doug@dhw68k.cts.com (Doug Salot) (03/10/88)
In article Cliff Joslyn writes: >In article Sarge Gerbode writes: >>Whereas for most of us, words are primarily aural, perhaps, for many they >>cannot be, viz: the congenitally deaf. The word "verbal" would carry the >>meaning better, I think. > >Excellent point. Perhaps some deaf person can give us phenomenological >insight into their primary thought modality. > While I'm not deaf, it seems to me that thinking should be quite independent of the speech modality. In fact, I propose that virtually any type of communicated language serves as a thought-damper! There are currently discussions going on in sci.bio, sci.med, sci.psychology, comp.edu, and here in sci.lang that all skirt around the question of the nature of intelligence, so I'm cross- posting this in the hopes that we can converge on a solution. All follow-ups are directed to sci.psychology (since this doesn't seem to have much linguistic content, and it's a bit premature to discuss this at the physiological level. However, relevant tangents are free to diverge). There are several issues here. Why can humans speak, but animals cannot (from comp.ai, "Why can't my cat talk?"). What is intelligence? Is the ability to communicate a neccessary precondition of intelligence? Does it follow from intelligence? What is it that differentiates smart and stupid people (or animals?)? How can we best exploit the intelligence mechanisms in education? Without much conscious data (not to say that data might have consiousness, but that's a viable topic in itself!), I hypothesise that some people are smarter than others because they have a more efficient network structure, often with a genetic basis, but that within the limits of the number of neurons available and perceptual experience, everyone has the potential to think any thought ever thunk (sic)! I believe that language nets can be tickled by thought, and can be used to help develop/direct thoughts but mostly as a venue to invoke past experiences. Spoken language is much too combersome as a computational tool, and it is clearly beneficial to design languages that are more operationally-oriented. I think that conciousness is sequential and usefull primarily as a blackboard where a train of thought can be followed and directed, but "thoughts" are the colescence of other nets working in parallel. Wow, is this psychobabble or what?! I'm sure there's nothing new here, who can I read who has better articulated these thoughts? Here are some random anecdotes to consider: Spoken/written speech is linear (except for some of the formants at the phonetic level). Sign Language has many aspects of speech communicated in parallel. I've never met a stupid mathematician. Nothing's more computationally powerful than a stupid Turing machine. PET scans show more brain activity in lower IQ subjects than that in higher IQ subjects. Do deaf people sign in their sleep? Do blind people "visualize" abstract ideas? Do humans really think? Is thinking anything more than a combination of Pavlovian events? Do you know people who couldn't pass the Turing test of intelligence!? I'm getting out of here! - Doug -- Doug "" Salot = doug@dhw86k.cts.com = {trwrb,hplabs}!felix!dhw68k!feedme!doug BIRTHRIGHT PARTY | "To the moon, Alice" - Kent CAMPAIGN SLUGANS? | "Got anth in my panth for the man from Xanth"
jsnyder@june.cs.washington.edu (John Snyder) (03/11/88)
In article <5776@dhw68k.cts.com> doug@dhw68k.cts.com (Doug Salot) writes: > >There are currently discussions going on in sci.bio, sci.med, >sci.psychology, comp.edu, and here in sci.lang that all skirt >around the question of the nature of intelligence, so I'm cross- >posting this in the hopes that we can converge on a solution. HA HA HA HA HA Ha Ha Ha ha ha ha. (gasp) Oh, sorry, how rude of me. I guess it just struck me funny to think that net babble could `converge on a solution' that has eluded the best philosophers and scientists since the pre-Socratics. >Here are some random anecdotes to consider: [...] >I've never met a stupid mathematician. Nothing's more computationally >powerful than a stupid Turing machine. Watch it. You're presupposing what's in question by positing `stupid Turing machines'. If TM's are not intelligent, they can't be stupid. Anyway, I'll bet we can't say what stupidity is any better than we can say what intelligence is. Talent in mathematics (or any other academic endeavor) certainly doesn't make one immune from being a grade A screaming bloody fool most of the time. Take Edward Teller for example. Or Galois, who got himself killed in a duel; if that's not stupid, I don't know what is (as I've already admitted ;-) ). The point is that intelligence is much broader and harder to measure than IQ tests would have us believe. jsnyder@june.cs.washington.edu John R. Snyder {ihnp4,decvax,ucbvax}!uw-beaver!jsnyder Dept. of Computer Science, FR-35 University of Washington 206/543-7798 Seattle, WA 98195
