bergman@afnews.af.mil (CMSgt Mike Bergman) (06/27/91)
From: CMSgt Mike Bergman <bergman@afnews.af.mil>
Here is the AF White Paper you inquiried about in sci.military:
Air Force Performance in
OPERATION DESERT STORM
Everyone witnessed the success of the coalition air forces in
Operation Desert Storm. From the early hours over Baghdad to the final
minutes in Kuwait City, the United States Air Force proved it is the
world's best. This effort did not just happen. It was the result of a
concerted effort over the past 20 years -- 20 years of hard work and
commitment to excellence. Quality people, quality equipment, quality
training and quality leadership created this force and assured our success
during Operation Desert Storm. Environmental impacts -- heat, sand and
fine dust -- were less significant than anticipated. Aircraft, weapons,
and ground and aircrews performed and survived even better than predicted.
Motivated people proved that flexibility is the key to airpower.
Ingenuity, cooperation with industry and reliable weapons systems enhanced
that flexibility.
This report captures the flavor of USAF system and personnel
performance in Desert Storm. It highlights the performance of a cross
section of resources from combat aircraft and combat support to the role of
Air Force engineers, logisticians, and space assets. It is not a
comprehensive report on capabilities, but an initial report of how the "100
hour war in the desert" was won.
Combat Systems
Much of the prewar debate centered around whether the military had the
right doctrine, was buying the right equipment, and could operate
effectively in a coalition force. Desert Storm showed that Air Force
equipment and doctrine were up to the task. It also demonstrated the U.S.
Air Force could integrate effectively into what was the largest coalition
air effort since World War II. In this integrated air campaign, coalition
air forces quickly gained and maintained air superiority. This achievement
opened opportunities for coalition forces to employ the versatility of
airpower to meet other military objectives.
Airpower destroyed the Iraqi Integrated Air Defense system and those
Iraqi pilots who chose to fly. After gaining air superiority, coalition
forces proceeded to destroy the strategic industrial and military targets
which keep a military force running. Electricity, oil, communications,
supply depots and transportation nodes are vital to any nation's ability to
use military power. As these strategic targets were destroyed, coalition
air forces focused their fire power on enemy forces on the battlefield.
The destruction of bridges, tanks, artillery and other military hardware in
the Kuwait Theater of Operations (KTO) demonstrated how effectively this
can be done with modern airpower.
Without air superiority, the full spectrum of airpower could not have
been applied against the right targets to avoid casualties and leverage our
high-tech advantages. Employing a single Air Tasking Order, CINCCENTCOM
selectively employed his best platforms, armed with the most effective
munition to attack the target. He used every joint and coalition asset to
accomplish the war objectives. Desert Storm revalidated many doctrinal
precepts. This war proved U.S. military forces had the quality people,
equipment, leadership and training required to fight and win. By employing
assets in a well-conceived plan, Desert Storm was won and Kuwait was again
free.
As was demonstrated, airpower offers the ability to quickly and
quietly respond to any crisis. F-15s were flying defensive patrols along
the Iraqi-Saudi border 7,000 miles from their departure bases within 38
hours of notification to deploy. Within five days strategic airlift moved
five fighter squadrons, a contingent of AWACS, and an 82 ABN Brigade to the
CENTCOM area of responsibility (AOR). Within 35 days, the coalition air
forces had a fighter force that equalled Iraq's fighter capability. The
global reach of the Air Force allowed the United States to mass its
military power rapidly and to immediately project combat power in this part
of the world. Once combat power was in place, it could either defend
friendly areas or attack an adversary.
The Air Force flew over 65,000 sorties during Operation Desert Storm
and accounted for 31 of 35 kills against fixed-wing aircraft. The air
campaign eliminated a minimum of 234 aircraft, including 120 that flew to
Iran, without a single loss in air-to-air combat. The Air Force flew 59
percent of all sorties, with 50 percent of the assets and incurred only 38
percent of the losses. The mission capable rate for Air Force aircraft was
92 percent -- higher than our peacetime rate.
F-117
Before CNN's initial reports of the air war over Baghdad, the F-117
was a stellar performer. Dropping the first bomb of the war on an air
defense control center, the F-117 provided us the advantage of surprise.
