nl-kr-request@cs.rpi.edu (NL-KR Moderator Chris Welty) (04/16/89)
NL-KR Digest (Sat Apr 15 16:45:18 1989) Volume 6 No. 20 Today's Topics: Philosophy/Cog Sci Colloquium SUNY Buffalo Cog Sci--Eric Dietrich CSLI Calendar, April 13, 4:22 AI and Law Conference - Program Announcement Submissions: nl-kr@cs.rpi.edu Requests, policy: nl-kr-request@cs.rpi.edu Back issues are available from host archive.cs.rpi.edu [128.213.1.10] in the files nl-kr/Vxx/Nyy (ie nl-kr/V01/N01 for V1#1), mail requests will not be promptly satisfied. If you can't reach `cs.rpi.edu' you may want to use `turing.cs.rpi.edu' instead. --------------------------------------------------------- To: nl-kr@cs.rpi.edu Date: Fri, 7 Apr 89 11:50:55 EDT >From: rapaport@cs.Buffalo.EDU (William J. Rapaport) Subject: Philosophy/Cog Sci Colloquium UNIVERSITY AT BUFFALO STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY and GRADUATE RESEARCH INITIATIVE IN COGNITIVE AND LINGUISTIC SCIENCES PRESENT LYNNE RUDDER BAKER Department of Philosophy Middlebury College HAS REPRESENTATION BEEN NATURALIZED? Physicalism either denies or denigrates beliefs, by maintaining either that there are no beliefs or that beliefs are identical with physical states. Baker's book gives close examination of each of these proposals in turn, concluding that they come up short. One of the most subtle and influential proponents of physicalism is Jerry Fodor. At the American Philosophical Association meetings in December 1988, Baker read a cri- tique of Fodor's book _Psychosemantics_, with Fodor giving a reply. The paper she will read here is a revision of her APA paper that takes Fodor's reply into account. Wednesday, April 19, 1989 3:00 P.M. 684 Baldy Hall, Amherst Campus Contact Newton Garver, Dept. of Philosophy, 716-636-2444, or Bill Rapaport, Dept. of Computer Science, 716-636-3193, for further information. ------------------------------ To: nl-kr@cs.rpi.edu Date: Mon, 10 Apr 89 15:23:36 EDT >From: rapaport@cs.Buffalo.EDU (William J. Rapaport) Subject: SUNY Buffalo Cog Sci--Eric Dietrich UNIVERSITY AT BUFFALO STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK GRADUATE RESEARCH INITIATIVE IN COGNITIVE AND LINGUISTIC SCIENCES PRESENTS ERIC DIETRICH Program in Philosophy and Computer & Systems Science Department of Philosophy SUNY Binghamton FODOR'S PERVERSE FRAME PROBLEM AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR SCIENTIFIC A.I. Over the last several years, Jerry Fodor has developed a theory of mind which has the unintuitive consequence that one part of the human brain routinely solves an intractable (or undecidable) problem. This problem is Fodor's version of the frame problem, which was first discovered in 1969 by McCarthy and Hayes, and is currently the subject of controversy and debate. I will briefly discuss Fodor's theory of mind--the modular- ity thesis--and his version of the frame problem. Then I will show that Fodor's frame problem is not solvable by any physical computer with realistic resources. Though Fodor apparently embraces this conclusion, I do not. Instead, the modularity thesis should be rejected. The gap left by the modularity thesis, however, poses at least one serious prob- lem for AI. I will suggest one way of handling this problem and its implications for a scientific AI. Monday, April 17, 1989 4:00 P.M. 684 Baldy Hall, Amherst Campus There will be an evening discussion at 8:00 P.M. at David Mark's house, 380 S. Ellicott Creek Road, Amherst. Contact Bill Rapaport, Dept. of Computer Science, 716-636-3193, for further information. ------------------------------ To: nl-kr@cs.rpi.edu Date: Wed, 12 Apr 89 17:56:37 PDT >From: emma@csli.Stanford.EDU (Emma Pease) Subject: CSLI Calendar, April 13, 4:22 C S L I C A L E N D A R O F P U B L I C E V E N T S _____________________________________________________________________________ 13 April 1989 Stanford Vol. 4, No. 22 _____________________________________________________________________________ A weekly publication of The Center for the Study of Language and Information, Ventura Hall, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305 ____________ CSLI ACTIVITIES FOR THIS THURSDAY, 13 April 1989 2:15 p.m. CSLI Seminar Cordura Hall Varieties of Context: Session 2 Conference Room Reading: "Cognitive Significance and New Theories of Reference" John Perry, Philosophy, Stanford Respondent: Jim Greeno 3:30 p.m. Tea Ventura Hall 4:00 p.m. STASS Seminar Cordura Hall The Frog, the Fly, and the Coffee Cup: Part 2 Conference Room John Perry and David Israel (john@russell.stanford.edu and israel@ai.sri.com) Abstract below ____________ CSLI ACTIVITIES FOR NEXT THURSDAY, 20 April 1989 2:15 p.m. CSLI Seminar Cordura Hall Varieties of Context: Session 3 Conference Room Indexicality in Context Geoffrey Nunberg, Xerox PARC Respondent: Brian Smith 3:30 p.m. Tea Ventura Hall 4:00 p.m. STASS Seminar Cordura Hall Dewey on Defeasible Reasoning Conference Room Tom Burke (burke@csli.stanford.edu) Abstract below ____________ CSLI SPRING SEMINAR SERIES Varieties of Context led by Jim Greeno, Brian Smith, Susan Stucky (greeno.pa@xerox.com, briansmith.pa@xerox.com, stucky.pa@xerox.com) 2:15, Thursdays Everyone knows that `I' can be used to refer to different people depending on circumstance. So why is such a fuss being made of this fact? We think there are two reasons. First, rather than view contextual dependence as a peripheral or complicating incident, recent theories of language have started to treat it as central and enabling---as a core phenomenon. Second, contextual dependence has been cited in other semantical fields, too: logic, psychology, computation, etc. In this seminar, we'll look at context in a wide range of examples---drawn from syntax, Tarskian satisfaction, the Mac interface, natural-language discourse, programming-language semantics, even mechanics. We'll try to understand what's in common among such cases, and also see how they differ. The real question is whether context-dependence is sufficiently cohesive to justify the single rallying cry? We've divided up the subject matter, varieties of context, according to local talent and interest, with the idea that there would be short presentations (say, thirty minutes) followed by a reply and general discussion. This is the last general message about the CSLI Seminar on context you will be receiving. If you'd like to be on the mailing list and you weren't at the first meeting, please send your net address to stucky.pa@xerox.com, and you'll be added. Notices will still appear in the CSLI Calendar. ____________ THIS WEEK'S STASS SEMINAR The Frog, the Fly, and the Coffee Cup: Part 2 John Perry and David Israel (john@russell.stanford.edu and israel@ai.sri.com) Thursday, April 13, 4:00 In this session we will continue to discuss some basic concepts, problems, and ideas concerning the incrementality of information. We are convinced that the key to this lies in two principles: The relativity of (useful) concepts of linguistic and informational content has its roots in the structure of action. The useful, interesting, familiar, deep relations among contents come at the incremental level. ____________ NEXT WEEK'S STASS SEMINAR Dewey on Defeasible Reasoning Tom Burke (burke@csli.stanford.edu) Thursday, April 20, 4:00 This will be a report on my study of John Dewey's "Logic: The Theory of Inquiry" (1938). This book is relevant to STASS for historical reasons since a notion of `situation' plays a central role in Dewey's logical theory. Dewey's logic has been ignored for the past forty years, largely because (a) it isn't compatible with the philosophical underpinnings of `formal logic' as