cdr@amd.com (Carl Rigney) (05/24/91)
From: cdr@amd.com (Carl Rigney) stevenp@decwrl.dec.com writes: > The FLIR sensors on F-15E's ALLOWED visual contact under conditions > that would not have been possible with a cheap, good-weather only > attack aircraft. Sure, I'm not at all surprised. Did the KTO Rules of Engagement permit firing on a FLIR contact, and if so why were planes coming back on cloudy days with their bombs still on? A case could be made that in the cloudy European Theater where NATO is in a life-or-death struggle against the Warsaw Pact that RoE would be relaxed and the collateral damage vs. German civilians accepted, but that doesn't seem like a very credible opponent anymore. I'm just suggesting that equipment should be chosen to fit the doctrine that it'll be used to fight under (with flexibility for when doctrine shifts). I know the Pentagon loves their state-of-the-art fighters that push technology and budgets to the wall, but it still seems true to me that pilot training makes the biggest single difference in performance, training requires air time, and the more expensive the plane the less time it'll spend in the air training. It's a related problem to buying lots of aircraft and too few spares because no one wants to command spares. I wonder if the argument that if planes were cheaper, there could be more of them and thus more command slots open, would fly? OK, I'm crossing my own boundary on politics, so I'll let myself be rebutted and then we'll move it to e-mail. Anyone for a soc.politics.defense? Or if its unmoderated, it'd have to be talk... -- Carl Rigney cdr@amd.com
stevenp@kodak.pa.dec.com (Steven Philipson) (05/29/91)
From: stevenp@kodak.pa.dec.com (Steven Philipson) > Did the Rules of Engagement permit firing on a FLIR contact Yes, for both aircraft and tanks. There were reports from captured Iraqis who said that they heard vehicles approaching, and then their tanks started exploding all around them. They were being hit before they could even see the American forces. It makes sense -- if you can get positive ID with a video image based on some sensor, why should a visual wavelength (i.e, not IR) also be required? >if so why were planes coming back on cloudy days with their bombs still on? Well, sometimes the target is going to be impossible to see even with FLIR. I think that they were using higher minimums when attacking targets in civilian areas, too. >I'm just suggesting that equipment should be chosen to fit the doctrine >that it'll be used to fight under (with flexibility for when doctrine >shifts). Seems reasonable to me, and I think that's consistent with what that general was saying. His point was that the lesson here is that ground attack fighters have to be able to attack under adverse conditions, and be able to dogfight, too, and that this can't be done by a cheap, VFR-only mudfighter. The equipment (multi-role fighters) seems to be completely compatible with the doctrine of positive ID before firing. Do you feel that they are not? > I know the Pentagon loves their state-of-the-art fighters >that push technology and budgets to the wall, This may be a smokescreen, but lately they've been justifying buying high-tech as it's cheaper. The May 6 issue of Av Leak had a comparison of F-16's, F-117s, and B-2's to get a job done. It was pretty wild. There was an attack on Iraqi reactors wherein they used 32 F-16's, escorted by 16 F-15's, plus 12 Wild Weasel's and F-111 jammers, requiring 15 KC-135 tankers for support AND they didn't get the target. They then sent in 8 F-117's with 2 KC-135's and did get it. They say that 2 B-2's would have done it, without support. This may be a plane in search of a mission (the B-2), but it's an interesting argument. The numbers they quoted were that the 60 attack aircraft and 15 tankers cost $6.5 billion, as opposed to the F-117 strike grouping costing $1.5 billion, and "only" $1.3 billion for two B-2s. >to me that pilot training makes the biggest single difference in >performance, That's true in an unassisted air-to-air duel, but that's not the way most encounters have ever gone. Usually the guy that gets shot down never sees his attacker. AWACS enables the friendly fighter get into attack position before the enemy aircraft ever sees him. In an engagement, AWACS allows the friendly fighter to continuously know the position of his adversary. Individual aircraft have to be pointed more or less at their adversary to get a radar track on him. That puts 'em at great disadvantage. In any case, what they were talking about here was not dogfighting, but ground attack. The ability to see a target before it can see you makes a tremendous difference. > training requires air time, and the more expensive the >plane the less time it'll spend in the air training. That's not clear. If an aircraft is expensive to buy, then there will be fewer of them. Training and operational hours are a function of how much they cost to operate though, and these new expensive airplanes are being built with lower maintenance and lower expendable costs as major considerations. >OK, I'm crossing my own boundary on politics, so I'll let myself be rebutted >and then we'll move it to e-mail. Do you really think that this is politics? Sounds like economic and logistical elements of practical military planning and operation. [I've taken my reply to e-mail. --CDR]
tiwasawa@uunet.UU.NET (Takashi Iwasawa) (05/31/91)
