rapaport@cs.Buffalo.EDU (William J. Rapaport) (12/12/89)
STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK AT BUFFALO
BUFFALO LOGIC COLLOQUIUM
1989-1990
Fifth Meeting
Co-sponsored by the Graduate Group in Cognitive Science
MICHAEL SCANLAN
Philosophy
Oregon State University
"RECENT MISINTERPRETATIONS OF TARSKI'S THEORY OF TRUTH"
Alfred Tarski proposed what he called Convention T as a criterion for
the adequacy of a truth definition. This convention requires that all
sentences like "`Snow is white' is true if and only if snow is white"
are implied by the metalanguage theory containing the truth definition.
Philosophers often present it as the key to understanding Tarski's
theory. There are two camps in the philosophical literature. One camp
contends that the Convention T sentences provide the central element in
a philosophical theory of truth (e.g., Davidson). The other camp con-
tends that consideration of the Convention T sentences reveals that
Tarski's theory of truth is of no philosophical interest.
In this talk, I consider some recent expressions of the latter position
in Putnam 1983, 1985, 1988 and Etchemendy 1988. I argue that these
authors are led to their negative conclusion by a failure to appreciate
the exact role served by Convention T in Tarski's work on truth.
REFERENCES:
(1) Putnam, Hilary (1983), "On Truth," in L. S. Cauman et al. (eds.),
_How Many Questions?_ (Indianapolis: Hackett): 35-56.
(2) Putnam, Hilary (1985), "A Comparison of Something with Something
Else," _New Literary History_ 17: 61-79.
(3) Putnam, Hilary (1988), _Representation and Reality_ (Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press): 60-71.
(4) Etchemendy, John (1988), "Tarski on Truth and Logical Conse-
quence," _Journal of Symbolic Logic_ 53: 51-79.
Thursday, December 14, 1989
4:00 P.M.
268 Capen Hall, Amherst Campus
Dutch Treat Supper Follows, Place TBA
Future speakers: A. Garciadiego (Mexico), R. Vesley (SUNY Buffalo), Z.
Orudjev (USSR), G. Moore (Canada).
For further information, contact John Corcoran, Department of Philoso-
phy, 716-636-2438 or 716-881-1640.