sbrunnoc@eagle.ulowell.edu (Sean Brunnock) (03/11/88)
In article <5776@dhw68k.cts.com> doug@dhw68k.cts.com (Doug Salot) writes: >In article Cliff Joslyn writes: > >There are currently discussions going on in sci.bio, sci.med, >sci.psychology, comp.edu, and here in sci.lang that all skirt >around the question of the nature of intelligence, so I'm cross- >posting this in the hopes that we can converge on a solution. > >There are several issues here. Why can humans speak, but animals >cannot (from comp.ai, "Why can't my cat talk?"). What is intelligence? >Is the ability to communicate a neccessary precondition of intelligence? >Does it follow from intelligence? What is it that differentiates smart >and stupid people (or animals?)? How can we best exploit the intelligence >mechanisms in education? OK I'll bite. I define intelligence as the ability to make new Stimulus -> Response associations. Everything responds to stimulus. Put a rock in open air and its response is to fall to the ground. Flowers bloom when exposed to light. These S->R relationships can be explained by laws of physical sciences and these S->R relationships will never change. An animal can make new S->R relationships though. The flatworm (the simplest animal to possess a brain) normally shows no response upon exposure to light and will recoil upon electrical shock. If you repeatedly expose the flatworm to light and electrical shock together, then after many trials the flatworm will learn to recoil upon exposure to light. This is the most basic form of learning discovered by Pavlov. What seperates man from a flatworm? What has been developing in the brain that puts man at the top rung of the ladder? The frontal lobe. The frontal lobe is considered to be the seat of man's intelligence. If you remove the frontal lobe ( a lobotomy ) from a person, then that person becomes "stupid". He will only be capable of Pavlovian learning and no more intelligent than a flatworm. Man would possess more complex sensory and motor organs and therefore able to make finer distinctions in stimuli than a flatworm, but if you gave a flatworm the same organs and a brain large enough to make sense of the inputs, then the person and the flatworm would possess comparable intelligence. What does the frontal lobe do that gives man his greater intelligence? I believe that it possesses conciousness. A man with conciousness can (for lack of a better word) conciously make reactions without the need for outside stimuli. Conciousness can also create stimuli at will (the cognitive image). This makes learning in a person more efficient. By tweeking responses at the same time the brain gets sensory input (whether real or imagined), associations are strengthened much faster. I won't go into the details of the physiology of this. This is how I believe the human mind works. I would like to get some input on how conciousness works. If there are any women offended by my exclusive use of the term "man", I am sorry. It is due to my laziness. Much of what I have learned concerning the brain comes from Isaac Asimov's book "The Human Brain: Its Capacities and Functions" (Houghton Mifflin, 1963). Sean Brunnock University of Lowell sbrunnoc@eagle.cs.ulowell.edu
randolph%cognito@Sun.COM (Randolph Fritz) (03/11/88)