Often the Iraqis would not start shooting until the bombs exploded. With
the ability to cruise to the target, identify it before surface threats
became active, and hit it with precision, the F-117 was an extraordinary
fighter-bomber. Although it represented only 2.5 percent of the shooters
in theater that first day, it hit over 31 percent of the targets. During
the war, it flew almost 1,300 combat sorties, dropped over 2,000 tons of
bombs, flew over 6,900 hours and demonstrated accuracy unmatched in the
history of air warfare.
The value of the F-117 was that it combined stealth technology and
precision delivery. With the use of tactical surprise, the F-117 helped
assure air superiority over Iraqi skies as it destroyed command and control
capabilities, the Iraqi Integrated Air Defense System, aircraft shelters
and valuable strategic targets in Baghdad and Iraq. Baghdad was more
heavily defended than the most highly defended Warsaw Pact sites in Eastern
Europe during the height of the Cold War. The F-117 was the only aircraft
to operate in this environment over downtown Baghdad. Precision delivery
assured the F-117 could destroy those targets in a single mission with
great lethality. Despite its heavy use, the F-117 had a mission capable
rate of 85.8% for the war -- 4 percent higher than in peacetime.
F-15
During Desert Shield, F-15s provided the defensive umbrella that
permitted the deployment of air, land and sea assets into the AOR. After
D-Day, they shifted to offensive counterair attacks against Iraqi air force
and helped gain air supremacy within the first 10 days of the war. Every
Iraqi fixed-wing aircraft destroyed in air-to-air combat by the air force
was a "kill" for the Eagle. Their success permitted coalition air forces
to exploit the versatility of airpower over the entire battlefield. The
120 F-15 C/D's deployed to the Gulf flew over 5,900 sorties and maintained
a 94 percent mission capable rate -- 8 percent higher than in peacetime.
F-15E
Forty-eight of these multirole fighters were deployed to the Gulf.
The F-15E's flexibility was the key to its success. The F-15E proved its
versatility by hunting Scud missiles at night, employing laser systems to
hit hard targets and attack armored vehicles, tanks and artillery. It
proved unusually effective with the Joint Surveillance Target and Attack
Radar System (JSTARS) for cueing on Scud locations and using Low Altitude
Night Infra-red Navigation System (LANTIRN) to locate and destroy the
missiles and launchers. Its overall mission capable rate was 95.9 percent
-- 8 percent higher than in peacetime. These aircraft deployed with
LANTIRN navigation pods (permits accurate navigation at night across
featureless terrain to the target area without the need for active
navigation aids). Subsequently the targeting pods were deployed. During
Desert Storm, the F-15E accomplished Operational Test and Evaluation of the
LANTIRN system with spectacular results. Their primary targets were Scuds,
command and control links, armor, airfields and road interdiction. While
flying over 2,200 sorties, only two were lost in combat.
A-10
The Air Force deployed 144 A-10s into the AOR. Although flying only
30 percent of the sorties, A-10s achieved over half the confirmed bomb
damage assessment (BDA) and fired over 90 percent of the Mavericks. Air
superiority allowed innovative employment of A-10s in a variety of roles.
Primarily killing tanks in an interdiction role, the A-10 proved its
versatility as a daytime SCUD hunter in Western Iraq, suppressing enemy air
defenses, attacking early warning radars and even recorded two helicopter
kills with its gun -- the only gun kills of the war. While the A-10 flew
almost 8,100 sorties, it maintained a mission-capable rate of 95.7 percent
-- 5 percent above its peacetime rates. Despite numerous hits and
extensive damage, the A-10 proved it could do a variety of missions
successfully.
F-111
Turning in an outstanding performance, the F-111 again proved itself
to be a workhorse not only in the interdiction and strategic attack roles
but across the spectrum of ground attack missions. With its FLIR (Forward
Looking Infrared) and laser designation system, the F-111F attacked key
military production facilities; chemical, biological, and nuclear sites;
airfields, bunkers, C3 assets, and portions of the integrated air defense
system with great success. Attacking bridges, hardened aircraft shelters,
and individual tanks, armored vehicles and artillery, it was a stellar
performer. In what became known as "tank plinking" the F-111s were
credited with over 1,500 verified armor kills. In over 4,000 sorties the
F-111 had a mission capable rate of over 85 percent - approximately 8
percent higher than peacetime rates. One wing commander reported that his
unit flew over 2,100 sorties with no maintenance non-delivers. These
platforms delivered the precision munitions on the manifolds which stopped
the oil Saddam was dumping into the Gulf. Overall, the F-111 proved to be
a versatile, precise, survivable platform which made significant
contributions to the success of the air war.
