer expense. They did. They couldn't deliver. They got canned. >>The full price tag on the ATF program puts it into jeopardy over the long run, >>regardless. There might be no more than one or two "silver bullet" squadrons >>built. >Please tell the group where you acquired the two squadron number from ? I am >certainly very interested. Various articles within the "Washington Post" and "Washington Times," the two major newspapers of the Washington D.C. area. >>That's goofy. The A-12 was going to be the ATA for the Air Force. You'll note >>the lack of external hardpoints and internal carriage on the F-23. >The USAF's principal deep strike interdictors, the F-111 and F-15E are >both aircraft with the speed and payload radius of a long range air >superiority airframe. Both airframes were designed from the ground up to have those capabilties available. The ATF airframes were designed to be fighters. Not fighters with a bombing capability. >Your assertion that the lack of external >hardpoints and internal munition carriage would prevent the YF-23 from >being developed for deep interdiction is irrational. >Firstly the nominal weapon load of any deep strike interdictor today is >set at two 2,000 lb class GBU-10 or GBU-24/27 semi-active laser homing >munitions. These typically require 15 ft + of weapon bay length which >isn't much more than an AIM-120 Amraam occupies.... the existing central >weapon bay of the YF-23 is close to these dimensions, certainly big enough >to accommodate the smaller 1,000 lb munitions. That's goofy too. The F-117 was designed to accomodate 2,000lb bombs. You want to trade off munitions size to make the airframe fit the mission. SURE you could do it. But, euh, how do you stack the AAMs in with the (smaller) 1,000 bombs in the single F-23 bay? The old-fashioned F-15E manages to lug around a couple of nice fat bombs and missiles on the airframe, plus an external LANTIRN system with FLIR and laser designator. No hardpoints. No place to put an external fuel tank. More money to retrofit a targeting system in. Maybe a guy in the back seat too; workload isn't mickey mouse when riding down on the deck. If anything you're going to need a BIGGER payload; the GBU-28 hack is 4,000lb bomb, to get that deep penetration ability. >Secondly, the payload/radius performance of the ATF is easily in the >class of the F-111 and would not be hurt at all by internal munition >carriage. I'll believe it when Northrop or the Air Force works up a mission profile. You substitute 1,000lbs bombs for 300lb missiles and you trade off fuel or range. Fact of life. >Theatre reconnaisance is another role which requires speed and range >and if possible, stealthiness. Fitting the central weapon bay with a >sensor and fuel pallet would provide an upgrade path without major >airframe changes. At the sacrifice of missile self-protection. RPVs would do it cheaper, and at less risk. >>No, affordability and price are. Had this project been run in the '70s, it is >>quite likely the YF-23 would have been selected. Today, because we do not have >>deep pockets, the bottom line must be watched. > >Nice, but you're promoting the party line again. I suggest you take a >serious look at the real decisionmaking criteria which apply on large >defence projects. It is a bit more complex than what you might read >about in AvLeak. >You might want to talk to some project managers >employed by defence contractors. I don't need to talk to a project manager to look at the current budget deficit numbers. The Congress of the United States provides the money, not a project manager at a defence contractor. Ultimately, they make decisions which shape the decisions at DoD. Bottom line is cost, and cost-effectiveness. [Warning! This is getting dangerously close to flame-levels. Let's play gently so as not to shock our less hardened readers. -- The friendly moderator]