crowl@cs.rochester.edu (Lawrence Crowl) (05/31/91)
From: crowl@cs.rochester.edu (Lawrence Crowl) In article <1991May31.061422.13627@amd.com> stevenp@kodak.pa.dec.com (Steven Philipson) writes: >The May 6 Av Leak had a comparison ... [of] an attack on Iraqi reactors... >The numbers they quoted were that the 60 attack aircraft [32 F16, 16 F15, >12 F4/F111] and 15 tankers [KC135] cost $6.5 billion, as opposed to the >[8] F-117 [2 KC135] strike group costing $1.5 billion, and "only" $1.3 >billion for two B-2s. So, Av Week is caught in the "initial purchace price" rut also. Well, it is a simple metric. Unfortunately, it is a misleading metric. A much better metric is the mission cost. This must include amortized aircraft purchase cost, expected loss rate, payroll and retirement for support personel, etc. Lets look at one factor, expected loss rate. First, the tankers aren't likely to be in harm's way, so they don't die. Assume the F16 group looses 3 planes, which costs $210 million; one plane from the F117 group at $150 million; and one plane from the B2 group at $650 million. (They sent in all those EW aircraft, so you aren't going to assume _no_ losses are you?). The B2 is the big looser here. How about crew? I'm going to pull some numbers out of the hat (erring on the low side) and say that each aircraft requires 24 support personel at $50,000 (per year) and its aircrew at $100,000. From vague memory on aircrew size, that puts the F16 group at $102 million, the F117 group at $13.6 million, and the B2 group at $3.2 million. The F16 group is the big looser, and the B2 is the big winner. Note the flip in the B2's position. [ It doesn't take a year to fly one sortie, and you haven't factored in training costs. --CDR] Attempting to use any one aspect of an aircraft's cost as a basis for decisions on buying them is stupid. The question we should be asking is: What is the amortized cost to field and fight a _wing_, and what can it do? Answering this question properly for new aircraft will require a security clearance and alot of hard simulation work. If we could get Congress to budget in terms of whole _wings_ (rather than purchase price), we would encourage people to ask the right questions. -- Lawrence Crowl 716-275-9499 University of Rochester crowl@cs.rochester.edu Computer Science Department rutgers!rochester!crowl Rochester, New York, 14627-0226
stevenp@decwrl.pa.dec.com (Steven Philipson) (06/01/91)
From: stevenp@decwrl.pa.dec.com (Steven Philipson) crowl@cs.rochester.edu (Lawrence Crowl) writes; > So, Av Week is caught in the "initial purchace price" rut also. No, they're not. The figures quoted were for "procurement and 20-year operational costs". The cost figures were provided by the US Air Force. You may take issue with their accounting, but House representatives didn't. "No one on the defense subcomittee challenged the Air Force figures, previewing what may be the flavor of this year's debate over the bomber." > (They sent in all those EW aircraft, so you aren't going to assume > _no_ losses are you?). The B2 is the big looser here. The loss rate of F-117 attack groups in the Gulf actually WAS zero. In any case, the article does not get into the details of the figures. But you do raise a good point -- aircraft will be lost, whether to enemy action or not. The loss of one B-2 would be a major one. This seems to favor the F-117 or other small stealth aircraft. > What is the amortized cost to field and fight a _wing_, and what can it do? That is the cost used and comparison made. I recommend that anyone who wants to continue this discussion read the Aviation Week article (May 6, 1991, pp.66-67). Steve Philipson stevenp@decwrl.dec.com