[comp.society.futures] Technology Forecasting

josh@klaatu.rutgers.edu (J Storrs Hall) (02/22/90)

Well, not too long ago, I sent the following to comp.arch:

what            1980    1990    extrapolation   2000
processor
pins		64	256	x4		1k
clock		8MHz	32MHz	x4		128MHz
"Devices"	50k	1M	x20		20M
mips		1	12	x12		144
memory(dram)
bits/chip	16k	1M	x64		64M
speed		240ns	80ns	/4		20ns

and got a flood of helpful responses, agreeing or disagreeing
about various points.  I've been updating it since, on the basis 
of that and other information.  Here's the current best guess:
(and allow me to point out that I changed the 1990 mips to 20 
*before* the 68040 announcement appeared...)

what            1980    1990    extrapolation   2000
processor
pins		64	256	x4		1k
clock		8MHz	32MHz	x4		128MHz
"Devices"	50k	1M	x20		20M
mips		1	20	x20		400
memory(dram)
bits/chip	16k	4M	x256		1G
speed		240ns	80ns	/3		25ns

An interesting thing is that one fellow objected to the figures
as too tame, because they were a "linear" extrapolation!  

Trendline forecasting like this is of VERY limited usefulness,
and that is just as true of the numerically sophisticated forms
like the "Club of Rome" models.  Basically you're saying, things
are going to stay the same as they are now, only more so.

I would claim that the best method of forecasting is still
to take someone who is a sharp social and technological observer
and have him apply his whole mind to the problem, using any
and all analytical tools available.

One of my favorite scenes from science fiction is in "Door into
Summer", by Heinlein (a SS&TO, see above).  The protagonist is
talking to a workman who is crushing cars in a big machine.
It eventuates that they don't have engines.  They are being 
built, and crushed, simply to provide jobs for the builders
and crushers [quoted from old and unreliable memory]:

"But why no engines?"

"Well, it doesn't make sense to put in an engine if it's just going 
to be crushed, does it?"

"But it doesn't make sense to build the car in the first place
if it's only going to be crushed!"

"Buddy, you just don't understand economics at all, do you?"

--JoSH

macdon@ists.ists.ca (Rick MacDonald) (02/23/90)

In <Feb.21.17.13.14.1990.1539@klaatu.rutgers.edu>, J. Storrs Hall gives an
interesting example of predicting processor capability in the year 2000,
and concludes:

>Trendline forecasting like this is of VERY limited usefulness,
>and that is just as true of the numerically sophisticated forms
>like the "Club of Rome" models.  Basically you're saying, things
>are going to stay the same as they are now, only more so.

>I would claim that the best method of forecasting is still
>to take someone who is a sharp social and technological observer
>and have him apply his whole mind to the problem, using any
>and all analytical tools available.

If I were in the business of designing microprocessors, and doing technology
forecasting to decide what R&D to do, I would be very concerned about
keeping track of advances in optical and molecular computing and the like.
Or perhaps, breakthroughs in neural nets will lead to a whole new processor 
technology, resulting in a limited need for microprocessors as we know them 
by the year 2000. These would be examples of 'blindsiding'.

My point is that you have to be aware of all the technologies that could
affect your business, and think about their future impact. That is a tough
job.

One thing that's clear to me is that a single individual is going to have a
much harder time doing forecasting like this than the right group of
individuals.

What kind of individuals should that group consist of and how should they
do their job? More importantly, how do they convince anybody that their
forecasts are worth acting on?


Rick MacDonald
Spar Aerospace Ltd.
macdon@ists.ists.ca

-- 
Rick MacDonald
Spar Aerospace Ltd.
macdon@ists.ists.ca

bill@videovax.tv.tek.com (William K. McFadden) (02/24/90)

In article <Feb.21.17.13.14.1990.1539@klaatu.rutgers.edu> josh@klaatu.rutgers.edu (J Storrs Hall) writes:
>
>what            1980    1990    extrapolation   2000
>processor
>memory(dram)
>bits/chip	16k	4M	x256		1G

This is the only one of your figures I've been tracking over the years.  My
personal rule-of-thumb says memory capacity quadruples about every three years.
I'm not sure of the first few dates, but I predict the following trend:

1978   16K
1981   64K
1984  256K
1987    1M
1990    4M
1993   16M
1996   64M
1999  256M
2002    1G
2005    4G
2007   16G
2010   64G

These dates are those for mass production, not first silicon in the lab.  Also,
they are approximate and of course speculative, especially the latter ones.
However, last year I saw an overhead from a major DRAM manufacturer predicting
size increases (including the 64G size!) that almost exactly matched my rule of
thumb.