we now think of it (Fregean, Quinean, syntactic, etc.), and (b) no one seems to know what to make of it otherwise. I want to take a few steps in the direction of showing that Dewey's logical theory is technically sound and worth further development. Consider the following example of common, everyday `defeasible reasoning': (1) That thing is apple-shaped and is predominantly reddish; so (2) That thing is an apple. Everyone would agree that this is not an example of `deduction'. But what is it an example of? Dewey would suggest that proposition (1) concerns the present registration of certain `qualities' of some thing while (2) goes further to classify that thing as being of a `kind'. For Dewey there are two different sorts of predicates involved here whereas current logical theory sees only one. The problem, as Dewey sees it, is not the classical epistemological matter of figuring out how to get in some principled way from propositions about appearances to propositions about facts, but rather from propositions about qualities to propositions about kinds. The focus of my presentation will be to explain this distinction between qualities and kinds---a distinction yielding two different sorts of properties and relations (hence two basic sorts of `infons', in STASS jargon, and so two sorts of prepositions). I will then look briefly at inference in a Deweyan framework. I will show how Dewey can account for simple deductions without having to explicitly specify `rules of inference' based on syntactic features of linguistic expressions. Rather, such rules essentially supervene on how one treats particular determiners like `all', `some', `many', `few', etc. ____________ SYMBOLIC SYSTEMS FORUM Indexicality in Context Geoff Nunberg (nunberg.pa@xerox.com) Xerox PARC and Stanford Linguistics Friday, 21 April, 3:15, 60:62N Most of our semantic accounts of indexical expressions---words like `I' and `now', for example---have been developed primarily on the basis of observations about how they are used in one-on-one, face-to-face conversation. But there are some essential aspects of indexicality that only emerge when we widen the net to consider how they are used in other types of communicative contexts, like road signs, published books, or telephone answering machines. In this talk, I'm going to draw on examples like these to show that it's not just the reference of an indexical expression that varies from one occasion of use to another, but the meaning of the expression as well---that is, the type of relation that the referent bears to the utterance. (So, to take a simple example, a written token of `I' on a printed greeting-card verse refers to the sender, not the person who inscribed it or composed it; but a token of `I' in a forwarded mail message refers to the original composer.) I'll talk about how the meaning of a particular use of an indexical is determined by the circumstances of communication---the mode of production, transmission, presentation, and so forth---and why you have to allow a role to intentions in determining the meaning in these cases. Finally, I'll say something about how observations like these are relevant to certain questions that literary theorists have asked about the nature of the context (and in particular, the notion of `audience') that is relevant to textual interpretation. ____________ SITUATION THEORY AND ITS APPLICATIONS The first conference on Situation Theory and its Applications (ST&A) was held at Asilomar from March 23 to 26. Fifty-five people attended from England, Scotland, Germany, Sweden, Norway, Japan, and Korea, as well as from the U.S. The format of the conference consisted of sixteen refereed papers, chosen from thirty-three submitted papers. Presentations of an hour's length took place in the mornings and evenings, with the afternoons free for less formal activities. The papers were on topics ranging from situation theory itself, to applications in linguistics, computational linguistics, theories of inference, and prototype theory, for example. The meeting was considered a great success by all. It became clear that a body of shared intuitions, theory, and notation has developed over the past few years, and that situation theory now has a momentum of its own. The program committee (Robin Cooper, Jens-Erik Fenstad, Kuniaki Mukai, John Perry) plans to publish a book based on the proceedings of the meeting. The meeting was such a success that it was decided to have a second ST&A conference in the Scottish Highlands, probably in September of 1990. Jon Barwise will chair the program committee. A call for papers will go out early this summer. ____________ CSLI VISITORS Keith Devlin Professor of Mathematics Manchester University Dates of visit: September 1987--July 1989 Devlin is a member of the STASS and MOST projects and an occasional attender at POST meetings. He is a mathematical logician, trying to develop an information-based logic that can handle situated inference. He is writing a book, "Logic and Information," that includes a lot of the basic work on situation theory currently under development here at CSLI. Marilyn Ford Senior Lecturer Computing and Information Technology Griffith University, Brisbane, Australia Dates of visit: December 1988--June 1989 Ford is visiting CSLI again to continue working with Joan Bresnan. Her interests include reasoning and natural-language perception and production. Hideyuki Nakashima Researcher Cognitive Science Section Electrotechnical Laboratory, Japan Dates of visit: February--May 1989 Nakashima is a member of the CAST and STASS projects. A programming language based on ST called PROSIT is being developed in the CAST project. His research interests include knowledge representation, nonmonotonic reasoning, combination of learning and ST, and a computer model of language acquisition. Hiroyuki Suzuki Researcher Tokyo Systems Research Department Corporate Engineering Division Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. Dates of visit: September 1987--April 1989 Suzuki, who is visiting CSLI as a Corporate Scholar, is a member of the CAST, STASS, and SITSEM projects. His research interests include computer science, natural-language processing, and especially Japanese discourse understanding. ------------------------------ To: nl-kr@cs.rpi.edu Date: Mon, 10 Apr 89 10:59:31 AST >From: carole hafner <hafner@corwin.ccs.northeastern.edu> Subject: AI and Law Conference - Program Announcement PROGRAM ANNOUNCEMENT ICAIL-89 - The Second International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Law June 13-16, 1989 University of British Columbia Vancouver, BC CANADA Sponsored by: Faculty of Law, University of British Columbia In Coooperation with ACM SIGART Additional Support from: IBM Canada Ltd. The Center for Law and Computer Science, Northeastern University To receive registration material contact: Ms. Rita Laffey School of Law, Northeastern University (617)437-3346 For information about exhibits or local arrangements contact: Ms. Rosemarie Page Faculty of Law, University of British Columbia (604)228-2944 SCHEDULE OF EVENTS Tuesday, June 13 5:00 p.m. - 9:00 p.m. - Registration and Reception, Gage Conference Center (Registration will continue through the conference) Wednesday, June 14 8:30 a.m. - 12:30 p.m. - Tutorials and Workshop 2:00 p.m. - 6:00 p.m. - Welcome, Paper Presentations, and Invited Talk 7:00 p.m. - Gala Banquet Banquet Speaker: The Honorable Chief Justice Beverly M. McLachlin Supreme Court of British Columbia Thursday-Friday, June 15-16 8:30 a.m. - 6:00 p.m. - Paper Presentations, Invited Talk, and Panel Thursday evening, June 15 - Salmon