Electronic Combat
With EF-111s Ravens and F-4G's Wild Weasels, the Air Force blinded
Iraq's Integrated Air Defense System. The 18 EF-111s in the AOR flew over
900 sorties with a mission capable rate of 87.5 percent; and the 48 F-4Gs
flew over 2,500 sorties with a 87 percent mission capable rate. Because
the Iraqis feared the F-4G and its HARM missile, they made brief, limited
and ineffective use of their radars. When they did choose to operate these
radars, the effective jamming of the EF-111 negated their ability to track,
acquire and target attacking aircraft. Every day the Weasels and Ravens
supported shooters as they attacked their targets in Iraq and the Kuwaiti
Theater of Operations (KTO). One sign of their success was that after day
four, all allied aircraft operated with impunity in the mid to high
altitude environment across the AOR. By decreasing the threat of SAMs to
our strike aircraft, EF-111s and F-4Gs permitted aircraft to deliver their
weapons from an environment where they can be very lethal.
F-16
The F-16 Fighting Falcon proved itself to be a versatile platform
which can attack targets day or night -- in good or bad weather. Two
hundred and forty-nine F-16s were deployed to the Gulf. These aircraft
flew almost 13,500 sorties -- the highest sortie total for any system in
the war -- and maintained a 95.2 percent mission capable rate -- 5 percent
above its peacetime rate. F-16s attacked ground elements in the KTO, flew
Scud missions, and destroyed interdiction targets, such as military
production and support and chemical production facilities, and airfields.
The 72 LANTIRN capable (navigation pods only) F-16s were a real success
story. LANTIRN's mission capable rate was over 98 percent. Past emphasis
on reliability and maintainability paid dividends here.
B-52
The role of the large conventional bomber was revalidated in the Gulf
war. B-52s flew 1,624 missions, dropped over 72,000 weapons, and delivered
over 25,700 tons of munitions on area targets in the KTO, and on airfields,
industrial targets, troop concentrations and storage areas in Iraq.
Despite being over 30 years old, the B-52 had a mission capable rate of
over 81 percent -- 2 percent higher than its peacetime rate. B-52s
dropped 29 percent of all U.S. bombs and 38 percent of all Air Force bombs
during the war. Through effective modification of the B-52, it remains a
useful platform. As Iraqi prisoners report, B-52 raids had devastating
effects on enemy morale. Estimates show that from 20 to 40 percent of
troop strength had deserted their units prior to the G-Day. While fighters
employed precision guided munitions to destroy pinpoint targets, the B-52s
successes demonstrated the need to preserve the large conventional bombers'
ability to destroy large-area targets.
Special Operations
Elements of all AFSOC units deployed to Desert Storm and performed a
variety of missions, including infiltration, exfiltration and resupply of
Special Forces Teams on direct action missions; combat search and rescue
for downed crew members; psychological operations (PSYOPS) broadcasts;
dropping 15,000 pound bombs; and supporting counterterrorist missions.
Fifty-one SOF assets were deployed, including eight AC-130s, three EC-130
Volant Solos, 14 MC/HC-130s and 26 helicopters. These assets flew over 330
missions and over 500 conventional operational missions to support CENTCOM.
SOF crews recovered downed crewmembers and provided valuable target
identification and human intelligence (HUMINT) work. One MH-53J Pave Low
also acted as a pathfinder for the Army Apaches that attacked the radars in
Iraq during the first hours of the war. One AC-130 was lost during the
war.
The individual performance of Air Force aircraft was overshadowed by
the people who fly and maintain these aircraft. Their accomplishments
reflect the pride, professionalism, and skill of a well trained force. A
force which had the right equipment to counter modern battlefield threats
and which was led by leaders who understand how to employ those forces.
This coupling of quality equipment and well trained people led by visionary
leaders who understand how to apply airpower is the real success story of
Desert Storm.
Munitions and Missiles
Aircraft get you to the target area, but effective munitions destroy
the targets. Vital centers of industrial power were vulnerable to pinpoint
attacks. Military equipment and infrastructure were destroyed across the
width, depth and breadth of the battlefield with impunity and at a time of
our choosing. Once air superiority was gained, every sanctuary and every
prerogative was vulnerable to airpower. The death knell in this war began
with the success of the F-117 during the first few hours to blind and
incapacitate the Iraqi military.
