meadors@cogsci.ucsd.EDU (Tony Meadors) (01/10/89)
In article <558@soleil.UUCP> peru@soleil.UUCP (Dave Peru) writes: >Please consider the following thoughts of three people concerning the physics >of the mind. > COMPUTER SCIENTIST: >In the book "The Society of Mind" Marvin Minsky writes (p.50): >"When people have no answers to important questions, they often give some > anyway. > What controls the brain? The Mind. > What controls the mind? The Self. > What controls the Self? Itself. > .... > It cannot help for you to think that > inside yourself lies someone else who does your work. This notion of > "hommunculus"--a little person inside each self--leads only to a paradox An infinite regress. One of the challenges of psychological explanation is to explain our overall intelligent behavior and cognitive abilities with a model whose parts are not themselves possessors of those abilities...this is how homunculi can creep into real world models. What Minsky is doing in the quoted passages is simply noting how commonsense notions such as self and mind entail the idea of a "detatched controller" and this quickly leads down the homunculi trail. > MATHEMATICIAN/PHYSICIST/ASTRONOMY: >In the book "Bridges To Infinity" Michael Guillen (Ph.D in physics, mathema- >matics, and astronomy from Cornell University) writes (p.98): > ........ > From there he goes on, however, to create an infinity of in-between numbers, > such as the number whose left set contains zero, {0}, and whose right set > contains one through infinity {1, 2, 3, ...}. > This defines a number somewhere > numbers, is embellished by an interminable number of in-between volumes. > And it doesn't stop there. > > Pursuing the logic of his method, Conway is able to create between in-between > numbers, then numbers between *these*, and so on, literally ad infinitum. > The result is limitless hierarchies of in-between numbers, never before > named in mathematics. I'm no mathematician, but if I take the numbers 2 & 3 and stick a bunch of new items between them (no matter how cleverly) I certainly won't have created "numbers never before named in mathematics." Numbers seem rather fixed to me, those that might be found on a simple numberline; the labels I attach to various points shouldn't make any difference...Unless these new numbers are not expressable in decimal form at all. If this is the case I missed the point but my point is below anyway... > points. Conway's theory, however, asks us to imagine numbers that fall > somehow between unimaginable cracks in this blur of points, and between > the cracks left behind by those numbers, and so on and so on. With his > theory, Conway has made credible what many persons before him had merely > speculated about: there is conceptually no limit to how many times an object > can be divided. Cosmic cracks eh. Again, Im not a numbers man, but was there ever any doubt that a given two points on a line one may always be found which lies between them? > Conway's "All Numbers, Great and Small" shows off the boundless potential > of the null set, but also of the human mind. Human creative energy, like > nothing, isn't anything if it isn't potential. It is also an indomitable > part of being alive, as countless experiments have documented. People > who are deprived of their senses by being floated in silent, dark tanks > of water warmed to body temperature will hallucinate. It is as though > the human mind will not be stilled of its propensity to make something > of nothing even, or especially, when immersed in nothingness. > > Like a physicist's vacuum, the human mind can be induced to create thoughts > that come seemingly out of nowhere. Mathematicians over the years have > documented this common phenomenon. The German Carl Friedrich Gauss recalled > that he had tried unsuccessfully for years to prove a particular theorem > in arithmetic, and then, after days of not thinking about the problem, > the solution came to him "like a sudden flash of lightning." The French > mathematician Henri Poincare, too, reported working futilely on a problem > for months. Then one day while conversing with a friend about a totally > unrelated subject, Poincare recalled that "... the idea came to me without > anything in my former thoughts seeming to have paved the way for it." > > In this sense, the human mind is the real null set in Frege's and Conway's > number theories; the mathematical null set is but a subordinate entity > created after the mind's self-image." I must say it's really getting deep at this point. I realize that the "wondrous parallels between profound mathematical principles with the human mind" is the idea here. But I see no more that a paper thin relatedness between the specifics under discussion. This reminds me of other cases where "deep fundamental" mathematic principles are put forward as "the essence" of thinking or mind (recursion a common one). Let's go over this again: > Conway's "All Numbers, Great and Small" shows off the boundless potential > of the null set, but also of the human mind. Human creative energy, like > nothing, isn't