obnoxio@BRAHMS.BERKELEY.EDU (Obnoxious Math Grad Student) (05/22/87)
I'm directing followups to sci.philosophy.tech. Subject: Re: Knowledge In article <669@gargoyle.UChicago.EDU>, carnes@gargoyle (Richard Carnes) writes, in response to Kenn Barry. >Your argument contains an implicit contradiction. You are arguing a >philosophical (epistemological) point: that the only adequate basis >for knowledge is the repeatable testing that characterizes the hard >sciences. But you can't prove this philosophical point by testing >and measurement; therefore, by your own reasoning, there is no >adequate basis for accepting it as true. By Kenn's own reasoning, there *is* an adequate basis. His thesis has received repeated tested over the centuries. (NB-Kenn did not say "re- peated".) In essense, is the solution to Hume's dilemma provided by Loeb's theorem!? [I mentioned the theorem in my review of Smullyan _Forever Undecided_.] > You can't say: "I know >that P is true, but of course that's just my opinion." You seem to >be advocating a positivistic philosophy which has long since been >abandoned by philosophers, for good non-positivist reasons. There was nothing even close to positivism in Kenn's assertions. Just plain old honest pragmatism. >There is certainly a great deal of agreement in the social sciences >and humanities. Kenn's "there is none" was incorrect. But the great deal that you are talking about couldn't stand up to the hard sciences for a minute. > Any time one scholar says to another, "I see your >point," or implicitly acknowledges the force of another's point by >addressing it, there is agreement. If what you are saying is true, >and everything in (say) philosophy, theology, or literary criticism >is just a matter of opinion, then discussions among scholars in these >fields would proceed in this wise: "My opinion of A is X." "My >opinion of A is Y (or not-X)." End of discussion. No, this is not what Kenn was saying. He was saying that theologians will never come to a uniform agreement about some of the central ques- tions of their field. Reading this as an assertion that all theolo- gians do is exchange opinions and then stop is a tad bit inaccurate on your part. (Perhaps they do--but that is another question.) > Obviously this is >not what happens. Scholars present *reasons* why we should accept >one view rather than another, and of course everyone speaks in this >way constantly in everyday life. Right. But these reasons build up into beautiful but airy castles. I certainly like the castles of the theologians and the philosophers. But they do not have the same deep roots that the physicists' and chemists' have. Thus, Kripke discovered how to make damned good sense out of Leibnez' "possible worlds". This was a remarkable achievement. In the final analysis, all he has done by this is make possible for you and I to argue more *accurately* about necessity and the like. This is not the same as arguing more *correctly*. (I am sloughing over the fact that some lovely mathematics grew out of this work. That is true, but irrelevant to my point.) > This shows that we are deeply >convinced that this kind of discourse is meaningful, and that there >*are* valid ways to adjudicate between opinions in domains outside >the hard sciences. This is an overdramatization. The reasons are given, yes, but they still only reduce one set of intangibles to another, more fundamental set of intangibles. >Also, I think it is naive to suppose that all the top scholars in the >humanities and social sciences do not know enough to come in out of >the rain, which is the implication of the view that they are quite >seriously engaged in meaningless and irresolvable debates. Not coming to firm uniform conclusions is definitely not the same as engaging in meaningless debates. Please stop it with these pointless strawmen of yours. >But the main point is that, by your own logic, the points you try to >make in your article are ultimately mere verbiage. This is untrue. Don't blame Kenn for not solving all the problems of the philosophy of science in one article--it can't be done. If, Richard, *your* thesis were true, we wouldn't be debating this very topic, now would we? -- Subject: Re: Believing the Academics In article <667@gargoyle.UChicago.EDU>, carnes@gargoyle (Richard Carnes) writes, responding to Charley Wingate: > For >instance, you might show us where sociologists imitate the >fundamentalists by starting with a conclusion which they lay down as >an axiom and refuse to reconsider no matter what evidence comes >along. I will ignore your exaggerated misrepresentation of Charley's position. For someone who believes that the social sciences can come to such strong agreement, why do you argue on these issues with yourself so much instead of the other people on the net? You gave your reading list. Here's one