jat@hpsemc.HP.COM (Joe Talmadge) (01/17/90)
Michael Ellis writes: > Joe Talmadge writes: > >When we see the original act, there is no good or bad inherent in its > >percepts. We often judge acts by their effects, but again, good or > >bad can't be judged of the effects through the senses. > > I can't quite tell whether I agree or not. Pain and pleasure are > directly sensed, and even if they are hardly the last word on good > and evil, they are certainly part of the story. Just as I not only > see falling trees, but I also see that a tree has fallen down, so > I also see that someone has harmed another on purpose. I agree > that we don't properly speaking have percepts of all this, but how > we come to see such things is not exactly clear to me or anyone else. I agree that pleasure and pain are a (significant) part of the story in understanding ethical judgements. But already we seem to be getting into subjective considerations. Different acts are judged ethical or not by different people partly because of the varying amounts of pleasure or pain an act gives us. > If I own something, I interpret it as rightfully mine and so, > it is hoped, do my neighbors. An essential part of this > interpretation is a historical claim, that I acquired ownership > in accordance with prescriptions historically understood in my > community, and ideally I can provide evidence to substantiate my > historical claim to ownership. And it's important that this claim not only be consistent with historical prescriptions, but that it fit in with the current ethical feeling as well. The land I'm living on was taken from some Native Americans many years ago using means that today probably wouldn't be considered ethical. However, the time in between is great enough that no one much cares anymore, and there isn't much of a feeling that I'm doing something wrong. I would expect that an attempt to take my land away and give it back to the heirs of those native Americans would give rise to uneasy feelings ("what if they take mine, too?"), and cries of "unethical!" Yet there's a feeling that stealing for any reason is always wrong, and should be rectified. > These interpretations themselves > are as much real world facts as the shining of the sun, although > we know these different facts in different ways. I'm not sure what you mean. It may be a fact that you hold such an interpretation. The best certainty I can obtain is by asking you and believing your answer. > The fact that my body moves a certain way and causes certain > physical effects is just not enough to get to the ethical issue. > What did I intend my body to do? How did the results of my actions > affect the self-interpretations and 1st person responses of others? > Ought a reasonable person have to have known that such actions > would have affected others this way? How would you feel if > somebody did that to you accidentally? What if it were on purpose? > What if his action didn't bother you? What if it did? Certainly, ethical judgements take into consideration the reasons for, and results of, actions. I don't see how such considerations provide an objective basis for an ethical judgement; they are more subjective judgements. It may be that the effects of your act cause differing judgements of pleasure or pain, and differing judgements of good or bad, in different people. But we still come back to subjective judgements. > >Where does this judgement of good or bad come from then? I'm not > >sure. I think from us, or rather, from our emotions. > > I don't think that goes far enough, although I agree the emotions > ought to take their proper place. Need, I would say, is to desire > what knowledge is to belief. Now we certainly have more than > emotional needs. Some needs are built into us at birth, others > given by the requirements of living in our society. The raw data > of ethics is the lore which has evolved as these needs evolved, > end ethics itself is the deliberate application of reason to > perfect this lore. Our capacity for exercising this virtue is the > highest moral capacity we have. Here, you're basing ethics on evolving needs. It would seem, though, that if these human needs can and do evolve, then what is ethical will change at different times, and may even be different at the same time at distinct locations. > as opposed to, say arts or skills ("techne"). Given the extent to > which technological science has become the religion ("scientism") > of the technological consciousness, it has many followers > ideologically committed to denying the validity of heretical > sciences like ethics. > > So whatever weaknesses O'ism may have, I think their application of > the term "science" to ethics is justified. Ethics just isn't an > empirical science. From the above, I think your view is a bit too broad. Studying the intricacies of the bible is a discipline whose end (it is hoped) is the disclosure of Truth, but we would hardly consider it science [actually, studying the bible to find out the truth *about the bible* may well be a science; studying it as a source of Truth probably isn't]. It would seem the method of discovering truth is an important consideration when determining what is a science. Michael, I agree with a fair amount of what you say. However, I'm missing the link that binds your premises to "there's an objective basis for ethics". I don't see what objective basis we have to derive 'ought'. Good doesn't seem to be an object of the senses; rather it seems to be based on subjective reactions, or conformity with principles which themselves are subjectively chosen. Joe Talmadge jat@hpsemc.hp.com hplabs!hpda!hpsemc!jat jat%hpsemc@hplabs.HP.COM
ddfr@tank.uchicago.edu (david director friedman) (01/17/90)
The central issue of this thread seems to be whether normative
judgements, like positive judgements, assert facts, or merely record
tastes, preferences, etc. While I am not an objectivist, on this
particular point I think I am on their side. I am at least willing to
argue that normative statements ("you should not have done that")
have as good a claim to being true or false as positive statements
("there is a glass sitting on the table.")