anything if it isn't potential. So roughly the claim is "the mind is like, the null set." (a california surfer dude accent would go nicely here). I find this a very strange claim but let's consider the two examples... First, > People > who are deprived of their senses by being floated in silent, dark tanks > of water warmed to body temperature will hallucinate. It is as though > the human mind will not be stilled of its propensity to make something > of nothing even, or especially, when immersed in nothingness. Yes people do eventually have all sorts of wild experiences. How does this relate to the mind being like a null set or the mathematical discussion at all? Does the null set notion PREDICT that those in such cahmbers will hallucinate? THERE IS ONLY A VERY CRUDE SEMANTIC RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE NULL SET AND SENSORY DEPRIVATION. "Oh, like both have to do with complete nothingness man..." Second, > Like a physicist's vacuum, the human mind can be induced to create thoughts > that come seemingly out of nowhere. Mathematicians over the years have > documented this common phenomenon. The German Carl Friedrich Gauss recalled >..... Yes, yes, such cases are well known. But now the relationship between the null set and the "example" is almost hard to find at all. First, there is no reason to suppose any sort of emptiness involved. Research on this "incubation" period of problem solving indicates that active though unconscious processing is involved in producting "the answer." And the individual, through his long and arduous pursuit of a solution to fulfill some set of constraints, has set up a situation where when the "answer" is unconsciously conceived of, it is "recognized" and brought to consciousness. Anyway THERE IS NOTHING MORE THAN A CRUDE SEMANTIC RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE NULL SET AND THE INCUBATION PHENOMENON IN PROBLEM SOLVING. > In this sense, the human mind is the real null set in Frege's and Conway's > number theories; the mathematical null set is but a subordinate entity > created after the mind's self-image." 1 THE HUMAN MIND IS NO MORE "THE REAL NULL SET IN...NUMBER THEORIES" THAN IT IS A BASEBALL BAT OR A TORNADO. 2 The notion that the null set arose as a mathematical concept due to man's perception of some nothingness within his psyche is absurd. > PHYSICIST: >In the book "The Turning Point" Fritjof Capra (Ph.D in high-energy physics >from University of Vienna) writes (p.101): > >"While the new physics was developing in the twentieth century, the > mechanistic Cartesian world view and the principles of Newtonian physics > maintained their strong influence on Western scientific thinking, and even > today many scientists still hold to the mechanistic paradigm, although > physicists themselves have gone beyond it. > ... > In biology the Cartesian view of living organisms as machines, constructed > from separate parts, still provides the dominant conceptual framework. > Although Descartes' simple mechanistic biology could not be carried very > far and had to be modified considerably during the subsequent three hundred > years, the belief that all aspects of living organisms can be understood > by reducing them to their smallest constituents, and by studying the > mechanisms through which these interact, lies at the very basis of most > contemporary biological thinking. So is this a tirade against a mechanistic approach, or the reductionist enterprise? They are not the same of course. >.... > Transcending the Cartesian model will amount to a major revolution in medical > science, and since current medical research is closely linked to research > in biology--both conceptually and in its organization--such a revolution > is bound to have a strong impact on the further development of biology." Yeah this sounds like Capra. I don't know what it would mean to "transcend the cartesian model", and no explanation of what that would be like is offered in this passage. If what is meant is to "look for causes and processes outside the normal realm of measurable cause and effect then I would say that its hogwash. If its just a childlike hope that taking new perspectives, sometimes a "systems" or "cybernetic" perspective may yield new insight into complex systems, then point taken. >Paradoxically, these three people's thoughts may sound unrelated. It is up >to you to decide, any comments? Yes, not only unrelated, they are unremarkable. Dave, your postings remain without peer in being provocative and interesting. But trust me, the "deep stuff" concerning minds and brains, the meta-psychology, is largely fluff. Move up the scientific foodchain a bit. You know the old saying, fact is stranger than fiction. Its never been more true than in psychology. Get down to real data and yet keep these larger questions in mind. Read about the bizzare dissociations brain damaged patients exhibit, study up on perceptual illusions, investigate the cases of extraordinary memories (people can literally tell you what shirt they wore or the change they made on a given day in 1966, and its not a trick or learned ability). Well, you get the picture...these sorts of phenomenon baffle and challenge, and if there are secrets to be found and profound changes to take place in how we understand the mind it will likely be fueled by these inexplicable sorts of data. tonyM
