roger@phoenix.Princeton.EDU (Roger Lustig) (01/17/90)
In article <8060@unix.SRI.COM> ellis@chips.sri.com.UUCP (Michael Ellis) writes: >> Roger Lustig >> me >>>>When we say, "the theory of relativity changed reality," that may well >>>>be false, given an objective reality, etc. But it doesn't matter! >>> That's simply false. We use the theory of relativity to make >>> conclusions about the way things were before the theory of >>> relativity was discovered, before there were even any such things >>> as humans. >>So? Surely reality, as we see it, includes history. Our history >>changed. > My, I see we are changing the past now. You really expect me to > take you seriously? Is this the extreme to which we must go in > order to find "rational" arguments against the O'ists? Is it any > wonder that Ayn Rand sells so many books? No, you don't need to go to such extremes. In fact, I was taking a purposely exaggerated attitude in order to make the point I seem to have failed to make. As far as changing the past goes, I'm a historian by trade. I invent the past every day. I haven't the foggiest idea what really went on back then, but I collect evidence and try to put together a picture that makes sense -- to me and others in my trade. New evidence rewrites that picture every time. And you know what? That picture IS the past, as far as we're concerned. Whatever the "reality," we know nothing but the picture. Why does Ayn Rand sell so many books? Well, she talks a good game, and she lets you know she's right beyond any controversy. Lots of people find that soothing -- to have found the Truth. > My understanding of the ToR is that we cannot affect anything > except that which ultimately happens within our future light > cone. If you think something, it is not even coherent within the > ToR to suppose that thought might cause reality in distant regions > (not to mention past times!) to somehow instantaneously change. Fine. That's a statement about the ideas of physical reality as they're affected by relativity. My problem is with the *perception* of reality, which is what human beings do. To say that relativity didn't exist before, say, the Michelson-Morley experiment, is, of course, pointless when you're discussing physics, and I wouldn't dream of doing so. But when I'm discussing physics, I'm considering a certain set of perceptions and theories ABOUT those perceptions: I am not considering reality itself, just a picture that I (and better draftsmen) have drawn. > Again, if it is a choice between Einstein and Roger Lustig's fantastic > world, guess who loses? False choice. I wasn't competing in the arena of physics. >>>>As far as anything we care about goes, the WAY OF THINKING about reality >>>>changed -- and that's all that matters to us! As far as human endeavor >>>>(the object of most philosophy) is concerned, there's just no material >>>>difference. >>> Speak for yourself. Your shabby attitude about truth may have been >>> trendy among early 20th century positivists, but it is as bankrupt >>> today as it always was. >>..What, tell me, do we USE the idea of truth for anything other than human >>endeavors? > Why does that make any difference? Is it your point that being > used for human endeavors somehow disqualifies something from > being objectively true? It is pretty clear to me that we have > utility for objective reference concepts like truth and reality, > but even if we didn't, I'd still expect philosophy to be concerned > with them. What do you mean, "objectively true?" Nobody even CONSIDERS the issue of the truth of a matter unless it has some importance to something else. And, tell me, WHY would pilosophy be concerned with such matters if they were trivial? Medieval philosophy concerned itself with issues regarding angels and heads of pins; it dropped such issues when they were perceived as useless and unimportant. Now, are "truth" and "reality" as we actually use them "objective reference points?" I don't think so. We like to assume they're objective, and strive to remove any obvious subjectivities with reference to some standards of objectivity that WE CHOOSE, but we tend to approach "reality" in a fairly circular way: it's what fits our model of it, once we've integrated as many perceptions of it as we can. >>> There is what we think is true, and then there is what is really >>> true, and attempting to narrow the gap has always been and will >>> always remain a philosophical, scientific, and personal matter, >>> at least to those who care about the truth. >>What gap? How do you know that any narrowing occurs? > I shouldn't have to answer this question to anyone who has ever > learned anything, or even briefly examined the history of human > knowledge. Depending on the domain of discourse, there are > different standards of verifiability and accuracy. If you expect a > simple to the question "how do we know", you won't get it. Acquiring > deeper knowledge about most things is a matter of practical > knowledge gained only through experience. So you define any process whereby a larger amount of data is integrated into a model as a narrowing? That's dangerous: I refer you to Copernicus, who came up with a better model of planetary motion, better because it was closer, but one that was actually farther from the one we have now than what preceded it. (His epicycles of epicycles fit the data better, but were a step away