Barbecue, Museum of Anthropology INVITED TALKS "The Marriage of AI and Law - A New Analytical Jurisprudence" Donald H. Berman, Richardson Professor of Law, Northeastern University "`That reminds me of a story' - How Memory Organization Supports Retrieval of Relevant Cases" Roger C. Schank, Professor of Computer Science, Yale University PANEL DISCUSSION "Research Funding for AI and Law: Opportunities and Pitfalls." Moderated by J.C. Smith, Professor of Law and Directory of the Legal Expert Systems Project, Faculty of Law, University of British Columbia TUTORIALS Tutorial A. "Artificial Intelligence and Law: Opportunities and Challenges" Donald H. Berman, Richardson Professor of Law, Northeastern University Carole D. Hafner, Associate Professor of Computer Science, Northeastern Univ. Tutorial B. "Case-Based Reasoning" Kevin D. Ashley, Ph.D., J.D. WORKSHOP "Deontic Logic." Presented by Andrew J. I. Jones, Professor of Philosophy, University of Oslo, Norway RESEARCH PRESENTATIONS Toward a Computational Theory of Arguing with Precedents Dr. Kevin D. Ashley IBM Watson Research Laboratories Cutting Legal Loops Professor Donald H. Berman Northeastern University School of Law Representing and Reusing Explanations of Legal Precedents Mr. L. Karl Branting Department of Computer Sciences University of Texas Boyd V. Deaver - Litigation Strategies Mr. Dan Burnstein Harvard Law School Deep Models, Normative Reasoning and Legal Expert Systems Dr. T.J.M. Bench-Capon Department of Computer Science University of Liverpool, England Xcite (an expert system for naturalization cases) Dr. Andreas Galtung Norwegian Research Center For Computers and Law Representing Developing Legal Doctrine A Problem for AI Programs Dr. Anne v.d.L. Gardner Atherton, CA A System for Planning Arguments and Searching Interpretation Spaces Dr. Thomas F. Gordon German National Research Center for Computer Science Sankt Augustin, Federal Republic of Germany A Specialized Expert System for Judicial Decision Support Dr. L.V. Kale Department of Computer Science University of Illinois The Treatment of Negation in Logic Programs for Representing Legislation Dr. Robert Kowalski Department of Computing Imperial College, London, ENGLAND LESTER: Using Paradigm Cases in a Quasi-Precedential Legal Domain Dr. Kenneth A. Lambert Department of Computer Science Washington and Lee University, Lexington, VA The Design of an Attorney's Statistical Consultant Dr. Leonard S. Lutomski The American Institutes for Research Expert Systems in Case-Based Law: The Hearsay Rule Advisor Dr. Marilyn T. MacCrimmon The University of British Columbia Vancouver, CANADA Representing the Structure of a Legal Argument Ms. Catherine C. Marshall Xerox Palo Alto Research Center Palo Alto, CA LRS Legal Reasoning System Professor Antonio A. Martino Istituto per la Documentazione Giuridica Del Consiglio Nazionale Delle Richerche, ITALY A Language for Legal Discourse Dr. L. Thorne McCarty Rutgers University New Brunswick, NJ An Attempted Dimensional Analysis of the Law Governing Government Appeals in Criminal Cases Mr. Simon Mendelson Cambridge, MA 02140 Market Realities of Rule-Based Software for Lawyers Where the Rubber Meets the Road Mr. Rees Morrison, Esq. Price Waterhouse New York, NY Building GRANDJUR Using Evidence and Other Knowledge to Prepare Casefiles Dr. Roger D. Purdy School of Law The University of Akron, OHIO Dimension-Based Analysis of Hypotheticals from Supreme Court Oral Argument Dr. Edwina L. Rissland Dept. of Computer Science University of Massachusetts, Amherst Interpreting Statutory Predicates Dr. Edwina L. Rissland Mr. David B. Skalak Dept. of Computer Science University of Massachusetts, Amherst Legal Information Retrieval A Hybrid Approach Dr. Daniel E. Rose Institute for Cognitive Science University of California, San Diego A Framework for Legal Knowledge Base Construction Dr. Tom Routen Department of Computer Science Leicester Polytechnic, ENGLAND EPS II Estate Planning With Prototypes (with L. T. McCarty) Mr. Dean A. Schlobohm Stanford Law School, Stanford CA Expert Systems and ICAI in Tax Law: Killing Two Birds with one AI Stone Dr. David Sherman The Law Society of Upper Canada Toronto, CANADA ASSYST - Computer Support for Guideline Sentencing Dr. Eric Simon U.S. Sentencing Commission, Washington, D.C. Taking Advantage of Models for Legal Classification Mr. David Skalak Dept. of Computer Science University of Massachusetts, Amherst The Latent Damage System A Jurisprudential Analysis Dr. Richard Susskind Ernst and Whinney London ENGLAND PROLEXS, A Model to Implement Legal Knowledge Mr. P.H. van den Berg Computer/Law Institute Juridische Faculteit Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, THE NETHERLANDS Legal Reasoning - A Jurisprudential Description Dr. Peter Wahlgren The Swedish Law and Informatics Research Inst. University of Stockholm, SWEDEN CACE: Computer-Assisted Case Evaluation in the Brooklyn District Attorney's Office Mr. Steven S. Weiner Yayes, Mechling, Kleiman, Inc. Cambridge, MA 02138 Amalgamating Regulation- and Case-based Advice Systems Through Suggested Answers Dr. David E. Wolstenholme Department of Computing Imperial College, London, ENGLAND CONFERENCE COMMITTEE Robert T. Fraonson, Faculty of Law, University of British Columbia, Co-Chair J. C. Smith, Faculty of Law, University of British Columbia, Co-Chair Carole D. Hafner, Northeastern University, Secretary-Treasurer PROGRAM COMMITTEE: Edwina L. Rissland, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, Program Chair Kevin D. Ashley, IBM Thomas J. Watson Research Center Trevor J. M. Bench-Capon, University of Liverpool, ENGLAND Donald H. Berman, Northeastern University Jon Bing, University of Oslo, NORWAY Michael G. Dyer, University of California, Los Angeles Anne v.d. L. Garner, Atherton, CA L. Thorne McCarty, Rutgers University Marek J. Sergot, Imperial College, London, ENGLAND ------------------------------ End of NL-KR Digest *******************
nl-kr-request@cs.rpi.edu (NL-KR Moderator Chris Welty) (04/28/89)
NL-KR Digest (Sat Apr 15 16:45:18 1989) Volume 6 No. 20 Today's Topics: Philosophy/Cog Sci Colloquium SUNY Buffalo Cog Sci--Eric Dietrich CSLI Calendar, April 13, 4:22 AI and Law Conference - Program Announcement Submissions: nl-kr@cs.rpi.edu Requests, policy: nl-kr-request@cs.rpi.edu Back issues are available from host archive.cs.rpi.edu [128.213.1.10] in the files nl-kr/Vxx/Nyy (ie nl-kr/V01/N01 for V1#1), mail requests will not be promptly satisfied. If you can't reach `cs.rpi.edu' you may want to use `turing.cs.rpi.edu' instead. --------------------------------------------------------- To: nl-kr@cs.rpi.edu Date: Fri, 7 Apr 89 11:50:55 EDT >From: rapaport@cs.Buffalo.EDU (William J. Rapaport) Subject: Philosophy/Cog Sci Colloquium UNIVERSITY AT BUFFALO STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY and GRADUATE RESEARCH INITIATIVE IN COGNITIVE AND LINGUISTIC SCIENCES PRESENT LYNNE RUDDER BAKER Department of Philosophy Middlebury College HAS REPRESENTATION BEEN NATURALIZED? Physicalism either denies or denigrates beliefs, by maintaining either that there are no beliefs or that beliefs are identical with physical states. Baker's book gives close examination of each of these proposals in turn, concluding that they come up short. One of the most subtle and influential proponents of physicalism is Jerry Fodor. At the American Philosophical Association meetings in December 1988, Baker read a cri- tique of Fodor's book _Psychosemantics_, with Fodor giving a reply. The paper she will read here is a revision of her APA paper that takes Fodor's reply into account. Wednesday, April 19, 1989 