dashman@rti.UUCP (Eric Dashman) (10/18/89)
The following article appeared in the Durham Morning Herald on Sunday,
October 15, 1989. It is reprinted without permission, but it's relevance
to all of our activities is patently clear and deserves wider dissemination.
U.S.' SOFTWARE COSTLY, DEADLY, REPORT WARNS
by Pete Carey and Rory J. O'Connor
Knight-Ridder Service
SAN JOSE, Calif. - Defective computer software has killed patients with
too much radiation, caused a civilian airliner to be shot from the sky,
produced gigantic defense cost overruns - and is still inadequately
regulated, according to a congressional report.
The report, scheduled for publication next month, warns that billions of
taxpayer dollars are being squandered because the government's antiquated
system for buying software doesn't work. The report calls for a drastic
revision in the way the government creates and buys software, as well as a
study of licensing computer programmers.
"These [computer] systems...are increasingly used for controlling equipment
or processes where failure has the potential to destroy human life," warns
the study, entitled "Bugs In The Program," produced by the House Committee
on Science, Space and Technology's subcommittee on oversight and
investigations.
An advance copy was obtained by the San Jose Mercury News.
The report says the government may have to "encourage" the certifying of
programmers because "a lack of concern regarding ethics is a weakness in
this profession," adding that if the computer programming community doesn't
police itself, it may lose its "prized autonomy."
The idea of government licensing of programmers is already the subject of
controversy among software professionals. Many say regulation wouldn't
solve any of the current problems with software, while others argue that
the ethics issue is overblown.
Computer software failure is behind several horrifying incidents and
snafus, the report says, including:
* The destruction of an Iranian airliner by the USS Vincennes in July
1988, with a loss of 290 lives. The ship's Aegis computer system was
operating correctly, but its software had not been designed to continually
update the altitude of an "enemy" aircraft on the ship's computer screens.
Confusion over the aircraft's altitude led to the decision to shoot it
down.
* The deaths in 1986 of four patients in Texas, Washington and Canada
caused by a Canadian-made radiation therapy machine, the Therac-25. The
machine's software allowed operators to inadvertently administer massive
doses of radiation to unsuspecting patients.
* Problems in the B-1B bomber's radar system caused by the use of the
same procurement schedule for the plane's hardware as for its software.
With programmers pushed to create a massive program too quickly and without
time for adequate testing, the plane ended up with a defensive radar system
that didn't work as well as it was supposed to.
* "Star wars" bumbling. Years after the start of the Strategic Defense
Initiative, the Defense Science Board concluded SDI had "a monumental
software problem" that was being ignored by hardware-obsessed military
officials.
The report also criticizes procurement of software in many federal
agencies.
The FDA issued 64 recall notices for computerized medical devices through
July 1987, the report said, mostly because of software defects undetected
until the products were distributed.
Yet the FDA has "no infallible method whereby a regulatory agency can
assure that the software embedded in a system will not cause death or
injury," even though it faces the introduction of hundreds of new
computer-driven medical devices, the report said.
The development of computer software to increase traffic on Amtrak's
heavily traveled Northeast Corridor rail line is being done by Chrysler
Corp., the car and defense manufacturer, even though it wasn't the
recommended choice, the report says. "Chrysler is not typically the first
company that comes to mind when discussing software questions," the report
said.
But Amtrak was directed by the Federal Railroad Administration to choose
the lowest bidder, the report said.
Even a new Defense Department directive to improve software procurement
would, if applied to all software purchased by the government, "drive costs
throught the roof [and] produce a mass of useless paper."
If the government does change its policies, the effort might still fail to
rectify problems in massive software projects like "star wars," said
Chapman.
"'Star wars,' is not a management problem or a problem of better
procurement procedures, but a fundamental limitation of what programmers can
do," he said. "When 'star wars' fails, the wrong question to ask will be
where the procurement procedure failed. We don't know enough to even test this
software."
The report recommends an interagency working group in the Office of Science
and Technology Policy to exchange information, revamping the space agency's
procurement practices and directing the National Institutes of Standards
and Technology to develop quality control methods.
The report also says the government isn't paying its best programmers
enough to keep them, while software boondoggles are costing too much.
"The strange policy where the government pays twice for a system - once to
buy it and again to make it work the way it was expected - cannot be
sustained in an era of multibillion-dollar shortfalls in the treasury," the
report says.