dthompso@magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu (David G Thompson) (05/22/91)
From: dthompso@magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu (David G Thompson) This afternoon I attended a presentation by Brig. Gen. James L. Cole, Jr., Military Air Command Assistant Director for Operations, on U.S. airlift op's in Desert Shield/Storm. A few of his prominent points were the following: Although this was the first time it was ever actually mobilized since its inception in 1951, the CRAF (Civilian Reserve Air Fleet) system was a remarkable success. All 24 commercial carriers involved in the program contributed much-needed aircraft, primarily for moving personnel rather than cargo. The hasty conversion of a few 747s to cargo duty was mainly ineffective, due mainly to loading problems (no ramp, etc.) Employment of civilian crews in the AOR (Area of Responsibility; aka, Saudi Arabia) created other headaches (e.g., security clearance for necessary ops briefings, chemical protections while on the ground, etc.), but for the most part worked well. The temporary lull following the initial crash-deployment in August-September proved invaluable to MAC in catching up on aircrew fatigue and maintenance tasks. Gen. Cole pointed out that the problems of chronic fatigue in sustained operations are nearly impossible to forecast in training. In the first 30 days, MAC lifted 91,000 personnel and 72,000 tons of cargo to the AOR. For comparison, peak 30-day lifts to Vietnam and Israel in 1973 were approx. 21,000 tons. MAC controlled flow of world-wide airlift sorties through a predesignated CAT (Crisis Action Team) of approximately 50 personnel, centered on 6 colonels backed up by Cole and the Dir. of Ops in dealing with other general officers. Bottlenecks appear to have been few, minimized by recently developed software which was perfected in a "blast-furnace crucible" of the most intense airlift to date. The software contractor was kept on the spot with the CAT throughout, guaranteeing full customer service! Prioritization of loads was a crucial question, especially during the initial (Aug-Sept) phase. Ultimate authority was CENTCOM's; however, other agencies making sudden emergency demands for immediate MAC service often had to be reminded to go through the proper chain of command. Cole gave the Marine Corps top marks for excellent preparation, staff work, and load discipline. The approximate total ratio of sealifted material to that airlifted was 90% / 10%; Cole commented that this was close to the same case during Vietnam. In limited cases heavy equipment was airlifted if a special need existed; for example, some AFVs during initial phase, and in another example, Army tank transporters by direct order of Schwarzkopf due to urgent requirement. Air/sea/land transport was coordinated by the inter-service TRANSCOM agency, established in 1986. Cole said this functioned fairly well, despite most "customers" preference for air transport; the common feeling was that loads sent by sea were more likely to get lost in the pipeline, even if they weren't necessarily time-critical. Total performance by MAC as of 11 Mar 91: 504,518 personnel, 542,011 tons delivered to AOR. Cole warned of the impending retirement of C-141; phase-out must begin in approximately 2 years due to structural fatigue. Most aircraft have only about 10,000 hours life remaining, despite SLEP (Service Life Extension Program) benefits. Cole endorsed the C-17 as an effective replacement, and expressed concern over cut-backs to only 120 units on order. He suggested that allied nations should consider acquisition of C-17 as well, citing example of French deployments to Africa which in past have depended on U.S. support; this would drive down unit cost of C-17 for USAF as well, and extend availability of production options. (Maybe if we had French congressmen we could write to?) Overall, MAC seems to have performed extremely well. Cole's primary concern seems to be that in the wake of such success, Congress will assume that miracles can be performed with nothing. In fact these crews were pushed to the very edge of their capabilities, and it is remarkable that only 1 crash occurred. Given projected force structure, Cole said it is unlikely that we could do the same thing again in 3 years, especially with the anticipated resignation of approximately 20% (some unit estimates as high as 50%) of reserve air components following end of call- up. The Total Force sounds nice, but a call-up extended from 90 to 180 days, and then to 2 years, hits some people very hard. Cole will assume his new post responsible for USAF safety in the near future. He is a veteran of extensive AC-47 gunship operations in SE Asia. --David G. Thompson dthompso@magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu
zrra07@uunet.UU.NET (Randall R. Appleton) (05/22/91)
From: apctrc!zrra07@uunet.UU.NET (Randall R. Appleton) About the Civilian Reserve Air Fleet ... How many aircraft are in it? And where do they get the crews? Surely they cannot just draft them, and I cannot imaging that the Aif Force has lots of Boing 747 pilots in the wings (heh heh). -Randy [Double .signature deleted - please check your posting software. --CDR]
