nl-kr-request@CS.ROCHESTER.EDU (NL-KR Moderator Brad Miller) (03/30/88)
NL-KR Digest (3/29/88 19:52:12) Volume 4 Number 35
Today's Topics:
ASL and non-linguistic thought
Ambiguity vs. vagueness (was: language, thought, and culture)
Concepts and Semantics (was: language, thought, and culture)
Submissions: NL-KR@CS.ROCHESTER.EDU
Requests, policy: NL-KR-REQUEST@CS.ROCHESTER.EDU
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Date: Fri, 11 Mar 88 10:42 EST
From: Philip Resnik <presnik@LABS-N.BBN.COM>
Subject: ASL and non-linguistic thought
In a number of the postings concerning non-linguistic thought,
people mentioned sign languages. Although I'm not deaf,
I have studied American Sign Language (ASL), and the following
point might be of interest:
Klima and Bellugi (_The Signs of Language_, Harvard Univ. Press, 1979)
have an entire chapter called "Remembering without Words: Manual Memory".
One of their series of experiments demonstrates that, just as hearing people
encode their language "predominantly in terms of phonological properties"
(p. 98), deaf native signers encode _their_ language in terms of simultaneously
occurring formational parameters (e.g. place of articulation, hand position,
kind of movement). In both cases, surprisingly, even if the input is
in the form of written text, the storage appears to be in terms of either
an auditory code (for the hearing) or manual parameters (for native signers).
(The study itself used a recall task and looked primarily at intrusion errors.
Where a hearing person might misremember "vote" as "boat" or "tea" as "tree",
a native deaf signer might misremember "bird" as "newspaper" [they differ
only in their place of articulation, but not in hand position, movement, or
orientation] or "socks" as "star" [they differ only in orientation].)
So, although it makes sense to generalize one's linguistic terms enough to
include both spoken and signed languages (e.g. using some term more general
than "prosody"), my guess is that sign language won't shed a great deal of
light on "non-linguistic thought". ASL involves _linguistic_ thought,
albeit with different parameters, in the same ways and circumstances that
spoken languages do:
"Deaf parents tell us that their children sign to themselves in their
sleep; we have observed deaf toddlers signing to themselves and their
toy animals before bedtime when they thought they were alone. We have
seen hands 'muttering' to themselves; we have seen deaf people rehearsing
_a mano_ before a videotape session, repeating a grocery list in sign,
and signing to make clear to themselves something read in English. Deaf
people tell us they dream in signs, plan conversation in signs, imagine
the perfect retort in signs." (Klima and Bellugi, p. 89)
Philip Resnik
presnik@bbn.com
------------------------------
Date: Tue, 15 Mar 88 08:59 EST
From: Rob Bernardo <rob@pbhyf.UUCP>
Subject: Ambiguity vs. vagueness (was: language, thought, and culture)
Cliff Joslyn:
>No, my assertion is that one could not have a clear concept of a horse
>without some form of representation of the horse, not necessarily visual.
Sarge Gerbode:
>I don't like the word "representation" too well, by the way, because it is
>ambiguuous. It can mean "to stand for", as where a symbol represents a
>concept, or it can mean what I call a "picture" -- an image of something. In
>things like NLP, it generally seems to mean the latter.
Cliff Joslyn:
>The strength of ambiguity is generality. That is my goal, a general
>semantic theory.
OOOPS!!! There is a big difference between *ambiguity* and *vagueness*.
Ambiguity is a quality by which something refers to more than one
thing via separate meanings.
Vagueness is a quality by which something refers a variety of things
via one meaning.
The strength of *vagueness* is generality. The danger of *ambiguity*
is the treatment of to separate things as if they were the same and
a muddle can result.
One ambiguous word in our culture whose ambiguity we are often blind
to is "sex". It can refer to sexuality or to gender. One of the muddles
that I have seen result from this ambiguity is confusion in the
notion of "sexual discrimination" or "sexual harrassment". The former
has to do with discrimination on the basis of gender, and the latter
has to do with behaving in an unwanted sexual/romantic way. But
notice how the two terms are often used to cover both situations?
How in EEO discussions the two come up together as if one issue?
