carlo@gaia.gcs.oz.au (Carlo Kopp) (05/16/91)
From: Carlo Kopp <carlo@gaia.gcs.oz.au> Topic: Why did the USAF make the decision it did and select the Lockheed and Pratt's designs in preference to the Northrop and GE designs ? The decision criteria for selection were pretty broad and covered performance and ability to meet the design spec, ability to meet manufacturer's internal spec, price, life-cycle-cost and development risk. The USAF have stated that the criterion of industrial base was not important, but informed sources advise me that this was not entirely true and that the USAF looked at the issue very seriously. On the strength of what has been published about both aircraft and engines, the US taxpayer would have gotten an excellent deal in terms of system performance with either aircraft, they are both top performers. The final comparison appears as such: 1.Performance Both aircraft apparently met the USAF's performance specs. Northrop were a bit faster, longer ranging and stealthier, whereas Lockheed were a bit more manoeuvrable. It appears that the performance margins between both types were not dramatic. The GE engine performed somewhat better in the trials than the P&W engine, but the final P&W proposal included an enlarged fan and hence higher thrust for production aircraft, presumably equalising the difference. 2.Price Apparently Lockheed and P&W were cheaper, by how much does not appear to have been published anywhere (anybody know ?) 3.Development Risk Northrop were penalised in a number of areas. Firstly Lockheed did more aggressive flying (played their politics right by doing it very visibly) during the dem/val program and demoed high AoA manoeuvres and missile launches well in excess of nominal dem/val requirements. Secondly Lockheed built a very conservative airframe design with very conservative materials, ie an F-15/F-18ish almost hybrid planform geometry using a lot of aluminium and titanium alloys, unlike Northrop who opted for cca 50% empty weight in composites, using a very stealthy airframe geometry, never used before in a fighter. Thirdly Lockheed did not suffer the development pain which Northrop did with their stealthy exhaust ducts. The lining of the YF-23 exhausts is a laminated alloy structure full of tiny cooling holes fed by engine bleed air. It was apparently rather heavy and may have required major design changes to bring it to production. Also the main weapon bays of the YF-23 apparently stacked the Amraams vertically and the USAF were unhappy about the potential for jams in the launcher mechanism preventing the firing of subsequent missiles. Northrop, true to their tradition, created a showpiece of the state of the art in technology - ie a high performance truly all aspect stealth airframe with better speed/range performance and bigger weapon bays than its rival. The price of innovation was the loss of the contract, as the YF-23 combines a lot of new ideas which have never been used before. Whereas the Lockheed F-22 is clearly an evolutionary development of current aerodynamic/stealth technology, the Northrop YF-23 is very much revolutionary. Therefore risky. Similarly, the P&W engine was conservative, whereas the GE engine was a radical variable bypass ratio design never used in production before. 4.Industrial Base MDC and Northrop have ongoing commitments for the C-17, F/A-18 and B-2 respectively, whereas Lockheed and GD don't really have any real military projects left once the P-3 and F-16 are completely closed. Similarly GE will be building F110s and F404s for F-16 and F-18 production to the end of the decade, whereas P&W only have the F100 for which the biggest user, the USAF F-15 force, is unlikely to seek additional purchases. Therefore, a decision to buy Northrop/GE could have seen both Lockheed and P&W end up shutting down their military airframe/engine businesses around the end of the decade. Summary The US taxpayer is getting the cheaper and more predictable product with some penalty in top end performance and long term performance growth potential. The USAF however had NO choice in this matter as the Administration killed the A-12 Avenger in January due cost overruns resulting from high risk R&D. By killing off the radical but high performance A-12, the Administration set a clear precedent. The A-12 was considered a very secure project politically because its cancellation would mess up Navy deployment plans for the next decade (the A-6Es are very old, basic airframe design 1958) and cause all sorts of problems. In comparison with the A-12, the ATF was considered politically expendable as it is seen (incorrectly in my opinion) as a dedicated killer of PVO/VVS aircraft, while the F-15s will remain viable for at least another decade. As a result, the USAF