anderson@osl475a.erim.org (Rod Anderson) (05/18/91)
From: anderson@osl475a.erim.org (Rod Anderson) DRCOA1::LENOCHS" <lenochs%drcoa1.decnet@drcvax.af.mil>, writes concerning the F-22 vs. F23 affair: >In Volume 7 : Issue 14, Steve Bellovin sez: >>Call it meta-logistics: Lockheed got the contract because >>Northrop already has a big contract, for the B-2. > >Well, folks, I beg to differ. In the world of military contracts, AF [17 lines deleted] >The judgement against Northrop would (IMHO) have played a >major role in selection. Also, Northrop has no recent experience in >successfully building a military aircraft (F-5 was their last good >airplane deal; F-20 was stillborn; ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ Killed in infancy is more like it. At least an equal to the F-16 in most performance measures (range, maneuverability, speed), it was more maintainable, had lower life cycle costs, and could fire a radar guided missile (F-16 can't, at least until AMRAAM comes on line). General Dynamics (with Air Force support) said they would do whatever was necessary to keep the F-20 out of production. And they did. Northrop need about 300 sales to go into production, which meant the Air Guard buy was the last chance. The F-20 came in at around $13M apiece. What do you know, GD's bid for F-16 was $12M, and GD was awarded the contract. The previous F-16 buys had been in the low 20's per unit. (Note: Figures are from memory.) B-2 is a fiasco). ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ Certainly, the cost is a major concern, but what do you expect when the total buy is reduced so much. Actually marginal costs are quite reasonable. From what I heard (AWST mainly) the flight tests have been going quite well. Two birds are now flying, and preliminary RCS tests well completed satisfactorily according to open sources. If you have additional information on substandard B-2 performance, perhaps you would share it with the net. Also, what about the F-18, a Northrop design? >Lockheed, on the other hand, has proven it's capability of giving the >AF what it wants: F-104, U-2, SR-71, F-117A. In the last three cases, >Lockheed not only delivered the aircraft on time, they kept quiet about >it for significantly long periods of time, and at a business >disadvantage. Mostly good aircraft (but you may want to talk to anyone who's flown a F-104 -- it tended to be a handful sometimes with its inertia coupling and control stick limiters, as many now-deceased Luftwaffe pilots found out). Also these aircraft were built at the Skunk works, without the normal government supervision. Certainly a competitive advantage. But what about Lockheed's most recent venture, the P-7? The company DEFAULTED on this contract! Seems to me a pretty good indicator that the firm has major internal problems. I've heard that the commonality with the P-3 was grossly overestimated. In terms of recent performance, of the 5 airframers who bid the ATF, only Northrop and Boeing have NOT defaulted on a major contract in the last year. (GD/MacAir defaulted on the A-12). >(When the ATF was still on paper, Lockheed complained >that they could not realistically compete with Northrop for the >contract because they could not talk about their most recent success >story - F117A - while Northrop was plastering the walls with B-2 >photos. AF agreed and the news from Tonopah started.) Don't think so; the people who needed access to the F-117 probably got it. >So, the awarding the ATF contract to Lockheed makes much more sense >than to Northrop from a variety of viewpoints. > [ Yes, I'll certainly believe this reasoning. --CDR] >Loyd M. Enochs - Dynamics Research Corp ><Flames to lenochs%drcoa1.decnet@drcvax.af.mil> No reports I've seen indicate significant differences in overall performance. I think the Air Force was trying to ensure getting the aircraft into production by pleasing a certain influentional senator, as previously noted. Also, Northop's non-union status probably didn't help it politically (even the engineers are unionized at Lockheed! :). Rod Anderson |Environmental Research Institute of Michigan Email: anderson@osl475a.erim.org | Voice/voicemail: 313-994-1200 x2725 | Fax: 313-994-0944/3890
henry@zoo.toronto.edu (Henry Spencer) (05/19/91)
From: henry@zoo.toronto.edu (Henry Spencer) >From: anderson@osl475a.erim.org (Rod Anderson) >But what about Lockheed's most recent venture, the P-7? The >company DEFAULTED on this contract! ... I've heard >that the commonality with the P-3 was grossly overestimated... In fairness, Lockheed claims that this was because blanks in the deal marked "to be filled in with something reasonable" were filled in with something very unreasonable, making it necessary to redesign the bird extensively to meet unexpectedly-harsh specs. The full story is not yet available, since Lockheed and the USN are still battling over the details of who is responsible. -- And the bean-counter replied, | Henry Spencer @ U of Toronto Zoology "beans are more important". | henry@zoo.toronto.edu utzoo!henry
