sarge@thirdi.UUCP (Sarge Gerbode) (03/21/88)
In article <968@bingvaxu.cc.binghamton.edu> vu0112@bingvaxu.cc.binghamton.edu (Cliff Joslyn) writes: >I can certainly accept that in your >example, I construct a representation (in whatever modality) of the >state of the world such that there is a purple car in the driveway, and >then present that representation to my consciousness. On this view, a >"possibilitiy" or a "concept" is a representation of that which is >possibile, or of that which is conceptualized. However, you assert that >concepts and possibilities exist *in and of themselves*, and *not >mediated by any form of representation*. I do not see how this >hypothesis can be tested. Indeed, it seems equivalent to an idealist or >theist position on mental entities. >.... >So, my questions are: >1) Why do you feel a non-representationl theory of concepts is necessary? >2) How would you test a "possibilitistic" theory of concepts? >3) If there is no answer to 2, how do you propose to proceed scientifically? I really appreciate your comments and questions, because they help illuminate all the areas in which I have not been entirely clear (either in my thoughts, or in how these thoughts are expressed). And I do appreciate and agree with your statement that an hypothesis should be testable. Let me back up a step and give you a little more of the theoretical background of my position. My interest is in building up an accurate account of the ways in which an individual person builds up his own world-view, and what the nature of an individual's world is. Pioneers in this effort are Michael Polanyi ("Personal Knowledge") and Nelson Goodman ("Ways of World Making"). I consider individual experience to be the ultimate empirical basis for all hypotheses, scientific and otherwise. So what are the constituents of a world, as experienced by an individual directly? In other words, what are the entities that make up an individual world? They are (in my view): 1. Phenomena. 2. Facts. 3. Ideas or concepts. Anything that exists for a person would fall into one of these categories. A phenomenon is anything that is directly perceived, either physically or by way of "mental representation". So there are mental and physical phenomena. A perceived physical chair would be a physical phenomenon, and a mental picture (such as a visual representation of a chess game in blindfold chess) would be a mental phenomenon. Both would count as phenomena, because both are perceived in one way or another. However, at any given moment, certain things exist for an individual, even though he is not viewing them at that time. These entities are *known*, rather than being *perceived*, and I refer to them as "facts". I do not *perceive* that there is a kitchen in my house (I'm not currently in my kitchen); I simply *know* that there is. I do not *perceive* that 2 + 2 = 4; I simply *know* it. So that's the second constituent of a person's world. Facts are often inferred from phenomena by interpretation. If a person looks pale, unsteady, and drawn, and feels hot I may infer that that person is sick, even though I cannot perceive the sickness (bacteria, etc.) directly. Finally, there are certain things that are neither known or perceived, but are simply *conceived*. I refer to these as "ideas". An idea is the *possibility* of a thing that might or might not exist, for a certain person, i.e., a possible fact. It might also be called a "proposition", a "theory", or an "hypothesis", in that it is something to which it makes sense to attribute existence or nonexistence. "A unicorn in the garden", though not a fact, is something about which one could wonder whether or not it exists. Experientially, it is by considering possibilities (ideas) that one arrives at facts. An idea is converted into an (experienced) fact by an act of assent. Anything that exists for a person at a particular time can be fit into one of these categories. >I don't think there's much utility in lumping [different kinds of mental >representation] all together under the heading "picture" (your >usage), since we will get confused between general mental >representations and specifically visual ones. Instead, what we need is >a term which describes all these modalities together. I think there is >such a term: "mental representation". I can go with that phraseology. I prefer the term "mental phenomenon", though, since perceived mental entities could appear that don't represent anything. >I was presenting three views: > 1) a word refers to an object or class of objects (classical semantics); > 2) a word refers to a mental representation of an object or class of objects > (cognitive, representational view); > 3) a word refers to an idealistic "concept" or "possibility" (Sarge's view). >I was asserting (2), not (1). Using my above schema (which may or may not be a form of idealism -- I think of it more as "phenomenology", because it does not postulate entities that are not directly knowable, conceivable, or perceivable by an individual), I would say that a word *represents* some entity, and serves to pull a person's attention to that entity, whether the entity be an idea, a fact, or a phenomenon. Thus if you wanted to share a certain experience with another person, you