peru@soleil.UUCP (Dave Peru) (01/11/89)
>>In the book "The Society of Mind" Marvin Minsky writes (p.50): >>"When people have no answers to important questions, they often give some >> anyway. >> What controls the brain? The Mind. >> What controls the mind? The Self. >> What controls the Self? Itself. >> .... >> It cannot help for you to think that >> inside yourself lies someone else who does your work. This notion of >> "hommunculus"--a little person inside each self--leads only to a paradox In article <686@cogsci.ucsd.EDU> (Tony Meadors) writes: >An infinite regress. >One of the challenges of psychological explanation is >to explain our overall intelligent behavior and cognitive >abilities with a model whose parts are not themselves possessors of >those abilities...this is how homunculi can creep into real world models. > What Minsky is doing in the quoted passages is simply noting how >commonsense notions such as self and mind entail the idea of a "detatched >controller" and this quickly leads down the homunculi trail. I would like to humbly express my opinion about the way Marvin Minsky describes "hommunculus" as "leads only to paradox". Using the word "only" is misleading, like there's something wrong with hommunculus or even having a paradox. Or as you have stated, "simply noting how". Personally, these kind of statements in any explanation are not very satisfying, in fact, I start to get uncomfortable. All I'm saying, considering the subject matter, is simply that things never to turn out so simple. Or at least, seem so simple to me. "The idea of a single, central Self doesn't explain anything. This is because a thing with no parts provides nothing that we can use as pieces of explanation!" MM. If to explain something, you must have parts, then at some point you got to reduce down to physics. I think our knowledge in physics is great, but limited. Physicists might have egos as big as atomic blasts, but unfortunately God is still alive. This bothers me and is why I have problems with reductionist thinking. Einstein said God does not play dice, or was it God that said Einstein does not play dice. Anyway, as far as I know, according to our current knowledge of physics, God does play dice and is probably living in Atlantic City. Who knows, maybe Donald Trump is the second coming of Christ. :-) Seriously, is there anyone out there who really thinks reductionism can explain everything there is to be explain? >>In the book "Bridges To Infinity" Michael Guillen (Ph.D in physics, mathema- >>matics, and astronomy from Cornell University) writes (p.98): >> ........ >> From there he goes on, however, to create an infinity of in-between numbers, >> such as the number whose left set contains zero, {0}, and whose right set >> contains one through infinity {1, 2, 3, ...}. >> This defines a number somewhere >> numbers, is embellished by an interminable number of in-between volumes. >> And it doesn't stop there. >> >> Pursuing the logic of his method, Conway is able to create between in-between >> numbers, then numbers between *these*, and so on, literally ad infinitum. >> The result is limitless hierarchies of in-between numbers, never before >> named in mathematics. >I'm no mathematician, but if I take >the numbers 2 & 3 and stick a bunch of >new items between them (no matter how cleverly) >I certainly won't have created "numbers never >before named in mathematics." Numbers seem rather fixed to me, those that >might be found on a simple numberline; the labels I attach to various >points shouldn't make any difference...Unless these new numbers are not >expressable in decimal form at all. If this is the case I missed the >point but my point is below anyway... Don't waive this off, spend some time with this. What Conway does is really awesome. If fact, it defines the word awesome. The idea of "nothingness" as opposed to "nothing as something", i.e. the set {0}, is really neat! And then boom, all the rational and irrational numbers spring to life. To say "Numbers seem rather fixed to me" seems fixed or closed minded to me. >> points. Conway's theory, however, asks us to imagine numbers that fall >> somehow between unimaginable cracks in this blur of points, and between >> the cracks left behind by those numbers, and so on and so on. With his >> theory, Conway has made credible what many persons before him had merely >> speculated about: there is conceptually no limit to how many times an object >> can be divided. > >Cosmic cracks eh. >Again, Im not a numbers man, but was there ever any doubt that a given two >points on a line one may always be found which lies between them? "Cosmic", interesting word choice. When you were younger, did you ever get the feeling while you were half asleep that you were falling off your bed? You suddenly wake up as you