dvlssd@cs.umu.se (Stefan Skoglund) (05/20/91)
From: dvlssd@cs.umu.se (Stefan Skoglund) >The judgement against Northrop would (IMHO) have played a >major role in selection. Also, Northrop has no recent experience in >successfully building a military aircraft (F-5 was their last good >airplane deal; F-20 was stillborn; > ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ F-20 was a improved F-5, more advanced avionics, a radar and much more thrust in the engine ( F-404 ). F-20 was a purely export fighter. The F-20 died because of this decision : lets sell the F-16's on export. ( The Air Force wanted cheaper F-16's ). -- dvlssd@cs.umu.se, Stefan Skoglund I Tel +46 90 19 65 29
sysmgr@KING.ENG.UMD.EDU (Doug Mohney) (05/20/91)
From: sysmgr@KING.ENG.UMD.EDU (Doug Mohney) anderson@osl475a.erim.org (Rod Anderson) writes: >>(When the ATF was still on paper, Lockheed complained >>that they could not realistically compete with Northrop for the >>contract because they could not talk about their most recent success >>story - F117A - while Northrop was plastering the walls with B-2 >>photos. >Don't think so; the people who needed access to the F-117 probably >got it. NO, they did not. The designers of the B-2, A-12, and ATF aircraft did not get a good look at the F-117 until after they put together their designs. This was repeated to me by one of the aero profs here, who had spoken to the chair...who had come from one of the ATF teams.... Z -- SYSMGR@CADLAB.ENG.UMD.EDU
wb9omc@ee.ecn.purdue.edu (Duane P Mantick) (05/21/91)
From: wb9omc@ee.ecn.purdue.edu (Duane P Mantick) anderson@osl475a.erim.org (Rod Anderson) writes: >concerning the F-22 vs. F23 affair: >B-2 is a fiasco). >^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ >Certainly, the cost is a major concern, but what do you expect when the >total buy is reduced so much. Actually marginal costs are quite >reasonable. From what I heard (AWST mainly) the flight tests have been >going quite well. Two birds are now flying, and preliminary RCS tests >well completed satisfactorily according to open sources. If you have >additional information on substandard B-2 performance, perhaps you >would share it with the net. I would like to see this as well - if any bomber program is truly a "fiasco", it has to be the B1. Seems to spend as much time officially grounded as it does flying. Certain elements may say as much about it as they like, but the fact that the B1's appear to have not appeared in the gulf *at all*, I think, IMHO, says plenty. By using the B52 instead of the B1, I think we are being told which is the more capable aircraft - and not on the drawing board, but in reality. IMHO, as much good at the B1 is doing us, we might as well have kept the previous North American bomber, the B70. At least then we'd have had something impressive..... only 1/2 :-) >>Lockheed, on the other hand, has proven it's capability of giving the >>AF what it wants: F-104, U-2, SR-71, F-117A. In the last three cases, >>Lockheed not only delivered the aircraft on time, they kept quiet about >>it for significantly long periods of time, and at a business >>disadvantage. And it would appear not only on time, but often under or AT budget. In fact, Kelly Johnson *returned* something like $2 million on the U2..... >Mostly good aircraft (but you may want to talk to anyone who's flown >a F-104 -- it tended to be a handful sometimes with its inertia coupling >and control stick limiters, as many now-deceased Luftwaffe pilots found I think you'd find that once the Luftwaffe pilots got appropriate training, the accident rate dropped phenomenally. You just can't throw green pilots into jets without appropriate training; the same thing would probably happen if we took Cessna 172 jockies and threw them into F16's.... >But what about Lockheed's most recent venture, the P-7? The >company DEFAULTED on this contract! Seems to me a pretty good >indicator that the firm has major internal problems. I've heard Who doesn't? I'd bet you could look at nearly every major contractor and find they'd blown it on at least *one* project. >No reports I've seen indicate significant differences in overall >performance. I think the Air Force was trying to ensure getting >the aircraft into production by pleasing a certain influentional >senator, as previously noted. Also, Northop's non-union status >probably didn't help it politically (even the engineers are >unionized at Lockheed! :). This is probably about as close to the truth as you'd probably like to get, if my guess is correct. One might take note that there is some evidence that the XB49, the first big jet flying wing, was literally sabotaged because some people in the defense establishment wanted the Convair B36 to be produced, and NOT the Northrop B49. Sabotaged not only in the hardware, but with behind the scenes politicking as well. While the B36 wasn't the worst plane in the world, quite a few authors claim that the B49 would have been a better plane from several viewpoints, not the least of which were handling characteristics, and the fact that the B36, by nature of it's propeller design, was not very expandable in terms of future development. It has also been said that the stealth characteristics of the Flying Wing were recognized at the time although not considered to be of paramount importance. Had the selection been different, it would be intersting to speculate on what the USAF would have looked like today.... Duane