--
Rob Bernardo uucp: [backbone]!ptsfa!rob
residence: (415) 827-4301 (Concord, CA) business: (415) 823-2417 (San Ramon, CA)
------------------------------
Date: Tue, 15 Mar 88 11:54 EST
From: Cliff Joslyn <vu0112@bingvaxu.cc.binghamton.edu>
Subject: Concepts and Semantics (was: language, thought, and culture)
In article <344@thirdi.UUCP> sarge@thirdi.UUCP (Sarge Gerbode) writes:
>Re: the article by Cliff Joslyn:
>
>Sorry; I didn't mean to sound condescending.
No problem.
>>Please understand that my position is that there is *only* a
>>quantitative difference between "deep" and "surface", "connotation" and
>>"denotation."
>
>Well, it seems to me that the denotation would be the primary concept that the
>token is meant to represent, not, at any rate, a physical object or set of
>objects.
I see: it seems you believe in the existence of concepts. If you agree
with me that a concept as such is a representation, then we can
certainly grant this, and further say that the denotation is the
"primary" connotation for the symbol, when there is one. I don't know
whether representations are entirely physical objects, but I believe
that they are physical objects in the context of a set of relations
among other things, other objects, other representations. If you wish
to consider such things as not physical objects, then we can agree.
However, my definition of representation entails that they are at least
in part physical objects, which to me means that they are physical
objects, and thus perhaps to you not a concept.
If you don't agree that a concept is a representation, then I'd ask you
what a concept is. If it is not a physical object, then do you assert
that non-physical objects exist? How could you test an hypothesis
concerning the existence of non-physical things?
>It seems that the distinction between a referent and
>associations is a useful one and a qualitative one, not merely a shading of one
>thing into another.
On the reading of my first paragraph above, I would agree, with certain
caveats. When I talk about quantitative difference, I recognize that
sufficient quantitative difference implies a qualitative difference. An
example is induction, where sufficient quantitative difference (there's
a *whole ton* of evidence that lightning causes thunder) demmands the
inductive inference (lightning causes thunder). I further agree that
making such an inference is very useful, and further that we do it all
the time and that it is a very important aspect of our minds that they
do that. However, that in no way implies that the qualitative
difference *actually exists*, merely that we *must* act *as if it did*,
and further *may not be able to tell that it does not*.
>>In particular, I don't think that any denotations are held
>>in the mind .... Denotations, like
>>numbers, are theoretical entities of a very different sort from mental
>>representations.
>
>Thqat depends on what is meant by "mind", itself a word whose referent is a
>matter of debate. Let me offer an experiential definition of mind:
>a person's mind is the set of all entities that he, and only he, can act upon or
>experience.
We normally say that my sensations are clearly a part of my mind. Yet
it is well known that sensations can be induced by neuro-surgical
procedures, clearly a public event (this is a case of acting-upon, not
experiencing). Notice that this case fits my definition quite well: the
neurosurgeon induced the triggering of a certain stored representation
which caused it to be expreienced by the patient.
>>[I doubt that it's possible to] construct a theory of
>>concepts without representations."
>
>I would agree, in one meaning of "representation", because most concepts are
>represented by some token. But I don't think *all* concepts need be. For
>instance, before a representation is assigned to a concept, it is
>unrepresented.
According to my first argument (concepts are a kind of representation),
before a representation is assigned a concept, it does not exist.
>I would agree that both a word (digital) and a picture (analog) are
>representations. Actually, I would put it differently: both a word and an
>analog picture of, say, a horse, are *pictures*, in my terminology.
Well, then you have a very strange terminology indeed. Please explain
how a word can be a picture.
>But I
>would say that a concept is neither kind of picture. It is not a
>representation at all; it is that which is represented: a possible
reality.
Normally we say that a word ("dog") represents the physical object
(dog). To say that the concept is that which is represented (the
"meaning" of the symbol), is to say that the dog is a concept (clearly
not a position which is very sympathetic to the dog). Now if instead we
say that a word represents (sic) an internal representation of the dog,
we've spared the dog it's non-concepthood. If we say with you that the
word represents a *concept* of the dog, not the dog itself, then we
*still* need to know what a concept is: is it a representation? If not,
how can it exist so that I can refer to it, and so that it is still not
the dog itself?
