vu0112@bingvaxu.cc.binghamton.edu (Cliff Joslyn) (03/17/88)
In article <2100@phred.UUCP> daveh@phred.UUCP (Dave Hampton) writes: > Recent postings have suggested that emotion may be important to >distinguishing us as sentient beings apart from other organisms that >appear to lack feelings. I strongly disagree that other organisms lack feelings, or even appear to. I think that anyone who's really an "animal person", who loves pets and animals and spends a lot of time with them, would also disagree. This observation underlies my thought on emotion. However, when looking for definitions, I find: > > "Emotion is a poorly conceptualized psychological concept. > Classification of emotions is inexact, involving subtilties better > suited to art and literature than to science. The ageless, > traditional cateegories of emotion are still widely used and have > not been replaced by a more accurate classification." > Miller, Living Systems ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ My hero! [ Miller is a prominent Systems Scientist. I'd love to hear that he is well known outside of our small numbers]. And I agree with him. I believe that it is fairly clear that emotion is in fact a very ancient form of mentality, perhaps evident in even primitive neural organisms. I have heard suggestions that every (almost every?) action is associated with a particular emotional feeling. Certainly such concepts as pleasure and pain can be applied to most animals, especially the higher ones. On this view, as we move towards the examination of simpler neural organisms, the concept of "emotion" merges with that of "tropism." O----------------------------------------------------------------------> | Cliff Joslyn, Professional Cybernetician | Systems Science Department, SUNY Binghamton, New York, but my opinions | vu0112@bingvaxu.cc.binghamton.edu V All the world is biscuit shaped. . .
daveh@phred.UUCP (Dave Hampton) (03/18/88)
>> ...emotion may distinguish us as sentient beings... ^^^^^ I agree that neither emotions nor sentience are restricted to human beings (especially after following the "Clif & Prem" debate across several newsgroups...). But, I'm still intrigued by the idea that, in living organisms in general, a display of emotion may serve as one marker of consciousness. > I have heard suggestions that every (almost every?) action is > associated with a particular emotional feeling. Certainly such > concepts as pleasure and pain can be applied to most animals, > especially the higher ones. I agree. According to the (poor) definitions that I have found, emotion results when a cognitive drive towards some definite object is either frustrated or satisfied. Since this definition requires both self- awareness of desire and perceptual awareness of an object, it seems to me that the presence of emotions can serve as a marker for conscious self-awareness. This emotion can range from the "passionate quest" of humans to the pleasure or worry (not pain: that's sensory) that one observes in pets (dogs and cats, but not turtles or fish...) > As we move towards simpler neural organisms, the concept of "emotion" > merges with that of "tropism." > | Cliff Joslyn, Professional Cybernetician I prefer "taxis" to "tropism" in this context, but, in either case, I think that there is a qualitiative difference between emotions and tropism. Tropic behavior is a blind response to environmental conditions: a reflex in which the character of the response is completely determined by the character of the stimulus. Emotional expression is not driven simply by environnmental conditions, but by how these circumstances relate to cognitive desires. Both perceptual- and self-awareness are needed to produce an emotional response: only the perceptual to obtain a tropic one. --- Dave Hampton -- Reply to: uiucuxc!tikal!phred!daveh {Dave Hampton} Addr: Research Division, Physio-Control Corp. P.O. Box 97006 Redmond, WA 98073-9706
vu0112@bingvaxu.cc.binghamton.edu (Cliff Joslyn) (03/18/88)