Doug Salot (doug@dhw68k.cts.com) writes: What is intelligence? Is the ability to communicate a neccessary precondition of intelligence? As far as I can tell, most people's working definition of "smart" is "someone who I can hold an interesting conversation with & who seems to know more about what I am interested in than I do." Other definitions include, "someone who writes interesting scientific papers", "someone who does something that I care about well". To be identifiable, a human capability must be expressed (read: communicated). Examples: people with speech impediments are often perceived as stupid. A reading problem coming from the inability to distinguish left from right (dyslexia) is often thought to indicate either stupidity or stubbornness. Problem with the idea of intelligence is, it's not the least clear that something called "intelligence" exists in any place other than the mind of an observer. Doug comments that he's never met a stupid mathemetician, yet there's plenty of people to whom the very idea of mathematics is stupid -- it's something they just don't care about, therefore must be stupid. Doug also writes: Why can humans speak, but animals cannot (from comp.ai, "Why can't my cat talk?"). Humans and other mammals can generally communicate emotions -- cat facial expressions are surprising similar to human, for instance. Generally, other mammals cannot communicate with each other unless they are raised together -- cats and dogs are the classic example. We have not yet succeeded in communicating abstract thought with other animals; we have not yet recognized the expression of abstract thought in other animals. It is generally assumed that animals are not capable of abstract thought because of this. -- Randolph Fritz randolph@sun.com sun!randolph
vu0112@bingvaxu.cc.binghamton.edu (Cliff Joslyn) (03/11/88)
Here I go writing another essay. . .I can't help myself. First, let me say that I agree substantially w/Sean. I would like here to add some clarification to his ideas. In article <5378@swan.ulowell.edu> sbrunnoc@eagle.UUCP (Sean Brunnock) writes: > OK I'll bite. I define intelligence as the ability to make new >Stimulus -> Response associations. In terms of definitions, this is better used strictly as "learning." We must distinguish, as you do below, between simple learning that the flatworm does and true intelligence. Obviously learning is one important aspect of intelligence, and learning is necessary but not sufficient for intelligence. > What does the frontal lobe do that gives man his greater intelligence? >I believe that it possesses conciousness. A man with conciousness can >(for lack of a better word) conciously make reactions without the need >for outside stimuli. Yes, this is the key point. Throughout biological evolution new capacities of organisms emerge, like legs, wings, brains, etc. It is quite clear to me that one of the/the latest new "organ" is the most important distinguishing feature of humans, and is also one of (the only?) uniquely human trait. That is this ability to control learning. This is meta-learning. The human can use its intelligence to generate (imagine) novel representations, and then test those representations in the context of its knowledge (network of existing representations). Those that somehow "fit" are retained. This is internal, non-stimulated learning, called "thought." >Conciousness can also create stimuli at will (the >cognitive image). This makes learning in a person more efficient. By >tweeking responses at the same time the brain gets sensory input (whether >real or imagined), associations are strengthened much faster. I won't go >into the details of the physiology of this. Yes, but emphatically not just "more efficient." It is a qualitatively different phenomena. Consider seeing a gorilla or a whale sitting in one place, thinking. It doesn't happen, they don't think. They *must* interact wwith their environments to learn, to "move" mentally. As we all know, humans can *generate their own mental movement*. This ability is a discontinuous change, a radical departure, a bifurcation, a meta-system transition, a "quantum leap" (discrete step) of biological evolution. Its significance should (obviously) not be underestimated. > This is how I believe the human mind works. I would like to get some >input on how conciousness works. You've already described it. I have a profound belief that there is an implicit, emerging consensus on this point, and thus a legitimate psychology is beginning. I'll take all comers! :-) O----------------------------------------------------------------------> | Cliff Joslyn, Professional Cybernetician | Systems Science Department, SUNY Binghamton, New York, but my opinions | vu0112@bingvaxu.cc.binghamton.edu V All the world is biscuit shaped. . .