dthompso@magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu (David G Thompson) (05/24/91)
From: dthompso@magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu (David G Thompson) If think that General Cole indicated that approximately 20-60 civilian aircraft (mostly, if not all 747s) were active during the CRAF mobilization for Desert Shield/Storm. The actual number operating at a given time varied throughout the lift; for example, MAC obligingly released some capacity for the airlines' holiday surge, then collected it back for the final push in Jan- Feb. I'm almost certain that no more than 100 civilian planes were involved, but I think the CRAF agreement also would allowed the call-up of more in case of a true "national emergency." Regarding pilots, I don't want to mis-quote the General, but I believe he said that CRAF actually does not automatically require the airlines to provide pilots. In this case, however, they were highly cooperative in almost all cases and performed good service. --David G. Thompson dthompso@magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu
dpm@cs.purdue.edu (David Moffett) (05/24/91)
From: dpm@cs.purdue.edu (David Moffett) (No doubt CDR will be upset this deals with the logistics of war, and not killing directly... :-) ) [The technology of logistics is an entirely appropriate topic. --CDR] dthompso@magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu (David G Thompson) writes: >If think that General Cole indicated that approximately 20-60 >civilian aircraft (mostly, if not all 747s) were active during >the CRAF mobilization for Desert Shield/Storm. [...] I toured Federal Express in Indianapolis in Decemeber. Indy is their 'heavy' freight sorting hub. At that time they had lost 24 747s to the stage 1 call up and their operation was seriously in trouble for the lost capacity. They expected to lose their remaining 747s if the civilian reserve fleet got called up to stage 2. (BTW: These were all FedEx 747s. Flying Tigers, a division of FedEx now, didn't participate in the civilian reserve.) They were also worried in stage 2 about the potential loss of DC-10s. >Regarding pilots, [...] While we were there we asked about pilots. The FedEx planes were all handed over to the military pilotless. HOWEVER, at the same time the planes left so did over half of the 747 crews, since most were in the AF reserve. It was not at all uncommon for FedEx crews (now in military clothing) to be flying their old aircraft since there was no training time required for that particular configuration of 747. We also asked, given the mobilizations to that point (second week of December) if Federal Express would withdraw from the the Civilian Reserve when the activation was over. They said no, for three reasons: First they would have no pilots to fly the aircraft, even if they had them. Second, they felt as a corporation that it was the 'right' thing to do. And third, it is still a reasonable way to help finance the purchase of $100m aircraft. They also noted that the 747 frieghters that United Parcel has were also called up out of Louisville (about a dozen or so if I remember correctly). If someone could write a coherent, detailed, couple of pages on the details of the civilian reserve agreement and send them to me, I'd be glad to summarize and send them off to CDR... I'd also like to hear about how palleting and pallet handlers worked for this adventure, since FedEx sent empty aircraft as far as our tour guide knew. She knew none of their pallet movers and lifters left. David Moffett dpm@cs.purdue.edu
lhb6v@faraday.clas.Virginia.EDU (Laura Hayes Burchard) (05/29/91)
From: lhb6v@faraday.clas.Virginia.EDU (Laura Hayes Burchard) dthompso@magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu (David G Thompson) writes: >He suggested allied >nations should consider acquisition of C-17 as well, citing >example of French deployments to Africa which in past have >depended on U.S. support; this would drive down unit cost of C-17 >for USAF as well, and extend availability of production options. >(Maybe if we had French congressmen we could write to?) Huh? I've always been under the impression that French-American military cooperation is minimal. I would expect that that we would be involved in supporting actions by NATO allies, but France? Anybody know more about this? -- Laura Burchard lhb6v@virginia.edu lhb6v@virginia.bitnet #inc <std.disclaimer>
military@amdcad (06/11/91)
From: <ames!rutgers!bellcore.bellcore.com!mruxb!patter> Either Pilot magazine or the AOPA mag (I can't remember which) had a very nice article recently about this topic. It was written by the pilot of one of the aircraft sent by a major airline (again, I don't remember which one). This airline also "loaned" entire crews, asking for volunteers for the job. This pilot got a real kick out of being issued an automatic weapon after landing.