could use words to draw that person's attention to that experience. Or, if you wanted to remember a certain entity, or keep it in mind long enough to consider, you might use words for that purpose. You could also use gestures, pictures, etc. for reminding oneself or communicating with others. In itself, a word (or picture, etc.) is a phenomenon, mental or physical. I have used the word "token" to refer to a phenomenon that "means" something (i.e. that directs attention to something), but perhaps the word "representation" would work well for this purpose. >Mathematically, we can see that if X is "associated" >with (a different thing) Y, this means that there exists a "associative" >relation R such that (X,Y) is in R. Thus, X and Y are similar, in that >they are different (different symbols, X <> Y), but also the same (they >are both in the relation R). It's been awhile (about thirty years) since I studied the theory of sets and relations, but, in my understanding, a relation is a set of pairs of entities (or, I suppose, it might be a set of triads, etc. -- I'm not sure). The elements of a relation are not the individual members of each pair, but the pairs themselves. Thus the similarity amongst elements of a relation is amongst the pairs that make up the relation, not between the elements of each pair, one to the other. To illustrate this point, consider the relation called "dissimilarity". The pairs of such a relation are alike, in that they contain dissimilar elements. But, ex hypothesi, the elements of each pair are dissimilar from each other. Therefore, I don't think it would be correct to say that a word must be "similar" to what that word represents. To be effective as a word, it need only be *associated* with some entity, such that a person hearing the word is reminded of that entity. -- "Absolute knowledge means never having to change your mind." Sarge Gerbode Institute for Research in Metapsychology 950 Guinda St. Palo Alto, CA 94301 UUCP: pyramid!thirdi!sarge
vu0112@bingvaxu.cc.binghamton.edu (vu0112) (03/21/88)
In article <357@thirdi.UUCP> sarge@thirdi.UUCP (Sarge Gerbode) writes: >I really appreciate your comments and questions, because they help illuminate >all the areas in which I have not been entirely clear (either in my thoughts, >or in how these thoughts are expressed). Thank *you* for engaging me. >And I do appreciate and agree with your statement that an hypothesis should be >testable. Good. >Let me back up a step and give you a little more of the theoretical background >of my position. I certainly appreciate your thoughts, but having read forward I *still* don't think you're answering my questions: >>1) Why do you feel a non-representationl theory of concepts is necessary? >>2) How would you test a "possibilitistic" theory of concepts? >>3) If there is no answer to 2, how do you propose to proceed scientifically? But let's proceed. >In other words, what are the entities that make up an individual >world? They are (in my view): > >1. Phenomena. >2. Facts. >3. Ideas or concepts. > >Anything that exists for a person would fall into one of these categories. A >phenomenon is anything that is directly perceived, either physically or by way >of "mental representation". Perhaps a key to our agreement is my assertain that even common perception is a case of mental representation. That is, my perception of an object is a mental image of that object, which is a visual mental representation (a very good, faithful one) of that object. Of course, if I close my eyes and evoke an image of that object, that is also a mental representation of that object. >However, at any given moment, certain things exist for an individual, even >though he is not viewing them at that time. These entities are *known*, >rather than being *perceived*, and I refer to them as "facts". >I do not *perceive* that 2 + 2 = 4; >I simply *know* it. Isn't this really a case of remembering? That is, in childhood I was taught that 2+2=4, and I believed it then, and remember it know. The other day I wrote my first Prolog program, which added numbers. I set it up and, sure enough, 2+2=4! Here I was re-learning it in this other way. In fact, I taught it to myself. This is not clear to me, nor critical. By the way, I can still cast the above in a mental representational (MR, already!) theory (see my questions above). That is, I have an MR for two, an MR for four, and an internal mechanism which relates the two such that 2+2=4. >Finally, there are certain things that are neither known or perceived, but are >simply *conceived*. I refer to these as "ideas". >"A unicorn in the garden", though not a >fact, is something about which one could wonder whether or not it exists. I think we've had this argument before. My assertion is that in order to entertain a Sargeian idea, one must represent it in some form. To me, your ideas are simply MRs which are created by the subject, like closing my eyes and seeing the object, or an image of the unicorn in the garden. >>Instead, what we need is >>a term which describes all these modalities together. I think there is >>such a term: "mental representation". > >I can go with that phraseology. I prefer the term "mental phenomenon", >though, since perceived mental entities could