todd@uhccux.UUCP (The Perplexed Wiz) (03/12/88)
In article <5776@dhw68k.cts.com> doug@dhw68k.cts.com (Doug Salot) writes: >While I'm not deaf, it seems to me that thinking should be quite independent >of the speech modality. In fact, I propose that virtually any type of >communicated language serves as a thought-damper! >There are currently discussions going on in sci.bio, sci.med, >sci.psychology, comp.edu, and here in sci.lang that all skirt >around the question of the nature of intelligence, so I'm cross- >There are several issues here. Why can humans speak, but animals >cannot (from comp.ai, "Why can't my cat talk?"). What is intelligence? >Is the ability to communicate a neccessary precondition of intelligence? >Does it follow from intelligence? What is it that differentiates smart >and stupid people (or animals?)? How can we best exploit the intelligence >mechanisms in education? It seems to me that these comments touch on at least three large areas of research: 1. Intelligence? Is intelligence a single dimension (I don't think so, personally) or is what we call intelligence simply a convenient level for what is really a multi-factor combination of sometimes independent processes (e.g., just because you are an expert musician doesn't mean you are also an expert in solving engineering problem, or foraging for food in the wilderness). 2. Comparative cognition (humans and other animals). 3. The question of the role of literacy (being able to read and write) in cognitive processes. I.e., do people who can read and write think differently from people who can't. My own interests lie primarly in area #1. Anyone up to date on areas #2 and #3? I'm afraid I haven't kept up my reading in those areas. ...todd -- Todd Ogasawara, U. of Hawaii Faculty Development Program UUCP: {ihnp4,uunet,ucbvax,dcdwest}!ucsd!nosc!uhccux!todd ARPA: uhccux!todd@nosc.MIL BITNET: todd@uhccux INTERNET: todd@uhccux.UHCC.HAWAII.EDU
randolph%cognito@Sun.COM (Randolph Fritz) (03/12/88)
Cliff Joslyn (vu0112@bingvaxu.cc.binghamton.edu) writes:
Consider seeing a gorilla or a whale sitting in one place, thinking. It
doesn't happen, they don't think. They *must* interact wwith their
environments to learn, to "move" mentally.
Cats sometimes move their eyes rapidly while sleeping. The motions are similar
to the rapid eye motions (REM) of a human dreamer; cats probably dream.
Apparently cats can operate on representations not physically present . . .
don't know about gorillas, though.
Conversely, many humans engaging in those activities called "thinking" move
through an imagined environment. Human activity and animal activity is, in
this way, quite similar. Is there a qualitative difference? I have been
frequently told that there is . . . but I'm not the least certain. Perhaps the
only difference lies in the quantity of imagined representations and the
ability to manipulate them or perhaps in the interest in working with imagined
representations.
--
Randolph Fritz
randolph@sun.com
sun!randolphlangg@ga.ecn.purdue.edu (George Lang) (03/12/88)
> What does the frontal lobe do that gives man his greater intelligence? >I believe that it possesses conciousness. A man with conciousness can >(for lack of a better word) conciously make reactions without the need >for outside stimuli. Conciousness can also create stimuli at will (the >cognitive image). > Instead the term "conciousness" I should like to suggest: A free - logically considered - will. This should be the first & formost attribute of deity in monotheistic faiths. Consequently, in exact accordance to monotheistic logic, since man was created "in god's image" has the same attribute, unlike animals which were not. > Sean Brunnock > University of Lowell > sbrunnoc@eagle.cs.ulowell.edu G. T. Lang, Purdue U.
max@omepd (Max G. Webb) (03/15/88)
In article <5378@swan.ulowell.edu> sbrunnoc@eagle.UUCP (Sean Brunnock) writes: > OK I'll bite. I define intelligence as the ability to make new >Stimulus -> Response associations... There are problems with defining 'intelligence' in those terms. As Chomsky demonstrated a long time ago, a strictly behaviorist definition of this kind is incapable of explaining the acquisition of competency in a natural language. After all, a natural language contains an _infinite set_ of stimuli. Adding S-R pairs, one at a time, will never produce the language capability humans (and even chimpanzees) can show. If you extend your definition to allow the addition of infinite sets of S-R links, without specifying how this (remarkable) feat occurs, then you haven't said much. All you will have said is that intelligence allows a progressive modification of reactions to stimuli. >The frontal lobe is considered to be the seat of man's intelligence. >If you remove the frontal lobe ( a lobotomy ) from a person, then that >person becomes "stupid". ... > He will only be capable of Pavlovian learning >and no more intelligent than a flatworm. If that were the observed effect of a lobotomy, I doubt whether the operation would have ever been done more than once. In actual fact, a lobotomy does not reduce a person to a vegetable state. The change is quite a bit more subtle than that. The psychopath may still hear her/his voices, but not be moved to a frenzy by them. > Sean Brunnock > University of Lowell > sbrunnoc@eagle.cs.ulowell.edu