Remember, this advice is worth every cent you paid for it!
-- 
Bill McFadden    Tektronix, Inc.  P.O. Box 500  MS 58-639  Beaverton, OR  97077
bill@videovax.tv.tek.com,     {hplabs,uw-beaver,decvax}!tektronix!videovax!bill
Phone: (503) 627-6920       "The biggest difference between developing a missle
component and a toy is the 'cost constraint.'" -- John Anderson, Engineer, TI

weber@popvax.harvard.edu (R09400@RPWeber) (02/24/90)

The main problem of forecasting is uncertainty. Trends are unhelpful
in dealing with uncertainty since they lead to roadsigns or milestones
that tell you if something has or has not happened.  For example,
we all know that the cost of computing has been declining and is likely
to do so. What does knowing the trend help us to forecast or understand?
I would suggest nothing.  However, if one were to think about the
future in terms of events, then an event such as, Apple will introduce
a "throwaway mac II" for $ 600 in 1994 , is an event that reflects
the declining cost of computing.  We can then ask, did this event
happen or not? The future, then, is made of sequences of events.

These ideas are elaborated in an article that appeared last November
27 in Computerworld, authored by Jim Herman, Patricia Seybold, and me.
 
Anyone intested in forecasting or the future of computing and communications
technology should look at this article.
Regards
Bob Weber


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weber@popvax.harvard.edu (R09400@RPWeber) (02/24/90)

Oops (not a good unix hacker, yet), it should have read, 
trends do NOT lead to signposts or milestones.
Bob Weber


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Robert Philip Weber, Ph.D.       | Phone: (617) 495-3744
Senior Consultant                | Fax:   (617) 495-0750
Academic and Planning Services   |
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bzs@world.std.com (Barry Shein) (02/24/90)

From: uunet!husc6.harvard.edu!popvax!weber  (R09400@RPWeber)
>The main problem of forecasting is uncertainty. Trends are unhelpful
>in dealing with uncertainty since they lead to roadsigns or milestones
>that tell you if something has or has not happened.  For example,
>we all know that the cost of computing has been declining and is likely
>to do so. What does knowing the trend help us to forecast or understand?
>I would suggest nothing.  However, if one were to think about the
>future in terms of events, then an event such as, Apple will introduce
>a "throwaway mac II" for $ 600 in 1994 , is an event that reflects
>the declining cost of computing.  We can then ask, did this event
>happen or not? The future, then, is made of sequences of events.

That's very well said, and subtle enough that I hope most people read
it again.

The first question which comes to my mind is, is this an either/or
situation? Don't the trend lines at least provide an envelope of
possibility to place events in, a probability space basically.

Something lying outside of the extrapolation boundary implies a
"catastrophic precursor", such as a new chip technology allowing a
sudden 100x speed-up, so we go back and look for that.

        -Barry Shein

Software Tool & Die    | {xylogics,uunet}!world!bzs | bzs@world.std.com
Purveyors to the Trade | Voice: 617-739-0202        | Login: 617-739-WRLD

weber@popvax.harvard.edu (R09400@RPWeber) (02/24/90)

In article <9002240412.AA14891@world.std.com> bzs@world.std.com (Barry Shein) writes:
>The first question which comes to my mind is, is this an either/or
>situation? Don't the trend lines at least provide an envelope of
>possibility to place events in, a probability space basically.
>
>Something lying outside of the extrapolation boundary implies a
>"catastrophic precursor", such as a new chip technology allowing a
>sudden 100x speed-up, so we go back and look for that.
>
The problem with probability space is that if you grant the premise
that the future occurs because of some event sequence (rather than 
because of some sent of trends (even thought the former reflect the
more likely than any other future.  For example, if you have 40 events
in a sequence leading to some outcome, and each event is highly probable,
say .9 likely, then the probability of this particular future is
.9 to the 40th power, or .017.  This tells us that the world is highly
contingent.  One goal should be to give up the notion of one particular   
likely outcome and think in terms of alternative event sequences and
alternative outcomes.
 