had no choice than to pursue the lowest risk design options regardless of any other criteria. As it turns out, both Lockheed and P&W were desperate enough to submit lower bids and hence the decision could not have really gone the other way. If the USAF chose the F-23 and it got into difficulties say in 1994 due R&D problems, it would almost certainly die the death of the A-12. Politicians generally seem to have little respect for air warfare strategy. As for the future of the F-23, it may not end up being adopted by the Navy simply because the Navy is having real money problems, ie buying F-18s instead of its preferred F-14s. Therefore the Navy is unlikely to buy any Naval ATFs until the end of the decade, by which time the Lockheed product will have matured whereas the Northrop one will have sat on the shelf. Alternative roles for the airframe could be theatre strike and reconnaisance, but it is basically too good an airframe for these jobs and hence cheaper options could be found. Final Observation: politics is always a stronger decision criterion than technology or air warfare strategy Carlo Kopp carlo@gaia.gcs.oz.au Defence Writer Aerospace Publications
sysmgr@KING.ENG.UMD.EDU (Doug Mohney) (05/17/91)
From: sysmgr@KING.ENG.UMD.EDU (Doug Mohney) carlo@gaia.gcs.oz.au (Carlo Kopp) writes: On YF-22 vs YF-23 selection: >The decision criteria for selection were pretty broad and covered performance >and ability to meet the design spec, ability to meet manufacturer's internal >spec, price, life-cycle-cost and development risk. Both manufacturers management teams were examined. The Lockheed-lead team was better organized and had a solid approach to most aspects of the project. Northrop's cost-overruns and managerial problems with the B-2 program did not help. >MDC and Northrop have ongoing commitments for the C-17, F/A-18 and B-2 >respectively, The B-2 is not a sure thing. The F/A-18 is a maybe; Grumman will fight for production of versions of the F-14 over beating on the F/A-18E/F for an A-12 interm replacement. >The USAF however had NO choice in this matter as the Administration killed >the A-12 Avenger in January due cost overruns resulting from high risk R&D. >By killing off the radical but high performance A-12, the Administration set >a clear precedent. The A-12 was a poorly managed program, and General Dynamics had little previous experience with large composite structures. Two high-ranking Navy officers were not cashed in for the failure of high risk R&D. >As a result, the USAF had no choice than to pursue the lowest risk design >options regardless of any other criteria. >If the USAF chose the F-23 and it got >into difficulties say in 1994 due R&D problems, it would almost certainly die >the death of the A-12. Politicians generally seem to have little respect for >air warfare strategy. The full price tag on the ATF program puts it into jeopardy over the long run, regardless. There might be no more than one or two "silver bullet" squadrons built. You can't built $100 million/copy planes by the hundreds without something else being sacrificed. USAF also has to provide for the MultiRole Fighter, a replacement for the F-16, over the next 5 years. Development for it won't be cheap. >As for the future of the F-23, it may not end up being adopted by the Navy >simply because the Navy is having real money problems, ie buying F-18s >instead of its preferred F-14s. Wahhhhh? The F-23 will never, ever be put on a carrier; its low-speed characteristics stick compared to the F-22, and you'd need serious money to strengthen the landing gear and get the wings to fold on it... > Therefore the Navy is unlikely to buy any >Naval ATFs until the end of the decade, by which time the Lockheed product >will have matured whereas the Northrop one will have sat on the shelf. >Alternative roles for the airframe could be theatre strike and reconnaisance, That's goofy. The A-12 was going to be the ATA for the Air Force. You'll note the lack of external hardpoints and internal carriage on the F-23. >Final Observation: politics is always a stronger decision criterion than >technology or air warfare strategy No, affordability and price are. Had this project been run in the '70s, it is quite likely the YF-23 would have been selected. Today, because we do not have deep pockets, the bottom line must be watched. -- SYSMGR@CADLAB.ENG.UMD.EDU
zrra07@uunet.UU.NET (Randall R. Appleton) (05/18/91)
From: apctrc!zrra07@uunet.UU.NET (Randall R. Appleton) First, I thought the article analyzing the two competing ATF designs was wonderful. That's why I read this newsgroup. Thanks. Second, what ARE the Navy's future aircraft plans now that the A-12 is dead? Are they going to try and adapt the ATF (which could be difficult for a number of reasons, but also have many advantages IF they could succeed)? Do they have any other designs in the wings (ha ha) or are they going to make do with the F-18 and the Harrier? Last I heard, the F-14 was already half-way out the door. -Randy
