djo@pbhyc.UUCP (Dan'l Oakes) (05/27/87)
In article <19045@ucbvax.BERKELEY.EDU> kube@cogsci.berkeley.edu.UUCP (Paul Kube) writes: >In article <651@pbhyc.UUCP> djo@pbhyc.UUCP (Dan'l Oakes) writes: >>Actually, we can accept a much weaker condition -- the inadequacy of our >>[current] mathematical model to describe the physical reality. > >Fine, though it's nice to have a reason for doing so. Reasons: (1) It's incredibly arrogant to simply assume that our mathematical model *is* adequate in the present state of knowledge. (2) [and I expect to be flamed to the stars for this] If we accept indeterminacy, the validity of scientific method as a whole is called into question. Scientific method is based on the absolute repeatability of experiments under essentially identical conditions. The admission of indeterminacy is tantamount to admission that experiments, even under absolutely identical conditions -- in itself an impossibility -- are not repeatable, but only statistically similar. The only way to recreate determinacy in QM is through the admission of a "hidden variable," something which determines the "indeterminate" regardless of our state of knowledge. >As it turns out, relative frequencies of outcomes observed in certain >experiments violate the inequality. This prima facie shows that >either there are superluminal signals or there's a strange >indefiniteness to particle state (coincidentally of the type required >by a noninstrumentalist interpretation of QM). Or that QM is simply inadequate. You've thrown that possibility out the window unexamined. >To argue for rejecting both of these conclusions, someone should >either point out an error in the derivation of the inequality (pretty >unlikely), some failing of the experiments (they've been repeated), or >some particular infelicity in the application of the former to the >interpretation of the latter. I would like to see this. But it's not >enough just to say that it's always possible that our mathematics >fails to correspond to reality (especially in this case where the >mathematics was developed to describe, in a very general way, what >should be observable in case there is some definite reality for our >classical state variables to correspond to). To say that the mathematics is "inadequate" is not equal to saying that it "fails to correspond to reality." Newtonian physics corresponds to reality, within its limits. When applied to relativistic speeds, masses, etc., however, Newtonian physics becomes inadequate. I suggest that something similar is taking place here: that QM corresponds to reality, within its limits; but that, just as the level of interpretation and observation once showed Newtonian physics inadequate, so now QM is proving inadequate under certain conditions. Is that so improbable? Dan'l Danehy-Oakes PS: Note the name, it ain't Oakes no matter what this damnfool mailer program thinks.
myers@tybalt.caltech.edu (Bob Myers) (05/28/87)
In article <654@pbhyc.UUCP> djo@pbhyc.UUCP (Dan'l Oakes) writes: > > (2) [and I expect to >be flamed to the stars for this] If we accept indeterminacy, the validity of >scientific method as a whole is called into question. Scientific method is >based on the absolute repeatability of experiments under essentially identical >conditions. The admission of indeterminacy is tantamount to admission that >experiments, even under absolutely identical conditions -- in itself an >impossibility -- are not repeatable, but only statistically similar. The only >way to recreate determinacy in QM is through the admission of a "hidden >variable," something which determines the "indeterminate" regardless of our >state of knowledge. It's completely obvious that you've never done any real physics experiments. Experiments *never* *ever* give exactly repeatable results. (unless you're using really poor measurement equipment) There are always errors, otherwise known as uncertainty. Heisenberg merely showed there was a limit to the amount you could reduce that uncertainty. The scientific method is not dependent on determinacy; it *is* based on statistically similar results in repeated experiments. You yourself stated that absolutely identical conditions are impossible -- this itself would destroy the scientific method by your reasoning. The only thing that is destroyed is your deterministic world view. Too bad for you. But don't claim that the validity of the scientific method is in any way affected. Look at the _Feynman Lectures on Physics_, Volume III, section 2-6 for a discussion of this. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Bob Myers myers@tybalt.caltech.edu ...seismo!tybalt.caltech.edu!myers