appear that don't represent >anything. I might go for that. In other words, if I have an hallucinaction, a visual pathology, or see some other meaningless (to me) pattern, that is not a *representation*, but rather a mental *presentation* (MP). Thus while MRs are by far the most common form of mental phenomena, virtually swamping all other forms in normal people most of the time, other forms of mental phenomena are possible. That's good. All MRs are MPs, very few MPs are not MRs. >>I was presenting three views: >> 1) a word refers to an object or class of objects (classical semantics); >> 2) a word refers to a mental representation of an object or class of objects >> (cognitive, representational view); >> 3) a word refers to an idealistic "concept" or "possibility" (Sarge's view). >>I was asserting (2), not (1). > >I would >say that a word *represents* some entity, and serves to pull a person's >attention to that entity, whether the entity be an idea, a fact, or a >phenomenon. You still hanve't answered my point that these are all MRs. On that interperetation, we would agree completely. >>Mathematically, we can see that if X is "associated" >>with (a different thing) Y, this means that there exists a "associative" >>relation R such that (X,Y) is in R. Thus, X and Y are similar, in that >>they are different (different symbols, X <> Y), but also the same (they >>are both in the relation R). > >The >elements of a relation are not the individual members of each pair, but the >pairs themselves. Yes, I was too lax. What I meant was that X and Y are the same in that they share a property, the property of being included in either the domain or range of R. Similarity is essentially the concept of both a non-empty intersection and non-identity. In the case of a symbol and its meaning, both conditions are guaranteed in that the symbol *refers* to the meaning. Of course, there are many similarity relations which are not semantic. O----------------------------------------------------------------------> | Cliff Joslyn, Professional Cybernetician | Systems Science Department, SUNY Binghamton, New York, but my opinions | vu0112@bingvaxu.cc.binghamton.edu V All the world is biscuit shaped. . .
bwk@mitre-bedford.ARPA (Barry W. Kort) (03/22/88)
Some writers like to distinguish noumena from phenomena. Although my dictionaries differ in their definitions, the definitions that captured my imagination came from the World Book: Phenomenon: that which is captured through the senses. Noumenon: that which is captured through thought. --Barry Kort "I don't entertain ideas. Ideas entertain me."
sarge@thirdi.UUCP (Sarge Gerbode) (03/22/88)
In article <27472@linus.UUCP> bwk@mbunix (Kort) writes: > >Some writers like to distinguish noumena from phenomena. > >Although my dictionaries differ in their definitions, the definitions >that captured my imagination came from the World Book: > >Phenomenon: that which is captured through the senses. > >Noumenon: that which is captured through thought. > Thanks!! In the first draft of my book, this was exactly the phraseology I used. But then I decided (perhaps wrongly) that "noumenon" had other, conflicting meanings, and that the essence of the concept was captured by the more common word, "fact". -- "Absolute knowledge means never having to change your mind." Sarge Gerbode Institute for Research in Metapsychology 950 Guinda St. Palo Alto, CA 94301 UUCP: pyramid!thirdi!sarge
sarge@thirdi.UUCP (Sarge Gerbode) (03/24/88)
In article <978@bingvaxu.cc.binghamton.edu> vu0112@bingvaxu.cc.binghamton.edu (Cliff Joslyn) writes: >In article <357@thirdi.UUCP> sarge@thirdi.UUCP (Sarge Gerbode) writes: >Thank *you* for engaging me. I *try* to be an engaging person ;-) . No, honestly, it's one of the major pleasures of my life to have interesting discussions with intelligent people about significant matters. I only regret, sometimes, that it takes so long for the interchange to take place. >1) Why do you feel a non-representationl theory of concepts is necessary? >2) How would you test a "possibilitistic" theory of concepts? >3) If there is no answer to 2, how do you propose to proceed scientifically? 1. It isn't absolutely *necessary*. But I believe that it *is* useful, in that it helps to have a word to describe "a thing that might or might not exist." If "concept" is a poor choice, I am willing to use another. I think we often use the term in that way, in ordinary usage. We say something is "conceivable", when we think of it as "possible". When Anselm said, "I can conceive of a being than which nothing greater can be conceived," I doubt that he meant that he could conjure up certain mental representations. "Conceive" also means "to bring into existence", and before something can come into existence, it must exist as a possibility. Anyway -- not a crucial point. The important thing is not the *word* "concept" but the concept of a possible entity. 