sbrunnoc@hawk.ulowell.edu (Sean Brunnock) (03/16/88)
In article <912@bingvaxu.cc.binghamton.edu> vu0112@bingvaxu.cc.binghamton.edu (Cliff Joslyn) writes: >In article 5378@swan.ulowell.edu (Sean Brunnock) writes: >>Conciousness can also create stimuli at will (the >>cognitive image). This makes learning in a person more efficient. By >>tweeking responses at the same time the brain gets sensory input (whether >>real or imagined), associations are strengthened much faster. I won't go >>into the details of the physiology of this. >Yes, but emphatically not just "more efficient." It is a qualitatively >different phenomena. Consider seeing a gorilla or a whale sitting in >one place, thinking. It doesn't happen, they don't think. They *must* >interact wwith their environments to learn, to "move" mentally. As we >all know, humans can *generate their own mental movement*. This ability >is a discontinuous change, a radical departure, a bifurcation, a >meta-system transition, a "quantum leap" (discrete step) of biological >evolution. Its significance should (obviously) not be underestimated. Human beings are not the only possessors of conciousness though. In Kohler's experiments with apes *, the subjects underwent a lengthy period of inactivity before they solved the problems put before them. This is the type of insightful learning that Thorndike said all animals were incapable of. ---------------------------------------------------- * - Theories of Learning; B.R. Hergenhahn, 1982, Prentice-Hall; pg. 259 Sean Brunnock University of Lowell sbrunnoc@hawk.cs.ulowell
daveh@phred.UUCP (Dave Hampton) (03/16/88)
> >There are currently discussions going on in sci.bio, sci.med, >sci.psychology, comp.edu, and here in sci.lang that all skirt >around the question of the nature of intelligence... > Recent postings have suggested that emotion may be important to distinguishing us as sentient beings apart from other organisms that appear to lack feelings. However, when looking for definitions, I find: "Emotion is a poorly conceptualized psychological concept. Classification of emotions is inexact, involving subtilties better suited to art and literature than to science. The ageless, traditional cateegories of emotion are still widely used and have not been replaced by a more accurate classification." Miller, Living Systems What is an appropriate classification scheme for emotion? A simple intensity-of-a-quality scheme is attractive, and would serve for continua such as love-like-dislike-hate and delighted- happy-unhappy-miserable. What qualities are needed to span the range of emotions? Or are there other schemes which work better? And what about "drives" such as hunger or curiosity? These feelings certainly have the sensation of an emotion , but seem less abstract in their expression (Consider lust vs. love, for example). How should these be handled? Any pointers to literature or insightful suggestions are welcomed... David Hampton -- Reply to: uiucuxc!tikal!phred!daveh {Dave Hampton} Addr: Research Division, Physio-Control Corp. P.O. Box 97006 Redmond, WA 98073-9706
sbrunnoc@hawk.ulowell.edu (Sean Brunnock) (03/16/88)
In article <2920@omepd> max@omepd.UUCP (Max G. Webb) writes: >In article <5378@swan.ulowell.edu> sbrunnoc@eagle.UUCP (Sean Brunnock) writes: >> OK I'll bite. I define intelligence as the ability to make new >>Stimulus -> Response associations... >There are problems with defining 'intelligence' in those terms. As >Chomsky demonstrated a long time ago, a strictly behaviorist definition >of this kind is incapable of explaining the acquisition of competency >in a natural language... Stimulus->response associations cannot explain language, but my definition of intelligence can be applied to any animal which possesses a rudimentary form of intelligence. A broader definition is required for human intelligence. Chomsky believed that the human brain is structured to generate language, but this doesn't explain the ape's ability