From: Takashi Iwasawa <netxcom!tiwasawa@uunet.UU.NET> In article <1991May29.011112.6898@amd.com> Carl Rigney writes: >I'm just suggesting that equipment should be chosen to fit the doctrine >that it'll be used to fight under (with flexibility for when doctrine >shifts). I know the Pentagon loves their state-of-the-art fighters >that push technology and budgets to the wall, but it still seems true >to me that pilot training makes the biggest single difference in >performance, training requires air time, and the more expensive the >plane the less time it'll spend in the air training. Unfortunately, it's not as simple as that. Equipment DOES make a difference, but it's hard to tell without hindsight exactly how much difference a given change in hardware makes. One good example is the Battle of Britain. Looking at the specifications, there isn't that much quantifiable difference between the Hurricane and the Spitfire. The quality of pilots flying Spitfires and Hurricanes were similar, as was their opposition. Yet fighter pilots on both sides clearly felt that there was a very perceptible difference in the performance of Spitfires versus Hurricanes when flown in fighter combat, and that feeling is backed by what we know of combat losses. So if more Hurricanes had been procured (and more pilots trained with more air time) by scrapping the more expensive Spitfire, would the British have done better in the Battle of Britain? Most people (including myself) would say "No". But then where do you draw the line between sufficient technology and too much technology? A second factor is that the training has to be appropriate. Again, in the Battle of Britain, many RAF fighter pilots had as much time in the air as their Luftwaffe counterparts (after all, the Luftwaffe didn't even exist until Hitler scrapped the Treaty of Versailles). Yet the average RAF fighter pilot did not do as well as his Luftwaffe counterpart in fighter-to-fighter combat in the Battle of Britain due to outmoded training based on stereotyped "attack by the numbers" on unresisting bombers. [ I know I'll get flamed for this .... Let me quickly point out (1) I do know that the Luftwaffe lost more aircraft in the Battle of Britain than the RAF. But if you look at ** Fighter ** losses of both sides, they are remarkably close. And given that the RAF had the advantage of fighting over it's own country, with ample airfields for emergency landings and radar and ground controller network to help them surprise the enemy, while the Luftwaffe pilots were often fighting near the limit of their fuel and tied to bombers that Goering insisted they escort, even losses indicates to me that the German pilots were better. (2) If you want to argue about the outmoded training, please read some books by the RAF aces first; "Johnnie" Johnson, Douglas Bader, Bob Tuck, and "Sailor" Malan among others have written books about their experiences.] So just increasing the amount of time pilots spend training does not assure a better combat performance. On the other hand, better equipment might allow a pilot to survive his initial mistakes (take Bob Johnson, a P-47 ace from the Eighth Air Force. In his first combat, he did everything wrong, and came back only because the Thunderbolt was such a tough bird.). This is important because the losses peak in the early combats, and because a disproportionate number of victories are produced by a rather small group of experienced experts (in the Eight Air Force, Hub Zemke's Fighter Group had over 1000 victories, I believe. And the top half dozen Luftwaffe aces have over 1500 victories among them.). In effect, training IS very important, but the best training is actual combat, provided the pilot survives. So better equipment has an effect beyond the immediate combat. Finally, let me note something about the Pentagon. Personnel costs (pay, pensions, medical care, housing, training, et cetera) account for more than 50% of the military budget. This means that even if the equipment were given to us free by Santa Claus, and the fuel and spare parts too, we still couldn't double the size of our armed forces without appropriating more money. Given this, there is a very strong incentive to try to get more combat power by better equipment rather than by more equipment, which needs more manpower. And the new equipment (which admittedly costs a lot more to buy initially) are designed to require much less maintenance, which translates to lower manpower requirements, and to lower costs over the life of the equipment. If we had the same number of F4 instead of F16 in Operation Desert Storm, we couldn't have generated the sortie rates we did. So why does Congress (and we in sci.military) agonize over cutting equipment programs to save money, when the real spending is in personnel costs? Because politically, it's impossible to cut the personnel costs...... I better stop before I go over the edge into politics. Hey, I'm not responsible, Carl over there made me do it :-) [Followups re Battle of Britian to soc.history, please. And followups re politics only by email. In answer to a query the author replied that he thinks the difference in cost between spitfire and hurricanes may have been on the order of 25%. Much different than the difference between a $2.5 million mudfighter vs. $60-80 million Kitchen Sink Fighter concept. --CDR] -- Takashi Iwasawa DISCLAIMER: Net Express Inc. has nothing to do with these opinions. I'm the one solely responsible for them. Takashi
sysmgr@KING.ENG.UMD.EDU (Doug Mohney) (05/31/91)
