bradr@bartok.Eng.Sun.COM (Brad Rubenstein) (06/05/90)
Music-Research Digest Sun, 27 May 90 Volume 5 : Issue 52
Today's Topics:
Musical Semantics (was: Re: Mira Balaban (was: Re: Workshop on Artificial inteligence and Music)) (2 msgs)
Music symbolism (was Re: Mira Balaban, among other things)
Semantics of music? (2 msgs)
*** Send contributions to Music-Research@uk.ac.oxford.prg
*** Send administrative requests to Music-Research-Request
*** Overseas users should reverse UK addresses and give gateway if necessary
*** e.g. Music-Research@prg.oxford.ac.uk
*** or Music-Research%prg.oxford.ac.uk@nsfnet-relay.ac.uk
*** Back issues, index, etc.: send "help" in a message to archive-server
*** @uk.ac.oxford.prg (in the UK) or @bartok.sun.com (elsewhere)
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Date: 21 May 90 16:48:30 GMT
From: Brad Rubenstein <bradr%bartok.Eng.Sun.COM@com.sun>
Subject: Musical Semantics (was: Re: Mira Balaban (was: Re: Workshop on Artificial inteligence and Music))
To: music-research@prg
Message-ID: <136021@sun.Eng.Sun.COM>
[ I must confess, I am thoroughly enjoying this discussion,
though it seems to be boiling down to disagreements
about the semantics of semantics. ]
>>musical objects can be manipulated by discriminating between their
>>semantic natures.
>
>Well no, that doesn't follow, at least from what I've said. I'm trying
>to put across the idea that music is a whole way of thinking, that this
>way of thinking is what's supplying film with the film equivalent of
>meaning, and that equivalent happens to be musical.
Is this different than saying "english is a whole way of thinking."?
Do you admit less than whole ways of thinking ("half a way of
thinking...")?
Suppose the film were a silent movie, with no music and no cue
posters. We can understand the plot. Is the action on the film
"speaking" to us? Can we say that that the film images have "semantic"
content? Or are they too iconic a representation of the meaning they
attempt to convey? What if, in addition to understanding of the plot,
we claim that the movie says "pathos", "frivolity", "poignancy" (a
recent posting said that a final tritone in a scale was "poignant").
Is that semantic? My intuition (and linguistic
indoctrination/education) suggest it's not.
On the other hand, I just finished reading Lakoff's new book "Women,
Fire, and Dangerous Things" (an extension of his earlier, and more
accessible, "Metaphors we live by"), and I come away with a renewed
appreciation for the depth to which metaphorical understanding (which
he defines in detail, I hope the idea is roughly clear) colors our
understanding of information which is not ostensively "formal" and
"semantic".
When I tie the two ideas together, I come away agreeing with Eliot,
that music has no semantics, but I don't feel as shocked as I think
Eliot wants me to feel (he'll deny it), since I also am feeling that
formal semantics has little interesting to do with my understanding and
appreciation of simple sentences like "John kicked Mary". On the other
hand, I'm quite comfortable listening to folks speak metaphorically of
the semantics of music, in the same way we speak of "meaning" in our
lives in general (I know this makes Eliot squirm).
Eliot says "music has NO semantics" and (oh, I hope I get this
paraphrase right) "talking about music semantics is nonsensical". I'd
agree with the former, and disagree with the latter. Applying the
structure of linguistic semantics metaphorically to music says a lot,
if not about our perception of music, then about the way we structure
and distort our perception in our drive to assign meaning to our
experience. The predominant metaphor in my culture for structuring
and discussing musical experience (both popularly and among performing
musicians) is MUSIC IS LANGUAGE (CONVERSATION, ARGUMENT, NEGOTIATION).
Examples:
"Please state the cadence more forcefully"
"The violins present the theme, then the brass reply."
"an argument between the winds and the strings"
"a deceptive cadence"
It could be that we speak imprecisely when we say these things,
but we say them nonetheless. Interestingly, our structures
for music are more commonly pragmatic (or discourse) structures,
rather than lower level semantic structures.
>response in some lab rats with no guaranteed generality. And yet music
>is, quite obviously, the instrument of mass consciousness. Your theory
>is predicting the wrong thing.
Hmmm... I consider that music is an epiphenomena of mass consciousness
(which is itself epiphenominal of social beings, in mass). I place
language in the same camp.
Slightly different topic: If we want to consider what music and mass
consciousness have to do with each other, the problem seems far from
the concerns of university music departments (I'd love to hear
counterexamples). It seems to have little to do with harmony and
counterpoint, with semantics and affect. It has everything to do with
the sociology of superstardom (Madonna, now that's music that speaks to
me!) and the effect of top-40 music stations on the musical and
cultural values of this generation.