3:00 P.M. 684 Baldy Hall, Amherst Campus Contact Newton Garver, Dept. of Philosophy, 716-636-2444, or Bill Rapaport, Dept. of Computer Science, 716-636-3193, for further information. ------------------------------ To: nl-kr@cs.rpi.edu Date: Mon, 10 Apr 89 15:23:36 EDT >From: rapaport@cs.Buffalo.EDU (William J. Rapaport) Subject: SUNY Buffalo Cog Sci--Eric Dietrich UNIVERSITY AT BUFFALO STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK GRADUATE RESEARCH INITIATIVE IN COGNITIVE AND LINGUISTIC SCIENCES PRESENTS ERIC DIETRICH Program in Philosophy and Computer & Systems Science Department of Philosophy SUNY Binghamton FODOR'S PERVERSE FRAME PROBLEM AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR SCIENTIFIC A.I. Over the last several years, Jerry Fodor has developed a theory of mind which has the unintuitive consequence that one part of the human brain routinely solves an intractable (or undecidable) problem. This problem is Fodor's version of the frame problem, which was first discovered in 1969 by McCarthy and Hayes, and is currently the subject of controversy and debate. I will briefly discuss Fodor's theory of mind--the modular- ity thesis--and his version of the frame problem. Then I will show that Fodor's frame problem is not solvable by any physical computer with realistic resources. Though Fodor apparently embraces this conclusion, I do not. Instead, the modularity thesis should be rejected. The gap left by the modularity thesis, however, poses at least one serious prob- lem for AI. I will suggest one way of handling this problem and its implications for a scientific AI. Monday, April 17, 1989 4:00 P.M. 684 Baldy Hall, Amherst Campus There will be an evening discussion at 8:00 P.M. at David Mark's house, 380 S. Ellicott Creek Road, Amherst. Contact Bill Rapaport, Dept. of Computer Science, 716-636-3193, for further information. ------------------------------ To: nl-kr@cs.rpi.edu Date: Wed, 12 Apr 89 17:56:37 PDT >From: emma@csli.Stanford.EDU (Emma Pease) Subject: CSLI Calendar, April 13, 4:22 C S L I C A L E N D A R O F P U B L I C E V E N T S _____________________________________________________________________________ 13 April 1989 Stanford Vol. 4, No. 22 _____________________________________________________________________________ A weekly publication of The Center for the Study of Language and Information, Ventura Hall, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305 ____________ CSLI ACTIVITIES FOR THIS THURSDAY, 13 April 1989 2:15 p.m. CSLI Seminar Cordura Hall Varieties of Context: Session 2 Conference Room Reading: "Cognitive Significance and New Theories of Reference" John Perry, Philosophy, Stanford Respondent: Jim Greeno 3:30 p.m. Tea Ventura Hall 4:00 p.m. STASS Seminar Cordura Hall The Frog, the Fly, and the Coffee Cup: Part 2 Conference Room John Perry and David Israel (john@russell.stanford.edu and israel@ai.sri.com) Abstract below ____________ CSLI ACTIVITIES FOR NEXT THURSDAY, 20 April 1989 2:15 p.m. CSLI Seminar Cordura Hall Varieties of Context: Session 3 Conference Room Indexicality in Context Geoffrey Nunberg, Xerox PARC Respondent: Brian Smith 3:30 p.m. Tea Ventura Hall 4:00 p.m. STASS Seminar Cordura Hall Dewey on Defeasible Reasoning Conference Room Tom Burke (burke@csli.stanford.edu) Abstract below ____________ CSLI SPRING SEMINAR SERIES Varieties of Context led by Jim Greeno, Brian Smith, Susan Stucky (greeno.pa@xerox.com, briansmith.pa@xerox.com, stucky.pa@xerox.com) 2:15, Thursdays Everyone knows that `I' can be used to refer to different people depending on circumstance. So why is such a fuss being made of this fact? We think there are two reasons. First, rather than view contextual dependence as a peripheral or complicating incident, recent theories of language have started to treat it as central and enabling---as a core phenomenon. Second, contextual dependence has been cited in other semantical fields, too: logic, psychology, computation, etc. In this seminar, we'll look at context in a wide range of examples---drawn from syntax, Tarskian satisfaction, the Mac interface, natural-language discourse, programming-language semantics, even mechanics. We'll try to understand what's in common among such cases, and also see how they differ. The real question is whether context-dependence is sufficiently cohesive to justify the single rallying cry? We've divided up the subject matter, varieties of context, according to local talent and interest, with the idea that there would be short presentations (say, thirty minutes) followed by a reply and general discussion. This is the last general message about the CSLI Seminar on context you will be receiving. If you'd like to be on the mailing list and you weren't at the first meeting, please send your net address to stucky.pa@xerox.com, and you'll be added. Notices will still appear in the CSLI Calendar. ____________ THIS WEEK'S STASS SEMINAR The Frog, the Fly, and the Coffee Cup: Part 2 John Perry and David Israel (john@russell.stanford.edu and israel@ai.sri.com) Thursday, April 13, 4:00 In this session we will continue to discuss some basic concepts, problems, and ideas concerning the incrementality of information. We are convinced that the key to this lies in two principles: The relativity of (useful) concepts of linguistic and informational content has its roots in the structure of action. The useful, interesting, familiar, deep relations among contents come at the incremental level. ____________ NEXT WEEK'S STASS SEMINAR Dewey on Defeasible Reasoning Tom Burke (burke@csli.stanford.edu) Thursday, April 20, 4:00 This will be a report on my study of John Dewey's "Logic: The Theory of Inquiry" (1938). This book is relevant to STASS for historical reasons since a notion of `situation' plays a central role in Dewey's logical theory. Dewey's logic has been ignored for the past forty years, largely because (a) it isn't compatible with the philosophical underpinnings of `formal logic' as we now think of it (Fregean, Quinean, syntactic, etc.), and (b) no one seems to know what to make of it otherwise. I want to take a few steps in the direction of showing that Dewey's logical theory is technically sound and worth further development. Consider the following example of common, everyday `defeasible reasoning': (1) That thing is apple-shaped and is predominantly reddish; so (2) That thing is an apple. Everyone would agree that this is not an example of `deduction'. But what is it an example of? Dewey would suggest that proposition (1) concerns the present registration of certain `qualities' of some thing while (2) goes further to classify that thing as being of a `kind'. For Dewey there are two different sorts of predicates involved here whereas current logical theory sees only one. The problem, as Dewey sees it, is not the classical epistemological matter of figuring out how to get in some principled way from propositions about appearances to propositions about facts, but rather from propositions about qualities to propositions about kinds. The focus of my presentation will be to explain this distinction between qualities and kinds---a distinction yielding two different sorts of properties and relations (hence two basic sorts of `infons', in STASS jargon, and so two sorts of prepositions). I will then look briefly at inference in a Deweyan framework. I will show how Dewey can account for simple deductions without having to explicitly specify `rules of inference' based on syntactic features of linguistic expressions. Rather, such rules essentially supervene on how one treats particular determiners like `all', `some', `many', `few', etc. ____________ SYMBOLIC SYSTEMS FORUM Indexicality in Context Geoff Nunberg (nunberg.pa@xerox.com) Xerox PARC and Stanford Linguistics Friday, 21 April, 3:15, 60:62N Most of our semantic accounts of indexical expressions---words like `I' and `now', for example---have been developed primarily on the basis of observations about how they are used in one-on-one, face-to-face conversation. But there are some essential aspects of indexicality that only emerge when we widen the net to consider how they are used in other types of communicative contexts, like road signs, published books, or telephone answering machines. In this talk, I'm going to draw on examples like these to show that it's not just the reference of an indexical expression that varies from one occasion of use to another, but the meaning of the expression as well---that is, the type of relation that the referent bears to the utterance. (So, to take a simple example, a written token of `I' on a printed greeting-card verse refers to the sender, not the person who inscribed it or composed it; but a token of `I' in a forwarded mail message refers to the original composer.) I'll talk about how the meaning of a particular use of an indexical is determined by the circumstances of communication---the mode of production, transmission, presentation, and so forth---and why you have to allow a role to intentions in determining the meaning in these cases. Finally, I'll say something about how observations like these are relevant to certain questions that literary theorists have asked about the nature of the context (and in particular, the notion of `audience') that is relevant to textual interpretation. ____________ SITUATION THEORY AND ITS APPLICATIONS The first conference on Situation Theory and its Applications (ST&A) was held at Asilomar from March 23 to 26. Fifty-five people attended from England, Scotland, Germany, Sweden, Norway, Japan, and Korea, as well as from the U.S. The format of the conference consisted of sixteen refereed papers, chosen from thirty-three submitted papers. Presentations of an hour's length took place in the mornings and evenings, with the afternoons free for less formal activities. The papers were on topics ranging from situation theory itself, to applications in linguistics, computational linguistics, theories of inference, and prototype theory, for example. The meeting was considered a great success by all. It became clear that a body of shared intuitions, theory, and notation has developed over the past few years, and that situation theory now has a momentum of its own. The program committee (Robin Cooper, Jens-Erik Fenstad, Kuniaki Mukai, John Perry) plans to publish a book based on the proceedings of the meeting. The meeting was such a success that it was decided to have a second ST&A conference in the Scottish Highlands, probably in September of 1990. Jon Barwise will chair the program committee. A call for papers will go out early this summer. ____________ CSLI VISITORS Keith Devlin Professor of Mathematics Manchester University Dates of visit: September 1987--July 1989 Devlin is a member of the STASS and MOST projects and an occasional attender at POST meetings. He is a mathematical logician, trying to develop an information-based logic that can handle situated inference. He is writing a book, "Logic and Information," that includes a lot of the basic work on situation theory currently under development here at CSLI. Marilyn Ford Senior Lecturer Computing and Information Technology Griffith University, Brisbane, Australia Dates of visit: December 1988--June 1989 Ford is visiting CSLI again to continue working with Joan Bresnan. Her interests include reasoning and natural-language perception and production. Hideyuki Nakashima Researcher Cognitive Science Section Electrotechnical Laboratory, Japan Dates of visit: February--May 1989 Nakashima is a member of the CAST and STASS projects. A programming language based on ST called PROSIT is being developed in the CAST project. His research interests include knowledge representation, nonmonotonic reasoning, combination of learning and ST, and a computer model of language acquisition. Hiroyuki Suzuki Researcher Tokyo Systems Research Department Corporate Engineering Division Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. Dates of visit: September 1987--April 1989 Suzuki, who is visiting CSLI as a Corporate Scholar, is a member of the CAST, STASS, and SITSEM projects. His research interests include computer science, natural-language processing, and especially Japanese discourse understanding. ------------------------------ To: nl-kr@cs.rpi.edu Date: Mon, 10 Apr 89 10:59:31 AST >From: carole hafner <hafner@corwin.ccs.northeastern.edu> Subject: AI and Law Conference - Program Announcement PROGRAM ANNOUNCEMENT ICAIL-89 - The Second International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Law June 13-16, 1989 University of British Columbia Vancouver, BC CANADA Sponsored by: Faculty of Law, University of British Columbia In Coooperation with ACM SIGART Additional Support from: IBM Canada Ltd. The Center for Law and Computer Science, Northeastern University To receive registration material contact: Ms. Rita Laffey School of Law, Northeastern University (617)437-3346 For information about exhibits or local arrangements contact: Ms. Rosemarie Page Faculty of Law, University of British Columbia (604)228-2944 SCHEDULE OF EVENTS Tuesday, June 13 5:00 p.m. - 9:00 p.m. - Registration and Reception, Gage Conference Center (Registration will continue through the conference) Wednesday, June 14 8:30 a.m. - 12:30 p.m. - Tutorials and Workshop 2:00 p.m. - 6:00 p.m. - Welcome, Paper Presentations, and Invited Talk 7:00 p.m. - Gala Banquet Banquet Speaker: The Honorable Chief Justice Beverly M. McLachlin Supreme Court of British Columbia Thursday-Friday, June 15-16 8:30 a.m. - 6:00 p.m. - Paper Presentations, Invited Talk, and Panel Thursday evening, June 15 - Salmon Barbecue, Museum of Anthropology INVITED TALKS "The Marriage of AI and Law - A New Analytical Jurisprudence" Donald H. Berman, Richardson Professor of Law, Northeastern University "`That reminds me of a story' - How Memory Organization Supports Retrieval of Relevant Cases" Roger C. Schank, Professor of Computer Science, Yale University PANEL DISCUSSION "Research Funding for AI and Law: Opportunities and Pitfalls." Moderated by J.C. Smith, Professor of Law and Directory of the Legal Expert Systems Project, Faculty of Law, University of British Columbia TUTORIALS Tutorial A. "Artificial Intelligence and Law: Opportunities and Challenges" Donald H. Berman, Richardson Professor of Law, Northeastern University Carole D. Hafner, Associate Professor of Computer Science, Northeastern Univ. Tutorial B. "Case-Based Reasoning" Kevin D. Ashley, Ph.D., J.D. WORKSHOP "Deontic Logic." Presented by Andrew J. I. Jones, Professor of Philosophy, University of Oslo, Norway RESEARCH PRESENTATIONS Toward a Computational Theory of Arguing with Precedents Dr. Kevin D. Ashley IBM Watson Research Laboratories Cutting Legal Loops Professor Donald H. Berman Northeastern University School of Law Representing and Reusing Explanations of Legal Precedents Mr. L. Karl Branting Department of Computer Sciences University of Texas Boyd V. Deaver - Litigation Strategies Mr. Dan Burnstein Harvard Law School Deep Models, Normative Reasoning and Legal Expert Systems Dr. T.J.M. Bench-Capon Department of Computer Science University of Liverpool, England Xcite (an expert system for naturalization cases) Dr. Andreas Galtung Norwegian Research Center For Computers and Law Representing Developing Legal