carlo@gaia.gcs.oz.au (Carlo Kopp) (05/22/91)
From: Carlo Kopp <carlo@gaia.gcs.oz.au> sysmgr@KING.ENG.UMD.EDU (Doug Mohney) writes: >Both manufacturers management teams were examined. The Lockheed-lead team was >better organized and had a solid approach to most aspects of the project. >Northrop's cost-overruns and managerial problems with the B-2 program did not >help. That is very much the Administration's party line on the matter. I think you may want to look at a broader range of sources before you make that kind of unqualified assertion. >The B-2 is not a sure thing. The F/A-18 is a maybe; Grumman will fight for >production of versions of the F-14 over beating on the F/A-18E/F for an A-12 >interm replacement. Again you ought to review your facts. There are outstanding commitments to F/A-18C purchases regardless of the E/F model. The Navy appears to have accepted the loss of new F-14D production in favour of F/A-18E/Fs simply for reasons of cost (total life cycle cost in this instance - notwithstanding Grumman's recent proposals for reduced purchase price), ie it cannot afford more F-14Ds, AX development, F/A-18E/Fs, further F/A-18C/Ds and initial NATF funding. Insofar as the B-2 goes, in terms of its development program it is actually a rather mature design due the major airframe design revisions carried out during the mid eighties in order to strengthen the airframe for low altitude penetration. The only problem the B-2 has at this time are grandstanding politicians to whom stealth is dangerous black magic and who stand to gain political points by killing the project. >The A-12 was a poorly managed program, and General Dynamics had little previous >experience with large composite structures. Two high-ranking Navy officers were >not cashed in for the failure of high risk R&D. The A-12 program had similar problems to the sixties TFX program - weight and integration. In all fairness these are generic to any large airframe project where you are pushing the technology of the day to the limit. Add to that the compartmentalising of the management structure to accommodate the secrecy requirements of a 'black' program and you are guaranteed to have problems. Anyone with any project management experience will have many instances to tell of - the less experience exists with a given technology, the less predictable your project timing and costs. Having been there myself, I know. Again, I suggest you look at some alternate sources and perhaps get the contractors' story - I'm not convinced that the party line is the whole story as you seem to imply. >The full price tag on the ATF program puts it into jeopardy over the long run, >regardless. There might be no more than one or two "silver bullet" squadrons >built. You can't built $100 million/copy planes by the hundreds without >something else being sacrificed. >USAF also has to provide for the MultiRole Fighter, a replacement for the F-16, >over the next 5 years. Development for it won't be cheap. Please tell the group where you acquired the two squadron number from ? I am certainly very interested. >Wahhhhh? The F-23 will never, ever be put on a carrier; its low-speed >characteristics stick compared to the F-22, and you'd need serious money to >strengthen the landing gear and get the wings to fold on it... An interesting assertion - I hope you can support it. Lockheed certainly thought the F-22's approach configuration speed/handling sufficiently unsuited to CV ops to propose a Variable Geometry (ie swing wing) NATF derivative airframe to meet the Navy's weight/speed recovery requirements. The Northrop airframe has substantially greater lifting area and reportedly much lower approach speeds than it competitor - also some of Northrop's key flight test/development personnel have Navy backgrounds which will have necessarily reflected in preferred handling characteristics. Where the Lockheed aircraft has been reported as better handling than the Northrop design is in the high AoA low speed (ie 200-350 kt IAS) range where its hybrid planform and big tails work to an advantage. At low AoA and IAS < 180 kt ie dirty approach configuration the hybrid planform does not offer dramatically superior lift/drag performance to other wings with similar low aspect ratio and sweepback. >> Therefore the Navy is unlikely to buy any >>Naval ATFs until the end of the decade, by which time the Lockheed product >>will have matured whereas the Northrop one will have sat on the shelf. > >>Alternative roles for the airframe could be theatre strike and