flink@mimsy.UUCP (Paul V Torek) (06/01/87)
Jim Laycock writes: >With regard to more reliable empirical observations/predictions, I'd assign >much higher probabilities, and would likely reach a point whereat the >negation of my belief would never be entertained at all. But, being a >skeptic, upon being asked whether a particular proposition was true, I'd >be reluctant to agree even to the most blatantly obvious claims. Problem: this implies that you can take nothing for granted. You can't be certain, e.g., that you and all your loved ones won't be tortured to death as a direct result of the Oilers game? Should we expect you then to be doing your damnedest to stop the game from occurring? Well no, because then again, you can't be certain that the game's _not_ happening wouldn't cause that disaster. But then, on what basis do you decide what to do? You can't seriously say that you consider every logically possible outcome, and weigh its probability. (For one thing, not every possibility could be assigned a finite probability -- there are too many of them.) Those which you do not consider, it seems, you must regard as not being real possiblities. You might object that you don't completely disbelieve in those possibilities; rather, you just don't think of them, but once someone points one out, then you attribute it some (very small) probability. But this won't do. The possibilities which are ever suggested to you are an infinitesimal subset of all the possibilities. According those possibilities special treatment is arbitrary and futile. Why not just admit to being certain in ruling some things out, and not worry about it? -- Paul Torek flink@mimsy.umd.edu