Doctrine A Problem for AI Programs Dr. Anne v.d.L. Gardner Atherton, CA A System for Planning Arguments and Searching Interpretation Spaces Dr. Thomas F. Gordon German National Research Center for Computer Science Sankt Augustin, Federal Republic of Germany A Specialized Expert System for Judicial Decision Support Dr. L.V. Kale Department of Computer Science University of Illinois The Treatment of Negation in Logic Programs for Representing Legislation Dr. Robert Kowalski Department of Computing Imperial College, London, ENGLAND LESTER: Using Paradigm Cases in a Quasi-Precedential Legal Domain Dr. Kenneth A. Lambert Department of Computer Science Washington and Lee University, Lexington, VA The Design of an Attorney's Statistical Consultant Dr. Leonard S. Lutomski The American Institutes for Research Expert Systems in Case-Based Law: The Hearsay Rule Advisor Dr. Marilyn T. MacCrimmon The University of British Columbia Vancouver, CANADA Representing the Structure of a Legal Argument Ms. Catherine C. Marshall Xerox Palo Alto Research Center Palo Alto, CA LRS Legal Reasoning System Professor Antonio A. Martino Istituto per la Documentazione Giuridica Del Consiglio Nazionale Delle Richerche, ITALY A Language for Legal Discourse Dr. L. Thorne McCarty Rutgers University New Brunswick, NJ An Attempted Dimensional Analysis of the Law Governing Government Appeals in Criminal Cases Mr. Simon Mendelson Cambridge, MA 02140 Market Realities of Rule-Based Software for Lawyers Where the Rubber Meets the Road Mr. Rees Morrison, Esq. Price Waterhouse New York, NY Building GRANDJUR Using Evidence and Other Knowledge to Prepare Casefiles Dr. Roger D. Purdy School of Law The University of Akron, OHIO Dimension-Based Analysis of Hypotheticals from Supreme Court Oral Argument Dr. Edwina L. Rissland Dept. of Computer Science University of Massachusetts, Amherst Interpreting Statutory Predicates Dr. Edwina L. Rissland Mr. David B. Skalak Dept. of Computer Science University of Massachusetts, Amherst Legal Information Retrieval A Hybrid Approach Dr. Daniel E. Rose Institute for Cognitive Science University of California, San Diego A Framework for Legal Knowledge Base Construction Dr. Tom Routen Department of Computer Science Leicester Polytechnic, ENGLAND EPS II Estate Planning With Prototypes (with L. T. McCarty) Mr. Dean A. Schlobohm Stanford Law School, Stanford CA Expert Systems and ICAI in Tax Law: Killing Two Birds with one AI Stone Dr. David Sherman The Law Society of Upper Canada Toronto, CANADA ASSYST - Computer Support for Guideline Sentencing Dr. Eric Simon U.S. Sentencing Commission, Washington, D.C. Taking Advantage of Models for Legal Classification Mr. David Skalak Dept. of Computer Science University of Massachusetts, Amherst The Latent Damage System A Jurisprudential Analysis Dr. Richard Susskind Ernst and Whinney London ENGLAND PROLEXS, A Model to Implement Legal Knowledge Mr. P.H. van den Berg Computer/Law Institute Juridische Faculteit Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, THE NETHERLANDS Legal Reasoning - A Jurisprudential Description Dr. Peter Wahlgren The Swedish Law and Informatics Research Inst. University of Stockholm, SWEDEN CACE: Computer-Assisted Case Evaluation in the Brooklyn District Attorney's Office Mr. Steven S. Weiner Yayes, Mechling, Kleiman, Inc. Cambridge, MA 02138 Amalgamating Regulation- and Case-based Advice Systems Through Suggested Answers Dr. David E. Wolstenholme Department of Computing Imperial College, London, ENGLAND CONFERENCE COMMITTEE Robert T. Fraonson, Faculty of Law, University of British Columbia, Co-Chair J. C. Smith, Faculty of Law, University of British Columbia, Co-Chair Carole D. Hafner, Northeastern University, Secretary-Treasurer PROGRAM COMMITTEE: Edwina L. Rissland, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, Program Chair Kevin D. Ashley, IBM Thomas J. Watson Research Center Trevor J. M. Bench-Capon, University of Liverpool, ENGLAND Donald H. Berman, Northeastern University Jon Bing, University of Oslo, NORWAY Michael G. Dyer, University of California, Los Angeles Anne v.d. L. Garner, Atherton, CA L. Thorne McCarty, Rutgers University Marek J. Sergot, Imperial College, London, ENGLAND ------------------------------ End of NL-KR Digest ******************* >From nl-kr-request@cs.rpi.edu Thu Apr 27 15:22:27 1989 Date: Thu, 27 Apr 89 15:22:27 EDT Received: by fs3.cs.rpi.edu (5.54/1.2-RPI-CS-Dept) id AA02036; Thu, 27 Apr 89 15:22:27 EDT Message-Id: <8904271922.AA02036@fs3.cs.rpi.edu> >From: nl-kr-request@cs.rpi.edu (NL-KR Moderator Chris Welty) Reply-To: nl-kr@cs.rpi.edu (NL-KR Digest) Errors-To: nl-kr-request@cs.rpi.edu Maint-Path: nl-kr-request@cs.rpi.edu To: nl-kr@cs.rpi.edu Subject: NL-KR Digest, Volume 6 No. 25 Status: R NL-KR Digest (Thu Apr 27 14:20:17 1989) Volume 6 No. 24 Today's Topics: Finnish: Another Answer to Nurkkala Communication ES wanted Buffalo Cog Sci: Asher CSLI Calendar, April 27, 4:24 Calendar addition COINS FIFTH ANNUAL RESEARCH REVIEW FOR INDUSTRY DOCTORATE PROGRAMS WITH LITTLE RESIDENCY Submissions: nl-kr@cs.rpi.edu Requests, policy: nl-kr-request@cs.rpi.edu Back issues are available from host archive.cs.rpi.edu [128.213.1.10] in the files nl-kr/Vxx/Nyy (ie nl-kr/V01/N01 for V1#1), mail requests will not be promptly satisfied. If you can't reach `cs.rpi.edu' you may want to use `turing.cs.rpi.edu' instead. ----------------------------------------------------------------- To: nl-kr@cs.rpi.edu Subject: Finnish: Another Answer to Nurkkala Date: Fri, 21 Apr 89 13:27:45 +0100 >From: richard%EPISTEMI.ED.AC.UK@CUNYVM.CUNY.EDU > I'm looking for references to work done on computerized parsing of natural > languages which rely on morphological affixes to convey grammatical infor- > mation, as opposed to word order. For example, languages like German or Greek, > as opposed to English. Nurkkala might be interested in Lauri Karttunen's work on Finnish? The stuff I'm thinking of is: Lauri Karttunen & Martin Kay Parsing in a Free Word Order Language" (1985) in Natural Language Parsing: Psychological, Computational and Theoretical Perspectives, Dowty, Karttunen & Zwicky (Eds) pp279-306, Cambridge University Press. Lauri Karttunen "Radical Lexicalism" (1986) CSLI Report CSLI-86-68. I'm also interested in the issue of context-free grammars. Although CF grammars may have nice parsablilty properties, phrase structure grammars in general do seem rather unsuited to languages with a lot of variation in word order. Karttunen's work, for example, is very lexical, the second of the above papers describing a variant of categorial grammar. I think context-freeness is a phrase structure notion that is not so important when looking at lexicalist grammars. Certainly for many categorial gammars (those employing no unary rules) it is far easier to see how to parse in cubic time than it is to prove (or disprove) context freeness, and non-context-freeness doesn't imply that the grammar can only be parsed in exponential time. One further point is that just because languages like English have fairly fixed word order (though even in English word order, or at least phrase order, can vary more than you might realise), that doesn't mean that they must be treated with phrase structure grammars. In the spirit of universal grammar, it would be nice to be able to treat Finnish and English within a single framework, and there are many existing treatments of English within lexical frameworks. Richard Cooper ------------------------------ To: nl-kr@cs.rpi.edu Date: Wed, 26 Apr 89 8:52:24 MET DST >From: Guilherme Bittencourt <gb@ira.uka.de> Subject: Communication ES wanted I am considering