slam your hand down on the mattress. I have this feeling all the time, but nothing to slam against. :-) And mathematically speaking, the way Conway generates numbers is the closest thing I've seen to expressing this feeling. >> People >> who are deprived of their senses by being floated in silent, dark tanks >> of water warmed to body temperature will hallucinate. It is as though >> the human mind will not be stilled of its propensity to make something >> of nothing even, or especially, when immersed in nothingness. > >Yes people do eventually have all sorts of wild experiences. How does this >relate to the mind being like a null set or the mathematical discussion at >all? I knew I should have left the float-tank part out. People have all kinds of prejudices. Tony, have you ever floated? I haven't, but maybe Guillen has. Apparently, Guillen thought the experience related to the discussion to use the analogy. You think the analogy doesn't apply, okay. I still think it's a neat idea and I'll reserve judgement until after I've floated. > Does the null set notion PREDICT that those in such cahmbers will >hallucinate? THERE IS ONLY A VERY CRUDE SEMANTIC RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN >THE NULL SET AND SENSORY DEPRIVATION. "Oh, like both have to do with >complete nothingness man..." This California surfer stuff is indicative of your close mindedness and adds nothing to the conversation. Which is appropriate considering the subject matter. When you say "there is only a very crude semantic relationship between the null set and sensory deprivation" are you speaking from experience? >> In this sense, the human mind is the real null set in Frege's and Conway's >> number theories; the mathematical null set is but a subordinate entity >> created after the mind's self-image." > >1 THE HUMAN MIND IS NO MORE "THE REAL NULL SET IN...NUMBER THEORIES" > THAN IT IS A BASEBALL BAT OR A TORNADO. > >2 The notion that the null set arose as a mathematical concept due to > man's perception of some nothingness within his psyche is absurd. Considering the quality of your comments, your mind is a perfect example of the null set. All you've really said is this is bullshit with bullshit reasons. Maybe this is all we can ever say about this subject. If you see something that is blatently wrong then say so and state why. However, if these interpretations are simply contrary to your own interpretations or intuition, then don't come off so condescending with words like "absurd". Like you know better, maybe you do. Personally, my belief system is evolving. I remain open to new ideas. >> Transcending the Cartesian model will amount to a major revolution in medical >> science, and since current medical research is closely linked to research >> in biology--both conceptually and in its organization--such a revolution >> is bound to have a strong impact on the further development of biology." > >Yeah this sounds like Capra. I don't know what it would mean to "transcend >the cartesian model", and no explanation of what that would be like is >offered in this passage. If what is meant is to "look for causes and >processes outside the normal realm of measurable cause and effect >then I would say that its hogwash. I think what Capra means by "transcend the cartesian model" is that a human being as an organism is affected by the environment in such a way that some processes will not be explanable out of that context. Things may be so interconnected that reductionism may be inadequate. I think this is interesting when you consider the relationship of the mind in respect to understanding the physics of the environment or the physics of the mind. > If its just a childlike hope that >taking new perspectives, sometimes a "systems" or "cybernetic" >perspective may yield new insight into complex systems, then >point taken. Childlike? I don't understand. What distinguishes childlike from adultlike? >>Paradoxically, these three people's thoughts may sound unrelated. It is up >>to you to decide, any comments? > > Yes, not only unrelated, they are unremarkable. Then why did you make a remark. I was trying to show some ideas about and of the mind in respect to the reductionist approach. Some people liked it. > Dave, your postings remain without peer in being provocative and > interesting. But trust me, the > "deep stuff" concerning minds and brains, the meta-psychology, > is largely fluff. Trust you? Is it safe? :-) Some fluff hardens. I think alot of people have been a little hard on Guillen. This guy has some really neat things to say. Consider from his essay "Irrational Thinking" from his book "Bridges to Infinity" (p.38-39): "Despite this preeminence of rational numbers, science does need irrational numbers. For well over a century, scientists have been taking note of a growing inventory of special quantities whose appearance in nearly every scientific theory signifies their import in the modern description of space-time. These natural constants can be seen as nature's vital statistics, and right now it looks as though every one of them is an irrational