nl-kr-request@CS.ROCHESTER.EDU (NL-KR Moderator Brad Miller) (10/30/87)
NL-KR Digest (10/30/87 01:13:47) Volume 3 Number 41 Today's Topics: ai/c dynamic KB restructuring Why can't my cat talk? Innate Language Ability Re: The real issue with concepts/words Re: concepts vs. words; false dichotomies Re: false dichotomies ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Date: Fri, 23 Oct 87 12:14 EDT From: Ali Hazzah <hazzah@acf3.nyu.edu> Subject: ai/c I am interested in netting with those currently mulling over Knowledge Representation issues, as well as those doing NLS research work, utilizing the language C. Here at NYU, I have just started developing a set of common, general-purpose C routines, callable by C programs, using as an interface shell a custom-built i/o graphics/text library. This work is only starting; it is just this side of vaporware, but my ruminations are begining to see the light of code. The idea is to be able to prototype malleable shells, which can then access "generic" functions, and in the process do something semi-useful. What I'm saying, then, is that I'd like to hear from like-minded individuals, whose intent is participatory, and who'd appreciate trading "shop-talk", and maybe even a few Great Ideas. A thousand thanks, Ali ------------------------------ Date: Fri, 23 Oct 87 17:33 EDT From: Bruce Nevin <bnevin@cch.bbn.com> Subject: dynamic KB restructuring Has there been any work on the problem of reorganizing knowledge bases in light of evidence for a different set of conceptual categories? I'm thinking of a `hindsight is better' realization that there is something seriously deficient or limiting in the system of concepts and links used at the beginning of building a KR system. This relates to problems of portability to new domains, merging or communicating between KR systems built independently for different domains, as well as incorporating information with kinds of structuring not foreseen at the outset of work. Bruce Nevin bn@cch.bbn.com ------------------------------ Date: Mon, 26 Oct 87 23:00 EST From: 26-Oct-1987 2000 <glantz@yippee.dec.com> Subject: Why can't my cat talk? What is it in humans which makes language possible? Much discussion about neural networks carries the implication that it is a human brain researchers are hoping, ultimately, to simulate, and that a successful simulation will exhibit human linguistic capability. This is certainly an admirable and worthwhile, if ambitious, goal. But current models don't seem to have any features which would distinguish a human brain from, say, a cat's brain (I realize this is very early days - no criticism intended). This will eventually have to be dealt with. One possible explanation for why humans have language and cats don't is that there may be one or more physiological structures unique to the human brain, other than its larger capacity, which make language possible. This is the most obvious explanation that comes to mind, and is perfectly reasonable, although we haven't yet identified which structures these are, or what roles they might play. But another possibility is that maybe the larger brain capacity is sufficient, but that language is possible only after certain ``internal'' or ``symbolic'' structures are built on top of the physiological base. This building occurs during infancy and early childhood, and the resulting structures can be considered to be part of the human brain, every bit as real as the physiologically observable features. We continue this line of conjecture by suggesting that: o At some point in the past, the human species did not have language, even though the brain was physiologically identical (or identical in all essential respects) to today's human brain; o It is the socialization process which, today, builds these structures in the brain of the human infant, layer upon layer being added until a layer at which language can exist is built, and then probably several layers beyond that; o That this linguistic-structure-formation process is a small component of the entire human social system, the whole of which has evolved through natural selection, just as any physical characteristic of any species evolves. The principal hypothesis, here, is that, given sufficient relative brain capacity, and the appropriate socialization process, any individual of another species (a porpoise, for example) could acquire linguistic ability. [Aside: It is known that the human brain (and that of other mammals, as well) undergoes physiological changes during the period of infancy and early childhood. It is possible that the initial acquisition of linguistic skills can only occur effectively during this period, during which time these physiological changes are significantly ``molded'' by the socialization process, where certain ``symbolic'' structures actually become ``wired in''. If this were the case, then the period during which basic linguistic ability can be acquired would be limited to this ``crystallization'' period, which is