from mine: Serge Lang _The File_. This remarkable book shows how completely bankrupt two respected research- ers, Ladd and Lipset, were in the scientific brains department. Although, I must confess, that in the end that it does support your thesis, since due to Lang's efforts, L&L were rather widely discredited. But within the field, the ability and/or inclination to take these two to task did not exist. It's a shame that Lang will probably not be able to publish his file con- cerning the Huntington affair. That would make *very* interesting read- ing. (Serge Lang, of course, is a mathematician.) I'd like to quote a newspaper article that I have taped to my office door. I have no idea how representative it is, or even if the paper's story had been accurate, but I quote it anyway: HANDICAPPERS PROVE IQ TEST FAULTS After studying and testing race handicappers two social scientists claim that there exist no correlations between complexity of thinking and IQ tests. Stephen Ceci of Cornell University and Jeffrey Liker of the University of Michigan studied 30 harness track hand- icappers at work and then compared their professional skills with their IQ levels. "We doubt that any professionals--including scientists, lawyers, bankers, and businessmen--engage in a more intel- lectually demanding form of decision," said Ceci. The researchers could find no link between expertise and formal test scores, which averaged around 100. > The flowering of the social and behavioral >sciences, i.e., mankind's increasing understanding of itself, is one >of the great intellectual achievements of this century for which it >will be long noted. A year ago you and I tangled over Freud. I posted numerous excerpts from Freud's famous article about Little Hans--I thought it was pretty clear that they were utter stinking garbage, consisting of Rorschach test readings of the situation and leading the little kid head on into the "correct" answers. I posted examples of professional psychiatrists diagnosing serious organic diseases with nothing but Freudian drivel and a charlatans' confidence, with no one within the field noticing anything wrong. Sorry to disillusion you, Richard, but compared to the *real* intellec- tual achievements of this century (within science)--from relativity to the genetic code to pulsars, from semiconductors to superconductors, from the Marianas trench to the moon and the planets, from Goedel in- completeness to fake R^4s and monstrous moonshine--the "flowering of the social and behavioral sciences" is going to remain one long gigan- tic eyesore and an embarrassing piffle of a joke. Mankind understands itself? Ha ha ha. ucbvax!brahms!weemba Matthew P Wiener/Brahms Gang/Berkeley CA 94720 "We can pay farmers not to grow crops, but we cannot pay artists to stop making art. Yet something must be done." --Jacques Barzun
flink@mimsy.UUCP (Paul V Torek) (05/23/87)
obnoxio@brahms.berkeley.edu (Matthew P Wiener) writes (in reply to Carnes): C>You are arguing a philosophical (epistemological) point: that the only C>adequate basis for knowledge is the repeatable testing that characterizes C>the hard sciences. But you can't prove this philosophical point by C>testing and measurement; therefore, by your own reasoning, there is no C>adequate basis for accepting it as true. [--Richard Carnes] >By Kenn's own reasoning, there *is* an adequate basis. His thesis has >received repeated tested over the centuries. (NB-Kenn did not say "re- >peated".) Tested how? A bunch of techie types get together and decide that other bases for knowledge have repeatedly produced "inadequate" results? To put it less confrontationally, what standard of "adequacy" is being used here? Not mere agreement, I hope. But even if he uses a better standard of adequacy, Kenn faces a regress problem here. How does he know that his test for adequacy of knowledge- bases is a reliable one? By yet another test? Regress beckons... >In essense, is the solution to Hume's dilemma provided by Loeb's theorem!? >[I mentioned the theorem in my review of Smullyan _Forever Undecided_.] I saw your review, but "Hume's dilemma"? Which? You owe us phil.tech readers some filling in of context here -- I don't read religion.misc. -- Paul Torek flink@mimsy.umd.edu
gallagher@husc4.HARVARD.EDU (paul gallagher) (05/24/87)
In article <8705220612.AA16224@brahms.Berkeley.EDU> obnoxio@brahms.berkeley.edu (Obnoxious Math Grad Student) writes: > >Sorry to disillusion you, Richard, but compared to the *real* intellec- >tual achievements of this century (within science) . . . the "flowering of >the social and behavioral sciences" is going to remain one long gigan- >tic eyesore and an embarrassing piffle of a joke. How do you distinguish science from non-science? Also how can the non-sciences straighten up their act? I've recently read some articles in historical biology (on the origin of bone), and I don't see how the sorts of evidence and the sort of reasoning the authors use differs from those used in the history of human society (which is not to say there is no difference)? How is a fact or a theory in a science like paleontology any more certain than one in history or a social science? PG
