smoliar@vaxa.isi.edu (Stephen Smoliar) (05/31/90)
In article <2394@aipna.ed.ac.uk> geraint@aipna.ed.ac.uk (Geraint Wiggins) writes: > >The point of my example of keys is that certain keys give certain very >lowlevel >sensations, which are perceived on some subliminal level. I'd be interested on >other netters views on this - I'm VERY surprised to hear you claim that these >associations are arbitrary. David Burge, for example, claims that these "tone >colours" run down to the individual note level, and are what give rise to >absolute pitch. Having followed part of his pitch training course, I'm >inclined >to agree. Aside from that, I have always been taught that the IS such a >widespread perception, and have used it (with, as far as I know, the desired >results) in my own compositions. > >So what do people think on this one? > Unless I'm mistaken, John Sloboda tried to deal with this issue in his book, THE MUSICAL MIND. He tried to account for any concrete psychological experiments which had been performed. About the only conclusion he could draw was that the jury was still out. Have any better experiments been designed since he wrote that book? ========================================================================= USPS: Stephen Smoliar USC Information Sciences Institute 4676 Admiralty Way Suite 1001 Marina del Rey, California 90292-6695 Internet: smoliar@vaxa.isi.edu "By long custom, social discourse in Cambridge is intended to impart and only rarely to obtain information. People talk; it is not expected that anyone will listen. A respectful show of attention is all that is required until the listener takes over in his or her turn. No one has ever been known to repeat what he or she has heard at a party or other social gathering." John Kenneth Galbraith A TENURED PROFESSOR
mgresham@artsnet.UUCP (Mark Gresham) (06/02/90)
In article <2364@aipna.ed.ac.uk> geraint@ai.ed.ac.uk (Geraint Wiggins) writes: >In article <16283@phoenix.Princeton.EDU> eliot@phoenix.Princeton.EDU (Eliot Handelman) writes: > >>The idea that music has "semantics" is completely meaningless because >>no music can be systematically explicated in terms of this function; >>besides there's no authoritative meaning-conferring community that >>establishes these semantics. Music is privately experienced and there's >>no way to convey that experience... > >Maybe this is a trite comment, but I've never seen a proof of this. Just >because we haven't got a way of doing something doesn't mean we can't do it. >In particular, the point about the meaning-conferring community seems >questionable: looking at language, we can only agree that certain words denote >ceratin concepts by supposing that our own interpretation of those concepts >agrees with those of others. A good example of this is colours. If I say an >object is "red" and agree with the person next to me on this, it is impossible >to say whether the sensations leading us to make this claim are the same. > >Thus, the interpretation of the colour is "privately experienced" and there is >indeed no way to convey that experience other than by pointing at the coloured >object and assigning a label to it ("red" in this case). > >It is not clear to me that such an agreed labelling could not be applied to >musical instances Probably for the reasoning that it doesn't apply in colour either. There is a Micronesian language, for example, in which the division of the visible spectra into "primary" colours are very much different from those of us of Euro-American backgrounds. There is one expression of a primary colour which covers what we call red, orange, and yellow; there are some seven words which cover the range of primary spectra which we refer to as green and blue. One might note that the Micronesian environment might :-) be somewhat responsible for the particular manner in which the sensation of primary colour is conceptualized is such a markedly different manner -- if you live in a blue-green world, you will be more sensitive to making conceptual distinctions in that range of colour. The interesting point about this, to me at least, is that it is one example leading towards the idea that neither words nor even concepts themselves are absolute models of divisions of "the real world," but are tools which we form (one kind of "knowing") to deal with the barrage of sensory material which we confront from the inception of life. (That itself a different story.) That is, there is no "redness" out there, per se. A direct attack, if you will on the Platonist notion of idealized whatevers, upon which (and including a game of philisophical ping-pong with Atistotle) our western, Cartesian approach to "understanding" the universe is based. I would like to suggest that the "privately experienced" which Eliot is referring to is not something which is "subjective" but is "non-objective" (in other words, simply not "objective" as opposed to the various "internal" psychological associations which the "subjective" term too often implies; but I also want to suggest that it is, indeed, "out there" too.) I also want to suggest that "meaning" is not the same as "definition." (I do recall also that my grandmother and I had very strong disagreements at times as to whether something was green or blue. In as much as the agreement on "red" cited above intends to show that maybe different stimuli produced conceptual agreement, there is also the notion that similar stimuli could produce a difference of concept.) Cheers, --Mark ======================================== Mark Gresham ARTSNET Norcross, GA, USA E-mail: ...gatech!artsnet!mgresham or: artsnet!mgresham@gatech.edu ========================================