I start by asking why I believe the positive statement is anything
more than an assertion about what is happening in my head. ("I
perceive a glass on the table.") The answer, I think, is that not
only do I perceive a glass on the table, I also perceive the other
things I would perceive if there were an objective reality out there,
perceptible to other people. Among other things, I perceive you
saying "yes, that is my glass" in resonse to my commenting on the
glass. This does not prove objective reality; I could be imagining
both the glass and you. But it at least means that the conjecture
that objective reality is out there passes the only test
(consistency) that I am in a position to impose on it.
Suppose it did not pass that test. Suppose you reply "what glass?,"
and someone else says "table? How can there be a table in the middle
of the swimming pool?" At some point, if it does not look as though
they are all joking, I begin to suspect that I am dreaming, or crazy,
or in some other way failing to perceive objective reality--either
because it is not there or because my perception is bad.
My next step is to claim that the "normative universe"--the set of
propositions about good and bad, ought and ought not, meets the test
of consistency about as well as the positive universe. It is my
impression that most people, most of the time, if they clearly
observe the same set of facts about a situation, reach the same
normative conclusion.
Many people will disagree with this proposition. I think there are
two reasons. First, most situations we discuss, or even observe, are
imperfectly specified. There are a lot of things we do not know about
the situation which we perceive as morally relevant. This is clear
even in hypothetical situations. When a libertarian and a socialist
argue about some hypothetical rights issue involving a capitalist and
a worker, it becomes clear on close enquiry that they are imagining
quite different circumstances. The libertarian's capitalist got his
capital by working hard while the lazy worker sat by; the socialist's
capitalist inherited his capital from his father, who stole it by
selling fraudulent goods. The fact that each party feels inclined to
bias his assumed facts is evidence that their underlying moral
intuitions are similar, and they therefore need different facts to
make those situations lead to different conclusions.
Second, most arguments on normative subjects, including essentially
all the ones on this newsgroup, are not about moral facts but about
moral theories. Moral theories (objectivist ethics, for instance) are
analogous to physical theories--complicated sets of ideas created in
trying to explain moral facts (i.e. our judgements about specific
situations) just as physical theories are created in trying to
explain physical facts. The observation that people disagree about
the ethics of property (a moral theory) no more demonstrates that
moral facts are not objective than the observation that people
disagree about economics or climate models (positive theories)
demonstrates that physical facts are not objective.
This could be a long posting, so I will end here.