to learn sign language since they were never recorded to have used sign language of their own initiative. >>The frontal lobe is considered to be the seat of man's intelligence. >>If you remove the frontal lobe ( a lobotomy ) from a person, then that >>person becomes "stupid"... >If that were the observed effect of a lobotomy, I doubt whether >the operation would have ever been done more than once. In actual fact, >a lobotomy does not reduce a person to a vegetable state. The change >is quite a bit more subtle than that... If a person's entire frontal lobe is removed, then that person will be reduced to the state of a chordate. In actual practice, only part of the frontal lobe (the pre-frontal lobe) is removed. I believe that the sections to the fore of the lobe are where the most recent associations were made (and hopefully the malignant ones). Sean Brunnock University of Lowell sbrunnoc@hawk.cs.ulowell.edu
vu0112@bingvaxu.cc.binghamton.edu (Cliff Joslyn) (03/16/88)
In article <5490@swan.ulowell.edu> sbrunnoc@hawk.ulowell.edu (Sean Brunnock) writes: > Human beings are not the only possessors of conciousness though. In >Kohler's experiments with apes *, the subjects underwent a lengthy period >of inactivity before they solved the problems put before them. This is >the type of insightful learning that Thorndike said all animals were >incapable of. All animals? Even paramecium? Seriuosly, I don't doubt what you say at all, but I'm not sure if it gives my theory problems. Perhaps *higher* primates have sufficient neural advancement to be *taught* to think. I think I actually said as much. That doesn't mean they have the necessary neural structures to do so naturally, or that it isn't a qualitiatively different kind of behavior even for them. >Sean Brunnock >sbrunnoc@hawk.cs.ulowell O----------------------------------------------------------------------> | Cliff Joslyn, Professional Cybernetician | Systems Science Department, SUNY Binghamton, New York, but my opinions | vu0112@bingvaxu.cc.binghamton.edu V All the world is biscuit shaped. . .
jcz@sas.UUCP (John Carl Zeigler) (03/17/88)
Another way to define intelligence as the quality of being able to wonder if anything else is intelligent. Trivia Quiz: Who was the philosopher who posed that dualism was observed when you could wonder what it was like to be something. That is, What is it like to be a brick vs. what is it like to be a dog. Things that you could in fact imagine yourself to experience yourself being were "alive", "cognizant", or "intelligent". Other things weren't, thus dualism was demonstrated. BTW, my cat can't speak, but he does have moods, and he can communicate them pretty effectively. -- --jcz John Carl Zeigler SAS Institute Inc. Cary, NC 27511 (919) 467-8000 ...!mcnc!rti!sas!jcz
vu0112@bingvaxu.cc.binghamton.edu (Cliff Joslyn) (03/17/88)
[ Hey, all us 'language thought and culture' folks: wanta take a stroll over to sci.psychology and let these poor linguists get on with dropping their pronouns? This cross-post should get the ball rolling; PLEASE DELETE sci.lang HEREAFTER! ] In article <27095@linus.UUCP> bwk@mbunix (Kort) writes: >My experience is that internal self-communication not only exits, it >forms the essesnce of learning, comprehension, and mastery. Here here. (Hear hear?) This is 'imagination'. >Like, Feynman, I note that my brain has multiple "departments". There is a >"language department" and a "vision department" and a "sensory-motor >department" and so on. This is also the thesis of the cognitivists, Fodor, Minsky, et. al. >The left and right hemispheres of the brain can represent the same >information in different formats. Yes, but I wouldn't make too much out of the left-right brain per se. That theory's been over-worked. Differentiation of modalities certainly occurs, but probably at a much lower neural resolution than the hemisphere. In my mathematical left-hemispere, >I can manipulate the equations of a ballistic trajectory. But if I >want to catch a softball, I rely on my right hemisphere to direct me >to the landing spot of the ball. Consider the various ways to solve a simple diff. eq. w/a machine: an analytic theorem proving expert system; a numerical algorithm; an analog computer; a physical model of a conic section. These are all representations of the same problem in different modalities. Why shouldn't the brain do the same? O----------------------------------------------------------------------> | Cliff Joslyn, Professional Cybernetician | Systems Science Department, SUNY Binghamton, New York, but my opinions | vu0112@bingvaxu.cc.binghamton.edu V All the world is biscuit shaped. . .
