[comp.archives] Security problems with rcp portmapper repost

fitz@rpi.edu (12/10/90)

Archive-name: fixes/sun-fixes/selection-svc/1990-12-09
Archive: uunet.uu.net:/sun-fixes/selection_svc.tar.Z [192.48.96.2]
Original-posting-by: fitz@rpi.edu
Original-subject: Re: Security problems with rcp portmapper  [repost]
Reposted-by: emv@ox.com (Edward Vielmetti)

I would like to make a few observations about the article referred
to above.

1. The "demonstration program" seems not to just demonstrate the
security hole.  It actually seems to attempt to delete rpc services on
remote machines.  It appears that this program does not create any
permanent problems, but I'd like someone else to post their opinion.
It does not do anything to the control file /etc/rpc, as far as I can
tell.

2. If someone does this to you, you can get your services back by
doing, as root, "kill -HUP <pid>", where <pid> is the process id of
inetd.  Rebooting also gets the services back.

3. It is possible, but I am not sure about this, that in addition to
machines running SunOS4.1, some SunOS4.0.3 machines may be protected.
Perhaps installing the selection_svc patch does this.  Someone else can
confirm or contradict me.  Just in case, I'll point out here that the
selection_svc patch is available by anonymous ftp from uunet.uu.net in
/sun-fixes as selection_svc.tar.Z, or call 1-800-USA-4SUN, and ask for
patch number:  100085-01.

4. If my first point is correct, the in my humble opinion, it might be
better for the wizards out there to point out these bugs without
actually providing a program that can be used to exploit them.  Maybe
some people plan to upgrade to 4.1, but not Right Now.  For myself, I'd
prefer to schedule my upgrades in a non-reactive way, when I can.

5. Just because I can't get on the "outer circle" security list of Neil
Gorsuch doesn't mean I think that it is a desirable for the "core"
information to become widely known so quickly.

Brian Fitzgerald