David Friedmanturpin@cs.utexas.edu (Russell Turpin) (01/17/90)
In article <7244@tank.uchicago.edu>, ddfr@tank.uchicago.edu (david director friedman) writes: > I start by asking why I believe the positive statement is anything > more than an assertion about what is happening in my head. ("I > perceive a glass on the table.") The answer, I think, is that not > only do I perceive a glass on the table, I also perceive the other > things I would perceive if there were an objective reality out there, > perceptible to other people. Among other things, I perceive you > saying "yes, that is my glass" in resonse to my commenting on the > glass. This does not prove objective reality; I could be imagining > both the glass and you. But it at least means that the conjecture > that objective reality is out there passes the only test > (consistency) that I am in a position to impose on it. ... > > My next step is to claim that the "normative universe"--the set of > propositions about good and bad, ought and ought not, meets the test > of consistency about as well as the positive universe. It is my > impression that most people, most of the time, if they clearly > observe the same set of facts about a situation, reach the same > normative conclusion. This is certainly true of some people most of the time, and perhaps for most people some of the time, but I do not think it is true of most people most of the time, as you claim. If the "some people" is your intellectual, classically liberal circle of friends, they will agree about many normative claims (some people, most of the time). If you broaden the group to include people with different outlooks, even from different cultures, they might still agree about a few normative claims (most people, some of the time). But now try the following. Ask a broad group of people whether it is ever morally permissible to simultaneously carry on a sexual relationship with two people. Along with Jeff Hummel and any renegade Mormons you know, also ask an Orthodox rabbi and a conservative Southern baptist preacher. Or ask a broad group of people what they should do when a man has sex with their sister, but then shows no matrimonial intention. Once again, let's include in the group, say, a strict Sunni from Saudi Arabia. Or if you just think that sex is the exception, about which people don't agree about normative facts, let's try something more basic: murder. It seems to me I have read more than once that the Vikings outlawed murder ... if committed within fifteen miles of home. Outside that, it was all part of the trade. (If this seems too much like what we still expect of soldiers, then I will use the example of certain cultures that practice some kinds of murder for ritual purposes, rather than for mercenary ones.) > Many people will disagree with this proposition. I think there are > two reasons. ... > > Second, most arguments on normative subjects, including essentially > all the ones on this newsgroup, are not about moral facts but about > moral theories. ... How do you distinguish between a moral theory and a moral fact? I suspect that you can "bullet-proof" your claim about broad agreement on moral facts by dismissing all counter-examples as theory. When someone claims as the most essential moral fact that one should love god with all their heart, is this fact or theory? Why? There is a basic difference between your normative universe and the physical universe. The consistencies to which you refer about perception validate the physical objects with which we deal. The physical universe is not populated by propositions, but by things. (Admittedly, but irrelevant to the point, different philosophies assign different ontological status to the stuff of the physical universe.) In contrast, your normative universe is populated entirely by propositions -- there are no other normative objects. Your claims of consistency lie entirely in the realm of "theory", without any connection to basic "fact". Russell
nelson_p@apollo.HP.COM (Peter Nelson) (01/18/90)
ddfr@tank.uchicago.edu (david director friedman) posts... > I am at least willing to >argue that normative statements ("you should not have done that") >have as good a claim to being true or false as positive statements >("there is a glass sitting on the table.") Among humans there is wide disagreement over normative "truths". There is no broad disgreement over evidence-of-senses issues. It is also very perilous for a libertarian or objectivist to base a belief system on "what people agree on". If most everybody agreed that it is OK for the state to take the property of the rich to give to the poor, as they do to some extent, would this make it "right"? >My next step is to claim that the "normative universe"--the set of >propositions about good and bad, ought and ought not, meets the test >of consistency about as well as the positive universe. It is my >impression that most people, most of the time, if they clearly >observe the same set of facts about a situation, reach the same >normative conclusion. Absolute nonsense. This is like someone who has lived all his life in a Christian culture asserting that, since it is his impression that most people most of the time agree that God exists, that the Christian God is as objectively extant as the glass of water on that table over there. If Mr. Friedman thinks there is such broad consensus on ethical issues he either has not traveled to other cultures very much or he has not studied much history or anthropology. I also suspect that by "clearly observe the same set of facts" he means that they interpret the facts the way he does. >Many people will disagree with this proposition. I think there are >two reasons. First, most situations we discuss, or even observe, are >imperfectly specified. Even when situations are pefectly specified different people have *different moral values*. Some Plains Indians tribes, when a warrior was killed, would ostracize the wife if she were past childbearing age, leaving her to die of exposure. Some pre- Columbian cultures used to practice human sacrifices on prisoners. Speaking of prisoners, the Japanese during WWII used to mistreat POWs in unspeakably hideous ways. Infanticide has been a commonly