2. You test a possibilistic theory of concepts the same way you test anything else: by an appeal to experience. Most people conceive some things to be possibly true or not true. I merely assigned a name ("Concept") to that class of entities. And I think most would agree that what *represents* a possibility is not the possibility itself. So a word is not a concept. So one can ask people whether they conceive of things that might or might not exist, and if people say, "Yes," the point is made that possible entities are part of people's worlds. >Perhaps a key to our agreement is my assertion that even common >perception is a case of mental representation. That is, my perception >of an object is a mental image of that object, which is a visual mental >representation (a very good, faithful one) of that object. Of course, >if I close my eyes and evoke an image of that object, that is also a >mental representation of that object. Good point. Yet in the ordinary view of things, people don't experience themselves as viewing mental pictures when they are looking at physical objects. Undoubtedly, all kinds of filtering is occurring, neurologically. Yet, experientially, there are some phenomena that are viewed as physical and some as mental. The difference may be one of degree, rather than of kind. Those phenomena that are "closer" to the experiencing viewpoint (in a certain sense of "closer") tend to be viewed as mental, while those that are more "distant" are viewed as physical. >>However, at any given moment, certain things exist for an individual, even >>though he is not viewing them at that time. These entities are *known*, >>rather than being *perceived*, and I refer to them as "facts". >>I do not *perceive* that 2 + 2 = 4; >>I simply *know* it. >Isn't this really a case of remembering? That is, in childhood I was >taught that 2+2=4, and I believed it then, and remember it now. I think that past events may be factual or phenomenal. One can simply "know" factually what happened in the past, without viewing any phenomena, or one can recall actual mental images of past events. I think both occur. If, when you know 2+2=4, you are recalling an actual mental image of past experience, then it would fall in the category of phenomenon; if you just know it without reference to any particular image, it would be considered a known fact. A confusing aspect of memory, not resolved in my mind, is whether, in viewing mental images of past events, one is actually viewing the past per se or whether one is only viewing mental representations of it. The ontological status of the past is unclear. Perhaps you or others have some ideas on this point. >By the way, I can still cast the above in a mental representational (MR, >already!) theory (see my questions above). That is, I have an MR for >two, an MR for four, and an internal mechanism which relates the two >such that 2+2=4. I guess the issue would have to be resolved empirically: do you *experience* mathematical calculations as manipulations of mental phenomena. Do you see little numbers and symbols, much as you would do on a scratch pad? I think I do, sometimes. But some things I simply know without calculating. I see "2+2" and I *know* 4. >>Finally, there are certain things that are neither known or perceived, but are >>simply *conceived*. I refer to these as "ideas". >>"A unicorn in the garden", though not a >>fact, is something about which one could wonder whether or not it >exists. >I think we've had this argument before. My assertion is that in order >to entertain a Sargeian idea, one must represent it in some form. To >me, your ideas are simply MRs which are created by the subject, like >closing my eyes and seeing the object, or an image of the unicorn in the >garden. I use the term "metapsychological" rather than "Sargian". That is because I am the very *soul* of modesty ;-) . It may be that, in order to "entertain" a concept, it must be represented. But to me the concept is different from the representation (sort of like the territory is different from the map). After all, the same concept may be represented in a variety of ways, e.g., in a variety of languages, or by a variety of synonyms. So is the concept some kind of "core" form of representation to which all the other representations refer? It doesn't seem that way. One representation seems about as good as another to express a concept. In other words, a concept, experientially, is not bound to any particular representation. >>I prefer the term "mental phenomenon", >>though, since perceived mental entities could appear that don't represent >>anything. >I might go for that. In other words, if I have an hallucinaction, a >visual pathology, or see some other meaningless (to me) pattern, that is >not a *representation*, but rather a mental *presentation* (MP). Thus >while MRs are by far the most common form of mental phenomena, virtually >swamping all other forms in normal people most of the time, other forms >of mental phenomena are possible. That's good. All MRs are MPs, very >few MPs are not MRs. Well, if we use "MP", you could see it as "mental presentation" and I could see it as "mental phenomenon". Then both of us would be happy. >>I would >>say that a word *represents* some entity, and serves to pull a person's >>attention to that entity, whether the entity be an idea, a fact, or a >>phenomenon. >You still haven't answered my point that these are all MRs. On that >interpretation, we would agree completely. I would say, rather, that all may be represented, mentally (or physically), but, again, that which represents