[comp.society.futures] Arrow's Impossibility Theorem

hibbert@arisia.Xerox.COM (Chris Hibbert) (01/07/89)

In article jeff@stormy.atmos.washington.edu (Jeff L. Bowden) writes:
>Didn't some Nobel Prize winning economist show some result wherin it is 
>impossible to have a "fair" election between more than two candidates (where,
>of course, the definition of "fair" is included in the proof - as is par for
>the course in economics)?

Yes, Jeff, Ken Arrow (I'm not sure about the Nobel, but he is a
prominent economist) proved something now referred to as Arrow's
Impossibility Theorem.  The following is written while referring to my
college micro-economics text "Micro Economic Theory: Basic Principles
and Extensions, 2nd ed.", by Walter Nicholson, copyright 1978 The
Dryden Press.

I've seen much better explanations than the one in this book so I'll
try to improve it somewhat while leaving its accuracy unaffected.  You
might also try looking in Arrow's "Social Choice and Individual
Values" (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1951) which probably
says it better than I will.

The theorem assumes that individuals preferences are transitive.  [The
text presents the theorem as if it only applies to two individuals and
3 choices.  I'm positive that that is an oversimplification, and that
the theorem holds for larger groups and many choices.]  It shows that
there are no possible voting systems that have all of the following
seemingly usefull properties:

1.  No ties are allowed.  All possible outcomes must be ordered in the
    ranking produced by the voting function.

2.  The ranking must be transitive.

3.  The ranking must be positively related to individual preferences.
    If all [both] voters prefers outcome a to outcome b, the outcome a must
    be preferred in the ranking.

4.  The outcome must be independent of irrelevant alternatives.  That
    is, adding more choices shouldn't affect the rankings of the
    existing choices.

5.  The outcome shouldn't be independant of voters' choices.
    (Decision based on custom are an example where voters' preferences
    don't matter

6.  There shouldn't be a single person (the dictator) whose choices
    overrule all the others.


There's a reference in a footnote that might also be interesting.  on
page 550, Nicholson says "Some interresting voting models are examined
in J. M. Buchanan and G. Tullock, 'The Calculus of Consent' (Ann
Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1962).  Buchanan did
just win the Nobel prize, so maybe this was the work Jeff meant.


So, yes, economists have shown that it's impossible to come up with
one mechanism for voting that will satisfy a pretty reasonable set of
criteria.  That's why we're so often able to show that particular
outcomes are ludicrous given people's expressed preferences, and why
there are so many seemingly useful schemes that we haven't adopted.

Chris