ab3o+@andrew.cmu.edu (Allan Bourdius) (05/21/91)
From: Allan Bourdius <ab3o+@andrew.cmu.edu> >NO, they did not. The designers of the B-2, A-12, and ATF aircraft did not get >a good look at the F-117 until after they put together their designs. >This was repeated to me by one of the aero profs here, who had spoken to the >chair...who had come from one of the ATF teams.... Z On the tail of the Lockheed/Boeing YF-22 is the logo of Lockheed's "Skunk Works." Since the 'Works built the F-117A, I think it's safe to say that the Lockheed/Boeing team had access to materials and construction methods used for the F-117. -- Allan Bourdius [MIDN 2/C (Marine Option)/Brother, Phi Kappa Theta Fraternity] ab3o+@andrew.cmu.edu or 1069 Morewood Avenue, Pittsburgh, PA 15213 The opinions in this post/mail are only those of the author, nobody else.
page@cod.nosc.mil (Ward C. Page) (05/23/91)
From: page@cod.nosc.mil (Ward C. Page) anderson@osl475a.erim.org (Rod Anderson) writes: >DRCOA1::LENOCHS" <lenochs%drcoa1.decnet@drcvax.af.mil>, writes >>airplane deal; F-20 was stillborn; > ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ >Killed in infancy is more like it. At least an equal to the F-16 in >most performance measures (range, maneuverability, speed), it was more The F-20 had the range and the speed approximately equivalent to the F-16 but it couldn't turn with the 16. The roll rate was a little better, I think. The big selling point that Northrop pushed was the time from alert to being on station. This was a good deal faster than the F-16's. I was at GD during this battle and one of the funny things that happened was GD set up a demo that showed that the 16 was quicker to station than the F-20. The limiting factor was getting all the gyros in the 16 warmed up, so they just hooked an APU to the 16 and let it run for a while before making the attempt (and film). >maintainable, had lower life cycle costs, and could fire a radar guided >missile (F-16 can't, at least until AMRAAM comes on line). General The lower life cycle costs were really not true. They were based on the numbers that GE (?) had given them for the engine, which was not in production until near the end of the F-20 development. They were just estimates (anyone know if they proved to be close?) Also, the F-20 required a spares set that was entirely different from the F-15 or the F-16. A spares set for an aircraft costs about the same as one plane. You need a couple of complete spares for a wing of planes. The F-16 and F-15 share the same spares set (with a few differences). This is a consideration when buying an aircraft. >Dynamics (with Air Force support) said they would do whatever was >necessary to keep the F-20 out of production. And they did. Northrop >need about 300 sales to go into production, which meant the Air Guard buy >was the last chance. The F-20 came in at around $13M apiece. What >do you know, GD's bid for F-16 was $12M, and GD was awarded the contract. 9 million. >The previous F-16 buys had been in the low 20's per unit. The A model was 14-16 million and the C-D models were 19-22 million. It's hard to know how much a given airplane costs since so many contractors provide parts (the engine, for example, is not purchased by GD but just installed by GD). It may not have been necessary for GD to have gone to all the trouble. It's real hard to sell an airplane when the test pilots who are showing them off keep flying them into the ground. Ward Page Naval Ocean Systems Center San Diego, CA
military@amdcad (05/23/91)
From: ames!pur-ee!wb9omc (Duane P Mantick) As regards the B49, you are probably aware that nothing was ever proven. On a flight that I understand was supposed to be a demo flight, there was a USAF officer that was supposed to be the flight engineer, as I understand it. One of his jobs was to make SURE that there was enough oil (I didn't get a full explanation on just what 'oil' they were talking about but it had something to do with the engines) in the engines. He signed off the work as having been checked/done but sure enough, duringthe flight, the engines pretty much self destructed. When they were checked they were found to be without oil, but not due to any kind of leakage that anyone could find. When Northrop wanted to find this USAF officer to ask him what the hell had happened, USAF told them that he was "unavailable", or something like that. IN fact, USAF got extremely uncooperative. When Mr. Northrop went to Washington for a meeting with DOD, he got into the meeting room and found not only the government people but the President