employed method of population control in many cultures. The NAZIs during WWII killed millions of Jews. Wifebeating is common and acceptable in many cultures. All of these and many other things that people have done violate *our* norms. If Mr. Friedman thinks that this problem disappears when the facts are better specified I'm sure we'd be interested to hear how. > The observation that people disagree about >the ethics of property (a moral theory) no more demonstrates that >moral facts are not objective than the observation that people >disagree about economics or climate models (positive theories) >demonstrates that physical facts are not objective. Still, the onus is on moral philosophers to show that they ARE discussing an objective phenomenon. Also, Mr. Friedman is mistaken in thinking that it is the disagreement, per se, that suggests moral theories are non-objective. Physical scientists disagree all the time. That doesn't mean physical science is non-objective. The recent flap over cold fusion illustrates this. When scientists disagreed over whether cold fusion ocurred they all went back to their laboratories and tried to duplicate the results, looking for excess heat and evidence of a nuclear process (neutrons, tritium, etc). The point is that even if there was disagreement about the phenomenon there was *agreement* about what had to be observed to resolve the issue. Ultimately physical science is rooted in evidence-of-senses and its ability to create or predict evidence- of-senses phenomena in the real world. Moral philosophers have no common tools or common vocabulary to resolve their disputes. While physical science demonstrably progresses, philosophers and religionists continue to waste their time shouting at each other, "Is not!", "Is too!", "Is not!" "Is too!" and getting precisely nowhere, as they have for centuries. ---Peter
ddfr@tank.uchicago.edu (david director friedman) (01/18/90)
My response to those who diagree with my posting does indeed hinge on the distinction between moral facts and moral theories and on defining moral facts as judgements about well-specified situations. A statement such as "it is wrong to do X (have two wives, for example)" is a complicated combination of normative and positive propositions. If you ask someone why it is wrong, many of the answers you will get will involve positive propositions, claims that bigamy will lead to consequences that both parties to the argument regard as undesirable. Bigamy will lead to infidelity, or unhappiness, or ... .Another answer may be: "because god condemns it, and a) one should do the will of God or b)we will be punished for not doing the will of God." Here part a) is a normative proposition, all the rest is positive. Again, consider the Nazi policy towards the Jews. The normative conclusion (Jews should be expelled or exterminated) was predicated on a set of positive facts (the jews are engaged in a centuries old conspiracy against the aryan race). The positive untruth was an essential part of justifying the normative untruth, precisely because what remains without it is the normative proposition "people unlike us who have done nothing wrong should be killed," which most Germans would have found very unconvincing. My claim is not that we have perfect agreement about normative facts, but only that we have about as much agreement about normative facts as about positive facts. The usual examples of normative disagreement are cases where a sizable part of the disagreement is in fact positive. "if Mr. Friedman thinks there is such broad consensus on ethical issues he either has not traveled to other cultures very much or he has not studied much history or anthropology." (Peter Nelson) I have travelled quite a lot (Europe, Turkey, India, Iran, Israel, Japan, South-east Asia, Ecuador, Australia, ...), and try to talk with people where I travel. On the other hand, I am pretty much limited, in arguing philosophy, to people who speak English, and I have never lived for any substantial length of time in a non-western society. I know relatively little anthropology but quite a lot of history--I have published articles on saga period Iceland and the medieval doctrine of the just price. Incidentally, Icelanders certainly did not limit their definition of murder to people living within fifteen miles of home (Russell Turpin). "Vikings" defines a profession, not a nationality, but I doubt it was true of any of the other viking period Norse cultures. On the general issue, I refer my critics to C.S. Lewis's book "The Abolition of Man." It is an interesting book in a number of ways, one of which is the attempt to disprove the relativist position empirically. Lewis argues, with a good deal of evidence, that basic moral propositions are pretty much the same across essentially all cultures. Of course, the detailed interpretation of those propositions varies a good deal--but I would claim that that is at least as much due to positive as normative disagreements. My main direct experience relevant to all of this, incidentally, is arguing with other people from my culture but with widely differing political views--including four years as a Goldwater conservative/libertarian and Harvard undergraduate (1961-1965). Arguments boil down to disagreements over positive propositions very much more often than into disagreements over normative propositions. I am not sure if I have been clear enough in my distinction between normative facts and normative theories. A normative fact, as I use the term, is the statement that a particular act or set of acts was wrong. "John should not have beaten his son yesterday" is an assertion about a normative fact. "Fathers should never beat their sons" or "You should never initiate coercion" is a normative theory, a general rule used to make or explain moral judgements. I should perhaps add that, in my opinion, no normative theories are as well worked out, understood, and justified as the more successful positive theories, such as physics, geology, or economics, and I am not particularly optimistic about that situation changing. That is one of the reasons that I almost never write about normative issues. I was however persuaded, many years ago, that the conventional sharp distinction between absolute, objective physical facts and relative, subjective moral judgements was much less convincing than I previously thought it was, hence the argument I have been presenting here. I believe Peter Nelson, in another posting, said that he would like to be convinced of a number of things, but so far had not been. My position on these issues is, ultimately, the result of losing an argument with Isaiah Berlin when I was about nineteen (he was visiting at Harvard). Before that, my position was the same one that Peter now holds. So sometimes, although not often, arguments do change beliefs. David Friedman