from Kepler's model-to-come.) There's no doubting that we continually build models that help us do things better than we did them before. But since we don't seem to want to define "truth" as something actually residing within the model (after all, what would happen to it when we eventually discarded the model, which we always seem to do), then "verifiability" and "accuracy" and "deeper knowledge" are NOT the same thing as truth. Truth is an unattainable standard. And since we don't actually chase after that standard, but rather strive to explain what we've seen and build tools to do what we'd like to do, that big objective truth out there is not the central issue that some would like to think it is. >>Maybe the two aren't different by degrees at all, but are completely different >>entities! > Sometimes that happens, sometimes that doesn't. Again, there is no > simple answer to how we know which is the case. In non-trivial cases, do we EVER know? >>And as for your pious words about "caring about the truth," what makes >>you think I don't? > In your own words: >ROGER LUSTIG> When we say, "the theory of relativity changed reality," >ROGER LUSTIG> that may well be false, given an objective reality, etc. >ROGER LUSTIG> But it doesn't matter! > "May well be false.. But it doesn't matter" -- Roger, this is > disgraceful! Why? What harm has it done? We don't operate within a framework of KNOWING objective reality. We may assume there is one, and for all practical purposes we do. But we do so very informally, and closer examination of exactly what we assume and why makes it clear that the reality we use, day to day, is not the ultimate, objective one. >ROGER LUSTIG> As far as anything we care about goes, the WAY OF THINKING >ROGER LUSTIG> about reality changed -- and that's all that matters to us! > Our way of thinking about something is one thing, what that thing > really is is another. True enough. What about it? > There really are branches of philosophy devoted to such things as > "ways of thinking about something", "viewpoints" and "worlds", > phenomenology for instance, and increasingly analytic philosophy > as well. There are other branches of thought devoted to other > kinds of objects. The kinds of objects that show up in the former > bear little or no resemblance to the kinds of objects discussed in > the latter. Viewpoints, beliefs, and so on are utterly different > kinds of things from what they are about. Indeed. But when we think, we're operating on thought, not on the "things" we're thinking about. > By your own admission, you don't care about the difference between > your way of thinking about reality and reality itself. Fine. Oh, on the contrary! I am constantly updating my view of reality -- thati s, the *informal* reality we all use. > So why should anyone who is concerned with the truth pay any > attention to you, except to point out the silliness of what you say? Concern yourself with the truth all you want. Call me when you find it. And let me know how you decided you know. Look at the ways you use the term "true." Look at the ways you come to decide that something is true. What have you done when you've done so? How objective were your actions? What do they (necessarily) refer to? What things do you assume? I have no objection to using "truth" and "reality" in fairly informal ways, and will not argue, say, that the text of the Gettysburg Address is wrong because we don't *know* he said just those things, and even if there had been a sound recording it could have been doctored, etc. I have no problem with referring to the assertion that that Address began with the words "Four score" as a true one -- but I make no cosmic claims for that definition of "truth". This is in contrast to those who insist that all sorts of axioms about objective reality are necessary, and that those who do not subscribe to them completely are on the road to Nazism, mysticism, 43% more cavities, or whatever. Roger
tma@osc.COM (Tim Atkins) (01/17/90)
In article <47ef200e.20b6d@apollo.HP.COM. nelson_p@apollo.HP.COM (Peter Nelson) writes:
.
. Tim Atkins posts
.
..Why is it that technically literate people that would not think of practicing
..blatant subjectivism with regard to the scientific or engineering domain totally
..change their attitude when dealing with societal or any "humanist" issue. In
..their own domain they would never think of claiming that the nature of the
..materials they work with is totally indeterminate or a mere convention. Yet
..human nature is treated as if it were infinitely malleable and any old way some
..group decides to act like it is, is perfectly ok.
.
. I never claimed it was infinitely malleable. It's obviously malleable
. to a certain extent as evidenced by the wide range of value systems
. and conventions of behaviour among our species.
It should be mentioned that many of the systems making up the "wide range"
have and do sow incalculable misery on those afflicted. Few even bother
with a comparison of misery/benefit much less try to trace to cause back
to the nature of Man.
.
.. Man, like any other existent,
..has a specific nature.
.
. He doesn't have a specific nature, he has a very complex nature. This
. preoccupation with rationality is simply not realistic. Rationality
. is NOT OUR ONLY SIGNIFICANT FEATURE. What is the significance of the
. fact that it distinguishes us from other creatures?