Precision Guided Munitions (PGMs)
Denying the enemy sanctuary has always been a goal of airpower, and
magnifies the effectiveness of an air campaign. U.S. pilots used 7,400
tons of precision munitions with deadly effectiveness. Approximately 90
percent were dropped by the Air Force. F-111s employed GBU-12s to destroy
over 150 armored vehicles a night during the last few weeks of the war.
F-117s used GBU-27s to hit hard targets such as aircraft shelters, bunkers,
and other strategic targets in Baghdad. F-111s and F-15E's used GBU-24s to
destroy chemical, biological and nuclear storage areas, bridges, aircraft
shelters and other strategic targets.
Precision munitions highlight the lethality of modern airpower. On
several occasions, a two-ship formation of F-15Es with 16 bombs destroyed
16 tanks. When one bomb equals one shelter or a tank -- the message
quickly spread that every sanctuary had been eliminated by airpower. After
the commencement of the shelter campaign, Iraqi pilots voted with their
afterburners to get out of the war. But, not every target requires a
precision weapon. The ability to use the right weapon on the correct
target shaped the outcome of the air war. When it was important to avoid
collateral damage, civilian casualties, or to directly hit a target, PGMs
were the right choice. F-117 attacks over Baghdad demonstrated the ability
to precisely kill military targets while minimizing civilian casualties.
Maverick
The Maverick missile, used by the F-16 and A-10, attacked armored
targets. This missile has continually been upgraded to handle new threats
and targets. The imaging infrared radar (IIR) Maverick's performance was
crucial in the armor war. Since it only took one missile to destroy each
Iraqi tank, a $70,000 Maverick equated to a $1.5 million T-72 tank. It is
important to note that Iraq had more tanks than Germany and Great Britain
combined. It was the fourth largest army in the world. Maverick, an older
system which had been continually modified to keep pace with modern war,
played a large part in the destruction of that significant military force.
AIM-7/AIM-9
The AIM-7 proved to be an effective air-to-air weapon. Twenty-three
enemy fixed-wing aircraft were downed by AIM-7s. Through an aggressive
product improvement program, the AIM-7 has become a more lethal weapon with
a bigger launch envelope. The AIM-9 destroyed six enemy fixed-wing
aircraft and worked as advertised.
High Speed Anit-Radiation Missile (HARM)
Its hard to assess the success of the HARM missile due to the Iraqi
tactics used to counter it. The Iraqis understood that if a radar went on,
a HARM was on its way. This deterrent kept them from using their operable
radars and control centers. Throughout the war, surface-to-air missile
(SAM) sites would turn off their radars after launching missiles, leaving
SAMs unguided as they flew toward their targets. Lethal SEAD (Suppression
of Enemy Air Defenses) permitted us to operate from the mid to high
altitude where aircraft were beyond anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) range.
Deployment, Sustainment and Resupply Efforts
Airlift, tanker support, prepositioning of supplies and a large,
modern, base infrastructure permitted movement of forces into the AOR, and
provided the ability to operate quickly from Saudi Arabia. These forces
assured we had the "global reach" and support to exercise "global power."
Strategic Airlift
Desert Storm was the largest airlift since World War II. Airlifters
moved combat forces half way around the world. By the cease fire, airlift
had moved over 482,000 passengers and 513,000 tons of cargo into the AOR --
the equivalent of moving Oklahoma City, all of its people, all of its
vehicles, all of its food, and all of its household goods halfway around
the world.
Air Force C-5s and C-141s, moved 72 percent of the air cargo and about
one-third of the people while commercial augmentation moved the rest.
C-5s were 90 percent and C-141s 80 percent committed to Desert Storm. The
remainder of Air Force airlift flew other high priority DOD missions to the
rest of the world. This operation was the first time in its 38-year
history that the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) was activated. On 18
August, the first stage of CRAF, 18 passenger and 23 cargo aircraft, was
activated. When fighting commenced, the second stage, 77 passenger and 40
additional cargo aircraft, were activated. These commercial carriers
provided additional airlift capacity needed to meet CENTCOM's requirements.
These commercial aircraft carried the majority of the troops to the AOR.
Strategic airlift forces have been going at full speed since Desert
Storm started and will continue until our forces are redeployed home.
Airlifters with Airlift Control Elements were the first to land in the
Arabian Peninsula and will be the last to leave. Many of these people are
Guardsmen and reservists who have twice demonstrated their patriotism
during the past 18 months -- in Panama and now the Arabian Peninsula.
