gall@yunexus.UUCP (Norman R. Gall) (05/08/89)
cam@edai (Chris Malcolm) writes: >>gall@yunexus.UUCP (Norman R. Gall) writes: >>I would like to ask: precisely what question could >>possibly be answered by the 'discovery' of the actual mechanism by >>which 'the mind' operates ... > >This question for starters: how can I build an artificial creature which >has a 'mind'? > Unfortunately, this is a loaded answer... What is an artificial 'creature'? If you mean a robot or cyborg or simply a computer, then I would challenge you on you choice of words here... none of these things is a 'creature' in any literal sense of the word. You place the word mind in quotes, as I did... I have a very real reason for doing so. You, on the other hand, seem to feel that there is a group of processes that constitute the mind and that these processes can then be modelled (presumable on a digital computer). Why would you qualify the term mind so? >>and just what makes us think that 'the >>mind' or psychological predicates 'refer' to mental processes? > > 1. The suggestive analogies in our everyday conversations about one > another's minds. > I would offer that these 'analogies' or 'pictures' are precisely what lead us astray. These pictures arise in the Mechanist Metaphor, and are exported ot everyday language uncritically. How many times have you used the words 'conditioned' and 'unconcious' this month in everyday speech. Superficially appealling to the analogies in everyday use is misleading and uncritical. > 2. There are (still) reputable philosophers and psychologists who > think so. > There were many reputable and extremely competant physicists who thought that the ether _must_ be there even after Maxwell's equations. Einstein was a 'reputable' physicist, and he refused to abandon 'Hidden Variable' notions of quantum mechanics, and Planck, another 'reputable' physicist _did_. This is simply not a good reason. > 3. The computational metaphor, which has proved fruitful in > philosophy, psychology, linguistics, neuroscience, and artificial > intelligence - what did I miss? > You gave a pretty comprehensive list of fields that buy into the Mechaist Metaphor whole scale. It remains to be seen that this Thesis is applicable to psychological verbs. This is assumed, not proven, nor even alluded to in most of these fields. >Of course, the most secure generalisation one can draw from the history >of the human pursuit of truth is that any particular idea you care to >select is most likely to turn out, sooner or later, to be mistaken. Even >remaining fruitful and unchallenged for the duration of the career of >the humble truth-seeker is asking a lot. The idea that psychological >predicates refer to mental processes has certainly been challenged, may >have as many interpretations as supporters, and possibly has no >supporter who doesn't entertain some doubts, but it is nevertheless >still bearing useful fruit. I have doubts about it, yet it's still the >best idea I've got. > The point isn't that the idea of mental verbs referring to mental processes is a bad theory, but that the idea of having a theory of psychological verbs is incoherent. The idea that our brains speak mentalese or that our beliefs are given by the causal role that they serve doesn't go to the questions that are asked of psychological verbs. If I ask the question "Why did that man ask for another jelly donut?", waht good is a competely physiological answer? Did it even answer the question? >But I'm not a dogmatist. I promise to give it up as soon as someone >comes up with a better idea. Anyone offering? Soon..... very soon. :-) Norman R. Gall -- York University Department of Philosophy Toronto, Ontario, Canada "It's only by thinking even more crazily than philosophers do that you can solve their problems." -- L. Wittgenstein _____________________________________________________________________________