>In other words, in my view, the denotation or meaning of a token (or
>representation), assuming that it has a meaning, is a *possible* reality, not
>an actual reality. Words like "unicorn" are meaningful, though not
>instantiated. The token "A purple car parked in front of my house," refers to a
>possible reality (one that happens not to exist at the moment, so far as I
>know). I.e., it refers to a concept.
To summarize: our positions are consistent if you grant that concepts
are representations. If not, we have to decide if concepts exist. If
they exist, and are mental entities which are not representations, then
what can they be? If they do not exist, then how can I refer to them?
>>The concept of *similarity* is so important. Things that are similar
>>are both the same and different.
>
>Sounds interesting, but I'm not sure what you are driving at, here.
Uh, not so sure now, but I know it's important. I thing it addresses
what I said about quality and quantity. Or maybe not.
Oh, yeah: similarity is the essence of representation. If the symbol
and its meaning are only the same (identical), then the symbol doesn't
refer to its meaning, it *is* its meaning. If the symbol and meaning
are only different, then there's no way to know what the symbol refers
to. Notice that this latter case actually occurs with some digital
semantic systems (language), like untranslatable languages (Etruscan).
In general, a word has *no* sameness with its meaning *except as
mediated by the language*. The language is the *source* of the
sameness. Thus all symbols are similar to their meanings, and vice
versa.
>Sarge Gerbode
>UUCP: pyramid!thirdi!sarge
O---------------------------------------------------------------------->
| Cliff Joslyn, Professional Cybernetician
| Systems Science Department, SUNY Binghamton, New York, but my opinions
| vu0112@bingvaxu.cc.binghamton.edu
V All the world is biscuit shaped. . .
------------------------------
Date: Tue, 15 Mar 88 12:03 EST
From: Cliff Joslyn <vu0112@bingvaxu.cc.binghamton.edu>
Subject: Re: Ambiguity vs. vagueness (was: language, thought, and culture)
In article <2959@pbhyf.UUCP> rob@pbhyf.UUCP (Rob Bernardo) writes:
>
>Sarge Gerbode:
>>I don't like the word "representation" too well, by the way, because it is
>>ambiguuous. It can mean "to stand for", as where a symbol represents a
>>concept, or it can mean what I call a "picture" -- an image of something. In
>>things like NLP, it generally seems to mean the latter.
>
>Cliff Joslyn:
>>The strength of ambiguity is generality. That is my goal, a general
>>semantic theory.
>
>OOOPS!!! There is a big difference between *ambiguity* and *vagueness*.
Yes, this is true. I think Sarge meant vagueness (right, Sarge?) For
example, when we say "shoes" we mean both red and black shoes, thus
"shoes" is vague relative to color. Were I to point to a specific shoe,
then it must be either red or black, so "that shoe" is ambiguous
relative to color.
So when I say "representation" I mean both digital and analog
representation, which is the case of generality (vagueness).
O---------------------------------------------------------------------->
| Cliff Joslyn, Professional Cybernetician
| Systems Science Department, SUNY Binghamton, New York, but my opinions
| vu0112@bingvaxu.cc.binghamton.edu
V All the world is biscuit shaped. . .
------------------------------
Date: Sat, 19 Mar 88 03:29 EST
From: Sarge Gerbode <sarge@thirdi.UUCP>
Subject: Re: Concepts and Semantics (was: language, thought, and culture)
In article <945@bingvaxu.cc.binghamton.edu> vu0112@bingvaxu.cc.binghamton.edu
(Cliff Joslyn) writes:
>I see: it seems you believe in the existence of concepts. If you agree
>with me that a concept as such is a representation, then we can
>certainly grant this, and further say that the denotation is the
>"primary" connotation for the symbol, when there is one.
Yes, I do believe in the existence of concepts, as subjective possibilities.
A possibility can exist experientially, just as much as an actuality, even
though that which is possible may or may not exist. For instance, the
*possibility* that there is a purple car in my driveway definitely exists for
me, even I do not know that any such car actually exists. The entire field of
quantum mechanics is built upon the existence of possibilities, so I think it
is safe to say that they are very real.