the possibility of writing an Expert System in the domain of communication between computers. The system should typically know about protocols, communication capabilities of each type of computer, etc. I am very interested in two types of information: (1) Do you know such an Expert System in Computer Communication? Any pointer to the literature would be appreciated. (2) Do you know any tutorial article introducing the domain of communication between computer? Some book about it? Pointers to the literature would also be appreciated. Please answer by mail, I will summarize if there is enough interest. Thanks in advance. Guilherme Bittencourt E-mail : gb@iraul1.ira.uka.de tel.: (49) 721 6084043 Universitaet Karslruhe - Institut fuer Algorithmen und Kognitive Systeme Postfach 6980 - D-7500 Karlsruhe 1 - BRD ------------------------------ To: nl-kr@cs.rpi.edu Date: Mon, 24 Apr 89 15:01:21 EDT >From: rapaport@cs.Buffalo.EDU (William J. Rapaport) Subject: Buffalo Cog Sci: Asher UNIVERSITY AT BUFFALO STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK BUFFALO LOGIC COLLOQUIUM and GRADUATE RESEARCH INITIATIVE IN COGNITIVE AND LINGUISTIC SCIENCES PRESENT NICHOLAS ASHER Department of Philosophy and Center for Cognitive Science University of Texas at Austin PARADOXES OF INDIRECT DISCOURSE In natural language and programs where we must reason about the states of other systems, it is extremely useful to quantify over beliefs of agents. I look at two proposals for quantifying over beliefs--one first-order and one second-order. I then consider certain paradoxes of indirect discourse that arise when one allows quantification over beliefs. These were part of the mediaeval insolubilia and have recently been discussed by Prior and Thomason. I show how inductive and semi- inductive theories of belief (like the one recently developed by Kamp and myself) can address the paradoxes Thomason discusses within the first-order theory of quantification over beliefs, and I propose an analogous way of handling these paradoxes within the higher order frame- work. Monday, May 8, 1989 4:00 P.M. 684 Baldy Hall, Amherst Campus There will probably be an evening discussion at a time and place to be announced. Contact John Corcoran, Dept. of Philosophy, 716-636-2444, or Bill Rapa- port, Dept. of Computer Science, 716-636-3193, for further information. ------------------------------ To: nl-kr@cs.rpi.edu Date: Wed, 26 Apr 89 17:59:17 PDT >From: emma@csli.Stanford.EDU (Emma Pease) Subject: CSLI Calendar, April 27, 4:24 C S L I C A L E N D A R O F P U B L I C E V E N T S _____________________________________________________________________________ 27 April 1989 Stanford Vol. 4, No. 24 _____________________________________________________________________________ A weekly publication of The Center for the Study of Language and Information, Ventura Hall, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305 ____________ CSLI ACTIVITIES FOR THIS THURSDAY, 27 April 1989 12:00 p.m. TINLunch Cordura Hall Reading: "A compositional approach to discourse Conference Room representation theory" by Henk Zeevat Discussion led by Stanley Peters (peters@csli.stanford.edu) Abstract in last week's Calendar 2:15 p.m. CSLI Seminar Cordura Hall Varieties of Context: Session 4 Conference Room Contexts in Activity Lucy Suchman, Xerox PARC (suchman.pa@xerox.com) Respondent: Susan Stucky Abstract in last week's Calendar 3:30 p.m. Tea Ventura Hall 4:00 p.m. STASS Seminar Cordura Hall Opacity, Unarticulated Constituents, and Conference Room Incremental Information Leora Weitzman (leora@csli.stanford.edu) Abstract below ____________ CSLI ACTIVITIES FOR NEXT THURSDAY, 4 May 1989 12:00 p.m. TINLunch Cordura Hall Machine Translation Conference Room Annie Zaenen (zaenen.pa@xerox.com) Abstract below 2:15 p.m. CSLI Seminar Cordura Hall Varieties of Context: Session 5 Conference Room Language Use in Context: How Does it Work? (or What's Context Good For, Anyway?) Susan Stucky (stucky.pa@xerox.com) Respondent: Herb Clark Abstract below 3:30 p.m. Tea Ventura Hall 4:00 p.m. STASS Seminar Cordura Hall Brian Smith Conference Room (briansmith.pa@xerox.com) ____________ NEXT WEEK'S TINLUNCH Machine Translation Annie Zaenen (zaenen.pa@xerox.com) 4 May The aim of this presentation is `propagandistic': I want to convince the researchers at CSLI involved in natural language that most of the problems that machine translation faces are not sui generis and can be looked upon as part of the research we are in any case engaged in. First, I will discuss some commonly mentioned problems of machine translation and show how the linguistic models elaborated around CSLI can deal with some of them rather straightforwardly. After this optimistic introduction, I will argue that: - most of the problems faced by translation come also up in the context of linguistic analysis outside of the context of machine translation; - one of the important reasons why there are problems with machine translation is that the linguistic analysis of most natural languages is extremely coarse. Finally, I will raise the question of how problems of translation relate to the problem of universal grammar. ____________ NEXT WEEK'S CSLI SEMINAR Varieties of Context: Session 5 Language Use in Context: How Does it Work? (or What's Context Good For, Anyway?) Susan Stucky (stucky.pa@xerox.com) Respondent: Herb Clark May 4 As we noted in the announcement to this seminar series, we have been assuming that context-dependence has already been elevated from a peripheral or complicating factor to a core phenomenon to be explained by theories of language and action. But moving beyond this assumption requires knowing something about varieties of context, on the one hand, and about just how context is enabling, on the other. This talk is meant to add to the latter enterprise, i.e., to begin to explain just how it is that context is enabling. For instance, one idea is that it frees participants from having to represent irrelevant aspects of the stuff surrounding a particular action. Another idea is that it frees participants from even more, from having to represent even all the relevant aspects of the surrounding stuff. I will propose a hypothesis---the radical efficiency hypothesis---that starts from a very constrained version of the second idea and show how this hypothesis, together with a couple of other less controversial assumptions, goes some distance towards providing an explanation for the wide variety of language use we see in real conversation. Examples will be drawn from English: some oldies but goodies such as Geoff Nunberg's ham sandwich example, and some new data from last week's seminar contributed by Lucy Suchman. ____________ THIS WEEK'S STASS SEMINAR Opacity, Unarticulated Constituents, and Incremental Information Leora Weitzman (leora@csli.stanford.edu) April 27 The referential opacity of propositional-attitude contexts may be due to their using their embedded sentences as vehicles for two kinds of content at once. For instance, perhaps a belief report typically conveys both the reported belief's pure and its incremental content (For the distinction between pure and incremental information, and also for the distinction between having and carrying information mentioned below, see Israel and Perry, "What is Information?") relative to the connecting facts in virtue of which it is about the particular objects it is about. If this is true and is the reason these contexts are opaque, a number of things follow. First, the semantics of opaque attitude reports seems to require unarticulated constituents, as Crimmins and Perry suggest ("The Prince and