Air Refueling
The rapid deployment of fighter aircraft to Saudi Arabia resulted from
Air Force tanker capability. Within 38 hours of the deployment notice, the
first F-15 aircraft had landed in Saudi Arabia and were ready to defend the
Persian Gulf area. The Strategic Air Command deployed 256 KC-135s and 46
KC-10s into the AOR during the war. In Desert Shield, tankers flew 4,967
sorties and 19,089 hours, refueled 14,588 receivers, including 5,495 Navy
and Marine aircraft, and offloaded 68.2 million gallons of fuel. Tankers
surpassed this effort during the six weeks of Desert Storm when they flew
15,434 sorties, logged 59,943 hours, refueled 45,955 aircraft and offloaded
110.2 million gallons of fuel. Approximately 20 percent was used for Navy
and Marine receivers. Every aircraft -- fighter, bomber, airlift, AWACS,
or JSTARS -- and every service and some allies used Air Force tankers to do
their missions. One F-15 pilot commented about tanker accessibility:
"There was more gas in the sky over Saudi than in the ground below" -- a
testimony to the tanker force. No other nation has such a capability.
Prepositioning and Base Infrastructure
Saudi host nation support was superb. During the past decade, whole
bases were built, stocked and prepared for war. These locations made it
easy for forces to quickly move from a deployment phase to full combat
operations. The Gulf Cooperation Council provided fuel and many other
materials. In other locations, the Air Force operated from open runways.
There, civil engineers literally built cities on the sand. During the past
decade, the Air Force developed tents, hospitals, supply areas, ramps and
other base essentials had been developed as modular buildings. This
investment guaranteed operation from austere locations anywhere around the
globe. Afloat and ashore prepositioning included bare base and fuels
equipment, supplies, vehicles and munitions which were required to sustain
and project Desert Storm forces. These supplies saved an estimated 1,800
airlift missions to the AOR and provided prepositioning of supplies and
base infrastructure for 21 principal airfields.
Theater Airlift
Over 145 C-130s deployed to support Desert Storm. These aircraft
moved units forward as they deployed into the theater. From 10 August to
the cease fire, C-130s flew 46,500 sorties, logged over 75,000 hours, and
moved over 209,000 people and over 300,000 tons of cargo. Once the
fighting started, they provided logistical support, medical evacuation of
wounded and battlefield mobility through airland and airdrop. During the
ground campaign, C-130s flew over 500 sorties a day. During Desert Storm,
C-130s had a mission capable rate of 84 percent -- 6 percent higher than in
peacetime.
Command and Control
Desert Storm employed a wide variety of new space and intelligence
assets to ease mission planning, command and control of the air war,
provide real-time identification of ground targets for shooters, and assure
the coalition gained and maintained the initiative. Both space and
intelligence platforms were force multipliers in Desert Storm.
Desert Storm was America's first comprehensive Space war. The prudent
investments of the past decade were justified as space provided weather
information, reliable navigation support, warning of possible threats and
secure, rapid communications. Until recently, space focused primarily on
providing strategic warning, surveillance, communications and arms control
verification. Today, even the tactical commander realizes the benefit
space assets provide to conventional warfare.
Defense Meteorological Support Program (DMSP)
DMSP assured commanders high resolution, near real-time weather
information about sand storms and other unusual phenomena in the Gulf area,
and could accurately predict target weather throughout the war. DMSP was
crucially important this year as the weather over Baghdad and Kuwait was
the worst in the last 14 years. It also provided the first glimpses of
Saddam's ecoterrorism of the Gulf waters and its air. CINCCENTCOM and his
staff fully integrated these capabilities into their planning and execution
of the war effort.
Global Positioning System (GPS)
Without reliable navigation, no precision weapon could have been
employed. Aircraft must get to the target area before they can effectively
use their weapons. GPS provided accurate guidance to the target area for
air, land and naval forces. Although the whole constellation will not be
completed until FY93, American forces had three-dimensional coverage for 20
hours a day, and two-dimensional coverage 24 hours a day. GPS provides the
Air Force the ability to traverse all parts of the globe to deliver
precision munitions.
Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS)
Throughout history, communication has been a shortfall during war.
