cash@convex.com (Peter Cash) (02/01/90)
In article <2018@cjsa.WA.COM> jeff@cjsa.WA.COM (Jeffery Small) writes: > >Philosophy n.; >...dictionary definition deleted >Science n.; >...dictionary definition deleted > >Definitions above from: "Merriam-Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary" - 1961 > > >Clearly, unless one wishes to rewrite the definitions and thereby distort >the meaning of any of the above terms, philosophy (as defined; often in >opposition to how it is practiced) is and must be considered a science. Clearly, this is a lesson in how a little (very little) knowledge can be a dangerous thing. The dictionary is a good place for finding superficial information about words; don't expect profundity or keen insight there. And don't expect to find an ultimate court of appeal; dictionaries sometimes disagree, and sometimes they're wrong. When Webster's talks about philosophy as a "science", "science" is surely used in the very loosest sense. Science is empirical; to be scientific, a question must--at least in theory--be capable of resolution by experiment. Modern philosophy deals with precisely those questions that cannot--*even in theory*--ever be resolved through experiment. If one can devise an experiment that would solve a question, then that question is not a philosophical one. Philosophy is therefore not "scientific". I do hope you Objectivists get your very own newsgroup soon. -- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ | Die Welt ist alles, was Zerfall ist. | Peter Cash | (apologies to Ludwig Wittgenstein) | cash@convex ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
cash@convex.com (Peter Cash) (02/02/90)
In article <0ZltB5y00Xc1MZPXZ9@andrew.cmu.edu> cr10+@andrew.cmu.edu (Christopher John Rapier) writes: >About the Skepticism vs Realism debate I mentioned earlier I suggest >read Rene Descartes "Meditations on the First Philosophy". Great work >that attempts to provide a base for reality without presuposing the >existance of reality. Excellent philosophizing. >basically he starts by saying that if he is pondering the nature of his >own existance then he must exist to be able to do that. All things are >taken from there. Yes, but does he really go anywhere? The doubts that he raises in the First Meditation are very powerful; I doubt whether he ever really settles them. Remember, there are three kinds of doubt in the 1st Meditation: 1. Doubts about the veracity of the senses ("My senses have sometimes deceived me", so maybe they're *never* reliable) 2. The dream argument (Maybe I'm dreaming right now; maybe my whole life is a dream) 3. The Evil Genius (who can deceive Descartes about everything, even the principles of mathematics and geometry). Against these doubts, Descartes pits two insights: a. If I doubt my own existence, then I must exist. b. God exists, is good, and wouldn't fool around with me (i.e. allow me to be mistaken about really important stuff, like that the world exists, etc.) Lots of commentators have remarked on the weaknesses in Descartes' arguments, and I'm really not saying anything new when I tell you that Descartes doesn't rescue us from the skepticism into which he deliberately plungs us in the 1st M. For example, "a" doesn't prove that Descartes exists. Maybe it proves that *something* exists, or is muttering to itself, but not that the "I" exists. After all, Descartes could be wrong about so many things. Maybe he's a troglodyte that lives at the bottom of a well and dreams about being a man. Maybe he's some wraith that's come into existence for a moment, "dreams" up a life history, says to itself, "I doubt, therefore I am", and then pops out of existence again. Maybe words ("exist", "I", "doubt", "am", etc.) don't mean what Descartes thinks they do. (The Evil Genius is very powerful, remember!) Certainly, the Evil Genius could mislead Descartes about the nature of God, so "b" doesn't follow. The best tack to take is to re-examine the doubts that get Descartes started. The best analysis of these that I have ever seen is in Bourdain's commentary on the Meditations in _Objections and Replies_. (Yes, the article that the editor considers to be "utterly without merit" and that is placed last in the book.) I think that G.E.M. Anscombe edited a version of _Objections and Replies_; your library should have a copy. -- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ | Die Welt ist alles, was Zerfall ist. | Peter Cash | (apologies to Ludwig Wittgenstein) | cash@convex ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
flink@mimsy.umd.edu (Paul V Torek) (02/09/90)
Although Jeff Small may be right that philosophy is a science, that fact alone is a woefully inadequate argument for classifying an objectivism newsgroup under "sci". Such a group would be dominated by "extensive discussions" as Gene Spafford points out; thus it clearly qualifies for classification under "talk" -- there is no reason to suppose that qualification for "talk" and for "sci" need be mutually exclusive. The question is which classification would be MORE appropriate. And the answer is that pragmatic reasons clearly favor "talk". Since others have eloquently stated those reasons, I won't bother to repeat them. -- Wait! ... There's no oat bran in FROOT LOOPS! Paul Torek flink@mimsy.umd.edu
francis@mirror.UUCP (Joe Francis) (02/10/90)
In article <0ZltB5y00Xc1MZPXZ9@andrew.cmu.edu> cr10+@andrew.cmu.edu (Christopher John Rapier) writes: >About the Skepticism vs Realism debate I mentioned earlier I suggest >read Rene Descartes "Meditations on the First Philosophy". Great work >that attempts to provide a base for reality without presuposing the >existance of reality. Excellent philosophizing. Hmmm. I found "Meditations on the First Philosophy" to be a mixed bag. I can appreciate the "carefully reasoned" approach (which is not to say that a book must be written this way to be worthwhile), but I was dissapointed by how easily fallacies could be unearthed in his text. Reminded me of Alvin Plantinga, who is noteable for using very formal logic constructs (for a philosophical work - don't be offended mathematicians) to couch his arguments in, which makes it all the easier for the critic to find the hole.