mgresham@artsnet.UUCP (Mark Gresham) (06/02/90)
In article <2370@aipna.ed.ac.uk> geraint@aipna.ed.ac.uk (Geraint Wiggins) writes: >> Can you recognize an oboe? I can teach you to recognize one, so that the >> next time you hear an oboe, you'll be able to say, "that's an oboe." Is >> your musicality dependant on your capacity to recognize (that is, to name) >> an oboe? No it isn't, because you might confuse an oboe with an english >> horn, or sometimes with a trumpet, or sometimes with a cello. > >No, in exactly the same way as the fact that I may not be aware that I'm really >colourblind doesn't affect me discussing, say, the work of Picasso. Misleading analogy. To use this comparison you'd have to be deaf to timbre, which would, indeed, make it difficult (impossible, in fact) to discuss orchestration. You might be able to discuss some aspects of Picasso's work (those not dealing with colour) but you'd be unable to successfully discuss anything having to do Picasso's use of colour. And you'd really have problems with Mark Rothko. >> My point is that we can learn to name things which have physical >> ... >> condition of the experience itself. > >All of this is true. It still does not exclude the possibility of some direct >physical or perceived or even artificial labelling relating musical "effects" >for want of a better term, to concepts, for want fo a better term. A simple >example of this kind of thing is the widespread perception that F sharp major >is a bright key which conveys associations of light, happiness etc and that b >flat minor is not. But then there was at one time a widespread conviction that the earth is flat. The strength of the conviction, however, doesn't make it true. The conviction that a song is "happy" doen't mean the song "contains" happiness. >I'm NOT saying there definitely IS a semantics. I'm saying >that I haven't seen a proof What would constitute a "proof" in this situation? Re: flat earth: There were a couple of linguists studying certain rural dialects in the southeastern US. In discussions about various things the subject of "flat earth" somehow came up. The gentleman whose dialect was being studied insisted that the earth was flat because the Bible said so. When asked, "What about airplanes that fly around the earth" (as evidence the earth is round) his reply was, "I never look up." Cheers, --Mark ======================================== Mark Gresham ARTSNET Norcross, GA, USA E-mail: ...gatech!artsnet!mgresham or: artsnet!mgresham@gatech.edu ========================================
mgresham@artsnet.UUCP (Mark Gresham) (06/05/90)
In article <16576@phoenix.Princeton.EDU> eliot@winnie.Princeton.Edu (eliot handelman) writes: >In article <2370@aipna.ed.ac.uk> geraint@aipna.ed.ac.uk (Geraint Wiggins) writes: >>Maybe I've >>been missing out on the discussion, but I only saw a claim, not an example or >>counter example. > >Fine. I'm unaware of semantics in Pithoprakta. Happy now? A different kind of counter-example: Notice the tune with which Americans associate the text "My Country, 'Tis of Thee" and British associate "God Save the Queen." Different responses for each when the tune is heard without text. That's an oversimplified example, and doesn't account for a person who hears the tune for the first time without ever hearing the words. However,... Another example is a very, very serious traditional Japanese court music (with a name I cannot pronounce) which is some of the *most* serious music in the world by *intention*. However, the response of most Westerners on first hearing (without prior lecture) is to laugh. If there is a semantic "seriousness" in the music itself, why doesn't it communicate? (If music is a universal "language," which I contend it is not. It is not a "language" of any kind.) Cheers, --Mark ======================================== Mark Gresham ARTSNET Norcross, GA, USA E-mail: ...gatech!artsnet!mgresham or: artsnet!mgresham@gatech.edu ========================================
icking@gmdzi.UUCP (Werner Icking) (06/06/90)