obnoxio@BRAHMS.BERKELEY.EDU (Obnoxious Math Grad Student) (05/24/87)
In article <6779@mimsy.UUCP>, flink@mimsy (Paul V Torek) writes: >>By Kenn's own reasoning, there *is* an adequate basis. His thesis has >>received repeated tested over the centuries. (NB-Kenn did not say "re- >>peated".) > >Tested how? Look in the history books. Kenn's own reasoning was that "induction works". And he *can* justify it--by induction. Now, perhaps you don't accept Kenn's basis. Fine. Then you will prob- ably find that Kenn does not have an adequate basis for knowing induc- tion works. But you have found so by a non-Kenn method. > A bunch of techie types get together and decide that other >bases for knowledge have repeatedly produced "inadequate" results? Where did this come from? > To put >it less confrontationally, what standard of "adequacy" is being used here? >Not mere agreement, I hope. I hope not too. But Kenn's point was you won't even find "mere agreement" in the social sciences, except of the most general kind. >But even if he uses a better standard of adequacy, Kenn faces a regress >problem here. How does he know that his test for adequacy of knowledge- >bases is a reliable one? By yet another test? Regress beckons... Regress--or perhaps Loeb's theorem. No one has adequately formalized induction--some believe it impossible--but the idea of solving Hume's problem by self-reference, as opposed to infinite regress, is attrac- tive. Not that I know how to, nor expect that anyone would accept such a solu- tion in the first place. And while I'm at it, what's wrong with infinite regress anyway? Some- times philosophers seem scared off by infinity the way physicists were from black holes for decades. So there're one or two points here. What's wrong with self-referential bootstrapping, and what's wrong with infinite regress? For example, what do you say when an intuitionist tells you that excluded middle is theological fiddle-faddle? (I usually say, "well fine, I've got the faith. I BELIEVE! Now go away." I'm not scared off by the pejorative power of words.) >I saw your review, but "Hume's dilemma"? Which? You owe us phil.tech >readers some filling in of context here -- I don't read religion.misc. Sorry about that--I coined the phrase on the fly. I meant the problem of induction, which is what was being discussed. ucbvax!brahms!weemba Matthew P Wiener/Brahms Gang/Berkeley CA 94720 I should mention .... that I say aporia without knowing what it means.
obnoxio@BRAHMS.BERKELEY.EDU (Obnoxious Math Grad Student) (05/24/87)
In article <2068@husc6.UUCP>, gallagher@husc4 (paul gallagher) writes: >>Sorry to disillusion you, Richard, but compared to the *real* intellec- >>tual achievements of this century (within science) . . . [me] >How do you distinguish science from non-science? Also how can the >non-sciences straighten up their act? Wooo! Two great questions! Damned if I know. I don't think the non-sciences need to "straighten up their act", so much as stop putting on inappropriate/inapplicable airs of scientific accuracy. >I've recently read some articles in historical biology (on the origin >of bone), and I don't see how the sorts of evidence and the sort of >reasoning the authors use differs from those used in the history of >human society (which is not to say there is no difference)? How is a >fact or a theory in a science like paleontology any more certain than >one in history or a social science? I'd like to hear some knowledgable opinions on this. Paleontology at times seems borderline to me. Then again, so does astrophysics. However, one difference that stands out is the ontology of the subject matter, as opposed to the epistemology of the investigator. The pale- ontologist and astrophysicist are trying to understand and make conclu- sions about definite or presumed definite objects. Historians and so- ciologists, however, are trying to grab onto something much more elu- sive. There is nothing wrong with that--but there is something wrong with pretending that such elusiveness can be defined or measured away. There was an article in the February(?) issue of "Astronomy" which at- tacked the current wave of interest in inflationary cosmology as so much metaphysical speculation. I disagreed, but only on technical grounds. (For example, they said that inflation makes only one testable predic- tion. This is untrue.) ucbvax!brahms!weemba Matthew P Wiener/Brahms Gang/Berkeley CA 94720 "Do not believe astrophysical observations until confirmed by theory."