Is a possibility a physical object, therefore? I think not. So I would not
count concepts as physical objects. Representations (i.e. things that
represent concepts) *may* be physical objects (like written words), or they
may be mental phenomena, like mental pictures. But in any case, they are
actualities, not mere possibilities. Hence I would differentiate
representations from concepts.
>When I talk about quantitative difference, I recognize that sufficient
>quantitative difference implies a qualitative difference.... However, that in
>no way implies that the qualitative difference *actually exists*, merely that
>we *must* act *as if it did*, and further *may not be able to tell that it
>does not*.
Let's take "assent" as an example. There is a whole quantitative spectrum
between full assent and full dissent, so we could say there is a merely
quantitative difference, but, as you say, the upshot is a qualitative one.
>We normally say that my sensations are clearly a part of my mind. Yet
>it is well known that sensations can be induced by neuro-surgical
>procedures, clearly a public event (this is a case of acting-upon, not
>experiencing).
It does seem that "acting upon" is a weaker case than "experiencing". Yet I
suppose one could say that the neurosurgeon is causing only an indirect effect,
not a direct one. People affect each other in a variety of ways all the time,
yet, for instance, one can have a more *direct* effect on one's own mental
pictures than anyone else. Also, since another person cannot experience my
pictures (absent telepathy), he cannot experience the act of acting on them
either.
>>I would agree that both a word (digital) and a picture (analog) are
>>representations. Actually, I would put it differently: both a word and an
>>analog picture of, say, a horse, are *pictures*, in my terminology.
>Please explain how a word can be a picture.
A word (as I understand it) is an observable phenomenon. A physical word is a
physical phenomenon, seen through the physical senses (usualy sight or sound).
A mental word is a mental phenomenon, seen through a mental act of
perceiving. When I perceive a word in my mind, I hear it in my mind's ear or
see in in my mind's eye (presumably, Helen Keller would have felt it in her
mind's hand).
>Normally we say that a word ("dog") represents the physical object (dog).
What you mean, "We"? I think very few people would say that "dog" represents a
specific physical dog. Some would claim it represents a *class* of physical
objects. But suppose some dread canine disease had suddenly killed off all
dogs. Would that mean that the word, which had hitherto been meaningful,
suddenly was devoid of meaning? I think not. So I'll persevere on the idea
that "dog" represents a concept, a possible entity.
>Oh, yeah: similarity is the essence of representation. If the symbol
>and its meaning are only the same (identical), then the symbol doesn't
>refer to its meaning, it *is* its meaning.
One example of this sort of thing is a *sample*, e.g., of cloth.
>In general, a word has *no* sameness with its meaning *except as
>mediated by the language*. The language is the *source* of the
>sameness. Thus all symbols are similar to their meanings, and vice
>versa.
Interesting, but in what way is, for instance, "8" like eight things? It seems
to me that, rather, there is a remembered *association* between a word or other
token and that which it represents, not necessarily a *similarity*, although
similarity (as in onomatopoeia (sp?), may serve as a good mnemonic. It isn't
total *difference* between a symbol and its meaning that makes the symbol
useless, but the lack of association. It would be like a politician without
any constituents.
--
"Absolute knowledge means never having to change your mind."
Sarge Gerbode
Institute for Research in Metapsychology
950 Guinda St.
Palo Alto, CA 94301
UUCP: pyramid!thirdi!sarge
------------------------------
Date: Sat, 19 Mar 88 03:31 EST
From: Sarge Gerbode <sarge@thirdi.UUCP>
Subject: Re: Ambiguity vs. vagueness (was: language, thought, and culture)
In article <946@bingvaxu.cc.binghamton.edu> vu0112@bingvaxu.cc.binghamton.edu
(Cliff Joslyn) writes:
>In article <2959@pbhyf.UUCP> rob@pbhyf.UUCP (Rob Bernardo) writes:
>>
>>Sarge Gerbode:
>>>I don't like the word "representation" too well, by the way, because it is
>>>ambiguous. It can mean "to stand for", as where a symbol represents a
>>>concept, or it can mean what I call a "picture" -- an image of something. In
>>>things like NLP, it generally seems to mean the latter.