jat@hpsemc.HP.COM (Joe Talmadge) (01/19/90)
Where I don't capitalize the "o" in "objectivist", this means I am talking about objective theories in general rather than Objectivism in particular. david director friedman writes: > argue that normative statements ("you should not have done that") > have as good a claim to being true or false as positive statements > ("there is a glass sitting on the table.") > > I start by asking why I believe the positive statement is anything > more than an assertion about what is happening in my head. ("I > perceive a glass on the table.") The answer, I think, is that not > only do I perceive a glass on the table, I also perceive the other > things I would perceive if there were an objective reality out there, > perceptible to other people. Among other things, I perceive you > saying "yes, that is my glass" in resonse to my commenting on the > glass. This does not prove objective reality; I could be imagining > both the glass and you. But it at least means that the conjecture > that objective reality is out there passes the only test > (consistency) that I am in a position to impose on it. Looks okay here. But note that you're using the objects of the senses to make your conclusions here. You can see and touch the glass. > My next step is to claim that the "normative universe"--the set of > propositions about good and bad, ought and ought not, meets the test > of consistency about as well as the positive universe. It is my > impression that most people, most of the time, if they clearly > observe the same set of facts about a situation, reach the same > normative conclusion. This is not my impression at all. Some people I've met from the United States often come to the same normative conclusion, but even within the United States there are huge differences in moral opinion. People from different areas of the world often come to radically different conclusions. This, I think, is to be expected. After all, we are products of vastly different societal, historical, personal, educational, religious, and other influences, and these all affect ethical judgements to some extent. > Many people will disagree with this proposition. I think there are > two reasons. First, most situations we discuss, or even observe, are > imperfectly specified. There are a lot of things we do not know about > the situation which we perceive as morally relevant. This is clear > even in hypothetical situations. When a libertarian and a socialist > argue about some hypothetical rights issue involving a capitalist and > a worker, it becomes clear on close enquiry that they are imagining > quite different circumstances. The libertarian's capitalist got his > capital by working hard while the lazy worker sat by; the socialist's > capitalist inherited his capital from his father, who stole it by > selling fraudulent goods. The fact that each party feels inclined to > bias his assumed facts is evidence that their underlying moral > intuitions are similar, and they therefore need different facts to > make those situations lead to different conclusions. I'm not sure how much weight can be given that argument. Many of these judgements of our capitalist are made *after* some principle has been judged ethical. When I first started seeing classical liberal principles as "ethical," suddenly the capitalist took on a whole new light for me. My view of the capitalist was changed by my ethical views, not vice versa. The socialist and the libertarian seem to have vastly different ethical views. The socialist seems to think equality of outcome, for example, is "good"; the utilitarian classical liberal thinks that happiness is good; and the libertarian thinks that conformance to a self-evidently good principle (the NCP) is good. I think there are different ethical views involved here. > Second, most arguments on normative subjects, including essentially > all the ones on this newsgroup, are not about moral facts but about > moral theories. Moral theories (objectivist ethics, for instance) are > analogous to physical theories--complicated sets of ideas created in > trying to explain moral facts (i.e. our judgements about specific > situations) just as physical theories are created in trying to > explain physical facts. The observation that people disagree about > the ethics of property (a moral theory) no more demonstrates that > moral facts are not objective than the observation that people > disagree about economics or climate models (positive theories) > demonstrates that physical facts are not objective. Your observation is essentially correct -- I can argue that no particular objective moral theory is correct, and even if I argue the point successfully, I have not proven that *no* objective moral theory is correct . However, Michael Ellis and I *have* been arguing about whether or not any kind of objective basis can exist, considering that subjective emotions (pleasure and pain) play such a big role in ethical judgement [in Mackie's terms, we've been arguing about 2nd-order views, not 1st order]. It may not be possible to prove beyond a shadow of a doubt that there *cannot* be an objective ethical system, any more than it is possible to prove beyond a shadow of a doubt that there isn't a massless invisible demon sitting on my shoulder right now. But at the moment, I haven't seen much more evidence to support the former than the latter. Joe Talmadge "They're not calling it a black billowing jat@hpsemc.hp.com cloud anymore." hplabs!hpda!hpsemc!jat "What are they calling it?" jat%hpsemc@hplabs.HP.COM "The airborne toxic event."