adam@its63b.UUCP (05/26/87)
In article <2068@husc6.UUCP> gallagher@husc4.UUCP (paul gallagher) writes: >In article <8705220612.AA16224@brahms.Berkeley.EDU> obnoxio@brahms.berkeley.edu (Obnoxious Math Grad Student) writes: >> >>Sorry to disillusion you, Richard, but compared to the *real* intellec- >>tual achievements of this century (within science) . . . the "flowering of >>the social and behavioral sciences" is going to remain one long gigan- >>tic eyesore and an embarrassing piffle of a joke. > >How do you distinguish science from non-science? Also how can the non-sciences >straighten up their act? >I've recently read some articles in historical biology (on the origin of bone), >and I don't see how the sorts of evidence and the sort of reasoning the authors >use differs from those used in the history of human society (which is not >to say there is no difference)? How is a fact or a theory in a science like >paleontology any more certain than one in history or a social science? > >PG For a good and clear discussion of these points may I recommend Scientific Knowledge and its social Problems Jerome R.Ravetz Oxford Clarendon Press Besides a host of other more social-oriented matters, the book discusses the differences between "real" science, "pseudo"-science and "non"-science. Disclaimer: The author is a friend of mine. Warning: This is NOT a light-weight book. Adam Hamilton
flink@mimsy.UUCP (05/27/87)
obnoxio@brahms.berkeley.edu (Obnoxious Math Grad Student) writes: >Look in the history books. Kenn's own reasoning was that "induction >works". And he *can* justify it--by induction. I don't dispute that part; I was doubting Kenn's claim "that the only adequate basis for knowledge is the repeatable testing that characterizes the hard sciences," to quote Richard Carnes's reply to Kenn. In order to support that claim with historical evidence, one would presumably have to show that other (alleged) bases for knowlege had consistently failed. The only clearcut way to do that would be to show that _each_ of those other bases had produced (largely or wholly) _false_ results. But in order to do that, one would have to decide questions which are (arguably) not the sort which are amenable to the sort of testing practiced in the hard sciences. That, I thought, was Carnes's point, and I agreed with it. >[...] But Kenn's point was you won't even find "mere agreement" >in the social sciences, except of the most general kind. So what? Unless mere disagreement weighs more heavily against a proposition than mere agreement weighs in favor -- which I don't find particularly plausible -- that doesn't suffice to support Kenn's claim. >Regress--or perhaps Loeb's theorem. No one has adequately formalized >induction--some believe it impossible--but the idea of solving Hume's >problem by self-reference, as opposed to infinite regress, is attrac- >tive. Ah, well, I didn't know that the discussion I was joining was so concerned about induction. And I'm not very familiar with Loeb's theorem, so I won't comment here, or on the issue of "self-referential bootstrapping". >And while I'm at it, what's wrong with infinite regress anyway? Some- >times philosophers seem scared off by infinity the way physicists were >from black holes for decades. Well, if one holds that infinite regresses are justifying in general, then one can justify anything. (There's a simple proof of this, but I can't remember it offhand; I'll dig it up upon request.) -- Paul Torek flink@mimsy.umd.edu
janw@inmet.UUCP (05/31/87)