number. For example, one of these constants, the speed of light, has been measured out to nine decimal places, and the digits have yet to show any pattern. (Expressed in millions of meters per second, our best measurement of the speed of light is the number .299792458.) Another constant is one that is descriptive of dynamic behavior at the atomic level. It is called the fine-structure constant, and there is no pattern to its digits even when measured out to ten decimal places. (Our best measurement of the fine- structure constant, which is a dimensionless quantity, is .0072973502.) In physics alone there are more than a dozen of these constants, which have been measured out to anywhere from a few to eleven decimal places, and not one of them has a pattern to its digits." When I read this I was astonished. Of course, some of these constants may not be irrational numbers. But what would be really awesome is to come up with some physics that would predict these irrational numbers. Anyway, some more fluff for the pile. > Move up the scientific foodchain a bit. You know > the old saying, fact is stranger than fiction. Its never been more true > than in psychology. Get down to real data and yet > keep these larger questions in mind. Read about the bizzare > dissociations brain damaged patients exhibit, study up on perceptual > illusions, investigate the cases of extraordinary memories (people can > literally tell you what shirt they wore or the change they made on > a given day in 1966, and its not a trick or learned ability). Well, > you get the picture...these sorts of phenomenon baffle > and challenge, and if there are secrets to be found and profound changes > to take place in how we understand the mind it will likely be fueled > by these inexplicable sorts of data. I try to get down to real data as much as I can. That's why I like USENET, after I read all the fluff, I can see what real people think. In reference to "move up the scientific foodchain", I'm currently reading Paul Kennedy's "Rise and Fall of Great Powers". I want to find out why it is so hard nowadays for a person my age to buy a house.
geb@cadre.dsl.PITTSBURGH.EDU (Gordon E. Banks) (01/11/89)
In article <564@soleil.UUCP> peru@soleil.UUCP (Dave Peru) writes: >God is still alive. This bothers me and is why I have problems with >reductionist thinking. Einstein said God does not play dice, or was it God >that said Einstein does not play dice. Einstein did say "God does not play dice with the universe", and one of his friends (I think it was Pauli) finally retorted: "When are you going to quit telling God what to do?" > >Seriously, is there anyone out there who really thinks reductionism can explain >everything there is to be explain? > I doubt if the human race will survive long enough to explain everything there is to explain whatever method is used. That isn't the point. The point is, when dealing with complex systems, reductionism is a necessary step if we are to understand them. Only a first step, since then we have to learn how to assemble the reduced parts back into a whole again. But it has worked splendidly in the past and there is no sign at all that it is exhausted as a method, despite the ravings of Capra and others. This all has nothing whatever to do with God. If reductionism allows us to make progress in understanding all parts of the universe we have heretofore investigated, why should the same method not work in the case of the human mind?
stevev@uoregon.uoregon.edu (Steve VanDevender) (01/12/89)
In article <564@soleil.UUCP> peru@soleil.UUCP (Dave Peru) writes: >I think alot of people have been a little hard on Guillen. This guy has >some really neat things to say. Consider from his essay "Irrational Thinking" >from his book "Bridges to Infinity" (p.38-39): > >"Despite this preeminence of rational numbers, science does need irrational > numbers. For well over a century, scientists have been taking note of a > growing inventory of special quantities whose appearance in nearly every > scientific theory signifies their import in the modern description of > space-time. These natural constants can be seen as nature's vital statistics, > and right now it looks as though every one of them is an irrational number. > For example, one of these constants, the speed of light, has been measured > out to nine decimal places, and the digits have yet to show any pattern. > (Expressed in millions of meters per second, our best measurement of the > speed of light is the number .299792458.) Another constant is one that is > descriptive of dynamic behavior at the atomic level. It is called the > fine-structure constant, and there is no pattern to its digits even when > measured out to ten decimal places. (Our best measurement of the fine- > structure constant, which is a dimensionless quantity, is .0072973502.) In > physics alone there are more than a dozen of these constants, which have > been measured out to anywhere from a few to eleven decimal places, and not > one of them has a pattern to its digits." > >When I read this I was astonished. Of course, some of