lenochs%drcoa1.decnet@drcvax.af.mil (DRCOA1: :LENOCHS) (05/30/91)
From: "DRCOA1::LENOCHS" <lenochs%drcoa1.decnet@drcvax.af.mil> In Vol 7 issue 34, Carl Rigney said: >I'm just suggesting that equipment should be chosen to fit the >doctrine that it'll be used to fight under (with flexibility for when >doctrine shifts). Take the time it takes for the 'world situation' to change (example: mission changes from European forest to Middle Eastern desert in 18 months) and compare it to the time it takes from when the government (USAF/USN) to get a proposal 'on the street' to when an aircraft actually is assigned to a fighter squadron (F-16 = 5 years), and two approches emerge: 1) - build aircraft for each possible role. Problems: how many for each role? If you build enough for a real air-to-ground pounding, can you then afford to build the escorts? If you build for air superiority, what happens to the foot soldiers when the enemy tanks come over the hill? Also, this approach results in spare parts problems and higher costs because of limited production runs. 2) - take the one-size-fits-all approach and build a whole bunch of multi-role aircraft. This resolves the (not mentioned above) pilot training and maintenance training issues as well as the supply difficulty. It does *not* solve the price problem, because the added complexity negates the economy of scale. The F-16 was originally designed to be a cheap air superiority aircraft to be deployed in *large* numbers, as an alternative to the much better (but too expensive for large acquisition) F-15 Eagle. As time has gone on, however, both the F-15 and F-16 have been modified to work in the air-to-ground role. It is actually cheaper than building more A-10s, sad to say. >pilot training makes the biggest single difference in performance, >training requires air time, and the more expensive the plane the less >time it'll spend in the air training. The more expensive the airplane, the more complex. The more complex, the more it's being fixed. QED. >if planes were cheaper, there could be more of them and thus more >command slots open, would fly? Ultimately, the people cost outweighs the hardware cost. Even if we could get the maintenance man-hours per flying hour down to 25 to 1, the cost of more aircraft escalates rapidly. More planes means more hangers/pads, more mechanics. More mechanics = more dormitories (more sheets, pillows, blankets), hospitals (more doctors/nurses - and the military has enough problems with that *NOW*), personnel folks, finance folks, supply folks, supply warehouses, bigger BX/commissary, bigger chow hall, etc, etc, ad nauseum. Each of these people has the potential of getting a pension, having a family (and they go to the hospital too), and so on. More police. More firemen. It all adds up. >Anyone for a soc.politics.defense? Or if its unmoderated, it'd have >to be talk... Sounds like a winner to me! Loyd M. Enochs - USAF 1974-1987