eliot handelman <eliot%winnie%phoenix@edu.princeton> writes: >In article <2370@aipna.ed.ac.uk> geraint@aipna.ed.ac.uk (Geraint Wiggins) writes: >>In another article, Eliot Handelman writes >>> In article <2364@aipna.ed.ac.uk> geraint@ai.ed.ac.uk (Geraint Wiggins) writes: ... >>> The ball's in your hands. I say "X does not exist." The only counterexample >>> that I can think of would be "There is an X which does exist." That's >>> your position, not mine. >>Not really. It's up to BOTH sides of the argument to make a case. Maybe I've >>been missing out on the discussion, but I only saw a claim, not an example or >>counter example. >Fine. I'm unaware of semantics in Pithoprakta. Happy now? For BOTH sides it may be helpful to read Nikolaus Harnoncourt: Musik als Klangrede Nikolaus Harnoncourt: Musikalischer Dialog (both dtv/baerenreiter) The titles already state that - long long ago - making music meant deliver a speech or make conversation. This would be very difficult without semantics? I hope there is a translation of the two books - ask Roger -; otherwise for a non german-speaking reader it would be only noise without any semantics. -- Werner Icking icking@gmdzi.gmd.de (+49 2241) 14-2443 Gesellschaft fuer Mathematik und Datenverarbeitung mbH (GMD) Schloss Birlinghoven, P.O.Box 1240, D-5205 Sankt Augustin 1, FRGermany
roger@phoenix.Princeton.EDU (Roger Lustig) (06/07/90)
In article <2514@gmdzi.UUCP> icking@gmdzi.UUCP (Werner Icking) writes: >eliot handelman <eliot%winnie%phoenix@edu.princeton> writes: >>In article <2370@aipna.ed.ac.uk> geraint@aipna.ed.ac.uk (Geraint Wiggins) writes: >>>In another article, Eliot Handelman writes >>>> In article <2364@aipna.ed.ac.uk> geraint@ai.ed.ac.uk (Geraint Wiggins) writes: >>>> The ball's in your hands. I say "X does not exist." The only counterexample >>>> that I can think of would be "There is an X which does exist." That's >>>> your position, not mine. >>>Not really. It's up to BOTH sides of the argument to make a case. Maybe I've >>>been missing out on the discussion, but I only saw a claim, not an example or >>>counter example. >>Fine. I'm unaware of semantics in Pithoprakta. Happy now? >For BOTH sides it may be helpful to read > Nikolaus Harnoncourt: Musik als Klangrede > Nikolaus Harnoncourt: Musikalischer Dialog (both dtv/baerenreiter) >The titles already state that - long long ago - making music meant deliver a >speech or make conversation. This would be very difficult without semantics? Not having read these, I can't say; but the issue of rhetoric-and-music in the Baroque (which I assume is Harnoncourt's topic) is a very dangerous one. Many writers spoke of musical rhetoric and musical figures, analogous to rhetoric, figures of speech, etc., and even with the same names; but first of all, this sort of thing was ALWAYS applied to vocal music only, so the question of 'what's being said?' was obvious from the start; and second, there was no agreement as to how the figures worked, what they expressed, etc. Music was LIKENED to oratory; that did not MAKE it oratory. (While in E. Germany this week, I hope to get to Dresden to do some research on one of the best writers on this topic, J. D. Heinichen. I've written a paper on his theories, and want to check out what he did in practice. He seems to have made a specific point about expressing certain characteristics of a text through the harmony of the setting; I wonder whether his music bears this out. I have 3 operas and 63 cantatas to work with, so we can hope.....) Roger >I hope there is a translation of the two books - ask Roger -; otherwise for a >non german-speaking reader it would be only noise without any semantics. >-- >Werner Icking icking@gmdzi.gmd.de (+49 2241) 14-2443 >Gesellschaft fuer Mathematik und Datenverarbeitung mbH (GMD) >Schloss Birlinghoven, P.O.Box 1240, D-5205 Sankt Augustin 1, FRGermany
eliot@phoenix.Princeton.EDU (Eliot Handelman) (06/07/90)
In article <17030@phoenix.Princeton.EDU> roger@phoenix.Princeton.EDU (Roger Lustig) writes: ;In article <2514@gmdzi.UUCP> icking@gmdzi.UUCP (Werner Icking) writes: ;>eliot handelman <eliot%winnie%phoenix@edu.princeton> writes: ;>>In article <2370@aipna.ed.ac.uk> geraint@aipna.ed.ac.uk (Geraint Wiggins) writes: ;>>>In another article, Eliot Handelman writes ;>>>> In article <2364@aipna.ed.ac.uk> geraint@ai.ed.ac.uk (Geraint Wiggins) writes: ; ;>>>> The ball's in your hands. I say "X does not exist." The only counterexample ;>>>> that I can think of would be "There is an X which does exist." That's ;>>>> your position, not mine. ;>>>Not really. It's up to BOTH sides of the argument to make a case. Maybe I've ;>>>been missing out on the discussion, but I only saw a claim, not an example or ;>>>counter example. ;>>Fine. I'm unaware of semantics in Pithoprakta. Happy now? ;>For BOTH sides it may be helpful to read ;> Nikolaus Harnoncourt: Musik als Klangrede ;> Nikolaus Harnoncourt: Musikalischer Dialog (both dtv/baerenreiter) ;>The titles already state that - long long ago - making music meant deliver a ;>speech or make conversation. This would be very difficult without semantics? ;Not having read these, I can't say; but the issue of rhetoric-and-music ;in the Baroque (which I assume is Harnoncourt's topic) is a very ;dangerous one. I read the first book about 6 years ago (in German) and I can't remember a thing about it other than not having found it particularly compelling. Werner will have to refresh my memory. --eliot
bradr@bartok.Eng.Sun.COM (Brad Rubenstein) (06/07/90)