>[gallagher@husc4.UUCP ] >How do you distinguish science from non-science? Also how can the >non-sciences straighten up their act? I've recently read some >articles in historical biology (on the origin of bone), and I >don't see how the sorts of evidence and the sort of reasoning the >authors use differs from those used in the history of human so- >ciety (which is not to say there is no difference)? How is a fact >or a theory in a science like paleontology any more certain than >one in history or a social science? History has some very scientific methods of fact verification. There's no reasonable doubt now that Troy existed, or that Pope Joan did not. History also contains *other* elements resembling fiction in its method of reality reconstruction; also broad unverifiable gen- eralizations depending for their acceptance on intellectual fashion or political climate. It is not *all* science or *all* non-science. Similarly, there are scientfic *elements* in anthro- pology or psychology. And, of course, not everything that is *not* science is trash. "Unscientific" need not be a pejorative term except as applied to something that *claims* to be scientific. The problem arises when "scientific" and "academic" are used as synonyms. When one quotes an accredited authority on a scientific fact, e.g, the mass of a muon, that's for brevity: you *can* verify the fact. On the other hand, when one quotes an authority on the subject of, e.g., future discoveries of science ("is fusion feasible in this century?") - then the authority, *even of a scientist* is not scientific. Opinions prevailing in academic circles are just that - opinions, not science. But in some soft-core "sciences" such prevailing opinions are the dominant criteria of truth - though they tend to be wrong (as judged by the opinions prevailing later). Can machines be made to think? Is intelligence heritable? Is overpopulation imminent? -- These are examples of interesting nonscientific questions, though some academics reinforce their private speculations on these questions with the prestige of sci- ence. The false pretense only detracts from the weight that an honest opinion would have. It is quite right to say "this is the mass of a muon, as says so-and-so who is a professor of physics, and in a position to know". The fact *is* known, so being in the position of access to this knowledge helps. But it is quite wrong to say: "a fetus is (or is not) a human be- ing, as says so-and-so who is a professor of ethics, a Ph.D in biology, an M.D. and a D.D.". The titles don't help because the "fact" is *not* known, not even defined so as to *become* known. And if, at a given moment, *all* academics agreed on it, it would *still* be their private opinion, quite probably wrong. Jan Wasilewsky
andrews@ubc-csgrads.uucp (Jamie Andrews) (06/08/87)
In article <160200002@inmet> janw@inmet.UUCP writes: >There's no reasonable doubt now that Troy existed, or that >Pope Joan did not. Pardom ne? Are you saying that few people now believe that Pope Joan existed? Please expand. (For those of you who don't know the story... a mass of circumstantial and explicit evidence exists that (at one time, at least) was thought to indicate that one of the early Pope Johns was a woman, who somehow made it all the way to Pope without anyone knowing (or perhaps with all those who knew keeping silent). When she was found out, the story goes, she was defrocked, excommunicated, executed, etc., and the Church tried to expunge all mention of her name and history from the records. Granted, I first read about this in one of these "things were great when all of civilization was a matriarchy" books, but the evidence seemed impressive.) --Jamie. ...!seismo!ubc-vision!ubc-cs!andrews
franka@mmintl.UUCP (06/09/87)
In article <160200002@inmet> janw@inmet.UUCP writes: >Can machines be made to think? Is intelligence heritable? Is >overpopulation imminent? -- These are examples of interesting >nonscientific questions, I am curious about why "is intelligence heritable?" was included in this list. This seems to me to be very much a scientific question, albeit one we can't really answer yet. -- Frank Adams ihnp4!philabs!pwa-b!mmintl!franka Ashton-Tate 52 Oakland Ave North E. Hartford, CT 06108
franka@mntgfx.UUCP (06/12/87)
In article <160200002@inmet> janw@inmet.UUCP writes: > ... Is intelligence heritable? No, intellegence is (and always has been) heretical. Same as it ever was, same as it ever was... Frank Adrian Mentor Graphics, Inc.
