[sci.logic] Free Will, Quantum computers, determinism, randomness, modelling

biep@cs.vu.nl (J. A. "Biep" Durieux) (05/10/88)

Warning: this is long!     Question to Muslims at the end (but they should
				read the rest first before answering).

In several newsgroups there are (independent) discussions on the nature
of free will. It seems natural to merge these. Since these discussions
mostly turn around physical, logical or mathematical notions, the natural
place for this discussion seems to be  sci.philosophy.tech  (which newsgroup
is devoted to technical philosophy, i.e. logic, philosophical mathematics
(like intuitionism, formalism, etc.), philosophical physics (the time
problem, interpretations of quantum mechanics, etc) and the like).
Here follows a bit of the discussion in sci.math, plus some of my
comments.

- - -

In article <5673@uwmcsd1.UUCP>,
	markh@csd4.milw.wisc.edu (Mark William Hopkins) writes:
> This is probably the sharpest formulation of the widely held idea
> that our free will may be ultimately derived from the Uncertainty Principle.
> What's being argued here is that human beings are fundamentally random
> (Turing Random) ... or less euphemistically, fundamentally insane.  The
> most succinct expression of these ideas is:

>       Human intelligence = Turing machine 
> 			       + Quantum theoretical random signal generator

- - -

Some points (personal opinions):

(1) The philosophical meaning of free will is mainly to form a basis for
    founding responsibility. To a lesser degree it is important with respect
    to the cluster of problems surrounding consciousness, experiencing, etc.
    It is in no way clear to me how "mechanical" explanations of the
    phenomenon can be of any help here. Is there any more reason for giving
    a victim a verdict of heavy duty instead of just life-long imprisonment
    (or easier still: death by destruction) because the victim came to its
    actions by a random decision process, or by trying in vain to model
    itself? Or does any such explanation give a hint as to the "why" of my
    sensation of existing? [I am not saying it doesn't: if you think it
    does, please explain!]
    [The same holds the other way too, of course: why take the trouble to
    give someone a "good old day" (especially if there is no motive of
    getting one yourself because of it).]

(2) In answer to Drew McDermott's robot that can only predict the world by
    seeing itself as a black box that acts intentionally: that is exactly
    what there is to it: the robot has to model itself as an intentional
    being. And it *is* an intentional being. So is a glass with water and
    lots of salt. Any system with the right sort of feedback is intentional.
    The concept of intentionality is just a tool for solving simultaneous
    equations without getting into an infinite recursion. But what does
    intentionality have to do with free will? If I understand you well, you
    say that the robot would get the *illusion* of having free will because
    of having to model itself that way. Does that mean that until you
    "understood" the working of a magnet, since you had to model it
    intensionally, you were forced into the thought magnets had free will?
    Do you think matter has the free will to attract its like?

(3) About explaining free will by introducing randomness:
    - I think those who say randomness is just as forcing as determinism:
      most of you have been talking about *external* randomness, and
      *external* determinism. Compatibilists see people make this error,
      and from that conclude that, since the objections to the theory
      don't hold, the theory is true after all. I think it isn't.
      Primo, the responsibility argument still holds, and secundo, the
      "explanation" is just shifting the problem, and therefore begging
      the (or another) question:
    - Randomness is a poorly (or even non-)understood phenomenon. Events
      may be random, but still have a probability distribution, which
      makes the thing even more complicated. Now free will might be an
      (unexplained in itself) explanation for randomness (the particle
      emerges where it wants to), at least as validly as the other way
      around.
    - Determinism, on the other hand, is not much better understood.
      It can easily be described, and so it *seems* better understood,
      but as far as I know, there is no valid explanation for why certain
      things happen always exactly the same way. (This is not even true
      in physics: QM.) The problem is as perplexing in logic: why are
      certain types of inference always valid? Even if I make one for
      the 100th time, again it is valid.
    - A widely accepted answer to both questions (on randomness and on
      determinism) is: because of free will (e.g. the free will of G-d
      to let the world be as it is). Free will, or at least will, is the
      "natural" explanation: primitive man supposes lots of spirits of
      all kinds to cause both regularities and irregularities. 
    - Finally, several persons have argued that there is a division
      deterministic/random, and that there is nothing between. (Martin
      Gardner, in "The whys of a philosophical scrivener", argues that
      there *is*, or at least may be, something in between.) My impression
      is that these persons are looking for free will at the wrong place.
      To me, there is a spectrum (or dichotomy, rather), with probability
      (including determinism at both limits and randomness in between)
      at one end, and free will at the other. After all, determinism is
      just a special case of probability. A priori, it seems to me that
      it is easier to explain probability in terms of free will than free
      will in terms of probability.