these constants may >not be irrational numbers. But what would be really awesome is to come up >with some physics that would predict these irrational numbers. > >Anyway, some more fluff for the pile. > This is definitely fluff. It is ridiculous to try to read meaning into the digits of the number for the speed of light in meters per second. Meters and seconds are entirely arbitrary measurements of space and time and it's not surprising that physical constants are going to show no patterns when expressed in base ten and when measured in metric units. You should know that in many physics problems, measurements are normalized so that, say, c is 1. The values of the constants themselves are not important. The relationships between the values of physical constants are. It is slightly more interesting to consider dimensionless constants like the fine structure constant, which are independent of any measuring system. However, who is to say that there is no pattern to its digits when we only have ten decimal places and uncertainty to work with, and we're looking at it in base ten anyway? When the Planck length is on the order of 10^-23 meters, is ten or eleven decimal digits of a constant enough to make a pronouncement on? Guillen's title "Irrational Thinking" may apply to more than just his essay. To claim that numbers we can only measure to finite precision and which involve uncertainty are therefore irrational is, well, irrational. Rational numbers are perfectly adequate for representing the physical constants he talks about. From what I've seen of Guillen so far, I can see why people are hard on him. He may have fascinating mystic insights but his attempts to justify them in scientific or mathematical terms don't work. The best I can say about his attempt to make an analogy between creating a continuum of numbers out of the null set and the ability of the mind to produce unpredictable thoughts is that the analogy is strained. Does he show that the mind produces some insights out of nothing? No. Can he know that it does? I think not. It is just as tenable to say that a mind produces insights via processes that are not accessible to that mind's own consciousness, from information it already has. This also counters the justification that sensory deprivation somehow shows that the mind makes something out of nothing. People who climb into a tank have memories, and when they start to hallucinate their minds presumably aren't creating visions out of nothing--they're creating hallucinations out of what is already in their minds. Would a mind that is completely blank, with no prior experiences, and that is deprived of all input hallucinate? Is this experiment possible? Probably not. Guillen isn't talking about this experiment, anyway, but it's what he really should be talking about if he wants to claim that a mind can generate something from nothing like Conway's theory can generate numbers from the null set. I think the reductionism/holism argument boils down to what I think is a pair of clearer questions: Is the universe explainable by rules? Can those rules be derived by observing the universe? Science assumes that the answer to both of those questions is "yes." My understanding of holism leads me to think that it would answer "no" to one or both of those questions. -- Steve VanDevender stevev@drizzle.cs.uoregon.edu "Bipedalism--an unrecognized disease affecting over 99% of the population. Symptoms include lack of traffic sense, slow rate of travel, and the classic, easily recognized behavior known as walking."
bwk@mbunix.mitre.org (Barry W. Kort) (01/13/89)
In article <564@soleil.UUCP> peru@soleil.UUCP (Dave Peru) opines: > To say "Numbers seem rather fixed to me" > seems fixed or closed minded to me. In Howard Rheingold's book, _Tools of Thought_, there is a sketch of the neurophysiologist and pioneering cyberneticist, Warren McCulloch. As Rheingold repeats the story, McCulloch was an abnormally gifted and colorful person who had a firm background in mathematics. A teacher asked McCulloch what he wanted to do with his obviously brilliant future. "Warren," said he, "what is thee going to be?" And I said, "I don't know," "And what is thee going to do?" And again I said, "I have no idea, but there is one question I would like to answer: What is a number, that man may know it, and a man that he may know a number?" He smiled and said, "Friend, thee will be busy as long as thee lives." > What distinguishes childlike from adultlike? On weekends I work as a volunteer in the Children's Discovery Room at the Boston Museum of Science. Occasionally I ask a parent, "What is the difference between a child and a scientist?" Most of them quickly respond, "No difference?" I often feel sorry for adults who have lost their childlike curiousity somewhere along the way. Fortunately a few children grow up to be scientists. It is a shame that so many people become adulturated enroute to maturity. --Barry Kort Today's Quote: "Nothing is as simple as it seems at first, or as hopeless as it seems in the middle, or as finished as it seems in the end."