jim@epistemi.ed.ac.uk (Jim Scobbie) (03/17/88)
In article <5776@dhw68k.cts.com> doug@dhw68k.cts.com (Doug Salot) writes: > spoken / written language >is linear (except for some of the formants at the phonetic level). ^ ^ | | | | woops - punctuation (I said "punctuation") marks embeddding in written language (underlining, for instance) and though its unfashionable spoken language appears to encode recursion and embedding too. (see ladd 1986 Phonology Yearbook 3, Cambridge Uni Press) -- Jim Scobbie: Centre for Cognitive Science and Department of Linguistics, Edinburgh University, 2 Buccleuch Place, Edinburgh, EH8 9LW, SCOTLAND UUCP: ...!ukc!cstvax!epistemi!jim JANET: jim@uk.ac.ed.epistemi
dk@sal.UUCP (Danny Kohn) (03/19/88)
I doubt your hypothesis that some people are smarter than other people. Also I cannot see what's desirable with a ability to "think every thought ever thunk". What we are after here, it seems, is to generate a phenomenon we can call breakthrough thinking. The thing about breakthroughs is that it contains thoughts or collections of thoughts never thought before. When we listen to these new thoughts we evaluate them and have our oppinions about them. But because the thought are so new our limited understanding of the new thoughts make these judgements very risky. Very often our ego, i.e. our thrownness to be right and to know better, hinders us to see clearly what somebody else sees. Thinking seems to me to be rather automatic. My brain processes, thinks. Some of the thinking am I awhare of. I listen to the thinking going on (and call it that I'm thinking). But if I actually am thinking, i.e. be in control tf the thoughts, I would easely be able to stop the thinking. And everybody who ever tried to stop thinking knows that it is very difficult to control the thinking process. You can control it by deep meditation or by drougs but as soon as you stop the meditation or the droug effect is whereing off the thinking starts all over again. Also most thinking is done in a conversation. I have an inner conversations with myself, a discussion. It is like somebody is speaking and somebody is listening and the inner speaker and the inner listener change ( as in an outward conversation). If you want to test this just sit on a chair, relax, and just listen to the conversation going on inside you. Notice that you are listening to this conversation. "I wonder what he is talking about. I don't beleive it. But maybe he is right. What wonderful whether we have today. I should really be doing something useful today. My thinking cannot be automatic. that's obscure. Well he must be a nut. Wonder if I should call Lisa today. I'm hungry. I should really do something useful now. Wonder what I should start with. Cleaning maybe. No, that can wait. No, i take a shower. Is it warm today? I better check. Wonder what cloth I should wear. On and on and on and on and on. It never stops. Breakthrough thinking has to do with being interested (my concept). If one is interested enough in something, something that is very meaningful and important to oneself, in some unexplainable way the thought are more focused around that subject. And when the thoughts, our awareness, focus around something, we start to observe things in a new way. We start to see things we have not seen before. People who are brekthrough thinkers seem to be able to dedicate themselfes to a subject so that it becomes absolutly essencial for them to work with it. Then we have the whole area of intuition but I must leave now. Sorry. /Love Danny
sarge@thirdi.UUCP (Sarge Gerbode) (03/20/88)
In article <2100@phred.UUCP> daveh@phred.UUCP (Dave Hampton) writes: > What is an appropriate classification scheme for emotion? A >simple intensity-of-a-quality scheme is attractive, and would >serve for continua such as love-like-dislike-hate and delighted- >happy-unhappy-miserable. What qualities are needed to span the >range of emotions? Or are there other schemes which work better? > And what about "drives" such as hunger or curiosity? These feelings >certainly have the sensation of an emotion , but seem less abstract >in their expression (Consider lust vs. love, for example). How should >these be handled? I think there is an important distinction between emotions and intentions, or "drives", on the one hand, and physical sensations on the other, though they relate to both. I don't particularly have scriptural authority to quote in support of my views. But I'd like to present an experiential (as opposed to physiological or neurological) account of emotion. First of all, emotion depends on intention. If one did not have any needs or desires (i.e., intentions), one would not feel emotions, I believe. Hence the Buddhistic idea that pain (including emotional pain) derives from attachment or desire (There's my scriptural authority :-). ). If one does not care about something (has no intentions with respect to that