facts, phenomena, and ideas is not the entity represented. And are you truly going to take the phenomenalist position that everything that exists is a phenomenon (mental representation)? That the only things that exist are those that are directly perceived? I somehow doubt that you would want to take that position. But if you want to avoid that position, then you must admit the existence of things that are not perceived, at least, and admit that certain things, not perceived, may or may not exist, which is my position. I get the feeling I am not understanding your position well. >Yes, I was too lax. What I meant was that X and Y are the same in that >they share a property, the property of being included in either the >domain or range of R. Well, again I will try to exhume my old set-theory memories and get *real* picky. My impression was that only certain kinds of relations -- namely, functions -- have a domain and a range. Functions, as I recall, have a certain ordering to them; they have a first component and a second component. In this case, the quality of being a first (or second) component in this relation would be a point of similarity. Association, though, strikes me as being possibly a non-ordered form of relation and hence not a function, so there would be no range or domain. But, as I said, I'm being picky. I would say that, empirically, things are associated both by similarity and by proximity in time (what might be called *temporal* similarity, but I think would be best not thought of as "similarity", strictly speaking). And *some* associations are ordered -- including many semantic ones ("car" refers to a car, but a car does not refer to the word, "car", does it?). -- "Absolute knowledge means never having to change your mind." Sarge Gerbode Institute for Research in Metapsychology 950 Guinda St. Palo Alto, CA 94301 UUCP: pyramid!thirdi!sarge
vu0112@bingvaxu.cc.binghamton.edu (Cliff Joslyn) (03/26/88)
In article <367@thirdi.UUCP> sarge@thirdi.UUCP (Sarge Gerbode) writes: >No, honestly, it's one of the major >pleasures of my life to have interesting discussions with intelligent people >about significant matters. I only regret, sometimes, that it takes so long for >the interchange to take place. I share your sentiments, except that sometimes I find the lag helpful. It allows me to devote my full effort to a response, letting me rewrite, review, study. >>1) Why do you feel a non-representationl theory of concepts is necessary? >>2) How would you test a "possibilitistic" theory of concepts? >>3) If there is no answer to 2, how do you propose to proceed scientifically? > >1. It isn't absolutely *necessary*. Thank you! Moreover, I argue below that a representational theory of concepts *is* necessary to preserve any knowledge of concepts. Existence of concepts is crucial, because we shuold not theorize about things which we *know* do not exist. >But I believe that it *is* useful, in >that it helps to have a word to describe "a thing that might or might not >exist." OK, I think I'm willing to grant your definition of the concept as a possible state of affairs (PSOF) (NB: my dictionary defines a concept as 1) A general idea or understanding, 2) a thought or notion). However, I think I can show that this doesn't get you where you want to go. In fact, I think that the only possible positions are that either concepts are representations, or that concepts do not exist. It seems clear that (as you imply) the former view mistakes the reference for the referenced. This leaves us with the latter. The question is now what is the relation between a PSOF and mental presentations (MPs, as opposed to MRs?). In particular, are some PSOFs also MPs? I think not. One critical property of PSOFs is that they may not be actual. Yet to the extent that all phenomena are actual, so all MPs are actual. >We say something is >"conceivable", when we think of it as "possible". Ah, yes, but notice that there may be a critical difference between the concept and the process of conceiving. There is no doubt that we can consider and represent PSOFs (i.e. conceive), but what I am questioning is our ability to hold directly that which is considered, that which is represented, that is the PSOF itself (i.e. the concept). >When Anselm said, "I can >conceive of a being than which nothing greater can be conceived," I doubt that >he meant that he could conjure up certain mental representations. I disagree strongly. In fact, he was thinking of a linguistic representation of God. I've noticed that you put heavy emphasis on pictures, images, and perhaps you've overlooked linguistic presentation. In particular, his definition is God := that X such that for all Y, X is greater than Y, or X=Y. This is a mental representation. >Anyway -- not a crucial point. The >important thing is not the *word* "concept" but the concept of a possible >entity. OK, but what is important about concepts (i.e. PSOFs) is that they may not exist. Thus when you say that when I conceive of (which I do allow, as representation) the pink unicorn (PU), that that "conception" is a concept, then you are saying that not only does the pink unicorn not exist, but also the concept itself (as a PSOF) does not exist. This is OK with me, but maybe not with you. On