tedrick@triangle.Berkeley.EDU (Tom Tedrick) (05/18/91)
From: tedrick@triangle.Berkeley.EDU (Tom Tedrick) There was some debate during WW1 and WW2, about the optimal length of time for pre-attack bombardments. Lengthy bombardments were criticized, for sacrificing the element of surprise, among other things. But it may be that the optimal length of time, in certain cases, is a month or more. This is because, such lengthy bombardments can cause near universal psychological casualties, amongst the target population, and after a long enough time of waiting for a ground attack to come, inertia may set in amongst the defenders. Thus the element of surprise, for the ground attack, may be regained to a certain extent. Thus, it may be the case, that air supremacy can guarantee victory on the ground, in future battles.
bwoodman@magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu (Robert H Woodman) (05/20/91)
From: bwoodman@magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu (Robert H Woodman) tedrick@triangle.Berkeley.EDU (Tom Tedrick) writes: >But it may be that the optimal length of time, in certain cases, is a >month or more. This is because, such lengthy bombardments can cause >near universal psychological casualties, amongst the target population, >and after a long enough time of waiting for a ground attack to come, >inertia may set in amongst the defenders. Thus the element of surprise, >for the ground attack, may be regained to a certain extent. > >Thus, it may be the case, that air supremacy can guarantee victory on >the ground, in future battles. While I could agree with that reasoning to a point, I would add that there were some apparently unique factors in the Gulf war that may not apply to all future wars. First, the KTO was a confined area. This allowed massive bombardment on a concentrated area, increasing both physical and psychological damage to the enemy troops. If we were at war with our old nemesis, the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact, the operational theater would be much larger, thus the physical damage could be equal to that seen in the KTO, and yet the cumulative psycho- logical effect would be less because of the distribution of the damage. Second, the Iraqi Air Force was clearly inferior. Superiority was gained in a couple of days, with air supremecy following just a few days after that. There is no guarantee that such conditions will exist in other wars and other theaters of operation. Third, the Iraqi troops were not expecting the kind of massive bombardment rained down on them. In future conflicts, defending troops might expect such a tactic and try to prepare accordingly. Thus, shelters might be made stronger. Antiaircraft defenses might be more concentrated and better placed for defense. Other tactics might be employed to offset the devestation of massive bombard- ment. In short, the astounding way in which air supremacy affected the outcome of the Persian Gulf war may be unique to the theater in which it was fought. It does not necessarily follow that such conditions will be equally relevant in the future. Comments? Discussion? Intelligent argument? -- Robert H. "Bob" Woodman, PhD INTERNET: woodman.1@osu.edu
fcrary@lightning.Berkeley.EDU (Frank Crary) (05/21/91)
From: fcrary@lightning.Berkeley.EDU (Frank Crary) tedrick@triangle.Berkeley.EDU (Tom Tedrick) writes: >But it may be that the optimal length of time, in certain cases, is a >month or more. Aviation Week reported a similar use of a preliminary "bombardment" being used to enhance supprise. They said that the use of EF-111 jamming aircraft to support a F-117 strike was found to hurt rather than help. The AAA units had a raid warning from the jamming aircraft long before they would have detected the F-117's (usually detecting a -117 raid means hearing the bombs go off...). However, the USAF found that a EF-111 jamming operation, begining well in advance of the actual raid HELPED. The AAA gunners, seeing the radar jamming, would begin to barage fire their guns. After a short time, they would use up their ready supply of ammunition and/or jam their guns. THEN the F-117 would reach their targets. According to Aviation Week, this was very effective if timed correctly. Frank Crary UC Berkeley
swilliam@oasys.dt.navy.mil (Steve Williams) (05/21/91)