ellis@chips.sri.com (Michael Ellis) (01/19/90)
> Peter Nelson > While physical science demonstrably progresses, philosophers > and religionists continue to waste their time shouting at each > other, "Is not!", "Is too!", "Is not!" "Is too!" and getting > precisely nowhere, as they have for centuries. That's because science is easy, ethics hard. Now in one sense, there is progress in ethics. Enlightenment ethics in certain ways genuinely goes beyond that of Aristotle. And sometimes philosophy's experiments fail miserably, as Marx provides an example. Such philosophical experiments take decades or even centuries, and progress is necessarily painful and slow. Maybe the enlightenment thinkers actually got it right (just like the O'ists have been saying now for decades, BTW). In another sense, there really is no progress in ethics. Most of the low level stuff, the micropractices that underlie any possible human culture (we might call this intractable mass "human nature") really don't change. It is extraordinarily difficult disclose a new chunk which is of practical utility to the individual person. Consequently, first rate ethics written by the ancients is every bit valid as anything written in the past century. -michael
utility@quiche.cs.mcgill.ca (Ronald BODKIN) (01/19/90)
In article <7244@tank.uchicago.edu> ddfr@tank.uchicago.edu (david director friedman) writes: >quite different circumstances. The libertarian's capitalist got his >capital by working hard while the lazy worker sat by; the socialist's >capitalist inherited his capital from his father, who stole it by >selling fraudulent goods. The fact that each party feels inclined to >bias his assumed facts is evidence that their underlying moral >intuitions are similar, and they therefore need different facts to >make those situations lead to different conclusions. Just because people tend to see different ideals is a far cry from saying they don't have real ethical differences. In the most extreme cases, it is trivial to show you something which can be totally disagreed upon by two people -- take abortion or the death penalty (and there are obviously cases where pro-choice/pro-lifers would agree that, for example, the mother can't afford the infant, and on all the other questions but would fervently disagree, not to mention the death penalty for an acknowledged criminal). The examples abound -- take banning guns, government regulation or anything. I agree people tend to have different attitudes to the agents but the attitudes are not truly relevant. A libertarian would STILL support the property rights of a suspected criminal's son unless it could be PROVED that the gentleman had broken the law. Fortunately, consensus is not required for objective truth -- just because lots of people used to think that the world was flat didn't make it so -- all objective truth is, is something which can be discovered by independent agents using logical inquiry. > >Second, most arguments on normative subjects, including essentially >all the ones on this newsgroup, are not about moral facts but about >moral theories. Unlike physical theories, which account for a very well known structure, alot of people don't SEE what the basic moral facts are -- given that morality describes intended behaviour, I find it very hard to dispute that 1) the goal of all behaviour should be the interest of the agent 2) the interest of a person is their own happiness And finding theories that fit this basic data is a justified example of people disagreeing on what fits a fact (Aristotle, Plato and a host of other philosophers used these assumptions). However, there are those today who support "duty-based" ethics -- the notion that one "should" act in certain ways, even to the harm of self-interest -- although I don't comprehend how one can be fooled into following such a notion. But, regardless, there are those who would advocatethe enslavement of everyone for "the greater good" and there are those who do not agree. These differences are a difference in moral attitude, and although I believe only one is correct, and that there IS a true morality (an objective one) it is not true that EVERYONE agrees that even the same acts are moral, let alone the differences on theory. Ron