the other hand, if you say that when I conceive of the PU, the concept is then the MR of the PU, then it is clear that the concept can exist and the PU not exist. >So one can ask >people whether they conceive of things that might or might not exist, and if >people say, "Yes," the point is made that possible entities are part of >people's worlds. Same point: either it is only representations of the possible entities which are a part of their world (i.e. exist in their world), or there are non-existent entities which are part of their world. How can a non-existent thing be a part of my world? Only as mediated through a representation of that thing. >Yet in the ordinary view of things, people don't experience >themselves as viewing mental pictures when they are looking at physical >objects. Then they are wrong! There are plenty of non-experienced true things in the world, and one of them is that perception is a process of representation. >It may be that, in order to "entertain" a concept, it must be represented. But >to me the concept is different from the representation (sort of like the >territory is different from the map). After all, the same concept may be >represented in a variety of ways, e.g., in a variety of languages, or by a >variety of synonyms. So is the concept some kind of "core" form of >representation to which all the other representations refer? It doesn't seem >that way. One representation seems about as good as another to express a >concept. In other words, a concept, experientially, is not bound to any >particular representation. Excellent point. Which is a "better" representation: 2+2, 2*2, 2**2, 4, IV, four? Well, it all depends on your purpose in representing the number, and no doubt the number is not the representation. At this moment I am inclined to say that numbers, like Sargeian concepts, do not exist. I'm not sure the point you were trying to win with this observation. It seems to support my view that the concept does not exist, as well as the view that the concept is not the representation of the concept. The latter is true in general: the symbol is never identical to the referrent, but always similar to it. >And are you truly going to take the phenomenalist position that everything that >exists is a phenomenon (mental representation)? That the only things that >exist are those that are directly perceived? I somehow doubt that you would >want to take that position. But if you want to avoid that position, then you >must admit the existence of things that are not perceived, at least, and admit >that certain things, not perceived, may or may not exist, which is my position. Hmm, it is certainly true that not everything that exists is represented. However, it need not be true that everything that is represented does indeed exist, that is, it is possible to represent PSOFs. So I do admit the existence of things that are not perceived. In fact, we seem to have the general result that presentation and existence are totally disjoint: that is, things presented to me can either exist or not, and things that exist can either be presented to me or not. So to review, you claim that concepts are PSOFs, and thus possibly non-existent; you also claim that a representational theory of concepts is not necessary, so that concepts are possibly non-presented. So defined, concepts are the cases of entities that are neither existent, nor presented. Yet you still claim that (so defined) they are parts of our worlds?! Surely *this* claim is untestable! It's like the disease without any symptoms, or any cure! I claim that concepts are PSOFs, but that a representational theory is necessary. Thus a concept, in order to be part of our world, must be mediated by a representation of that concept. What's *really* interesting about this is that on *this* definition, the claim that a concept is *not* its representation, but rather the PSOF which is represented, is itself untestable, because a PSOF, in order to be tested, must be represented. Thus all concepts have associated representations, and we will never see a naked PSOF. If concepts are indeed naked PSOFs, we can *never know it*. O----------------------------------------------------------------------> | Cliff Joslyn, Professional Cybernetician | Systems Science Department, SUNY Binghamton, New York, but my opinions | vu0112@bingvaxu.cc.binghamton.edu V All the world is biscuit shaped. . .
arti@vax1.acs.udel.EDU (Arti Nigam) (03/30/88)
In article <367@thirdi.UUCP> sarge@thirdi.UUCP (Sarge Gerbode) writes: > >A confusing aspect of memory, not resolved in my mind, is whether, in viewing >mental images of past events, one is actually viewing the past per se or >whether one is only viewing mental representations of it. The ontological >status of the past is unclear. Perhaps you or others have some ideas on this >point. > For now I will accept your phrase 'viewing mental images of past events.' While 'viewing such mental images,' you may be viewing a reconstructed past that never actually existed (repisodic memory); your 'recall', if you will, may be based on a schema for events of a certain type, rather than recall for the actual event. Also, what you recall may likely be influenced by a conglomerate of later and earlier events.