>I think Sarge meant vagueness [rather than "ambiguity"] (right, Sarge?)
I can see how one might think that's what I meant, because a picture is often
thought of as a picture *of* something, and thus a representation, though (as
in fantasies or abstract designs) it may not be really a picture of anything.
But I believe that the term "represent" has come to mean "to have any form of
mental phenomenon," though I could be wrong about this usage. In this sense,
it would be ambiguous; otherwise, as you point out, it would merely be vague.
I do agree that there can be both digital and analog representation -- a
picture represents in a different way than a word. Both are phenomena,
however.
--
"Absolute knowledge means never having to change your mind."
Sarge Gerbode
Institute for Research in Metapsychology
950 Guinda St.
Palo Alto, CA 94301
UUCP: pyramid!thirdi!sarge
------------------------------
Date: Sat, 19 Mar 88 12:53 EST
From: Cliff Joslyn <vu0112@bingvaxu.cc.binghamton.edu>
Subject: Re: Concepts and Semantics (was: language, thought, and culture)
In article <350@thirdi.UUCP> sarge@thirdi.UUCP (Sarge Gerbode) writes:
>Yes, I do believe in the existence of concepts, as subjective possibilities.
>A possibility can exist experientially, just as much as an actuality, even
>though that which is possible may or may not exist. For instance, the
>*possibility* that there is a purple car in my driveway definitely exists for
>me, even I do not know that any such car actually exists.
Thank you for making your position more clear, but I think you're
avoiding my direct question. I can certainly accept that in your
example, I construct a representation (in whatever modality) of the
state of the world such that there is a purple car in the driveway, and
then present that representation to my consciousness. On this view, a
"possibilitiy" or a "concept" is a representation of that which is
possibile, or of that which is conceptualized. However, you assert that
concepts and possibilities exist *in and of themselves*, and *not
mediated by any form of representation*. I do not see how this
hypothesis can be tested. Indeed, it seems equivalent to an idealist or
theist position on mental entities. On the other hand, my hypothesis
does seem testable, if not in practice at least in theory, and provides
*at least as good an explanation* of the phenomena. Further, there is a
great wealth of circumstantial evidence to support it.
So, my questions are:
1) Why do you feel a non-representationl theory of concepts is necessary?
2) How would you test a "possibilitistic" theory of concepts?
3) If there is no answer to 2, how do you propose to proceed
scientifically?
>Let's take "assent" as an example. There is a whole quantitative spectrum
>between full assent and full dissent, so we could say there is a merely
>quantitative difference, but, as you say, the upshot is a qualitative
one.
Yes, a good example.
>>Please explain how a word can be a picture.
>
>A word (as I understand it) is an observable phenomenon. A physical word is a
>physical phenomenon, seen through the physical senses (usualy sight or sound).
>A mental word is a mental phenomenon, seen through a mental act of
>perceiving. When I perceive a word in my mind, I hear it in my mind's ear or
>see in in my mind's eye (presumably, Helen Keller would have felt it in her
>mind's hand).
Your last sentence is a very accurate description of some different
modalities of mental representation. And I don't think there's much
utility in lumping them all together under the heading "picture" (your
usage), since we will get confused between general mental
representations and specifically visual ones. Instead, what we need is
a term which describes all these modalities together. I think there is
such a term: "mental representation". In this context, a visual
representation is an "image." Unfortunately, we don't have words for
aural and tactile representations ("aurige"? "hearige"? "feelige"?).
>>Normally we say that a word ("dog") represents the physical object (dog).
>
>What you mean, "We"? I think very few people would say that "dog" represents a
>specific physical dog. Some would claim it represents a *class* of physical
>objects.
Yes, but you take me out of context. I was presenting three view: 1) a
word refers to an object or class of objects (classical semantics); 2) a
word refers to a mental representation of an object or class of objects
(cognitive, representational view); 3) a word refers to an idealistic
"concept" or "possibility" (Sarge's view). I was asserting (2), not (1).
>>In general, a word has *no* sameness with its meaning *except as
>>mediated by the language*. The language is the *source* of the
>>sameness. Thus all symbols are similar to their meanings, and vice
>>versa.