of Convair (i.e. the B36 dude) waiting for him. The guy from Convair, with the seemingly tacit approval of DOD, told Northrop that there was no way in hell he was going to lose on this contract. Well, he didn't. Seems as though the man from Convair had one or more Congesscritters pretty much in his pocket, which Northrop didn't. A lot of people have made a great deal out of the fact that one Capt. Glen Edwards died in a crash of a B49. It must be pointed out that he would not be the only test pilot to die test flying a military aircraft. Many of those aircraft even went into production after the fact, a case in point being the F100 Super Sabre, which took the life of test pilot George Welch and was in production anyway. The Welch accident was directly due to the undersized vertical stabilizer onthe F100A early models - and the worst part was, the company knew it, the USAF knew it and according towhat I read, *Welch* knew it. The YF100 prototypes had a taller tailfin; it was cut down to decrease weight. After the accident, all ofthe existing A models got a taller fin and all future models had it too. So the B49 is not alone in having problems. As is typical, problems get ironed out - that is what test pilots are for. What I have read of actual pilot descriptions indicates that the B49 was a bomber that handled more like a fighter, and the existing films seem to bear that out. B49's were able to make in-flight manuevers that would have shredded a B36, manuevers that would have made the B49 MUCH harder to shoot down during an intercept, for example. When you consider that it was known at the time the the B49 was difficult to track on radar because of its flying wing configuration while the B36 must have had an RCS the size of Mount Everest, it is not difficult to conclude that the procurement procedure was a complete and utter fraud. Now if you want chapter and verse, I ain't got it....I am in the process of acquiring aviation reference books as my budget allows. I might refer you to a bit of video called "The Wing Will Fly" which does include some of this information. One last thing you might want to consider: in the end run, which aircraft of the two, the B49 or the B36, has actually contributed *anything* of value to the current status of military aviation in the US? Certainly not the B36 - it was a relic of WW2 technology, a propellor driven stopgap to hold us over until the B47 and B52 were ready to go. B36's were scrapped so fast it makes the head spin. On the other hand, before Jack Northrop died a few years ago, he was granted a security clearance and allowed to see drawings and scale models of the B2 Stealth Bomber. I understand he was very impressed.... Duane
jtchew@csa2.lbl.gov (05/24/91)
From: jtchew@csa2.lbl.gov wb9omc@ee.ecn.purdue.edu (Duane P Mantick) writes... > While the B36 wasn't the worst plane in the world, quite a >few authors claim that the B49 would have been a better plane from >several viewpoints, not the least of which were handling characteristics, Hmm. Could you provide references? What I heard was that the B-49 was killed in part because of controllability problems. I also recall a perhaps apocryphal story that, when a prototype nosed over after landing and caught fire, the by-then-disgusted pilot tried to dissuade the firemen from extinguishing the wretched aircraft. Your statements about "sabotage" in the B-49 program are also quite provocative and, if true, would be interesting to hear in further detail. --Joe
Steve.Hix@Eng.Sun.COM (Steve Hix) (05/25/91)
From: Steve.Hix@Eng.Sun.COM (Steve Hix) jtchew@csa2.lbl.gov writes: >wb9omc@ee.ecn.purdue.edu (Duane P Mantick) writes... >> While the B36 wasn't the worst plane in the world, quite a >>few authors claim that the B49 would have been a better plane from >>several viewpoints, not the least of which were handling characteristics, > >Hmm. Could you provide references? What I heard was that the B-49 was >killed in part because of controllability problems. The initial version of the YB-49 was a less than ideal bombing platform, being a little sensitive in pitch, mostly. After it was equipped with one of the first artificial stability systems (from Honeywell), it was something else entirely. The B-35/49 programs suffered from being stretched out over too long a period of years. The B-35 had right around 10,000 miles unrefuelled range...swapping props for the early jet engines drastically reduced its range. It didn't help that we were at the early ramp up of jet technology, either. In just a very few years, new powerplants came out with better thrust/weight numbers, better specific fuel consumption and all the rest. >Your statements about "sabotage" in the B-49 program are also quite >provocative and, if true, would be interesting to hear in further detail. The competition between the B-36 and B-49 was more political than anything else. And the cancelling of the B-49 guaranteed that it would be a long time before anyone else tried the flying wing for a production aircraft.