(4) I think free will and determinism don't have to clash, but for another
    reason than the ones I have read so far. Let me explain by way of an
    example: Suppose I am dreaming. Now I dream a world, and in that world
    someone proves that pi equals 7. What's more: he *correctly* proves so.
    He shows his proof to others, and the knowledge that pi is 7 becomes
    general knowledge in that world. That is possible. I will never be
    able to reproduce that proof as a correct proof in this world, but
    it that other world it is correct. Ask anybody in that dream-world of
    mine, and (s)he'll tell you that the laws of logic are as rigid as we
    think they are here. (By the way, what would the logical equivalent
    of the physical light speed be?) So that world is deterministic, but
    nevertherless my will made pi be 7. The only requirement is, that my
    will is *transcendent* to the world in question. Now anybody can
    imagine a world that is governed by *one* will, because we all have
    the dream example. But now imagine a world that is partially governed
    by lots of wills: every will calls the piece it governs "I". That may
    be somewhat harder to imagine, but to me it seems that that would
    produce a world in which the rules of logic and physics could be rigid
    and inviolable, but in which nevertheless free will could influence
    reality.
    I realise this too, is begging the question, for how would those
    free wills exist in their hyper-world, but one thing has changed:
    what first seemed impossible, now "only" seems ununderstandable (as
    we don't have any idea of what such a hyper-world would be like, and
    we only cannot imagine what sort of substratum they would have in
    stead of logic and causality).

But let's stop now, before I introduce G-d, or even J-sus (ever been
immanently present in your own dream-world?).

One last question: how do Muslims explain the concept of responsibility,
given the fact that they can't help what they do or don't do (kismet)?
Or am I misunderstanding the concept of kismet?
-- 
						Biep.  (biep@cs.vu.nl via mcvax)
	Some mazes (especially small ones) have no solutions.
							-- man 6 maze

rmpinchback@crocus.waterloo.edu (Reid M. Pinchback) (05/24/88)

In article <1032@klipper.cs.vu.nl> biep@cs.vu.nl (J. A. "Biep" Durieux) writes:
>Warning: this is long!     Question to Muslims at the end (but they should
>				read the rest first before answering).
>
>In several newsgroups there are (independent) discussions on the nature
>of free will. It seems natural to merge these. Since these discussions
>mostly turn around physical, logical or mathematical notions, the natural
>place for this discussion seems to be  sci.philosophy.tech  (which newsgroup
>is devoted to technical philosophy, i.e. logic, philosophical mathematics
>(like intuitionism, formalism, etc.), philosophical physics (the time
>problem, interpretations of quantum mechanics, etc) and the like).
>Here follows a bit of the discussion in sci.math, plus some of my
>comments.
>
   Merging a subject is a nice idea... but perhaps, instead of effectively
continuing the subject of NINE newsgroups, maybe you could just post
a little note to folks about where to continue the discussion?  In other
words, if you want to merge it, actually merge it!  All this free will
discussion has been cluttering up so many newsgroups, its becoming a
real pain, instead of an interesting topic.

  I agree... sci.philosophy.tech sounds like a good group for this
discussion.  Maybe the USENET folks out there would like to start
focusing the talk in that group.  Its getting to the point where people
are posting messages to justify why they are continually posting into
places like comp.ai.

   Who knows, if there is enuf interest, we could start a new
newsgroup.  How about sci.philosophy.free  ?   :-)


   Ok, flame off.  Ciao!


          Reid
          ----