Brad I-IV-V-I Rubenstein
--
---Brad Rubenstein-----Sun Microsystems Inc.-----bradr@sun.com---
------------------------------
Date: 21 May 90 23:49:12 GMT
From: pa2253 <pa2253%sdcc13%sdcc6@edu.ucsd>
Subject: Musical Semantics (was: Re: Mira Balaban (was: Re: Workshop on Artificial inteligence and Music))
To: music-research@prg
Message-ID: <10703@sdcc6.ucsd.edu>
In article <16590@phoenix.Princeton.EDU> eliot@winnie.Princeton.Edu (eliot handelman) writes:
>If associations are the origin of the semantic you're supplying,
>why should one thing be more privileged than another? Maybe you're
>missing something in your conception? Probably overstating the
>importance of associating in the first place.
I am not overstating the importance of association with respect to
my musical experience. I see present musical experience as highly
dependent upon associations among past musical experiences. This
occurs in my mind; therefore, it occurs. That is all that I am
attempting to communicate. You can play Freud and tell what I am
really thinking; I'll just laugh and try to make my perspective clearer.
You can also try to negate the importance of individual musical
histories--but I'll say: perhaps you are missing something in your
conception.
>You think that only because you insist on semantics. You talk about
>music as though it were an abstract experiment, a sort of conditioned
>response in some lab rats with no guaranteed generality. And yet music
>is, quite obviously, the instrument of mass consciousness. Your theory
>is predicting the wrong thing.
Music is not necessarily an instrument; it can be a window. The
nature of mass consciousness can be reflected through music; this
can occur through repetitive association. This is not the extent
of musical experience. It is simply a potentiality that many people
employ. I doubt the existence of an absolute musical consciousness.
The nature of cultural differentiation provides individuals with
necessarily different musical experiences.
Christopher Penrose
penrose@do.ucsd.edu
------------------------------
Date: 17 May 90 09:01:47 GMT
From: Dale Gold <dgold%actrix%dsiramd%comp.vuw.ac.nz%kaukau.comp.vuw.ac.nz%munnari.oz.au@net.uu.uunet>
Subject: Music symbolism (was Re: Mira Balaban, among other things)
To: music-research@prg
Message-ID: <1990May17.090147.25350@actrix.co.nz>
>>In article <844@swan.ulowell.edu> gryphon@dino.ulowell.edu (Coranth
D'Gryphon)
>>writes:
>> If you want to talk about an association link which might embody
>>"musical semantics," that link would be between EXPERIENCE and BEHAVIOR.
> Stephen Smoliar writes:
> There IS an issue of communication from which we might learn a thing or
> two by observing musicians in action; and this is the matter of
> coordinating independent processes.
> How does a string quartet keep themselves coordinated? Each member has
> his own "program;" but that program is "clock sensitive." How do they
> agree on the ticks of the "reference clock" which keeps them together?
> Note that I deliberately chose a string quartet because in such an
> ensemble there is not necessarily the single "authority figure" you would
> find leading an orchestra. For much chamber music, this responsibility
> MUST be shared; but we know very little about HOW it is shared.
Well, a good performer certainly knows a lot about how this responsibility
is shared. Even in an orchestra with a great conductor, the idea of a
single authority figure is a pretty limited way of looking at the problem.
Most quartets rehearse a lot, and the idea of each player having a
'performance program' is a valid one, but in practice, it's not that
simple. The 'reference clock' a performer uses is a constantly changing
factor which is based on the 'program' established in rehearsal.
In a typical bar of music in a good orchestra, the 'clock' might work
something like this: Watch conductor for upbeat. Listen to basses for
downbeat. Listen to violas for moving inner voices for a couple of beats.
Listen to solo oboe for rubato in middle of bar. Watch concertmaster's bow
for end of note. Look at conductor again. etc. etc.
In any group, the lead voice is constantly changing & must be used as a
reference point, but the 'clock' is often coming from moving parts that are
not necessarily the most important to the listener. Other factors, such as
the instrument you have to play with play a great part: I'm playing with
the snare drum - have to get in quick! The violins are starting on an up
bow - wait a bit!
> Now we can make the matter even MORE interesting by taking the parts away.
> Now we are in the domain of jazz.
Although we're obviously in a far different realm here, the basic
principals of 'experience & behavior' remain the same. Who to listen to,
when, and how to react.