>
>Interesting, but in what way is, for instance, "8" like eight things?
Well, since "8" is a digital symbol which in English (and other
languages) refers to the number eight, on the above view I would assert
that the only way that "8" is the same as the number eight is that *in
English*, "8" *means* the number eight. In that context, if we limit
ourselves *strictly* to semantic (linguistic) behavior *in English*,
then we say that "8" *is* the number eight. Since there is no greater
sameness than identity, we can conclude that *in English*, "8" is
exactly the same as the number eight. Of course, we see this kind of
behavior all the time: when we balance our check-books, we do this in
the language English, we see an "8", and say, "that's eight!"
>It isn't
>total *difference* between a symbol and its meaning that makes the symbol
>useless, but the lack of association.
Well, yes and no. Mathematically, we can see that if X is "associated"
with (a different thing) Y, this means that there exists a "associative"
relation R such that (X,Y) is in R. Thus, X and Y are similar, in that
they are different (different symbols, X <> Y), but also the same (they
are both in the relation R). To translate back to linguistics, let
X=the word "bongo", let Y=dog (object, representation, whatever), and
let R=English. It follows that there is no association between X and Y
((X,Y) not in R), so that there is a total difference between "bongo"
and dogs relative to English. Thus the symbol "bongo" is totally
useless to dogs relative to English.
O---------------------------------------------------------------------->
| Cliff Joslyn, Professional Cybernetician
| Systems Science Department, SUNY Binghamton, New York, but my opinions
| vu0112@bingvaxu.cc.binghamton.edu
V All the world is biscuit shaped. . .
------------------------------
Date: Sun, 20 Mar 88 15:49 EST
From: Sarge Gerbode <sarge@thirdi.UUCP>
Subject: Re: Concepts and Semantics
In article <968@bingvaxu.cc.binghamton.edu> vu0112@bingvaxu.cc.binghamton.edu
(Cliff Joslyn) writes:
>I can certainly accept that in your
>example, I construct a representation (in whatever modality) of the
>state of the world such that there is a purple car in the driveway, and
>then present that representation to my consciousness. On this view, a
>"possibilitiy" or a "concept" is a representation of that which is
>possibile, or of that which is conceptualized. However, you assert that
>concepts and possibilities exist *in and of themselves*, and *not
>mediated by any form of representation*. I do not see how this
>hypothesis can be tested. Indeed, it seems equivalent to an idealist or
>theist position on mental entities.
>....
>So, my questions are:
>1) Why do you feel a non-representationl theory of concepts is necessary?
>2) How would you test a "possibilitistic" theory of concepts?
>3) If there is no answer to 2, how do you propose to proceed scientifically?
I really appreciate your comments and questions, because they help illuminate
all the areas in which I have not been entirely clear (either in my thoughts,
or in how these thoughts are expressed).
And I do appreciate and agree with your statement that an hypothesis should be
testable.
Let me back up a step and give you a little more of the theoretical background
of my position. My interest is in building up an accurate account of the ways
in which an individual person builds up his own world-view, and what the
nature of an individual's world is. Pioneers in this effort are Michael
Polanyi ("Personal Knowledge") and Nelson Goodman ("Ways of World Making").
I consider individual experience to be the ultimate empirical basis for all
hypotheses, scientific and otherwise.
So what are the constituents of a world, as experienced by an individual
directly? In other words, what are the entities that make up an individual
world? They are (in my view):
1. Phenomena.
2. Facts.
3. Ideas or concepts.
Anything that exists for a person would fall into one of these categories. A
phenomenon is anything that is directly perceived, either physically or by way
of "mental representation". So there are mental and physical phenomena. A
perceived physical chair would be a physical phenomenon, and a mental picture
(such as a visual representation of a chess game in blindfold chess) would be a
mental phenomenon. Both would count as phenomena, because both are perceived
in one way or another.
However, at any given moment, certain things exist for an individual, even
though he is not viewing them at that time. These entities are *known*,
rather than being *perceived*, and I refer to them as "facts". I do not
*perceive* that there is a kitchen in my house (I'm not currently in my
kitchen); I simply *know* that there is. I do not *perceive* that 2 + 2 = 4;
I simply *know* it. So that's the second constituent of a person's world.