In article <2103@phred.UUCP> daveh@phred.UUCP (Dave Hampton) writes: >> I have heard suggestions that every (almost every?) action is >> associated with a particular emotional feeling. Certainly such >> concepts as pleasure and pain can be applied to most animals, >> especially the higher ones. > > I agree. According to the (poor) definitions that I have found, emotion >results when a cognitive drive towards some definite object is either >frustrated or satisfied. Since this definition requires both self- >awareness of desire and perceptual awareness of an object, it seems >to me that the presence of emotions can serve as a marker for conscious >self-awareness. I disagree, and assert that I can have unconscious or at least subconscious emotions (not denying that emotion is frequently (usually?) associated with self-awareness). For example, when I slip on the stairs, I get a surge of adrenalin, and my emotional state instantly changes to one of fear and exhiliration. Now, when this happens, I am typically self-aware, but not necessarily so. Let's say that I was thinking intently on some subject as I came down the stairs. Then it may take some fractions of a second after the adrenalin stimulation for my attention to turn from what I was considering to considering my peril. Or, I doubt that people in uncontrollable rages are always self-aware, but clearly emotional. Indeed, this is the insanity defense. > I prefer "taxis" to "tropism" in this context, but, in either case, >I think that there is a qualitiative difference between emotions >and tropism. Tropic behavior is a blind response to environmental >conditions: a reflex in which the character of the response is >completely determined by the character of the stimulus. >Emotional expression is not driven simply by environnmental >conditions, but by how these circumstances relate to cognitive desires. First, we always need to be very careful when using terms like "completely determined." Very few things in nature are completely determined. And that's exactly my point: I don't doubt that the simplest taxic reflex is normally determining, but suspect that very quickly as we move up the phylogenetic tree in neural complexity, that the organisms gains some small amount of freedom in their reflexive responses. Consider the octopus, a simple, but large, neural organism. I doubt that their courtship rituals are always identical, always determined. Strongly controlled, highly similar, yes, but the difference between complete determinism and strong control is exactly my argument on the quantitative difference between emotion and taxis. Or, do you really think the octopus is *self*-aware? To conculde, I deny that your latter point is necessary, although it may be common. Consider (:-}) the height of sexual passion, battle-lust, absolute depressive despair or grief. . .it seems these extreme emotional states overwhelm our consciousness to the extent that our self-awareness may indeed be temporarily absent. During these peak experiences, all we have "room" to be aware of is the emotion, and if we're lucky, the object of the emotion. > --- Dave Hampton >Reply to: uiucuxc!tikal!phred!daveh {Dave Hampton} O----------------------------------------------------------------------> | Cliff Joslyn, Professional Cybernetician | Systems Science Department, SUNY Binghamton, New York, but my opinions | vu0112@bingvaxu.cc.binghamton.edu V All the world is biscuit shaped. . .
sarge@thirdi.UUCP (Sarge Gerbode) (03/20/88)
In article <2103@phred.UUCP> daveh@phred.UUCP (Dave Hampton) writes: > I prefer "taxis" to "tropism" in this context, but, in either case, >I think that there is a qualitiative difference between emotions >and tropism. Tropic behavior is a blind response to environmental >conditions: a reflex in which the character of the response is >completely determined by the character of the stimulus. >Emotional expression is not driven simply by environnmental >conditions, but by how these circumstances relate to cognitive desires. >Both perceptual- and self-awareness are needed to produce an >emotional response: only the perceptual to obtain a tropic one. To me, the most major difference is that tropism is a behavior, whereas emotion and intentions are experienced. The one term is looking from the outside and the others are looking from the inside. -- "Absolute knowledge means never having to change your mind." Sarge Gerbode Institute for Research in Metapsychology 950 Guinda St. Palo Alto, CA 94301 UUCP: pyramid!thirdi!sarge
sarge@thirdi.UUCP (Sarge Gerbode) (03/20/88)