------------------------------
Date: 18 May 90 00:00:09 GMT
From: Eliot Handelman <eliot%phoenix@edu.princeton>
Subject: Semantics of music?
To: music-research@prg
Message-ID: <16452@phoenix.Princeton.EDU>
In article <2364@aipna.ed.ac.uk> geraint@ai.ed.ac.uk (Geraint Wiggins) writes:
;In article <16283@phoenix.Princeton.EDU> eliot@phoenix.Princeton.EDU (Eliot Handelman) writes:
;
;>The idea that music has "semantics" is completely meaningless because
;>no music can be systematically explicated in terms of this function;
;>besides there's no authoritative meaning-conferring community that
;>establishes these semantics. Music is privately experienced and there's
;>no way to convey that experience...
;
;Maybe this is a trite comment, but I've never seen a proof of this. Just
;because we haven't got a way of doing something doesn't mean we can't do it.
This goes beyond my assertion, but nevertheless.
;In particular, the point about the meaning-conferring community seems
;questionable: looking at language, we can only agree that certain words denote
;ceratin concepts by supposing that our own interpretation of those concepts
;agrees with those of others.
Either I'm missing something or you're missing something. I started off by
saying that "the analogy to language is entirely false." I then continued
by saying that "music has no semantics" (and not "vague semantics" -- I'm
claiming NO SENANTICS, not "privately defined semantics," NO SEMANTICS).
And now you're saying, "by analogy with language, we can see how semantics
can arise in music."
;A good example of this is colours. If I say an
;object is "red" and agree with the person next to me on this, it is impossible
;to say whether the sensations leading us to make this claim are the same.
Can you recognize an oboe? I can teach you to recognize one, so that the
next time you hear an oboe, you'll be able to say, "that's an oboe." Is
your musicality dependant on your capacity to recognize (that is, to name)
an oboe? No it isn't, because you might confuse an oboe with an english
horn, or sometimes with a trumpet, or sometimes with a cello. You can always
hear an oboe (assuming conditions obtain) whether or not you're able to
name what it is that you hear. Generally it takes more than a few years,
plus whatever native ability, to be able to do this naming (let's say, to
write down the full score of a Webern Bagatelle by ear). In ear
training class, for example, you might play a fourth and the student says
"that's a seventh" (it happens). Does this mean that the student is
actually experiencing sevenths where those with the proper training are
experiencing fourths? As Ed Koch says: "I don't think so."
My point is that we can learn to name things which have physical
correlates: we can learn to describe the physical signal. And professionals
need to be able to do this, just the way that a good cook can taste a dish
and break it down into its various herbs and spices, let's say. But
you don't eat the dish because of the semantics of herbs and spices --
you eat it because, presumably, it tastes good, or you're hungry. Now
music is more complicated than "tasting good," but I'll push the analogy
(vehemently denied by Meyers, incidentally) because it sheds some
light on the difference between private experience and knowledge of
the physical correlate of that experience. We can talk clearly about
the physical correlate and we can attempt to explicate (and construct)
our experience, but that explication is by no means a prerequisite
condition of the experience itself.
;It is not clear to me that such an agreed labelling could not be applied to
;musical instances (and work has been done to this end, in Australia - I'm
;afraid the author's name escapes me). It is certainly the case that on a very
;coarse general level such labellings can be applied. Beethoven's "Pastoral" is
;a good example.
The author's name is Manfred Clynes, and he describes his ideas in a book
called "Sentics." I know Manny personally, and we've had dinner together.
He even once wrote me a long letter. The status of his work is most dubious,
and if you want to argue it out go read his book carefully and then we'll
argue it out. Until then forget about "work done in Australia."
Would you like it if I said that "work has been done on general problem
solving" without mentioning that that work has been totally discredited?
Or stating that SHRDLU or ELIZA demonstrate that machines can "understand"
human language, without first noting that Weinograd and Weizman have both
discredited those conclusions, and that it remains to be proved? Or that
that the systems reply to Searle demomstrates that machine consciousness
is possible?
I don't know what you think the Pastorale is a "good example" of, but don't
wing programme music at me as evidence for the existence of musical
semantics. One can always come to agreement as to what music X might
symbolize, particularly when the composer tells you. What music can
symbolize (and there's a ricj history of this) and how music is experienced
are two different matters. The realization by the informed listener that
the Dies Irae in Berlioz symbolizes death isn't equivalent to the
expeirnce of the Symphonie Fantastique, just as the knowledge of what
a leitmotiv stands for doesn't substitute for its experience, even if
langiuage in these cases does (or can) provide a coloration of that experience.