mark@verdix.com (Mark Lundquist) (01/14/89)
In article <686@cogsci.ucsd.EDU> meadors@cogsci.UUCP (Tony Meadors) writes: > "deep stuff" concerning minds and brains, the meta-psychology, > is largely fluff. Move up the scientific foodchain a bit. You know > the old saying, fact is stranger than fiction. Its never been more true > than in psychology. Get down to real data and yet > keep these larger questions in mind. Read about the bizzare > dissociations brain damaged patients exhibit, study up on perceptual > illusions, investigate the cases of extraordinary memories (people can > literally tell you what shirt they wore or the change they made on > a given day in 1966, and its not a trick or learned ability). Well, > you get the picture...these sorts of phenomenon baffle > and challenge, and if there are secrets to be found and profound changes > to take place in how we understand the mind it will likely be fueled > by these inexplicable sorts of data. Try any of the books written by Oliver Sacks ("A Leg To Stand On", "The Man Who Mistook His Wife For A Hat", etc). These books are accounts of some really strange disorders experienced by patients who had had trauma to the right hemisphere of the brain. These disorders profoundly change the patients' whole experience of being a human being. Their symptoms are not easily measured or quantified, and the disorders (according to Sacks) do not lend themselves well traditional case studies. Sacks decided that the appropriate form of 'case study' for these disorders is the story. He tells these stories with acumen, compassion, insight, and humor. He's also got another book (I can't remember the title) in which he discusses the relationships between Parkinson's and Tourette's syndromes.
mirk@warwick.UUCP (Mike Taylor) (01/16/89)
In article <1995@cadre.dsl.PITTSBURGH.EDU> geb@cadre.dsl.pittsburgh.edu (Gordon E. Banks) writes: >If reductionism allows us to make progress in understanding all parts >of the universe we have heretofore investigated, why should the same >method not work in the case of the human mind? Because the human mind is, by its very nature, something that can only be observed in its entirety from within, and this viewpoint of conciousness that we have is not succeptible to reductionist methods because we cannot view the phenomenon objectively. It is an intrinsically subjective thing. Thomas Nagel's article "What is it like to be a bat?" (which can be found in Hofstadter & Dennet's "The Mind's I") makes this point in rather more detail, but in a very dull and dry way, IMHBDO. His basic point is that we cannot understand what it is like to be a bat because it is a feeling subjective to the bat (if it is conscious at all). We can imagine what it would be like for ourselves to be a bat - but to have a true picture of the phenomenon of bat-consciousness, we must understand what it is like for the bat to be bat. Clear? No, I didn't think so :-( :-) I will try to restate the point in its bare form: to analyse something by reductive techniques, we must be able to view it objectively. But to view consciousness objectively is to omit the most important aspect of the phenomenon, namely the subjective experience of it, and thus any reductionist anaysis made on this basis will be incomplete and/or inaccurate. There - that wasn't so bad, was it? :-) ______________________________________________________________________________ Mike Taylor - {Christ,M{athemat,us}ic}ian ... Email to: mirk@uk.ac.warwick.cs *** Unkle Mirk sez: "Em9 A7 Em9 A7 Em9 A7 Em9 A7 Cmaj7 Bm7 Am7 G Gdim7 Am" *** ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
bwk@mbunix.mitre.org (Barry W. Kort) (01/17/89)
In article <3498@uoregon.uoregon.edu> stevev@drizzle.UUCP (Steve VanDevender) writes: > I think the reductionism/holism argument boils down to what I think is > a pair of clearer questions: Is the universe explainable by rules? > Can those rules be derived by observing the universe? Science assumes that > the answer to both of those questions is "yes." My understanding of > holism leads me to think that it would answer "no" to one or both of those > questions. Steve, did you really mean "derive" rather than "discover"? Einstein supposed that the universe would appear the same to all observers. From this supposition, he derived the Theory of Relativity. His starting point was neither a discovery nor a derivation. But he discovered that his derivation led to predictions which were borne out by experimental observation. But Einstein's nemesis was the Quantum Theory with it's dice-playing lack of rhyme or reason. So one of the "rules" appears to be lawless and chaotic behavior. Whether Stephen Hawking and others will ultimately imagine/discover/derive rules underlying quantom randomness remains to be seen. Personally, I believe that quantum indeterminacy will survive the razor of Occam, and that we will end up thanking our "lucky stars" for the gift of life, including intelligent life. --Barry Kort