the Phone Booth", CSLI Report 128). Second, these contexts can be clearly distinguished from contexts introduced by phrases like "shows that", "causes", or "sees", which, as Perry observes ("Possible Worlds and Subject Matter"), resemble propositional-attitude contexts in resisting substitution of logically equivalent sentences but differ from propositional-attitude contexts in allowing substitution of coreferring proper names. The underlying difference may be that the sentences embedded by phrases like "shows that" convey content at only `one' level relative to the connecting facts---either pure content or incremental content, but not both---whereas belief reports (as suggested above) convey both at once. Finally, this difference might in turn reflect a fundamental difference between `carrying' information (what "shows that"-type sentences report) and `having' information (what "believes that"-type sentences report). It may be that it is useful to report both the pure and the incremental information that an agent `has', since both are relevant (at different levels) to predicting what the agent will do, whereas no analogous purpose is served by reporting both the pure and the incremental information that something `carries'. ____________ LINGUISTICS DEPARTMENT COLLOQUIUM Discrepancies between Comprehension and Production Implications for Acquiring and Representing Linguistic Knowledge Eve Clark (eclark@psych.stanford.edu) Friday, 5 May, 3:30 Cordura Conference Room ____________ SYMBOLIC SYSTEMS FORUM Looking for a Theory of Information Content Keith Devlin (devlin@csli.stanford.edu) Friday, 5 May, 3:15, 60:62N In 1949, the father of the American computer, John von Neumann, said: "It is therefore quite possible that we are not too far from the limits which can be achieved in artificial automata without really fundamental insights into a theory of information." Thanks to Shannon, Weaver, and all the rest, we do have a precise, mathematical theory of the `amount' of information in a given signal. But what about a mathematical theory of the information `content' of a signal, i.e., what the signal is `about'? How do you go about trying to develop such a theory? Is the answer to be found in mathematical logic? Will some revamped kind of logic be required, one that is based on the information conveyed by language rather than the truth-value logic we all learn in traditional logic courses? Or is it better to approach the problem more in the spirit of an empirical science such as physics? The STASS research group at CSLI has been trying to develop a suitable mathematical framework and use it to obtain a theory of information content. The talk will survey the overall approach in fairly general terms. The Symbolic Systems Forum on April 28 is "Symbols and Thought" by Fred Dretske; the abstract was in last week's calendar ------------------------------ To: nl-kr@cs.rpi.edu Date: Tue, 25 Apr 89 13:59:22 PDT >From: emma@csli.Stanford.EDU (Emma Pease) Subject: Calendar addition STASS SEMINAR Opacity, Unarticulated Constituents, and Incremental Information Leora Weitzman Cordura Conference Room Thursday, April 27, 4:15 The referential opacity of propositional-attitude contexts may be due to their using their embedded sentences as vehicles for two kinds of content at once. For instance, perhaps a belief report typically conveys both the reported belief's pure and its incremental content(*) relative to the connecting facts in virtue of which it is about the particular objects it is about. If this is true and is the reason these contexts are opaque, a number of things follow. First, the semantics of opaque attitude reports seems to require unarticulated constituents, as Crimmins and Perry suggest(**). Second, these contexts can be clearly distinguished from contexts introduced by phrases like "shows that", "causes", or "sees", which, as Perry observes(***), resemble propositional-attitude contexts in resisting substitution of logically equivalent sentences but differ from propositional-attitude contexts in allowing substitution of coreferring proper names. The underlying difference may be that the sentences embedded by phrases like "shows that" convey content at only _one_ level relative to the connecting facts -- either pure content or incremental content, but not both -- whereas belief reports (as suggested above) convey both at once. Finally, this difference might in turn reflect a fundamental difference between _carrying_ information (what "shows that"-type sentences report) and _having_ information (what "believes that"-type sentences report). It may be that it is useful to report both the pure and the incremental information that an agent _has_, since both are relevant (at different levels) to predicting what the agent will do, whereas no analogous purpose is served by reporting both the pure and the incremental information that something _carries_. (*) For the distinction between pure and incremental information, and also for the distinction between having and carrying information mentioned below, see Israel and Perry, "What is Information?" (**) "The Prince and the Phone Booth" (***) "Possible Worlds and Subject Matter" ------------------------------ To: nl-kr@cs.rpi.edu Date: Wed, 26 Apr 89 13:21 EST >From: jennifer <GERAN@cs.umass.EDU> Subject: COINS FIFTH ANNUAL RESEARCH REVIEW FOR INDUSTRY FIFTH ANNUAL RESEARCH REVIEW FOR INDUSTRY ENCOURAGES ACADEMIC-INDUSTRIAL INTERACTION The Department of Computer and Information Science (COINS) at the University of Massachusetts at Amerst will host its Fifth Annual Research Review for Industry on Thursday and Friday, May 4 & 5, at the Hotel Northampton in Northampton, MA. Former Senator and current Massachusetts State Board of Regents' Chairman Paul Tsongas will deliver the keynote address for the Review, which will highlight over 40 on-going research efforts. The international reputation of the COINS Department has generated increasing interest in its research program among major high-tech corporations, both within the computer industry and in industries with computer-based products and services. Representatives from various high-tech companies all over the world are expected to attend this year's conference to take advantage of the opportunity to see and discuss the innovative and exciting research going on in COINS labs. COINS faculty and researchers consider a more essential link between American universities and American industry to be critical to the economic competitiveness of the Commonwealth and the U.S. in world high-tech markets. To this end, the department plans to announce the details of two exciting new initiatives which will accelerate the transfer of technologies from COINS labs to government and industry. For Additional Information Contact: Jennifer A. Geran Computer Information Science University of Massachusetts at Amherst (413)545-2475 ------------------------------ To: nl-kr@cs.rpi.edu Date: Thu, 20 Apr 89 15:18 CST >From: <PMACLIN%UTMEM3.BITNET@CUNYVM.CUNY.EDU> Subject: DOCTORATE PROGRAMS WITH LITTLE RESIDENCY I wish to enter a doctoral program (involving neural networks, expert systems, or computer-related) that does not require more than four weeks residency on campus per year and is fully accredited. As a working faculty member, I cannot be away from my job for more than four weeks annually. I have B.S. and Master degrees. If you know any universities meeting my needs, please contact: PMACLIN@UTMEM1 Philip Maclin Univ. of Tennessee at Memphis, Computer Science Faculty. 877 Madison Ave., Memphis, TN 38163. ------------------------------ End of NL-KR Digest *******************