sarge@thirdi.UUCP (Sarge Gerbode) (03/30/88)
In article <997@bingvaxu.cc.binghamton.edu> vu0112@bingvaxu.cc.binghamton.edu (Cliff Joslyn) writes: >[A lag in communication] allows me to devote my full effort to a response, >letting me rewrite, review, study. Yeah, that's nice too, sometimes. >>But I believe that it *is* useful, in >>that it helps to have a word to describe "a thing that might or might not >>exist." Rather than put a lot more verbiage on the net, let me try to summarize your major argument for the view that concepts must be MP's. You state that concepts may not exist, as I define them, since I have defined them as possible entities. Then you wonder how we can hold PSOF's (possible states of affairs, as you term my idea of concepts), since they may not exist. To hold them, we would have to hold something that *did* exist. And that would have to be some kind of mental representation (MR). My response is that a *possibility* may exist, even if the thing which is possible does not necessarily exist. The possibility exists that there is a purple car (not a purple cow) in my driveway. Though the car may not exist, the *possibility* of the car exists. Secondly, you use the term "hold", and the question is exactly what you mean by this term. If you mean that something hels must be perceptible in order to be held, then I would have to grant you that only some kind of presentation or representation would have to exist in order for something to be held. If, however, you substituted "have, as an existing entity" for "hold", then a thing like a possibility can be had, as an existing entity. I'm not saying that we hold conepts in our minds, as you define "hold"; all I am saying is that concepts (or PSOF's) *exist* for us, as part of our non-phenomenal world, just as Afganistan exists for me, even though I have never seen it or "held" it. The confusion is understandable and is partly a function of my choosing the term "concept", which has many different meanings. In my view, concepts are not "held" in the mind as mental representations. Now one could *define* a concept as a form of mental token. Such tokens certainly exist, I believe. But then, in my schema, concepts would be subsumed as a particular kind of phenomenon, and we would have to give another name to existing possibilities. That would be OK, I guess. But I would still say that possibilities may exist for a person without being represented by any particular mental token or representation. >>[I]n the ordinary view of things, people don't experience >>themselves as viewing mental pictures when they are looking at physical >>objects. >Then they are wrong! There are plenty of non-experienced true things in >the world, and one of them is that perception is a process of >representation. I fully agree that a great deal of interpretation is involved in the act of perception and that perception is not a pure act of contacting reality. But if one said that all perception is a form of mental representation, isn't that equivalent to saying "it's all in your mind."? It seems to me that a useful distinction can be drawn between sensory perceptions (however interpreted) and non-sensory ones (such as when we create a mental picture). that's the only point I waqs making. >>It may be that, in order to "entertain" a concept, it must be represented. But >>to me the concept is different from the representation (sort of like the >>territory is different from the map). After all, the same concept may be >>represented in a variety of ways, e.g., in a variety of languages, or by a >>variety of synonyms. So is the concept some kind of "core" form of >>representation to which all the other representations refer? It doesn't seem >>that way. One representation seems about as good as another to express a >>concept. In other words, a concept, experientially, is not bound to any >>particular representation. >Excellent point. Which is a "better" representation: 2+2, 2*2, 2**2, 4, >IV, four? Well, it all depends on your purpose in representing the >number, and no doubt the number is not the representation. At this >moment I am inclined to say that numbers, like Sargeian concepts, do not >exist. I'm not sure the point you were trying to win with this >observation. It seems to support my view that the concept does not >exist, as well as the view that the concept is not the representation of >the concept. The latter is true in general: the symbol is never >identical to the referrent, but always similar to it. I wasn't really trying to win any points! A number is probably not a metapsychological "concept", because a number is not something of which it could be said "this exists" or "this does not exist". One person couldn't say, "4!" (assuming that there wasn't an implied "The answer is ..." preceding "4!", or something of the sort), and another person say, "Yes. That's right!". On second thought, "the quality of having the same number as 2 + 2" might be a legitimate concept, in that "4-ness" might exist as a quality of something, like "yellowness". There is certainly four of *something*. I'm not sure on this point. But the point is, that in order for something to be a concept, it would have to at least make *sense* to say, "It exists" or "It doesn't exist." >Hmm, it is certainly true that not everything that exists is >represented. However, it need not be true that everything that is >represented does indeed exist, that is, it is possible to represent >PSOFs. So I do admit the existence of things that are not perceived. >In fact, we seem to have the general result that presentation and >existence are totally disjoint: that is, things presented to me can >either exist or not, and things that exist can either be presented to me >or