possibly much longer in humans than in other mammals. We would then have to amend the hypothesis to read: given sufficient brain capacity and a sufficiently long ``crystallization period'' etc. It then remains (among other things) to determine the exact nature of this ``crystallization'', and incorporate a sufficiently long duration of this in a computer model. Does anyone have any concrete information about human brain physiology which would favor the completely ``physiological'' hypothesis of linguistic capability over the ``sociological/anthropological'' explanation, or which would shed any other light on the question? - mike glantz Disclaimer: My employer is not aware that I have posted this message. ------------------------------ Date: Tue, 27 Oct 87 11:09 EST From: merrill@iuvax.cs.indiana.edu Subject: Re: Why can't my cat talk? There is evidence that supports an argument the humans are "pre-equipped" to speak and to participate in language. In particular, the structure of the adult human velum is different from that found in other great apes, which, like human babies, can brethe while they swallow. Adult humans (in fact, human one-year-olds) can no longer do so. This modification is closely associated with the ability of the tongue to produce a number of the standard vowels. This argument is not air-tight, since children deaf from birth can (and do, if given the chance) acquire language, even though they do not speak. On the other hand, if an external structure has evolved to participate in linguistic performance, it is reasonable to argur that many internal structures have, too. John Merrill ARPA: merrill@iuvax.cs.indiana.edu UUCP: merrill@iuvax BITnet: merrill%iuvax.cs.indiana.edu@psuvax ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 28 Oct 87 08:53 EST From: Douglas J. Bonn <hao!gatech!rayssd!djb@ames.arpa> Subject: Re: Why can't my cat talk? It seems to me that we need to draw a distinction between the mental ability to comprehend and form independent thoughts (called phrases and sentences) from the vocal organs necessary for speech. I once had a cat that seemed smart enough to talk (but didn't often condescend to speak to me :-) though she didn't have the vocal chords for it, and there are mentally retarded people that don't seem to have the necessary intelligence to speak. While it is not exactly "speech", monkeys have been taught sign-language. They can ask for food, recognize people (even from photographs), ask to be let out of their cages, etc. I don't know enough about the study (but perhaps someone out there does), but the last I heard, the research with monkeys doing sign was curtailed. "Why can't my cat talk?" Perhaps if she could think as we understand thought, she would learn to meow in Morse Code or use a PC. -- Douglas J. Bonn, Esq. djb@rayssd.ray.com "As far as we can determine, our system has never had an undetected error..." ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 28 Oct 87 13:47 EST From: Len Friedman <FRIEDMAN@vaxa.isi.edu> Subject: Innate Language Ability > One possible explanation for why humans have language and cats don't is > that there may be one or more physiological structures unique to the > human brain, other than its larger capacity, which make language > possible. This is the most obvious explanation that comes to mind, and > is perfectly reasonable, although we haven't yet identified which > structures these are, or what roles they might play. In the 1840's or 50's a French physician named Broca discovered that an aphasic patient (one who had lost his ability to speak as the result of a stroke) had suffered a massive lesion in a particular area of the brain. He was able to demonstrate that any human who suffered an injury in that area lost the ability to speak. It has since been named Broca's area, and is one of the few in the brain whose function has been so clearly associated with a known, uniquely human ability. A great deal of more modern neurophysiological investigation has shown that other specialized areas of the human brain are associated not only with speech, but with aspects of language understanding as well. Norman Geschwind has written several excellent review articles in Science on the subject in the last 5 years or so. > It is the socialization process which, today, builds these structures > in the brain of the human infant, layer upon layer being added until a > layer at which language can exist is built, and then probably several > layers beyond that; There have been extensive investigations by psychologists of the thesis, advanced in the 60's, that a core language capability is innate, i.e., wired into the brain of any normal infant. These investigations have taken several forms, including the sound by sound study of the development of language capability in normal human infants, and the study of "creole" grammars. The conclusions of the people studying the development of infant language is that its course is almost invariant, involving first the