The need to communicate easily and securely is crucial to prosecuting
military operations. During Desert Storm, DSCS was the workhorse providing
both inter- and intra-theater communications. With over 100 ground
tactical terminals to support theater operations, the Air Force was able to
provide a full range of secure and non-secure voice and data capability to
Desert Storm commanders. Even though the communications requirements
increased by a factor of 30, DSCS assured our tactical commanders the
ability to communicate wherever and whenever they wanted. Overall, the
first space war was an unqualified success.
Just as space played a significant role in this war, our intelligence
assets changed the way we prepare for war and fight. Four systems -- the
Mission Support System, Tactical Digital Facsimile, AWACS, and JSTARS --
provided timely information, and support for air, ground and naval forces
during Desert Storm.
Mission Support System
This system provided integrated mission planning support for Air Force
pilots. While it took a couple of days to plan a mission in Vietnam, it
was now possible to prepare a pilot for a mission in four hours. Charts,
maps, threats and other vital data were integrated through this system into
every squadron involved in Desert Storm. Through its reliability, it
became a command and control asset for planners in the CENTCOM staff. Many
units found innovative and creative ways to better use this asset.
Tactical Digital Facsimile
Crucial to crews and commanders, it provided the capability to send
high-resolution pictures and other data. It is a secure, reliable and
versatile force multiplier which can relay near real-time data vital to
combat success to the pilot. Much maligned before the war, the investment
was well worth the money. The TDF was today's telephone to the modern
battlefield commander.
AWACS
From 16 January to the cease fire, AWACS flew four continuous orbits
to control over 3,000 sorties a day. Despite multiple air forces and
languages involved in the coalition, not one instance of friendly
air-to-air fratricide resulted -- a tribute to AWACS effectiveness. It was
an AWACS vector which positioned the Saudi F-15 to kill his two F-1s. Just
as it patrolled the Persian Gulf skies from 1980 to 1989, AWACS proved to
be an invaluable asset to control the air war. It was very effective in
target pairing and declaring hostile threats.
JSTARS
This program had not finished its developmental test and evaluation
prior to its deployment to Saudi Arabia in mid-January. JSTARS proved to
be a spectacular success. These two test aircraft flew 54 combat sorties
and supported 100 percent of mission taskings with a system availability
rate of over 80 percent. JSTARS tracked everything that moved on the
ground. From D-Day to G-Day, JSTARS operators logged over 535 hours to
locate, identify and target assembly areas, POL storage sites, Scud areas
and missiles, convoys, trucks, tanks, and even SAM sites and artillery for
allied fighters. Coupled with F-16s, JSTARS enhanced the kill box approach
to air interdiction which proved so effective in destroying Iraqi equipment
in the KTO. When used with F-15E's, F-16s and F-111s, JSTARS effectively
denied the enemy its night sanctuary and kept continual pressure on ground
troops in the KTO. A mission on 13 February proves this point. During a
10.9-hour flight, JSTARS detected over 225 vehicles -- more than it had
fighters to attack. Every commander agreed it was a spectacular success.
The large investments in intelligence and space assets to provide
command and control over the battlefield and to provide information for all
coalition forces were wise expenditures of taxpayer money. Lives were
saved, assets better employed and the full weight of joint forces were
demonstrated in Operation Desert Storm. These initial efforts to merge new
command and control capabilities with near real-time data will define the
modern battlefield of the future.
Combat and Logistical Support Efforts
Civil Engineering and Community Services Support
The Air Force is a self contained community. Most city services, like
road repair, building maintenance, meals, housing and office space are
provided by the civil engineers and community support personnel. During
Desert Storm, these people erected over 5,000 tents, constructed over
300,000 square feet of hardwall facilities, laid over 500,000 square meters
of concrete and asphalt and served over 20 million meals. The beddown of
over 1,200 aircraft and its personnel was a major achievement.
Approximately 9 percent of all personnel deployed to the AOR were in civil
engineering and services. In one instance, they built a base from the
ground up in 40 days. As one wing commander noted "the tallest thing on
the base when we got here was the two-inch high taxiway lights." RED HORSE,
PRIME BEEF, and Saudi contractors worked around the clock to build the base
areas -- 380 tents, four field kitchens, a 50-bed hospital, tactical field
laundry, 19 latrine/shower units, and a tactical field exchange. They even
had to bring electrical power to the base. Without this support, aircrews
at these bare bases could not have performed their mission.