reconnaisance, > >That's goofy. The A-12 was going to be the ATA for the Air Force. You'll note >the lack of external hardpoints and internal carriage on the F-23. On the contrary. The USAF was never very keen on the ATA (and probably shed no tears over its demise) as it didn't fit the USAF's paradigm of a tactical fighter. In practical terms, all the ATA offered what the F-117A didn't have was better payload radius and all weather radar nav/attack. The USAF's principal deep strike interdictors, the F-111 and F-15E are both aircraft with the speed and payload radius of a long range air superiority airframe. Your assertion that the lack of external hardpoints and internal munition carriage would prevent the YF-23 from being developed for deep interdiction is irrational. Firstly the nominal weapon load of any deep strike interdictor today is set at two 2,000 lb class GBU-10 or GBU-24/27 semi-active laser homing munitions. These typically require 15 ft + of weapon bay length which isn't much more than an AIM-120 Amraam occupies. I suspect (can anybody confirm this ?) that the existing central weapon bay of the YF-23 is close to these dimensions, certainly big enough to accommodate the smaller 1,000 lb Paveway munitions. Secondly, the payload/radius performance of the ATF is easily in the class of the F-111 and would not be hurt at all by internal munition carriage. Were the mission profile not to require the use of afterburner, the design of the (hypothetical) YA/F-23 could be lighter and cheaper due to the resulting simplification of the exhaust trough and tailpipe design. The airframe would still retain supersonic capability, less the 1.4:1 thrust/weight ratio needed for dogfights. Theatre reconnaisance is another role which requires speed and range and if possible, stealthiness. Fitting the central weapon bay with a sensor and fuel pallet would provide an upgrade path without major airframe changes. >>Final Observation: politics is always a stronger decision criterion than >>technology or air warfare strategy > >No, affordability and price are. Had this project been run in the '70s, it is >quite likely the YF-23 would have been selected. Today, because we do not have >deep pockets, the bottom line must be watched. Nice, but you're promoting the party line again. I suggest you take a serious look at the real decisionmaking criteria which apply on large defence projects. It is a bit more complex than what you might read about in AvLeak. You might want to talk to some project managers employed by defence contractors. Carlo Kopp carlo@gaia.gcs.oz.au
zrra07@uunet.UU.NET (Randall R. Appleton) (05/22/91)
From: apctrc!zrra07@uunet.UU.NET (Randall R. Appleton) Carlo Kopp <carlo@gaia.gcs.oz.au> ... >The only problem the B-2 has at >this time are grandstanding politicians to whom stealth is dangerous >black magic and who stand to gain political points by killing the >project. I Write .. Uhh, that is hardly established fact. In fact., many of us think that the best way to spend the 30 BILLION it will take to finish building the 75 planes that the current plans call for is to not build them, and spend it instead on new planes for the Navy (which has a great need) or spend it on SDI (which congress keeps cutting) or spend it on air-lift (re: Desert Weirdness) or spend it on re-establishing an industrial base. If you want to bomb someone, use cruise missiles. At 1 million per copy, you can buy 300 per B-2. That 30 BILION should buy 30,000 cruise missiles, and we have no shortage of platforms to launch them from. But please don't tell me about B-2 cruises mearliy chasing thru the Russian countryside looking for targets of oportunity. I don't recall the B-52's over Iraq doing so, and Russia in a B-2 has to be a less safe place then Iraq in a B-52. (Since no B-52's were shot down, I feel safe in saying this.) -Randy [Double .signature deleted. --CDR]
henry@zoo.toronto.edu (Henry Spencer) (05/24/91)
From: henry@zoo.toronto.edu (Henry Spencer) >From: apctrc!zrra07@uunet.UU.NET (Randall R. Appleton) >But please don't tell me about B-2 cruises mearliy chasing thru the >Russian countryside looking for targets of oportunity... Officially it's supposed to cruise merrily around looking for mobile missiles. Some doubts have been raised about this recently :-), since the USAF's finest didn't do too well at that in Iraq, despite much more favorable conditions. It turns out that this is just a rediscovery of WW2 experience; I was re-reading "The Rocket Team" the other day and found its descriptions of massive -- and quite unsuccessful -- efforts made to find and attack mobile V-2 launchers quite relevant. -- And the bean-counter replied, | Henry Spencer @ U of Toronto Zoology "beans are more important". | henry@zoo.toronto.edu utzoo!henry