Regards
Bob


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Cambridge, MA 02138
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v291nhtp@ubvms.cc.buffalo.edu (02/24/90)

In article <5462@ists.ists.ca>, macdon@ists.ists.ca (Rick MacDonald) writes:
> 
> In <Feb.21.17.13.14.1990.1539@klaatu.rutgers.edu>, J. Storrs Hall gives an
> interesting example of predicting processor capability in the year 2000,
> and concludes:
>>I would claim that the best method of forecasting is still
>>to take someone who is a sharp social and technological observer
>>and have him apply his whole mind to the problem, using any
>>and all analytical tools available.
	This is exactly what R. Buckminster Fuller did throughout his life. (He 
is know [among other things] for inventing the geodesic dome.) His [and my] 
philosophy entailed NOT speciallizing in any one area, but standing back and 
getting "The Big Picture." Taking a holistic, omni-interrelated look at the 
universe, and seeing how things fit together.

> My point is that you have to be aware of all the technologies that could
> affect your business, and think about their future impact. That is a tough
> job.
	True. But SOMEBODY'S gotta do it! :) (Actually a LOT of somebodys should
do it, but that's another story.....)

> One thing that's clear to me is that a single individual is going to have a
> much harder time doing forecasting like this than the right group of
> individuals.
	True. Wanna help us out? I'm already part of an informal group doing 
that. (See below.)

> What kind of individuals should that group consist of and how should they
> do their job? 
	All kinds of individual from all walks of life. Everyone has SOMETHING 
to offer. The whole key is to have the desire and imagination to dare to dream! 
That's what seems to bond us together.

> More importantly, how do they convince anybody that their
> forecasts are worth acting on?
	Ah! Now we're getting to the crux of the matter! This is one of the 
biggest walls I keep slamming into. It's tricky, and I can't quite figure it 
out. I think it has something to do with having more money than most small 
countries, so you can do anything you want, and not be liable to a bank for it. 
;^) If the idea is good enough, and is "right," then people will spontaneously 
adopt it and discard the older, less efficient way. The key is bringing said 
idea to fruition.
	Like I said, I'm already a part of this. I have a Listserv on BITNET 
called GEODESIC, which is a sort of free-form discussion on various 
technologies, from space shuttle fuel-cell power systems, to toilets (  ;)  ), 
and how they impact and interrelate to improve the standard of living for all 
humans on the planet, through intelligent design and proper application of the 
principles of the Universe. 
	I'm in the process of peering the list to the BRAND NEW NEWSGROUP (what 
a plug.) ***BIT.LISTSERV.GEODESIC*** (Outrageous! How can people get away with 
such tawdry advertising schemes?!?) ;^)
	Check it out! I think you might like it! (IF we can get it running! :) )


> Rick MacDonald
> Spar Aerospace Ltd.
> macdon@ists.ists.ca
							-Patrick Salsbury
							U. of Buffalo, NY
							V291NHTP@UBVMS.BITNET

KPURCELL@liverpool.ac.UK (Kevin 'fractal' Purcell) (02/27/90)

On 23 Feb 90 20:29:46 GMT William K. McFadden
(zephyr.ens.tek.com!tekfdi!videovax!bill@edu.washington.cs.beaver) said:

>In article <Feb.21.17.13.14.1990.1539@klaatu.rutgers.edu>
> josh@klaatu.rutgers.edu (J Storrs Hall) writes:
>>
>>what            1980    1990    extrapolation   2000
>>processor
>>memory(dram)
>>bits/chip	16k	4M	x256		1G
>
>This is the only one of your figures I've been tracking over the years.  My
>personal rule-of-thumb says memory capacity quadruples about every three years.
>I'm not sure of the first few dates, but I predict the following trend:
>
>1978   16K
>1981   64K
>1984  256K
>1987    1M
>1990    4M
>1993   16M
>1996   64M

At this point there will be a breakpoint as standard ULSI production
techniques will have to be replaced with something better, e.g using
synchrotron radiation to move to smaller wavelenghths for making the patterns
in the resist coupled with better matching of masks to wafers.