production of nouns, then noun phrases, then noun-verb pairs, etc. The grammar associated with this development is the same grammar found in "creole" languages. Creoles are "pidgin" languages that develop when adult communities are artificially thrown together. When the members of these comingling communities speak radically different languages like Japanese and Portuguese they develop a means to communicate with each other in a language that has the same primitive grammar that infants employ on their way to learning the grammar of the adult community. An example of such a creole is one developed by agricultural workers imported into Hawaii to work as pineapple pickers, mostly from Japan and Portugal around 1900. Other examples of such languages, all with the same grammar, are described in an article that appeared in Scientific American. I am sure that many psychologist readers of AIlist can point you to the literature on infant language development. > The principal hypothesis, here, is that, given sufficient relative > brain capacity, and the appropriate socialization process, any > individual of another species (a porpoise, for example) could acquire > linguistic ability. In view of the evidence for specialized brain areas in humans plus the evidence for innate capabilities in language development, this appears to be most unlikely. By the way, porpoises, dolphins, and whales, have specialized areas in their brains for processing echo returns, as do bats. ------------------------------ Date: Thu, 22 Oct 87 16:37 EDT From: Alan Lovejoy <alan@pdn.UUCP> Subject: Re: The real issue with concepts/words In article <2485@mmintl.UUCP> franka@mmintl.UUCP (Frank Adams) writes: >Can you give an example of a commonly held false belief which is *not* >reflected by language in this sense? *Of course* people use words in a way >which accords with their beliefs. How could they do otherwise? Exactly. What else were you expecting? Language is the tuple (syntax, semantics). Since the syntax only specifies form, only the semantics (the content) could possibly influence thought or opinion. --alan@pdn ------------------------------ Date: Thu, 22 Oct 87 23:41 EDT From: Sarge Gerbode <sarge@thirdi.UUCP> Subject: Re: concepts vs. words; false dichotomies In article <334@odyssey.ATT.COM> gls@odyssey.ATT.COM (g.l.sicherman) writes: >To me, a concept or idea is a kind of pattern, and thus a perception in >its own right. I still distinguish a concept from a statement of it. I agree that a concept is not a statement. I don't think a concept is a pattern, but even if a concept were a pattern, that still doesn't say that it would be perceptible. Lots of patterns are only *inferred* and cannot be perceived. >You have touched the fulcrum of the argument. A perception cannot be >"wrong"--your senses are just doing their job. If you genuinely saw >pigs fly, it doesn't matter whether the pigs were actually caught in >a whirlwind, or you were watching an animated cartoon, or you were >asleep and dreaming. Your perception was *true.* I think that's right, in a way. *At the time of the perception*, perception seems infallible. One cannot say "I perceive a flying pig, but there isn;t one there." If you didn't think a flying pig was there, you wouldn't say, "I see a flying pig," but "I see an *illusion* or a *picture* of a flying pig." Nevertheless, ssomething that, at the time, was thought of as a perception may later be thought of as having been a misperception. For instance, when we dream, we seem to be perceiving all sorts of things. When we wake up, however, we see that it was not a true perception but illusory. -- "Absolute knowledge means never having to change your mind." Sarge Gerbode Institute for Research in Metapsychology 950 Guinda St. Palo Alto, CA 94301 UUCP: pyramid!thirdi!sarge ------------------------------ Date: Mon, 26 Oct 87 09:41 EST From: g.l.sicherman <gls@odyssey.ATT.COM> Subject: Re: false dichotomies More about perception and illusion ... > I don't think a concept is a pattern, but even if a concept were a pattern, > that still doesn't say that it would be perceptible. Lots of patterns are > only *inferred* and cannot be perceived. It's the rule that you infer, not the pattern. You must perceive a pattern before you can establish a rule! > I think that's right, in a way. *At the time of the perception*, perception > seems infallible. One cannot say "I perceive a flying pig, but there isn;t > one there." If you didn't think a flying pig was there, you wouldn't say, "I > see a flying pig," but "I see an *illusion* or a *picture* of a flying pig." > Nevertheless, ssomething that, at the time, was thought of as a perception may > later be thought of as having been a misperception. For instance, when we > dream, we seem to be perceiving all sorts of things. When we wake up, > however, we see that it was not a true perception but illusory. The nature of illusion was discussed here a few months ago. Do you know the story of the sage who dreamed he was