not. What?? Everything that exists is represented?? That doesn't seem correct, somehow. I assume you mean *experientially*, that you are working within an experiential framework in saying that. But even so, it seems to be quite possible that something could exist as part of a person's world without being represented. I might know that there are papayas at the local Lucky's without having any particular representation of that fact. I don't necessarily get the sentence "There are papaya's at Lucky's", nor even a picture of papayas or Luckys, when I know that. This fact *may* bne represented in a number of ways, but it may *not* be represented, at any particular time. You *may* be right that, in order for us to put our attention on some fact or idea, it must be represented in some way, or that it just so happens that there is always some representation present when our attention is on a fact. I don't happen to think that's the case. But even if it *were* the case, that wouldn't mean that the representation *is* the fact or concept. As I said before, a concept may be represented in a number of ways and therefore the representations cannot be the concept. The concept must be something else, and it seems useful to me to think of it as the possibility of an entity. -- "The map may not be the territory, but it's all we've got." Sarge Gerbode Institute for Research in Metapsychology 950 Guinda St. Palo Alto, CA 94301 UUCP: pyramid!thirdi!sarge
vu0112@bingvaxu.cc.binghamton.edu (Cliff Joslyn) (03/31/88)
[ I'm adding talk.philosophy.misc to the newgroups ] In article <375@thirdi.UUCP> sarge@thirdi.UUCP (Sarge Gerbode) writes: >You state that >concepts may not exist, as I define them, since I have defined them as possible >entities. Then you wonder how we can hold PSOF's (possible states of affairs, >as you term my idea of concepts), since they may not exist. To hold them, we >would have to hold something that *did* exist. And that would have to be some >kind of mental representation (MR). Fair enough, but you missed a critical point (see below). >My response is that a *possibility* may exist, even if the thing which is >possible does not necessarily exist. The possibility exists that there is a >purple car (not a purple cow) in my driveway. Though the car may not exist, >the *possibility* of the car exists. What? Then what is a possibility? How can I distinguish a possibility from something that is not a possibility? Doesn't the possibility of *anything* exist? You seem to have presented us with a vacuous category of things. And what about impossibilities? Do they exist? Are they anti-concepts? The crucial point regards the falsifiability of these possibilistic claims, something I went to great pains to express earlier, but didn't get a response to. I asked above "doesn't the possibility of *anything* exist?" And the answer is that the possibility of anyhing *that I can express*, that is anything I can construct an MR for, exists. And this is the key. Let's say that there exists a possibility for which I cannot construct an MR. On what possible grounds can I consider whether or not it exists? Thus even if your theory is true, it will be impossible to distinguish it from mine. >>Hmm, it is certainly true that not everything that exists is >>represented. However, it need not be true that everything that is >>represented does indeed exist, that is, it is possible to represent >>PSOFs. So I do admit the existence of things that are not perceived. >>In fact, we seem to have the general result that presentation and >>existence are totally disjoint: that is, things presented to me can >>either exist or not, and things that exist can either be presented to me >>or not. > >What?? Everything that exists is represented?? That doesn't seem correct, >somehow. No, it isn't: please read the quotation again more carefully! I'll ignore your response for now, and perhaps you'll want to respond again. BTW, the important sentences is the last one, not the first one. >I might know that there are papayas at the local Lucky's without >having any particular representation of that fact. I don't necessarily get the >sentence "There are papaya's at Lucky's", nor even a picture of papayas or >Luckys, when I know that. This fact *may* bne represented in a number of ways, >but it may *not* be represented, at any particular time. Hmm. Let's say I ask myself what the fourth root of 67 was, and then I do the calculations, and find the answer. After the calculation, I know the answer. Did I know the answer before I did the calculation? I think not. In other words, I think what you're saying is that if at time t-1 I wasn't representing Lucky's and papayas to msyelf, and then at time t I was, that I still knew it in both cases. This thesis is also unfalsifiable. Clearly, if I can know something without representing it to myself, then I can legitimately claim to know everything right now: it's just that I haven't represented it to myself yet! >You *may* be right that, in order for us to put our attention on some fact or >idea, it must be represented in some way, or that it just so happens that there >is always some representation present when our attention is on a fact. I don't >happen to think that's the case. But even if it *were* the case, that wouldn't >mean that the representation *is* the fact or concept. No, it doesn't mean that the MR *is* the concept, it means that the MR and the concept are *indistinguishable*, and the existence of the "naked" concept is unknowable. O----------------------------------------------------------------------> | Cliff Joslyn, Professional Cybernetician | Systems Science Department, SUNY Binghamton, New York | vu0112@bingvaxu.cc.binghamton.edu V All the world is biscuit shaped. . .