Going beyond 64Mbytes features will need to be less than 100nm
then we real start to hit FUNDAMENTAL size limits such as the number of
electrons you can keep in a memory cell decreases and (of course) quantum
effects.

Around the millenium the paradigm of computing will have changed from this
pattern. I would expect to see memory more closely coupled to
the processing elements, with von neumann processors drifting out of fashion.

We may even have got somewhere with nanotechnology!

>1999  256M
>2002    1G
>2005    4G
>2007   16G
>2010   64G
>
>Bill McFadden    Tektronix, Inc.  P.O. Box 500  MS 58-639  Beaverton, OR  97077

=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=
Kevin 'fractal' Purcell ...................... kpurcell @ liverpool.ac.uk
             Surface Science Centre, Liverpool University
=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=
"It is time that knowledge became more accessible to those to whom it
properly belongs"  -- James Burke, _The Day the Universe Changed_

matheson@portia.Stanford.EDU (David Matheson) (02/27/90)

In article <1936@husc6.harvard.edu> weber@popvax.harvard.edu (Bob Weber) writes:

>The problem with probability space is that if you grant the premise
>that the future occurs because of some event sequence (rather than 
>because of some sent of trends (even thought the former reflect the
>more likely than any other future.  For example, if you have 40 events
>in a sequence leading to some outcome, and each event is highly probable,
>say .9 likely, then the probability of this particular future is
>.9 to the 40th power, or .017.  This tells us that the world is highly
>contingent.  One goal should be to give up the notion of one particular   
>likely outcome and think in terms of alternative event sequences and
>alternative outcomes.
> 
>Regards
>Bob

Although I wholly agree with Bob's event notions for thinking about the
technology of the future, I would have to take issue with the notion that
probability is not very helpful.  When making decisions (i.e. committing
$ now) in anticipation of the future state of technology, it is critically
important to know which scenarios (or sequences of events) are more 
plausible than others.  What I have typically done is to:
1. Construct event definitions to serve as the progress of technology
2. Select representative sequences to serve as possible futures.
3. Assess a probability distribution over future states, using the 
representatives as proxies.  Using models to help people represent their
information, current decision tree technology can reach around 2,000 such
scenarios.
4.  Although the probability of any particular scenario is small (as Bob
points out),  one does not need to know the future in order to make a 
decision today. Rather, the entire collection of future possibilities should
be taken into account.

I think my work has a somewhat different focus that typical technology
forecasting.  Some want to forecast technology for the sake of forecasting
technology (a slight charactature).  I always have a specific decision in
mind.  Thus my event definintions, modelling, and so are all constructed
so as to make the correct decisino as clear as possible.

David Matheson
Stanford University



-- 
______________________________________________________________
David Matheson                    matheson@portia.stanford.edu
376 College #5, Palo Alto, CA 94306-1545        (415) 328-3515

gary@racine.ACA.MCC.COM (Gary Knight) (03/01/90)

	For those interested in retrospective analysis of technology
forecasting efforts, pick up a copy of Steve Schnaars book,
MEGAMISTAKES.  You'll find it enlightening.  I spent an afternoon talking
with Schnaars after the book came out, and came away with a much
better understanding of why TFing has utterly failed when held to any
scientific standard.  Schnaars' advice was (1) watch your assumptions,
and (2) use common sense, and forget all the bells and whistles.
 
	Rather than trying to forecast (which has lots of things going
against it, including (1) high error rate, (2) assuming that tomorrow is
going to be just like yesterday, (3) people actually believe forecasts and
get complacent as a result, (4) lack of a global, qualitative approach,
it's probably preferable to work from scenarios -- i.e., determine the
future state you want to achieve, block out a path to reach it, identify
all the events that might occur and present obstacles or opportunities,
and then plan out contingencies for such events.  This way you control
the future, in a sense, rather than futilely trying to predict it.
 
	For what it's worth . . . .  And "Hi" Paul -- when are we going
to start talking about this stuff again?!?!

-- 
Gary Knight			Technology Foresight Analyst
MCC				gary@mcc.com
3500 W. Balcones Center Dr.	phone 512/338-3694
Austin TX 78759-6509		fax 512/338-3898

bzs@world.std.com (Barry Shein) (03/02/90)

Good idea, let's get books listed...