thing), one does not particularly feel emotions about that subject. An emotion is correlated with a consideration of how well one is doing at fulfilling a particular intention. And the different emotions contain different "built-in" strategies for coping with the various degrees of perceived failure or success in fulfilling the intentions that correspond to the emotions. Thus, emotion is specific to a particular activity, governed by a particular intention. One can feel enthusiastic about one's job and, at the same time, apathetic about one's marriage and angry at a rude shopkeeper. It is possible to arrange emotions along an increasing scale, arranged in increasing order of perceived probability of success in fulfilling a particular intention. Anyone can work out what this scale would consist of by consulting his own experience, but this is what I get: At of near the bottom of this scale would be the emotion called "apathy", which occurs when one believes there is little or no chance of success, and the strategy of which is to disengage from the corresponding activity. Above that level is grief, where one feels one is probably going to fail, and the strategy is to make enough noise and express enough pain to get someone else to do something about it, since one has given up oneself. At the level of fear, the strategy is to run away. At anger the strategy is to destroy obstacles to the fulfillment of the intention. At antagonism, the strategy is to push back with equal force against opposing forces. Above antagonism is a level of ambivalence, where one is uncertain of impending success or failure and therefore tends to vacillate and be relatively inactive. Then comes complacency, where the strategy is to more or less continue doing what one is doing. Above that, where one is quite confident of success, lie enthusiasm and exhilaration, where one feels one can be more relaxed and experimental in one's approach. At and below antagonism, the "built-in" strategies themselves usually are counter-productive and (all else being equal) lead to a greater degree of failure. So I call those "negative emotions". At and above complacency, the strategies tend to lead to success, all else being equal. I call those "positive emotions". So a person who is content or cheerful in a particular area tends to gravitate towards enthusiasm, whereas a person who is antagonistic or angry tends to gravitate towards apathy. If an emotion be thought of as like a musical note, these different levels are like different "pitches" or "wavelengths". However, the other component of a musical note is volume, and this in determined by the intensity of the *intention* that underlies the emotion. We have intense emotions concerning things that are very important to us and rather light emotions concerning things where our intentions are weaker. As a matter of personal survival, it is best to associate with people who are habitually on the positive end of the emotional spectrum. Those who are lower tend to drag higher individuals down to a lower level of emotion. Those who are higher up tend to pull one up. So in listening to or reading what another person has to say, I have found it extremely helpful to listen to the "music" (the emotional scale) of their communication and take that into account in evaluating what they say. People who are expressing negative emotion are rarely truthful. I go into these matters at more length in my book "Beyond Psychology -- An Introduction to Metapsychology" (self-published; email or write me for details). -- "Absolute knowledge means never having to change your mind." Sarge Gerbode Institute for Research in Metapsychology 950 Guinda St. Palo Alto, CA 94301 UUCP: pyramid!thirdi!sarge
vu0112@bingvaxu.cc.binghamton.edu (Cliff Joslyn) (03/20/88)
What Sarge says sounds reasonable and plausible, but: In article <353@thirdi.UUCP> sarge@thirdi.UUCP (Sarge Gerbode) writes: >Thus, emotion is specific to a particular activity, governed by a particular >intention. One can feel enthusiastic about one's job and, at the same time, >apathetic about one's marriage and angry at a rude shopkeeper. The well-known phenomena of panic attacks are (probably) biochemically induced states of non-directed emotion. It is a definite feature that they are specifically not fear of anything in particular. The victim, finding this an irrational and untenable situation, will frequently project that fear to something and attach to it, but this is a pathological reaction. We can conclude that while it is normal for emotions to be intentional, this is not necessary, and therefore emotions require an explanation independent of intention. O----------------------------------------------------------------------> | Cliff Joslyn, Professional Cybernetician | Systems Science Department, SUNY Binghamton, New York, but my opinions | vu0112@bingvaxu.cc.binghamton.edu V All the world is biscuit shaped. . .