litow@csd4.milw.wisc.edu (Bruce E Litow) (01/18/89)
Recently some postings have appeared in which the type of argument (so-called) indicated in the summary has been invoked to maintain that reductionist methods cannot succeed in mind studies. I cannot accept that we can use the construction: `the mind by its very nature ...' when we haven't a clue as to what that `very nature' might be. In arguments based on this construction one is always forced at some point into actually accepting that there is a mind in toto which escapes whatever approach is being argued against. That is the mind is an entity. (Following Rilke perhaps the ``Angels'' see it entire) Once this is admitted ,then mind study is on par with physics which also faces a unity (the universe) about which all our understanding has come from reductionist methods. An interesting extended attempt in support of the claim that mind studies cannot proceed via reduction is given in Fodor's ``Modularity of Mind''. However,Fodor only makes the case for cognition being beyond our present reductions and nothing more. I believe that there is tremendous confusion in mind studies between e.g. general,metaphysical speculation about mind and reductions such as neurophysiology,molecular physiology,linguistic inquiries,etc. The first is limited because it only rarely can provide testable hypotheses. It is unscientific. Its utility comes from inspiring people to examine things but it is useless for carrying out research about mind. We have nothing else but reduction when it comes to science.
bettingr@sunybcs.uucp (Keith E. Bettinger) (01/19/89)
In article <906@ubu.warwick.UUCP> mirk@uk.ac.warwick.cs (Mike Taylor) writes: > > [ ... ] > >I will try to restate the point in its bare form: to analyse something >by reductive techniques, we must be able to view it objectively. But >to view consciousness objectively is to omit the most important aspect >of the phenomenon, namely the subjective experience of it, and thus >any reductionist anaysis made on this basis will be incomplete and/or >inaccurate. > >There - that wasn't so bad, was it? :-) Maybe it IS so bad. Let me try taking this position to its logical conclusion. We study things objectively, but consciousness is "subjectivity" itself, so that any objective study of subjectivity will be just missing the essence of what is being studied. Thus, we should reject objectivity for the one case of studying subjectivity. But we have already rejected subjective studies of phenomena, because its person-dependent results are only useful to the person making the discovery. Eliminating both means of investigation, this argument would seem to obviate any reductive attempt to fully study consciousness. Does this, then, argue for holism? I'm sure this line of reasoning has a gaping hole in it, but it seems interesting on the surface. (Another in a series of Why-bother? arguments.) Pardon my laziness, but I leave it to the esteemed members of the net to plunge the dagger into the heart of this demon... ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Keith E. Bettinger "Paradise SUNY at Buffalo Computer Science Is exactly like Where you are right now CSNET: bettingr@Buffalo.CSNET Only much much BITNET: bettingr@sunybcs.BITNET Better" - Laurie Anderson INTERNET: bettingr@cs.buffalo.edu UUCP: ..{bbncca,decvax,dual,rocksvax,watmath,sbcs}!sunybcs!bettingr -------------------------------------------------------------------------
geb@cadre.dsl.PITTSBURGH.EDU (Gordon E. Banks) (01/19/89)
In article <906@ubu.warwick.UUCP> mirk@uk.ac.warwick.cs (Mike Taylor) writes: >In article <1995@cadre.dsl.PITTSBURGH.EDU> geb@cadre.dsl.pittsburgh.edu (Gordon E. Banks) writes: >>If reductionism allows us to make progress in understanding all parts >>of the universe we have heretofore investigated, why should the same >>method not work in the case of the human mind? > >Because the human mind is, by its very nature, something that can only >be observed in its entirety from within, and this viewpoint of conciousness >that we have is not succeptible to reductionist methods because we cannot >view the phenomenon objectively. It is an intrinsically subjective thing. > Certainly the mind can not be observed in its entirety from within. Introspection is a very poor tool for understanding the mind. If we were able to understand the hardware (wetware) in which the mind is implemented, and create simulations which show similar behavior to minds, then don't you think we would be able to better understand the natural mind? Especially since we could perform experiments with the simulations which we cannot do easily with the mind?