In article <962@bingvaxu.cc.binghamton.edu> vu0112@bingvaxu.cc.binghamton.edu (Cliff Joslyn) writes: >>According to the (poor) definitions that I have found, emotion >>results when a cognitive drive towards some definite object is either >>frustrated or satisfied. That's my view also, but I would be interested in some references to support it. >I disagree, and assert that I can have unconscious or at least >subconscious emotions (not denying that emotion is frequently (usually?) >associated with self-awareness). For example, when I slip on the >stairs, I get a surge of adrenalin, and my emotional state instantly >changes to one of fear and exhiliration. I guess to believe in "unconscious emotion", one would have to look upon emotion as a physiological state, of which one could be conscious or unconscious. But supposing that emotion is thought of as an *experience* of some kind (as, I think, it is commonly viewed). What would qualify as an "unconscious experience"? On the face of it, that would seem to be a contradiction in terms, since an experience is something of which one is conscious. If emotion isn't just a physiological state, and if it isn't part of one's experience, then I find it hard to understand what it might be. -- "Absolute knowledge means never having to change your mind." Sarge Gerbode Institute for Research in Metapsychology 950 Guinda St. Palo Alto, CA 94301 UUCP: pyramid!thirdi!sarge
vu0112@bingvaxu.cc.binghamton.edu (Cliff Joslyn) (03/20/88)
In article <355@thirdi.UUCP> sarge@thirdi.UUCP (Sarge Gerbode) writes: >In article <962@bingvaxu.cc.binghamton.edu> vu0112@bingvaxu.cc.binghamton.edu >(Cliff Joslyn) writes: >>I disagree, and assert that I can have unconscious or at least >>subconscious emotions (not denying that emotion is frequently (usually?) >>associated with self-awareness). For example, when I slip on the >>stairs, I get a surge of adrenalin, and my emotional state instantly >>changes to one of fear and exhiliration. > >I guess to believe in "unconscious emotion", one would have to look upon >emotion as a physiological state, of which one could be conscious or >unconscious. Perhaps I used a term laxly. The original poster had said that one needed to be *self* aware about one's emotions. I will agree that while I must always be *aware* of my emotions in order for them to exist at all, that I need not be self-aware, although that state is common. My example is evidence. Now, the argument depends on you stance on consciousness: can I be conscious (aware) of somthing without being self-conscious (self-aware)? This is also the KK thesis: if I know something, do I know I know it? O----------------------------------------------------------------------> | Cliff Joslyn, Professional Cybernetician | Systems Science Department, SUNY Binghamton, New York, but my opinions | vu0112@bingvaxu.cc.binghamton.edu V All the world is biscuit shaped. . .
sarge@thirdi.UUCP (Sarge Gerbode) (03/21/88)
In article <972@bingvaxu.cc.binghamton.edu> vu0112@bingvaxu.cc.binghamton.edu (Cliff Joslyn) writes: >[C]an I be conscious (aware) of somthing without being self-conscious >(self-aware)? This is also the KK thesis: if I know something, do I know I >know it? I think it is quite possible to be aware of something without being aware that one is aware of it. This is what Polanyi calls "subsidiary awareness", as opposed to "focal" awareness. Otherwise, we'd have all our "RAM" tied up in endless feedback loops all the time. I think the same applies to KK: probably of most things I know, I have never thought about whether I know them or not. A similar loop exists with intentions: one can intend without intending to intend, I believe. -- "Absolute knowledge means never having to change your mind." Sarge Gerbode Institute for Research in Metapsychology 950 Guinda St. Palo Alto, CA 94301 UUCP: pyramid!thirdi!sarge
tjhorton@ai.toronto.edu ("Timothy J. Horton") (03/22/88)
In article <355@thirdi.UUCP> sarge@thirdi.UUCP (Sarge Gerbode) writes: >... to believe in "unconscious emotion", one would have to look upon >emotion as a physiological state, of which one could be conscious or >unconscious. But supposing that emotion is thought of as an *experience* >of some kind... What would qualify as an "unconscious experience"? >On the face of it, that would seem to be a contradiction in terms, since >an experience is something of which one is conscious. >If emotion isn't just a physiological state, and if it isn't part of one's >experience, then I find it hard to understand what it might be. Process, and/or processing constraint, perhaps. These would probably be experienced INdirectly. Much like the way a computer might come to know that it's swapping processes in and out so much that it's not getting anything done (thrashing). There's no "thrashing" sensor in a 68000, but there are ways of calculating such things from the observable quantities. I think the "unconscious experience" idea referred to such indirectly observable "stuff". A second after an adrenalin surge, a zillion things happen in one's body, not all at the level of abstract analyzable thought. And the "flight-response" is a process, not a single physiological state -- more like a computer being in the middle of an interrupt routine than being in some "state". >"Absolute knowledge means never having to change your mind." Got some? Please e-mail. I'll summarize and post. :-)