That the Man's nature is complex hardly implies there isn't one! Or that it
is unknowable. No one has claimed rationality as the only significant
feature, merely as the most important one for man's continued survival
and well being. The significance is that we implement social and private
policies that ignore and/or make difficult the use of rationality to freely
improve our lives at peril to ourselves PRECISELY BECAUSE we thereby fly in
the face of our own nature.
.
.. This nature imposes requirements for optimal functioning.
.
. What is "optimal"? Optimal for whom? What is optimal for me may
. not be optimal for you.
.
Optimal for a human being is not a matter of convention or vote given that
human beings have a specific nature. If you think that perhaps you do not
know whether it would be "optimal" to live in a dictatorship then I suggest
you go try it! Without reference to any sort of definition of what man's
nature is, I don't really see any other way for you to decide the issue.
Do You?
.
. ...and...
.
..Objectivism is concerned with what kind of beings we are! The kind of beings we
..are determine how we should deal with life in order to be successful. Trying to
..set up Objectivists as wooly-headed idealists simply will not fly. Try again as
..you apparently feel you must!
.
.
. But they ARE idealists! Show me an actual community of objectivists
. who actually live by Objectivist values and I may change my mind.
.
.
. ---Peter
I can show you several that live by the principles of Objectivism in their
own lifes. A community will be some time coming. It is much earlier and
much later than you think. That there is not such a community hardly marks
the philosophy as pure idealism.
- Timtma@osc.COM (Tim Atkins) (01/17/90)
In article <12818@phoenix.Princeton.EDU. roger@phoenix.Princeton.EDU (Roger Lustig) writes: .In article <1787@osc.COM. tma@osc.UUCP (Tim Atkins) writes: ..In article <12577@phoenix.Princeton.EDU. roger@phoenix.Princeton.EDU (Roger Lustig) writes: ...You've just cut yourself a long piece of cloth! Can you demonstrate ...that NO rational thought is possible without your axioms? Proving a ...universal negative is a toughie. . ..I am not a formal philosopher so I probably will make and have made some errors ..here BUT I'll take one more go at this. The "no rational thought" might be ..better expressed as "no effective thought" in the sense that workable, ..consistent concepts that are actually applicable to reality presuppose these ..three things, as I understand Objectivism. The disclaimer should be kept in ..mind where not repeated, as I may occassionally present something erroneously. ..It is in the nature of these axioms that while a direct proof is impossible any ..attempted disproof (of the axioms themselves) falls into a maze of ..contradiction. . .AGAIN with the universal negatives! ANY attempted disproof? You have a .proof for that assertion, perhaps? The obviousness of existence requires no proof. I have never seen any argument attempting its negation that did not become loaded with contradiction. As I am convinced of the fundamental validity of the Existence axiom I do not think any such argument will ever fail to be full of contradiction. Seems to me the ball is in your court to either come up with such an argument or simply restate that it is not proved that one does not exist. In my philosophic system one can not exist as it would contradict a fundamental axiom. It is up to you to show that this axiom is ill-founded OR itself contradictory. . . Now, why are these axioms so different from all other axioms? What .makes their "nature" different from all others'? . .(Hint: it's because they're not axioms...) This has not been shown. They qualify by your stated definitions. I claim they are a bit more than what is required. . .Now, back to what axioms are: they are NOT things subject to disproof or .proof! They are, so far as the philosophical system iteslf is .concerned, chosen arbitrarily. As far as the larger purpose of the .philosophy (or geometry, or whatever) goes, they are chosen for a .reason. But provability WITHIN the philosophy is not one of those .reasons. . .And to say that the philosophy itself falls apart without them is not .saying much. . ....In Objectivist philosophy the three central axioms are: . .... Existence .... Reality is objective - independent of consciousness; . ...Why can I not perform rational thought without this? More to the point, ...what does it have to do at all with rational thought? Rational thought, ...after all, is no more and no less than one aspect of consciousness ...itself! What does the existence of something entirely independent of ...consciousness have to do with it? . ..If Existences does not precede Consciousness then what are you thinking about? ..If Consciousness is primary and creates reality then where is there any provably ..existent YOU to do any thinking? I think the importance of this axiom is rather ..obvious. Without it all is just a "dream within a dream". . .So? The point is that we can't tell either way. Moreover, even WITH .the "axiom" in place, what do we gain? Consciousness does not operate .on reality itself; it operates on perceptions, etc. Precisely. But the axioms state that perception is awareness of external reality. I highly recommend David Kelley's book, "The Validity of the Senses" , in this regard. . .When we say, "the theory of relativity changed reality," that may well .be false, given an objective reality, etc. But it doesn't matter! As .far as anything we care about goes, the WAY OF THINKING about reality .changed -- and that's all that matters to us! As far as human endeavor .