From: sysmgr@KING.ENG.UMD.EDU (Doug Mohney) stevenp@kodak.pa.dec.com (Steven Philipson) writes: > The numbers they quoted were that the 60 attack aircraft and 15 tankers >cost $6.5 billion, as opposed to the F-117 strike grouping costing $1.5 >billion, and "only" $1.3 billion for two B-2s. This argument is somewhat bogus. It suggests the AF will give up all those planes in exchange for B-2s. They are not. They wish to buy both the B-2 and ATF and the MultiRole fighter, and they will need Weasels and EF-111s and tankers to support said ATF & MultiRole fighters and B-2s. You also don't hear them talk about scrapping F-15s and F-16s, either, in exchange for the more expensive B-2s. They want to keep everything. So what happens if one of the two B-2s goes down during the strike because it hits a bird or one of the MiG-27 fighters has Allah on his side? Suddenly, your capability has been cut in half and you are HOSED. It would have helped if the F-16s were using smart weapons/standoff munitions instead of dumb bombs, preferable with the LANTIRN targeting pods. We could just as easily question the wisdom of the DoD planners who have purchased gee-wiz planes with low-tech munitions. >> training requires air time, and the more expensive the >>plane the less time it'll spend in the air training. > > That's not clear. If an aircraft is expensive to buy, then there >will be fewer of them. Training and operational hours are a function >of how much they cost to operate though, and these new expensive >airplanes are being built with lower maintenance and lower expendable >costs as major considerations. And being asked to train for both nuclear (primary) and conventional (secondary) missions. The AF has stated they won't be able to fly the B-2 for as many hours as they'd like because it is so expensive to fly and the risk of losing a plane in training is high. One of the major unsung "triumphs" of Desert Storm, after you go through the glory of Tomahawk missiles and Stealth fighters, is training. Red Flag and Top Gun and OPFOR training at the NTC in Fort Irwin all worked. Period. End of story. SYSMGR@CADLAB.ENG.UMD.EDU
dlbres10@pc.usl.edu (Phil Fraering) (06/01/91)
From: dlbres10@pc.usl.edu (Phil Fraering) stevenp@kodak.pa.dec.com (Steven Philipson) writes: > The numbers they quoted were that the 60 attack aircraft and 15 tankers >cost $6.5 billion, as opposed to the F-117 strike grouping costing $1.5 >billion, and "only" $1.3 billion for two B-2s. I wonder what the cost would be for real attack aircraft and not converted supersonic dogfighters. Do you think they could get the costs for doing it with A-10s with Lantirn pods instead of Maverick missles for night guidance, and maybe some 'stretched' A-7s as well? Has anyone seen how the Air Force has been saying how much of a success the F-16 is over the A-10 when the former gets the night vision pods and navigating equipment, while the latter gets to use the camera on the wing-mounted Maverick missles as a guidance system? Has anyone here heard of 'self-fufilling prophecy?' Phil Fraering dlbres10@pc.usl.edu
mjackson.wbst147@xerox.com (06/03/91)
From: mjackson.wbst147@xerox.com Takashi Iwasawa <netxcom!tiwasawa@uunet.UU.NET> writes: > [Better equipment enabling new pilots to survive initial mistakes] > is important because the losses peak in the early combats. . . . In > effect, training IS very important, but the best training is actual > combat, provided the pilot survives. I was under the impression that simulator technology had made a serious run at closing the gap between training and combat (assuming, of course, that the trainers are correct in their expectations of the opponent's performance and tactics). > [I]n the Battle of Britain, many RAF fighter pilots had as much time in > the air as their Luftwaffe counterparts (after all, the Luftwaffe didn't > even exist until Hitler scrapped the Treaty of Versailles). I have a vague memory that the Germans had a much earlier secret deal with the Soviet Union, in which the Luftwaffe cadres gave training (and equipment?) to the Soviet AF in return for use of airspace for their own training. True or not? [Answers to the last paragraph by email or in soc.history, please! -- CDR] Mark <MJackson.Wbst147@Xerox.COM>
tzeng@sunland.gsfc.nasa.gov (Nigel Tzeng) (06/04/91)
From: tzeng@sunland.gsfc.nasa.gov (Nigel Tzeng) sysmgr@KING.ENG.UMD.EDU (Doug Mohney) writes: > It would have helped if the F-16s were using smart weapons/standoff > munitions instead of dumb bombs, preferable with the LANTIRN targeting > pods. We could just as easily question the wisdom of the DoD planners > who have purchased gee-wiz planes with low-tech munitions. Hi Doug! I believe that they've managed to get fairly high accuracy with good ol' iron bombs on the F16...hence the somewhat questionable practice of sending high-tech fighters in with low-tech munitions. I've heard that the Isreali raid on the nuclear power plant was made with F16s and iron bombs with good results. I've also heard that that story is pure bunk or that damage assessment done was highly inflated. I'd appreciate info (solid as opposed to the ever present rumour variety) if anyone has any. I tend to believe the original article I read several years ago but it was the Washington Post and not a "trade" journal. You sort of end back up into the old debate of "platform" vs "weapons" and where you're going to sink your money into. In a optimal world the answer is both...in the real world we all know that tradeoffs have to be made to save the odd billion dollars or so. The problem lies in the fact that the bean counters occasionally forget that if we keep sending our high-tech fighters OVER the target area the odds of that golden BB appearing becomes much higher. Nigel Tzeng