Facts are often inferred from phenomena by interpretation. If a person looks
pale, unsteady, and drawn, and feels hot I may infer that that person is sick,
even though I cannot perceive the sickness (bacteria, etc.) directly.
Finally, there are certain things that are neither known or perceived, but are
simply *conceived*. I refer to these as "ideas". An idea is the
*possibility* of a thing that might or might not exist, for a certain person,
i.e., a possible fact. It might also be called a "proposition", a "theory",
or an "hypothesis", in that it is something to which it makes sense to
attribute existence or nonexistence. "A unicorn in the garden", though not a
fact, is something about which one could wonder whether or not it exists.
Experientially, it is by considering possibilities (ideas) that one arrives at
facts. An idea is converted into an (experienced) fact by an act of assent.
Anything that exists for a person at a particular time can be fit into one of
these categories.
>I don't think there's much utility in lumping [different kinds of mental
>representation] all together under the heading "picture" (your
>usage), since we will get confused between general mental
>representations and specifically visual ones. Instead, what we need is
>a term which describes all these modalities together. I think there is
>such a term: "mental representation".
I can go with that phraseology. I prefer the term "mental phenomenon",
though, since perceived mental entities could appear that don't represent
anything.
>I was presenting three views:
> 1) a word refers to an object or class of objects (classical semantics);
> 2) a word refers to a mental representation of an object or class of objects
> (cognitive, representational view);
> 3) a word refers to an idealistic "concept" or "possibility" (Sarge's view).
>I was asserting (2), not (1).
Using my above schema (which may or may not be a form of idealism -- I think
of it more as "phenomenology", because it does not postulate entities that are
not directly knowable, conceivable, or perceivable by an individual), I would
say that a word *represents* some entity, and serves to pull a person's
attention to that entity, whether the entity be an idea, a fact, or a
phenomenon. Thus if you wanted to share a certain experience with another
person, you could use words to draw that person's attention to that
experience. Or, if you wanted to remember a certain entity, or keep it in
mind long enough to consider, you might use words for that purpose. You could
also use gestures, pictures, etc. for reminding oneself or communicating with
others. In itself, a word (or picture, etc.) is a phenomenon, mental or
physical. I have used the word "token" to refer to a phenomenon that "means"
something (i.e. that directs attention to something), but perhaps the word
"representation" would work well for this purpose.
>Mathematically, we can see that if X is "associated"
>with (a different thing) Y, this means that there exists a "associative"
>relation R such that (X,Y) is in R. Thus, X and Y are similar, in that
>they are different (different symbols, X <> Y), but also the same (they
>are both in the relation R).
It's been awhile (about thirty years) since I studied the theory of sets and
relations, but, in my understanding, a relation is a set of pairs of entities
(or, I suppose, it might be a set of triads, etc. -- I'm not sure). The
elements of a relation are not the individual members of each pair, but the
pairs themselves. Thus the similarity amongst elements of a relation is
amongst the pairs that make up the relation, not between the elements of each
pair, one to the other. To illustrate this point, consider the relation
called "dissimilarity". The pairs of such a relation are alike, in that they
contain dissimilar elements. But, ex hypothesi, the elements of each pair are
dissimilar from each other.
Therefore, I don't think it would be correct to say that a word must be
"similar" to what that word represents. To be effective as a word, it need
only be *associated* with some entity, such that a person hearing the word is
reminded of that entity.
--
"Absolute knowledge means never having to change your mind."
Sarge Gerbode
Institute for Research in Metapsychology
950 Guinda St.
Palo Alto, CA 94301
UUCP: pyramid!thirdi!sarge
------------------------------
Date: Mon, 21 Mar 88 15:01 EST
From: Barry W. Kort <bwk@mitre-bedford.ARPA>
Subject: Re: Concepts and Semantics
Some writers like to distinguish noumena from phenomena.
Although my dictionaries differ in their definitions, the definitions
that captured my imagination came from the World Book:
Phenomenon: that which is captured through the senses.
Noumenon: that which is captured through thought.
--Barry Kort
"I don't entertain ideas. Ideas entertain me."
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End of NL-KR Digest
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