From: swilliam@oasys.dt.navy.mil (Steve Williams) >From: bwoodman@magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu (Robert H Woodman) >If we were at war with our old nemesis, the Soviet Union and Warsaw >Pact, the operational theater would be much larger, thus the physical >damage could be equal to that seen in the KTO, and yet the cumulative >psychological effect would be less because of the distribution of the >damage. This may be comparing apples and oranges. For example, we might be using nuclear weapons on Russia and Warsaw Pact countries instead of the conventional bombs that we used on Iraq. Likewise, Russia will use nuclear weapons against us. Furthermore, Russia has a greater ability to hit our American soil with their long range bombers, submarine-launched missiles, and intercontinental missiles that Iraq didn't have. Thus, it would be a war with much greater destruction on both sides. >Third, the Iraqi troops were not expecting the kind of massive bombardment >rained down on them. That was Iraq's bad underestimation of our capabilities. A serious military mistake. >In future conflicts, defending troops might expect such a tactic and >try to prepare accordingly. Thus, shelters might be made stronger. [From] experience, new weapons will be developed to defeat new targets. The military history is a long history of the development of new weapons to defeat new armor. >Antiaircraft defenses might be more concentrated and better placed >for defense. Other tactics might be employed to offset the devestation >of massive bombardment. Iraq already had high concentration of anti-aircraft batteries around Baghdad at the start of the war. Remember all those fireworks over Baghdad on TV news? The problem for Iraq is that our planes were releasing bombs a good distance away from Baghdad, outside the Iraqi air defenses. What about our cruise missiles that were skimming over the land? Furthermore, we had a new weapon up our sleeve: the F-117A Steath Fighter. Regardless of Iraq's anti-aircraft defense, the F-117As went inside and destroyed Iraq's most valuable military asset - the military communication center. >In short, the astounding way in which air supremacy affected the outcome >of the Persian Gulf war may be unique to the theater in which it was >fought. It does not necessarily follow that such conditions will be >equally relevant in the future. Each war is unique. What is important is how we plan and fight in each war. It would be a serious mistake to fight a war using exactly the same tactics from other wars that are not appropriate for this war. For example, the way we fought against Japan in WWII was entirely different from the way we fought against Germany. In the Gulf War, Iraq basically used the same tactics they used against Iran in the eight-year war. No wonder why Iraq lost badly.
carroll@cs.uiuc.edu (Alan M. Carroll) (05/22/91)
From: carroll@cs.uiuc.edu (Alan M. Carroll) >From: bwoodman@magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu (Robert H Woodman) > tedrick@triangle.Berkeley.EDU (Tom Tedrick) writes: > >But it may be that the optimal length of time, in certain cases, is a > >month or more. This is because, such lengthy bombardments can cause > >near universal psychological casualties, amongst the target population, > While I could agree with that reasoning to a point, I would add that there > were some apparently unique factors in the Gulf war that may not apply to all > future wars. > [ Various points ] It's important to keep in mind that the goal is to lower overall costs. The costs are (roughly) the sum of the costs of N days of bomardmen followed by the cost of the actual attack. The unique fact of the Gulf War is that the Coalition air supremacy and the basically inneffectual Iraqi air defense made the cost of bombardment almost nil. This had several major benefits for the Coalition: + Low cost, in terms of planes / pilots lost, so operations could be continued without regard to cost. + Morale boost for Coalition air forces. + Moral loss for Iraqi soldiers, who could tell that their AA was useless, and probably started looking forward to the ground attack, because that would mean no more bombardment. I think the fact that the Iraqis couldn't strike back in anyway (either through artillery, AA, or air combat) was a significant factor in their demoralization. A ground force able to do noticeable damage to the attacking air force might have held up much better. -- Alan M. Carroll <-- Another casualty of applied metaphysics Epoch Development Team Urbana Il. "I hate shopping with the reality-impaired" - Susan
phil@brahms.AMD.COM (Phil Ngai) (05/22/91)
From: phil@brahms.AMD.COM (Phil Ngai) I don't know, seems to me the Iraqi anti-air systems were ineffective. Substantially below what I could imagine for SAMs. A cruise missile is just a slow, small airplane, it should be possible to shoot them down. B-52s of course are sitting ducks. Stealth bombers are a little harder, but then again, they have to know where their targets are. I'm not sure they would do much good in a Vietnam type of scenario. A desert war is probably the best conditions that are possible for air power. I suspect that we will never again see air power play such a decisive role in future conflicts. -- For the Welfare system to flourish, its clients must not. Conflict of interest?