(the object of most philosophy) is concerned, there's just no material .difference. . .... Identity .... That which exists exist with specific characteristics. .... To exist is to have identifiable differences from and .... similarities to other existents. That which can not be .... assigned characteristics (such as God) can not be said .... to exist. . ...Why can't God, or a unicorn, or the present King of Finland, be asigned ...characteristics? Moreover, what's this "assigning" business? That's ...part of consciousness/rational thought, etc., not of the independently ...existent existence. . ..Your point is well taken on the use of "assigned". I should have said that ..all that exists has specific characteristics. The Christian God on the other ..hand, is defined in terms of what it is not and in terms of ultimate ..superlatives. Thus, God effectively has no identity. In a statement of ..axioms I was probably off-base to digress into mythology. . .You still are. God most certainly IS defined in terms of certain .characteristics. Triuneness, for instance. Eternity, for another. .Omnipotence, omniscience, omnipresence, etc. Identity? Why something .either is or is not God, same as any other thing. How can a "thing", an existent, be meaningfully defined in terms of negatives and unbounded superlatives? What the hell is Triuneness? How is it proved as a property? What is "Eternal" but of indeterminate duration? What is omnipotence other than without any meaningful measurement in the realm of power? Same for omniscience and omnipresence. So "God" is this three part thing with no meaningful bounding conditions in duration, power, knowledge or location. Sounds like a lot of nothing to me! More than anything else your defense of such zaniness shows me you are NOT a serious thinker. A comparison with prime numbers is silly. Prime numbers are defined as those positive integers than cannot be evenly divided by any positive integer other than themselves and 1. This is perfectly well bounded. It shows an essential property is the absence of non-trivial factorization. A closer analogy would be a number that is divisible by all numbers! Taken as a matter of faith, of course. :-) ..As to its necessity, perception of an entity requires that the entity possess ..specific characteristics. Perception as a distinct entity requires ..differentiation from other entities. Conceptualization requires rigourous ..differentiation from and comparison to other entities as a basis for the ..act of abstracting the differentiating elements. Arbitrary "assignment" of ..attributes goes nowhere, of course. . ."Perception as a distinct entity requires differentiation from other .entities." WHOA!!! Who says my faculty of perception does that .flawlessly? You've just confused the objective reality that exists .independent of my consciousness with my consciousness itself! No sir! Your conceptual faculty (your consciousness) must process your perceptions in order to properly form the differentiation. And you may certainly make mistakes. . .Similarly, conceptualization involves differentiating PERCEPTIONS. .These are not the entities themselves!!! I compare perceptions, not .entities, when I conceptualize. I use these perceptions to represent .entities I assume are there, but they are not the same thing. So what? Your perceptions are all the knowledge of what is there you can claim except that ferretted out by reason and conceptualization on prior perceptions. . .... Consciousness .... Consciousness is the tool for developing awareness of and .... manipulating that which exists. This includes the mental .... states themselves. . ...How is this an axiom? And what is it good for in your system? . ..Consciousness as secondary to existence and as a tool of perception and ..conceptualization rather than as the creator of reality is a very important ..point. The opposite axiom lets immediately to contradictions and insoluble ..morasses such as outlined under axiom 1 above. . .Not an answer to my question. How is it an axiom? Looks more like a .partial definition. Moreover, what are "the mental states" here, and .what do they represent in the system? Consciousness is awareness of Reality. Consciousness does not create Reality. How is this not an axiom? By your apparent definition of the term anything I wish to state at the outset is an axiom! The contents of consciousness are the "mental states". Do I have to prove their existence or do you grant it? . ...And will you deny that their axioms are axioms (as opposed to the ..."axioms" you've outlined above, which I can't place either as axioms or ...theorems derived from other axioms)? . ..Many of their axioms are not axiomatic in the sense I've explained here. . .Well, your "axioms" don't seem to be axioms in anybody else's sense -- .not Aristotle's, not Euclid's, not that of modern formal logicians, .mathematicians, and philosophers. . .Roger As I understand it, axioms are fundamental assertions that a system of thought is based on. The axioms here certainly qualify. Axioms are considered freebies that do not require and can not within the system constructed have, proofs. The three axioms of Objectivism go one step further in that they name fundamental, irrefutable facts of reality.
