jcollier@ariel.ucs.unimelb.edu.au (John Donald Collier) (05/07/91)
An acquaintance of mine, an Italian mathematician, once argued that birth control was inappropriate because the essential function of sexual intercourse is reproduction, and to have sex without the possibility of reproduction violates the essential function of sex, making the act meaningless, or at least less than wholesome. I have tried to make sense of this from a biological perspective, and I find that things are not at all simple. By definition, the biological function of any adaptation is to enhance reproduction, but we do not generally think that the use of an adapatation in a way that might frustrate reproduction is a violation of the essential nature of the function. Just for example, time spent thinking about philosophy, mathematics or music does not directly contribute to reproduction, but we do not see this (my friend certainly would not) as therefore unwholesome. The question is, why should sex have this special role, over and above that of other adaptations? There are reasons to believe that it does not, especially in humans. For example, humans are adapted so that ovulation is concealed, thus much sexual activity serves no direct reproductive function (though, the essential function may be perserved, since there is at least the deception in the participants that reproduction is possible). Furthermore, sexual intercourse is the basis for a variety of other social functions that it is difficult to classify as biologically perverse without knowing already the biological function of sex, which is the issue that is in question. What I am asking is whether there is any biological evidence that sex has a special function in contributing to reproduction over and above the way in which all adaptations contribute to reproduction, and if this justifies the claim that reproduction is uniquely essential to the biological function of sex in human beings. This issue is significant, since some rather strong moral claims have been made on the basis of supposed factual claims about the function of sex that seem to me to get little support from our current knowledge of human biology. I probably need not stress the moral questionability of deriving moral claims from dubious factual claims, on a variety of well-trodden grounds. Any comments, either directly or posted to the net, would be welcome. I am currently writing on the sociobiology of morality. -- John Collier Email: Collier@HPS.unimelb.edu.au HPS -- University of Melbourne jcollier@ariel.ucs.unimelb.edu.au Parkville, Victoria, AUSTRALIA 3052 Fax: 61+3 344 7959