a butterfly? Afterwards he was never sure that he was not a buttefly dreaming it was a sage. The only difference it makes to _you_ is that you interpret what you perceive differently. The only difference it makes to others is that they may want to rely on what you say. If you shout, "Look out! Here come the flying pigs again!" they can choose between running for cover and looking foolish when a herd of swine walks past, or laughing, "Ha, ha! Serge has been dreaming again!" and (just maybe) being killed by flying pigs. On the other hand, if you're dealing with Old Age people, you just say "I had a dream of flying pigs," and they answer, "We don't believe you! Where is your dream? Let's see it!" Here's another example, from Myron Moose ("Little Myro`n Slumberland"): "Oh! boy! A marshmallow bush! I will eat one! Yes! "Oh! That is good! Oh! Is this marshmallow getting bigger! "Hey! Perhaps I had better eat faster! Um! Yes! "Oh! my! I cannot eat this fast enough! Oh! "Oh! oh! If I do not eat this up quick I will be crushed. Oh! I must eat faster! Yes! "Oh! my! Oh! My goodness! I cannot eat so fast! Oh! "Oh! What am I to do! Um! It is definitely getting bigger! Yes I am sure it is! "What ails this marshmallow? "Oh! Ow! Um! Help!" "Oh Myro, now what? What have you done with your pillow?" "Ptoo!" -- Col. G. L. Sicherman ....!ihnp4!odyssey!gls ------------------------------ Date: Tue, 27 Oct 87 02:29 EST From: Sarge Gerbode <sarge@thirdi.UUCP> Subject: Re: false dichotomies In article <344@odyssey.ATT.COM> gls@odyssey.ATT.COM (g.l.sicherman) writes: >> I don't think a concept is a pattern, but even if a concept were a pattern, >> that still doesn't say that it would be perceptible. Lots of patterns are >> only *inferred* and cannot be perceived. > >It's the rule that you infer, not the pattern. You must perceive a pattern >before you can establish a rule! I think I see what you mean. You seem to be defining "pattern" to mean a perception. That's OK, so long as that usage is consistent. However, sometimes one speaks of pattern in different ways, such as "a pattern of crimes". One may not have perceived any of these crimes, but they appear to have a certain regularity. Per what you have said, I imagine you would call this an inferred rule, not a pattern. I can go along with this, although there is a sense in which *any* perceived pattern involves a certain degree of inference or interpretation of perception, not a pure perception. >The nature of illusion was discussed here a few months ago. Do you know >the story of the sage who dreamed he was a butterfly? Afterwards he was >never sure that he was not a buttefly dreaming it was a sage. But what one accepts as reality is not entirely arbitrary as this example appears to suggest. Standards of consistency, as well as considerations of predictability, order, aesthetics, and other considerations relative to credibility come into play in determining which interpretation a person accepts of his experience. >The only difference it makes to _you_ is that you interpret what you >perceive differently. Another way of putting this is that one "steps back" from the previous perception one had and sees it now as, not a perception, but a misinterpretation of a "lower level" perception. For instance, one sees a ghost in the dead of night. Then, when the light comes, one sees that it was only a shirt on a chair. In looking at one's prior perception, one "steps back" from the interpretation of it as a ghost and sees "ghost" as having been a mere interpretation (In fact, an incorrect one) of the "lower-level" perception of "a whitish shape in my room".s That doesn't mean that it was not originally a perception. But now one looks from a different viewpoint, minus that interpretation. Any act of perception contains multiple levels of interpretation, into which one can "step forward" or from which one can "step back". >The only difference it makes to others is that >they may want to rely on what you say. If you shout, "Look out! Here >come the flying pigs again!" they can choose between running for cover >and looking foolish when a herd of swine walks past, or laughing, "Ha, >ha! Sarge has been dreaming again!" and (just maybe) being killed by >flying pigs. Yes. One selects amongst possible interpretations of perceptions those that are conducive to the establishment of a universe of discourse with other people. If not, one is likely to be very lonely at best and at worst end up in a back ward somewhere or dead. >On the other hand, if you're dealing with Old Age people, you just say >"I had a dream of flying pigs," and they answer, "We don't believe you! >Where is your dream? Let's see it!" Great point. Those who do not believe in telepathy demand telepathy as proof! -- "Absolute knowledge means never having to change your mind." Sarge Gerbode Institute for Research in Metapsychology 950 Guinda St. Palo Alto, CA 94301 UUCP: pyramid!thirdi!sarge ------------------------------ End of NL-KR Digest *******************