sarge@thirdi.UUCP (Sarge Gerbode) (03/24/88)
In article <8803222016.AA27059@ai.toronto.edu> tjhorton@ai.toronto.edu ("Timothy J. Horton") writes: >>What would qualify as an "unconscious experience"? >Process, and/or processing constraint, perhaps. >These would probably be experienced INdirectly. >Much like the way a computer might come to know >that it's swapping processes in and out so much >that it's not getting anything done (thrashing). >There's no "thrashing" sensor in a 68000, but >there are ways of calculating such things from >the observable quantities. >I think the "unconscious experience" idea referred >to such indirectly observable "stuff". OK. So something unconscious would be something that is not yet known. And unconscious emotion, on this scheme, would be an internal physiological state that was not yet known but could be inferred. But in this case, it's not "unconscious *experience*", is it? It's the "experience" part that's difficult. A better formulation of "unconscious experience" (to answer my own question), might be like the "ground" in a figure-ground diagram. One is aware of the ground, in some sense, since it contributes to the perception of the figure, yet one's attention is not focused on it. These are instances of what I would call "simple unawareness". Another type of "unconscious experience" is "directed unawareness" or repression, where one is pointedly unaware of something (like an uncomfortable emotion). Yet here there's a paradox, because to know where *not* to direct one's attention, one must know *exactly* what not to look at. So one has to be aware of the thing in order to be directly unaware of it. Like not thinking of a pink elephant. >>"Absolute knowledge means never having to change your mind." >Got some? Please e-mail. I'll summarize and post. :-) It's simple: The only piece of absolute knowledge I have is that there is no absolute knowledge. Socrates would be proud of me! -- "Absolute knowledge means never having to change your mind." Sarge Gerbode Institute for Research in Metapsychology 950 Guinda St. Palo Alto, CA 94301 UUCP: pyramid!thirdi!sarge
tjhorton@ai.toronto.edu ("Timothy J. Horton") (03/25/88)
In article <366@thirdi.UUCP> sarge@thirdi.UUCP (Sarge Gerbode) writes: >>>What would qualify as an "unconscious experience"? > >>Process, and/or processing constraint, perhaps. >>These would probably be experienced INdirectly. >OK. So something unconscious would be something that is not yet known. No. Some thing or event or process or change that is not DIRECTLY detectable, nonetheless indirectly detectable, though not necessarily ever known or knowable. >Unconscious emotion, on this scheme, would be an internal physiological state >that was not yet known but could be inferred. Try this: on your first ski trip you observe that you haven't said anything to the gorgeous member of opposite sex sitting on the bus seat next to you, though you normally would. That's not an observation of some "physiological state". Later, on the ski hill you notice your trembling hands and flighty stomache. Is it fatigue, excitement, anxiety, or the jostling your brain took on your first big fall? Later on, in the warmth of the lodge, you feel euphormic and can't seem to focus your attention on anything but wild skiing exploits to come. I really do mean *process* and *process constraint*. I doubt you want to say that processes ("acts" if you will) like reasoning are "physiological states". I doubt you want to say that process constraints like consciously applying yourself to some mental task, or treating some task with urgency, or responding aggressively to someone's every statement, are "phsyiological states". I think that most emotion is indirectly perceived. I don't think we have direct "happiness" sensors, or "jealousy" sensors built right in. (Tell me, what is your current emotional state?) Even my introductory psychology textbook seemed to provide firm evidence for indirect self-attribution as far as emotions were concerned. (apparently, smiling will make you think you are happier, etc).