Medical Support
Just six days after the invasion of Kuwait, the first Air Force
squadron medical elements and air transportable clinics left for Saudi
Arabia. In a very short time, the largest projection of medical personnel
in American history was assembled in the Gulf. The first of 15 air
transportable hospitals arrived in theater within the week and was ready to
receive patients within 24 hours. These 50-bed hospitals, together with a
250-bed contingency hospital, were the primary Air Force medical support in
the theater. In Europe, four USAF contingency hospitals with 3,250 beds
were prepared, staffed and ready for casualties while 2,178 beds were
available in CONUS. Over 6,200 active duty medical personnel and 5,500
from the ARC deployed to Europe or the AOR. The Reserve forces also made a
significant contribution in CONUS by augmenting medical treatment
facilities with over 6,600 personnel. During Desert Shield and Desert
Storm, almost 48,000 patient visits were made in the AOR.
Modifications and Logistical Audibles
During combat, new operational threats and requirements arise which
must be countered. During Desert Storm, the Air Force worked hard to
shorten the time needed to meet new operational requirements. A rapid
response process reduced the two to 12 year requirement process to less
than six months for urgent and compelling needs. Fourteen percent of these
requirements were for new capabilities unique to Desert Storm, while the
remainder enhanced current warfighting capabilities. By using or adapting
off-the-shelf equipment, the Air Force minimized risks with these systems.
Through this system, many changes were made to upgrade computer software
for aircraft and support equipment.
Areas for Improvement
Regardless of the plan or the preparation, nothing ever goes as
planned. This war was no exception. Clausewitz called these the
"frictions" of war -- those forces which impede you from doing your job.
One area involved the use of systems which the military cannot use during
peacetime training -- to use them would compromise their capabilities. In
Desert Storm some of these systems needed adjustments, but the deficiencies
weren't known until the equipment was tested in the AOR. Quickly adjusted,
these systems worked as advertised. Another area dealt with training
munitions during the deployment phase. The Air Force did not deploy with
sufficient training munitions. Without these assets, the ability to
conduct training during the build up was limited.
Overall, BDA was a problem. It was not always timely. In addition,
the video tape recorders in many fighters did not have sufficient quality
to permit accurate BDA. Less than half of all air-to-air kills could be
confirmed through this system. The principal data recorded related to
ground attack -- buildings, bridges, airfields, storage areas, tanks,
artillery, trucks and armored personnel vehicles. Although these video
recorders provided much of that data, with further refinement, new
recorders could help overcome the BDA problems noted during the war.
Finally, tactical intelligence support was not always timely.
Commanders complained about the excessive time it took to receive
information at the units and the shortage of tactical reconnaissance
assets. As we have increased the tempo and decision cycle of war, the
ability to analyze post-mission data has not kept pace. Intelligence at
the theater level to support the mission with AWACS and JSTARS was
excellent; but work is needed to ensure reliable, timely BDA.
These problem areas will not be the only ones which occured during
Desert Storm; they are only the initial impressions of areas where we could
have performed better. As we continue to study and dissect the lessons
learned in the war, others problems will appear.
Summary
The Air Force's success in Desert Storm stems from quality people,
equipment, training and leadership. Today's airman is the best that has
ever been recruited. Articulate, bright and innovative, these people
willingly accept responsibility, and operate sophisticated equipment with
skill and pride. They are team players. An incident during the war will
highlight this team effort. One F-15 wing deputy commander for operations
praised the efforts of the only maintenance person available when his
wing's aircraft arrived at a remote base: "The aircraft had to be turned
and put on status, so the chief did the only thing he could do under the
circumstances -- he enlisted cooks, cops and engineers, and had every
aircraft ready to go inside an hour." This example attests to the fighting
spirit and flexibility of Air Force people during the war. Numerous other
examples abound as well.
The Air Force today has the "global reach" and the "global power" to
support national security objectives. These comprehensive forces can
exploit the speed, range, flexibility, lethality and precision of modern
airpower. Desert Storm reflects a commitment to recruiting quality people,
providing them the best equipment and technology available, training them
until they gain confidence in their ability and their equipment, and giving
them quality leaders to direct them. This formula was a winner in this
war. Realistic training at Red Flag and other exercises prepared both
pilots and support personnel for war, and they performed magnificently.
When coupled with innovative planning, aggressive leadership and near
flawless execution, Desert Storm was an unqualified success.
(April 1991)
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__________________________________________________________________
| Air Force News Center (AFNEWS) |
| Kelly Air Force Base, Texas, USA |
| bergman@afnews.af.mil |
|__________________________________________________________________|