jjd@chinet.chi.il.us (Joe Durnavich) (01/18/90)
Roger Lustig writes: > As far as changing the past goes, I'm a historian by trade. I invent > the past every day. I haven't the foggiest idea what really went on > back then, but I collect evidence and try to put together a picture that > makes sense -- to me and others in my trade. New evidence rewrites that > picture every time. > > And you know what? That picture IS the past, as far as we're concerned. ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ > Whatever the "reality," we know nothing but the picture. You must have a definition of "picture" which is different from the usual one. A picture, most people would say, is a type of representation of some object. To fully understand the word "picture" then, one needs knowledge of the representation (the drawing, snapshot, etc.), the object (the house, the nude model, etc.), and the relationships between them (you can't live in the drawing of a house, etc.). Yet you claim that one cannot have knowledge of objects (in your case, the past), or perhaps, that the objects themselves are only pictures (as far as we are concerned). If that's the case, then your definition of "picture" is either circular or it is not the usual one. What I think you need to support your view is to provide a grounding for the concepts "picture," and more generally, "representation." -- Joe Durnavich jjd@chinet.chi.il.us
nelson_p@apollo.HP.COM (Peter Nelson) (01/19/90)
Tim Atkins posts... >.. Man, like any other existent, >..has a specific nature. >. >. He doesn't have a specific nature, he has a very complex nature. This >. preoccupation with rationality is simply not realistic. Rationality >. is NOT OUR ONLY SIGNIFICANT FEATURE. What is the significance of the >. fact that it distinguishes us from other creatures? > >That the Man's nature is complex hardly implies there isn't one! Or that it >is unknowable. No one has claimed rationality as the only significant >feature, merely as the most important one for man's continued survival >and well being. But this is not at ALL obvious. It may well be that our aggressiveness, our mating behaviour, our "herd instinct" (whatever you want to call it, but I am referring to the tendency of many humans to mindlessly follow a charismatic leader), our tendency to form societies (man as a social animal), or our spirituality are also been VERY important to our SURVIVAL. Consider a nation at war. Sure, it takes rationality to plan strategy, design weapons and so forth. But it also takes a highly emotional form of nationalism to make the sacrifices, all pull together, and follow the dictates of authority that are required for a country to win. Most of all it takes lots of young men who are willing to risk their lives and limbs for their country, which may hardly be a rational thing to do. If you think that most of the young men who have enthusiastically charged into battle throughout military history did so because they rationally sorted out the objective facts, you're dreaming. And building a great cathedral takes rationality to design and plan it, but to actually marshall the resources to get the damn thing built, or to even conceive of building it in the first place may come from non-rational aspects of man. Also, we should be well-cautioned that the "nature" of human beings is poorly understood even by biologists, neurophysi- ologists, social psychologists, economists, and others who have tried very systematically to establish more about man's "nature". Science in general has a much better track record at describing things and building on its knowledge than philosophy does, and science still has a long way to go with humans. Objectivists would do well to ESTABLISH what man's nature is, rather than just asserting it. >.. This nature imposes requirements for optimal functioning. >. >. What is "optimal"? Optimal for whom? What is optimal for me may >. not be optimal for you. >. > >Optimal for a human being is not a matter of convention or vote given that >human beings have a specific nature. If you think that perhaps you do not >know whether it would be "optimal" to live in a dictatorship then I suggest >you go try it! As a dictator or a peasant??? Dictatorships have worked out pretty well for dictators. Recent events notwithstanding, historically most kings, dictators, etc, were not deposed by the peasants. There must be some reason why autocracies have been MUCH more the rule than the exception throughout history. How does Objectivism's assumptions about man's nature square with this historical fact? Besides, one may perfectly well imagine situations where it may be optimal for one individual to deny freedom or even life to another individual. Objectivism claims to address this, but how? > Without reference to any sort of definition of what man's >nature is, I don't really see any other way for you to decide the issue. >Do You? Sure. I know what *I*, as an individual, prefer. I don't need to create some theoretical model of human nature to know that *I* would be less happy in, say, Albania, than in the U.S. ---Peter
ellis@chips.sri.com (Michael Ellis) (01/20/90)
> Gerry Gleason >There is no debate on this. But in a sense, what is really true is >irrelevant because we have no direct access to it or even to a true >metric of how wide or narrow the gap is. What is the cognitive content of this suspicious notion "direct access" that disqualifies perception or introspection from being "direct access to reality"? > We have no way of knowing that all our current theories aren't one > vast detour away from the real truth. Perception isn't a theory. Neither is introspection. >To assert anything else is to claim omniscience. This sounds pretty crazy to me. Just how does the claim that one knows something commit oneself to the claim that one knows everything? -michael