In article <856@artsnet.UUCP> mgresham@artsnet.UUCP (Mark Gresham) writes: >Another example is a very, very serious traditional >Japanese court music (with a name I cannot pronounce) >which is some of the *most* serious music in the world by >*intention*. However, the response of most Westerners on >first hearing (without prior lecture) is to laugh. >If there is a semantic "seriousness" in the music itself, >why doesn't it communicate? (If music is a universal "language," >which I contend it is not. It is not a "language" of any kind.) This is not unique to music. A Japanese speech synthesis program of marginal quality "utters" a series of sounds that japanese speaker understands as (roughly) "you are very welcome, honorable sir", but which an english speaker understands as "dont'cha touch your moustache". [ the sounds are roughly /doo-i-tashi-mashite/ ] The sounds invoke a "serious" response in the japanese speaker, and a "comic" (or perhaps "confused") response in the english speaker. Together, these demonstrate that the meanings assigned to sound (or the referents of sound-as-sign) are culture-specific. I don't take this to be a revelation. :-) Brad -- ---Brad Rubenstein-----Sun Microsystems Inc.-----bradr@sun.com---
mgresham@artsnet.UUCP (Mark Gresham) (07/03/90)
In article <2394@aipna.ed.ac.uk> geraint@aipna.ed.ac.uk (Geraint Wiggins) writes: >Yes of course it is. But the point is that there exist some low level atoms, I have strong doubts about that. >regardless of what you call 'em, from which some higher level stuff MIGHT be >composed. That's all I'm saying. And your point about finding the right words >is indeed correct. Nor do I think the "right words" to parallel a a statement in a "music language" worsk either, as music is not a language (where with the "correct" interpretation or knowledge of the language, you understand what's being "said", emotionally or otherwise.) >The point of my example of keys is that certain keys give certain very lowlevel >sensations, which are perceived on some subliminal level. I'd be interested on >other netters views on this - I'm VERY surprised to hear you claim that these >associations are arbitrary. David Burge, for example, claims that these "tone >colours" run down to the individual note level, and are what give rise to >absolute pitch. Having followed part of his pitch training course, I'm inclined >to agree. But lots of different kinds of metaphors are handy tools for learning things like 'perfect pitch.' That doesn't mean there's a "colour-ness" to particular frequency/pitch. (And how is it affected by timbre, BTW?) I sang in a choir for several years in which the warmups began by the entire ensemble singing an A-natural without being given a pitch. They practiced it weekly, and frankly were able to do it and have a decent unison at the same time. No "tone colours" or hints of such a concept, it was a slow development of a particular 'long-term' memory (like remembering the face of a relative). Perfect pitch, I believe, is a particular kind of identification in long-term memory. One person I knew with perfect pitch could only identify pitches correctly when played on the piano, but never on other instruments. Another has perfect pitch, but can only identify the pitch 'on top' and identifys pitches as either naturals or sharps as she never learned what was meant by 'flat.' Another who was unable to say which of two pitches was higher or lower, but has an incredible sensitivity to timbre and the 'beating' of two pitches against each other. Yet another who had 'perfect pitch' but was unable to listen to the classical music of India or non-tempered Western instruments without becoming extremely annoyed. I think Burges' "tone-colours" is a 'halfway house' or a system to learning 'perfect pitch' that works, but I don't believe that the "tone-colours" are an intrensic part of the 'nature' of the pitches. >Aside from that, I have always been taught that the IS such a >widespread perception, and have used it (with, as far as I know, the desired >results) in my own compositions. That and a few other things are still (erroneously, I think) taught, in spite of the fact that it the notion was theoretically evacuated long ago. Sometimes, educators take a long while to catch up. >So what do people think on this one? > >> At which measure does the smell start? [...] > >Again, yes of course I am. I'm talking about my (subconscious) interpretation >of the piece (= assignment of semantics?). It is still not clear to me that if >I can assign soemthing like that, other people can't and, if they can that the >two are necessarily different or unreconcilable. Again, I don't consider 'having semantic value' and 'assignment' are the same thing. Surely you can assign association, as you can assign associations to the image of a sunset or the smell of a hamburger cooking, but does that make either of those a 'language'? No. Nor does it mean that others will make the same assignment as you to either of those, though many may make *similar* ones or (and more accurately) assign similar verbal descriptions to them. >Incidentally, nobody said anything about a FORMAL language. No one's distingushed the two yet in this discussion, but I would still say music is NOT a language, formal or informal. Cheers, --Mark ======================================== Mark Gresham ARTSNET Norcross, GA, USA E-mail: ...gatech!artsnet!mgresham or: artsnet!mgresham@gatech.edu ========================================