[comp.protocols.ibm] Restricting IBM token-ring snooping

peter@ria.ccs.uwo.ca (Peter Marshall) (10/19/90)

I'm not very familiar with IBM's token ring having grown up on ethernet, so my
question may be a little naive.

On most ethernet cards there is a promiscuous mode that allows stations to
monitor all traffic.  This is very useful for example for a LAN watching
device, an ethernet bridge or a hacker bent on getting some passwords.

I have heard (second hand from IBM) that on token rings while promiscuous mode
is available on some boards that there is a way to restrict it to just certain
stations.  Is this a general facility provided by the token ring protocols? 
How is this identification enforced?  What do I have to buy?

We may be basing alot of our campus security on such a scheme, so I'm very
interested to discover any and all details.

Peter Marshall, Manager (Academic Networking) 
CCS, NSC, U. of Western Ontario, London, Canada N6A 5B7
(519)661-2111x6032 peter.marshall@uwo.ca pm@uwovax (BITNET); peter@ria.uucp 

hank@bitnic.BITNET (10/19/90)

I'm not very familiar with IBM's token ring having grown up on ethernet, so my
question may be a little naive.

On most ethernet cards there is a promiscuous mode that allows stations to
monitor all traffic.  This is very useful for example for a LAN watching
device, an ethernet bridge or a hacker bent on getting some passwords.

I have heard (second hand from IBM) that on token rings while promiscuous mode
is available on some boards that there is a way to restrict it to just certain
stations.  Is this a general facility provided by the token ring protocols?
How is this identification enforced?  What do I have to buy?

We may be basing alot of our campus security on such a scheme, so I'm very
interested to discover any and all details.

Peter Marshall, Manager (Academic Networking)
CCS, NSC, U. of Western Ontario, London, Canada N6A 5B7
(519)661-2111x6032 peter.marshall@uwo.ca pm@uwovax (BITNET); peter@ria.uucp

drake@drake.almaden.ibm.com (10/20/90)

In article <1990Oct19.143505@ria.ccs.uwo.ca> peter@ria.ccs.uwo.ca writes:
>I have heard (second hand from IBM) that on token rings while promiscuous mode
>is available on some boards that there is a way to restrict it to just certain
>stations.  Is this a general facility provided by the token ring protocols? 
>How is this identification enforced?  What do I have to buy?

Standard Token Ring cards (from IBM, at least) don't have a
"promiscuous mode" at all.  Can't be done.  For monitoring
applications, you have to purchase a special "trace and performance
adapter".  When such a card inserts itself into the ring, an alert is
sent to every other station on the ring.  If one of those stations is
running the IBM LAN Manager, it logs the fact that a monitor is on the
ring, and if the monitor isn't registered with the LAN Manager it will
force that station OFF the ring.

So with standard Token Ring adapters there is no promiscuous mode.
Adapters with promiscuous mode announce their presence and can be shut off
by another system on the ring.  Reasonably secure!


Sam Drake / IBM Almaden Research Center 
Internet:  drake@ibm.com            BITNET:  DRAKE at ALMADEN
Usenet:    ...!uunet!ibmarc!drake   Phone:   (408) 927-1861

drake@drake.almaden.ibm.COM (10/20/90)

In article <1990Oct19.143505@ria.ccs.uwo.ca> peter@ria.ccs.uwo.ca writes:
>I have heard (second hand from IBM) that on token rings while promiscuous mode
>is available on some boards that there is a way to restrict it to just certain
>stations.  Is this a general facility provided by the token ring protocols?
>How is this identification enforced?  What do I have to buy?

Standard Token Ring cards (from IBM, at least) don't have a
"promiscuous mode" at all.  Can't be done.  For monitoring
applications, you have to purchase a special "trace and performance
adapter".  When such a card inserts itself into the ring, an alert is
sent to every other station on the ring.  If one of those stations is
running the IBM LAN Manager, it logs the fact that a monitor is on the
ring, and if the monitor isn't registered with the LAN Manager it will
force that station OFF the ring.

So with standard Token Ring adapters there is no promiscuous mode.
Adapters with promiscuous mode announce their presence and can be shut off
by another system on the ring.  Reasonably secure!


Sam Drake / IBM Almaden Research Center
Internet:  drake@ibm.com            BITNET:  DRAKE at ALMADEN
Usenet:    ...!uunet!ibmarc!drake   Phone:   (408) 927-1861

TOM@PENNDRLS.BITNET ("Thomas D. Denier") (10/22/90)

I asked about promiscuous mode at an IBM communications seminar. As
far as IBM's token-ring interfaces are concerned, the speaker gave a
less detailed version of Sam Drake's response. However, there are
other companies making token-ring interfaces. As far as the speaker
was aware, the makers of such interfaces were not subject to any
formal requirement to build them without a promiscuous receive
capability, and he suspected that some of the interfaces on the
market had such a capability.

lstowell@pyrnova.pyramid.com (Lon Stowell) (10/24/90)

Line monitor devices are SUPPOSED to announce their presence on
the ring, but most don't.   Only the newer versions from
reputable manufacturers do so by actually sending the "Trace
Device Present" vector.

Most others do participate in Ring Poll and Neighbor
Notification, so the network manager, if smart enough, can spot
an unidentified station, but is not necessarily aware of any
snooping....

Some "smart" MSAU's like the Star Tek and Proteon can be set to
prohibit ANY new station from mechanically accessing the ring, which
eliminates all but the most persistent units which could tap the
data by bypassing the MSAU and the phantom drive technique
entirely....

With the new TI chipset and the available C-compiler support for
the Comm Processor, it would be child's play to create a
non-obvious snooper....if you can de-jitter the data (sorry,
couldn't resist....) sufficiently.   I cannot imagine why anyone
would do this...

Physical security of the LAN media is quite important....if you
REALLY want security, run strictly SNA protocols and use IBM's
DES Encrypted RU feature (if available yet for Token Ring..)
You can read the SNA headers, but no way will you get at the
user data......