AUTHOR          Smith, Douglas K.
TITLE           Fumbling the future : how Xerox invented, then ignored, the
                 first personal computer / Douglas K. Smith and Robert C.
                 Alexander.
PUBLICATION     1st ed.  New York : W. Morrow, c1988.

I couldn't get an ISBN out of the catalog, possibly my fault, but the
book is current and should be at your local popular title bookstore.

I've read it, it's a fun story although I don't know what others
involved in Xerox during those years have said about the book's
accuracy. Definitely non-technical and geared towards business types.

        -Barry Shein

Software Tool & Die    | {xylogics,uunet}!world!bzs | bzs@world.std.com
Purveyors to the Trade | Voice: 617-739-0202        | Login: 617-739-WRLD

ken@cs.rochester.edu (Ken Yap) (03/02/90)

|AUTHOR          Smith, Douglas K.
|TITLE           Fumbling the future : how Xerox invented, then ignored, the
|                 first personal computer / Douglas K. Smith and Robert C.
|                 Alexander.
|PUBLICATION     1st ed.  New York : W. Morrow, c1988.
|
|I couldn't get an ISBN out of the catalog, possibly my fault, but the
|book is current and should be at your local popular title bookstore.
|
|I've read it, it's a fun story although I don't know what others
|involved in Xerox during those years have said about the book's
|accuracy. Definitely non-technical and geared towards business types.

A funny story. When I borrowed this book out of our library, I found a
postit note inside saying "This story is TRUE. Signed: a Xerox
person". (Xerox has several sites in Rochester). Take this story
however you will. :-)

dana@atexnet.UUCP (Dana Burns) (03/15/90)

In article <34918@cci632.UUCP> jct@ccird3.UUCP (John Thompson) writes:
>In article <84.25e65edf@ubvms.cc.buffalo.edu> v291nhtp@ubvms.cc.buffalo.edu writes:
>>;^) If the idea is good enough, and is "right," then people will spontaneously 
>>adopt it and discard the older, less efficient way. The key is bringing said 
>>idea to fruition.
>
>How do you define "right"? My obsevation of most new ideas is that most
>people will resist them, not on any "logical" ( a word I always find to
>be suspect ) grounds, but basically for the following two reasons :
>
>	1) It's not the way our ancestors/fathers/mentors did it.
>	2) I don't understand it, therefore it won't work "for me".
>
>Efficency has little to do with it. It seems to be that the older idea is
>"time proven" therefore comfortable. All real advances in this world (IMO)
>seem to have come about because one person or group has had a vision of
>a "better" way and forced the world to listen.
>

   I don't usually post, but here's a story you guys might enjoy:

   Someone I know went to work for this shoe-machine company. Now,
shoes manufacturing is a very complex business due to all the sizes
and shapes etc... It is also an industry steeped in tradition, and as
an example, my old coworker related this tidbit:

   Seems there is this mechanical device that traces a prototype
onto patterns from which tooling is made for the manufacturing
equipment. It was invented in the 1800's and is still in use.

   This shoe-machine company has created a computer-system for
automatically generating these patterns from a CAD system. All the
patterns can be generated based on these exact tables and the
system works great. Just got to sell it now.

   Well, it turns out that the old mechanical thing (wish I could
remember what they call it...) has some inaccuracies in it due to
mechanical joint limitations (or some such ...). To assess the
new computer-based system (which lack the inaccuracies), they
compare the patterns generated TO THE ONES GENERATED BY THE OLD
MECHANICAL THINGY! When they don't match very well, they say:
"this new fangled thing doesn't work for sh*t". When the sales
people try to explain that the problem lies in the mechanical
inaccuracies, they get: "son, this things been doing the job for
A HUNDRED YEARS!" and they get thrown out the door.

   So, back to the drawing board. Now the company is spending
mucho development studying the old thingy, so they can build the
same inaccuracies into their computer.


            ////                |Dana Burns <dana@bottle.atexnet.UUCP>
------HHHHHHHHHH                |ATEX Publishing Systems
            \\\\                |"opinions mine"


-- 

            ////		|Dana Burns <dana@bottle.atexnet.UUCP>
------HHHHHHHHHH		|ATEX Publishing Systems
            \\\\		|"opinions mine"