;Thus, though I, like Eliot, am sceptical about the possibility of a complete
;semantics for music,
Correction: I'm not "sceptical," I'm DENYING IT OUTRIGHT! NO MUSICAL
SEMANTICS! Please try to quote me correctly oin this point, folks.
I don't know why the past 3 or 4 people who want to argue about this
insist on watering down my position.
;I certainly think it may be possible to make some steps in
;that direction. But, regardless of my beliefs, I think it's a bad idea to make
;sweeping statements like the above, unless you have a counterexample.
;
;OK. Cue the flames...
The ball's in your hands. I say "X does not exist." The only counterexample
that I can think of would be "There is an X which does exist." That's
your position, not mine.
------------------------------
Date: 20 May 90 22:22:45 GMT
From: eliot handelman <eliot%winnie%phoenix@edu.princeton>
Subject: Semantics of Music?
To: music-research@prg
Message-ID: <16576@phoenix.Princeton.EDU>
In article <2370@aipna.ed.ac.uk> geraint@aipna.ed.ac.uk (Geraint Wiggins) writes:
>In another article, Eliot Handelman writes
>> In article <2364@aipna.ed.ac.uk> geraint@ai.ed.ac.uk (Geraint Wiggins) writes:
Frankly, I find arguing this out in abstracto isn't going very far. Geraint
has supplied us with a couple of examples from which his perception of the
existence of a musical semantics is due: so let's look at those.
>It still does not exclude the possibility of some direct
>physical or perceived or even artificial labelling relating musical "effects"
>for want of a better term, to concepts, for want fo a better term. A simple
>example of this kind of thing is the widespread perception that F sharp major
>is a bright key which conveys associations of light, happiness etc and that b
>flat minor is not.
I assure you Geraint --- there is no such widespread perception. The
assigment of key to affect is completely idiosyncratic. No one has
even written seriously on the matter for a hundred years or more, because
it always boils down to which words seem best to describe the character of
a given piece, and there's never been sufficient agreement as to just
which words do seem best to characterize a given piece. Listening is a
much more active process than just discerning the explicit character of a
piece, promoted through a few banal rules of usage -- the idea that a given
key means a given affect, for instance.
>> I don't know what you think the Pastorale is a "good example" of, but don't
>> wing programme music at me as evidence for the existence of musical
>> semantics.
>It's a good example of how a piece of music can evoke associations in the mind.
>And what you want a semantics for, as I understand it in this context, is to
>notate, analyse, and reason about (the mental associations of) (expressions in)
>a (formal) language.
>The programme element is not what I meant. In me (maybe I'm oversensitive)
>listening to the opening few bars of the Pastoral produces physical sensations
>(the smell of country air and so on) - really, it does. That is the kind of
>thing I'm getting at, not "oh, this sounds like a peasant dance".
At which measure does the smell start? You have an overall set towards
the piece, Geraint. You're not actually talking about the Pastorale. You're
talking you and I'm talking music. Give me a better example, or at least
a more precise example, one that suggests that your response to the piece
is entirely due to the piece itself, that you're reasoning about the mental
associations of expressions in the formal language that you hold music to be,
and which elicits the same response in all other listeners; and tell me
how you were able to establish the identity of all these responses.
>> I don't know why the past 3 or 4 people who want to argue about this
>> insist on watering down my position.
>I think you should water down your complaints. Discussion is a process of
>MUTUAL understanding. You should remember that not everyone uses words in the
>same way as you, because perception of semantics differs* . :-)
I think you might learn to read what I have to say and stop paraphrasing
in such a way as to suggest that in saying "NO SEMANTICS, NONE, THERE ARE
NO SEMANTICS," what I REALLY want to say is "Maybe there are semantics
but I doubt it."
I'm saying something that needs to be said, so that, hypothetically, some
people will realize that the statement "music has semantics" has no obvious
defense, and that at least one person -- me -- claims "NO SEMANTICS."
I'm doing this not to get people to agree with me -- though I'm willing to
argue with whoever wants to argue about it -- I'm doing this so as to
let people know that I THINK OTHERWISE, and nothing more.
>> The ball's in your hands. I say "X does not exist." The only counterexample
>> that I can think of would be "There is an X which does exist." That's
>> your position, not mine.
>
>Not really. It's up to BOTH sides of the argument to make a case. Maybe I've
>been missing out on the discussion, but I only saw a claim, not an example or
>counter example.
Fine. I'm unaware of semantics in Pithoprakta. Happy now?
------------------------------
End of Music-Research Digest
--
---Brad Rubenstein-----Sun Microsystems Inc.-----bradr@sun.com---