sysmgr@KING.ENG.UMD.EDU (Doug Mohney) (05/23/91)
From: sysmgr@KING.ENG.UMD.EDU (Doug Mohney) phil@brahms.AMD.COM (Phil Ngai) writes: >A cruise missile is >just a slow, small airplane, it should be possible to shoot them down. A small, low-radar profile airplane which hugs the ground and gets lost in clutter. Not so easy to shoot them down. >B-52s of course are sitting ducks. IF they operate in a "clean" electronic environment sure. If you have EF-111 jammers blocking radars, F-117s targeting command centers, and F-4Gs launching on anything which emits a SAM pulse, they aren't so bad at all. >A desert war is probably the best conditions that are possible for air >power. I suspect that we will never again see air power play such a >decisive role in future conflicts. Next-generation weapons, with longer stand-off range and better accuracy promise to make air power more lethal. Our greatest sin was not building enough "smart" weapons. SYSMGR@CADLAB.ENG.UMD.EDU
smb@ulysses.att.com (Steven Bellovin) (05/24/91)
From: smb@ulysses.att.com (Steven Bellovin) swilliam@oasys.dt.navy.mil (Steve Williams) writes: > Regardless of Iraq's anti-aircraft defense, the F-117As went inside and > destroyed Iraq's most valuable military asset - the military communication > center. I'm can't tell if you're referring to one particular building or set of buildings, but a recent article in the NY Times calls into question just how badly the Iraqi military communications network was damaged. Apparently as a result of the war, the U.S. is proposing to add tight new restrictions on the export of certain communications gear. It was a non-technical article, so I can't say for certain exactly what is being regulated; the three items mentioned were datagram switches, ``fast select'' capability, and dynamic reroute capability. Translated into English, those all refer to communications devices that can be used to build a decentralized or survivable network. The article claimed that the motivation for this was the difficulty the U.S. had in actually preventing the military from ``talking''. I confess that I find this quite ironic. The DoD has spent lots of money over the years fostering the development of the TCP/IP protocol suite, and one of the reasons for its architecture is that it is survivable. I guess they now know it works... --Steve Bellovin
swilliam@oasys.dt.navy.mil (Steve Williams) (05/24/91)
From: swilliam@oasys.dt.navy.mil (Steve Williams) smb@ulysses.att.com (Steven Bellovin) writes: >swilliam@oasys.dt.navy.mil (Steve Williams) writes: >> Regardless of Iraq's anti-aircraft defense, the F-117As went inside and >> destroyed Iraq's most valuable military asset - the military communication >> center. > >I'm can't tell if you're referring to one particular building or set of >buildings, but ..... I was talking about one particular multi-story building. Steve Williams
fcrary@headcrash.Berkeley.EDU (Frank Crary) (05/25/91)
From: fcrary@headcrash.Berkeley.EDU (Frank Crary) sysmgr@KING.ENG.UMD.EDU (Doug Mohney) writes: >>A desert war is probably the best conditions that are possible for air >>power. I suspect that we will never again see air power play such a >>decisive role in future conflicts. > >Next-generation weapons, with longer stand-off range and better accuracy >promise to make air power more lethal. Our greatest sin was not building enough >"smart" weapons. But what about the "Next-generation" air DEFENSE weapons? The gulf war was a case of cutting edge aircraft and air-to-surface weapons against ten-year old air defense systems (at least equivilent to ten-year old NATO systems.) After the war with Iraq, I think a lot of effort will go into new, cutting edge air defense weapons. If this is the case, will air power do as well in the next war? Frank Crary