eric@snark.UUCP (06/13/87)
In article <2172@mmintl.UUCP>, franka@mmintl.UUCP (Frank Adams) writes: > I am curious about why "is intelligence heritable?" was included in this > list. This seems to me to be very much a scientific question, albeit one we > can't really answer yet. Intelligence is *extremely* heritable. The results that show this are solid but not as well known as they might be due to the fact that hereditarianism in general is out of fashion and 'politically incorrect'. Empirical evidence: the I.Q. and aptitudes of identical twins raised apart are quite strongly correlated -- sorry, I don't have numerical statistics handy. 'Intelligence' is a multidimensional composite of aptitudes in several distinct areas. However, factor analysis on the results suggest that about half the variance is due to a single 'hidden variable' which some psychometricians call xxxx's q, where xxxx is a psychometrician's name that I can't recall right now -- something like Jensen or Ivorsen. This q factor is about 80% heritable. Certain specific talents generally thought of as forms of intelligence -- such as mathematical and musical ability -- have long been known to be that heritable. All of this data is discussed, from a strongly environmentarian viewpoint, in Stephen Jay Gould's _The_Mismeasure_of_Man_ -- a book I recommend for facts and style while disagreeing almost totally with its analysis and conclusions. Gould is a fine and lucid writer when his Marxist sympathies are dormant. What seems to be true is that heredity sets a fairly hard upper limit on the capability of the brain to do particular kinds of information processing (things like, say, spatial visualization). Whether that limit is ever pushed depends on the individual's environment. Nearly all psychometricians agree on this much. Go any further and you get into controversies with such heavy political overtones that it's hard to see light through the smoke. Environmentarians believe the inherited limits are generally well above the performance level of typical individuals, so that there's plenty of room for improving the masses by improving things like richness of early environment, education, etc. This tends to correlate a more general beief in human perfectibility and with politics that are statist-liberal, socialist or Marxist. Hereditarians believe that individuals routinely push their inherited limits; you can and should train an individual up to maximum, but unless that person has been lucky in the genetic draw that maximum will be at or below average for the population. This tends to correlate with conservative, religious-fundamentalist, reactionary and fascist politics. Historically, psychometrics has swung like a pendulum between hereditarian and environmentarian extremes, often in a way correlated with the political ideology of the period's dominant culture. The late 1800s saw an extreme of hereditarian dogma (the Nazi master-race bulls**t was a sort of degraded pop version of stuff that was mainstream scholarly anthropology in 1850-1900). The 1960s saw an extreme of environmentarian dogma, more recently corrected by the influence of Wilson and the sociobiological school. My personal opinion: the hereditarian claim is unpleasant, but fits the observed statistical facts better than most versions of the environmentarian thesis. Attempts by Gould and others to dismiss the q-factor as an artifact aren't convincing, particularly since they tend to fall back on ad-hominem attacks on infamous hereditarians of the past when reasoned argument fails. (My politics, you ask? A fair question. Libertarian -- I loathe the left and right with equal intensity...:-)) -- Eric S. Raymond UUCP: {{seismo,ihnp4,rutgers}!cbmvax,sdcrdcf!burdvax}!snark!eric Post: 22 South Warren Avenue, Malvern, PA 19355 Phone: (215)-296-5718
g-rh@cca.UUCP (06/15/87)
[Note -- I have directed followups to sci.bio and sci.misc, since I don't really feel that this is a sci.philosophy.tech subject.] In article <123@snark.UUCP> eric@snark.UUCP (Eric S. Raymond) writes: >In article <2172@mmintl.UUCP>, franka@mmintl.UUCP (Frank Adams) writes: >> I am curious about why "is intelligence heritable?" was included in this >> list. This seems to me to be very much a scientific question, albeit one we >> can't really answer yet. > >Intelligence is *extremely* heritable. The results that show this are solid >but not as well known as they might be due to the fact that hereditarianism >in general is out of fashion and 'politically incorrect'. > >Empirical evidence: the I.Q. and aptitudes of identical twins raised apart are >quite strongly correlated -- sorry, I don't have numerical statistics handy. Well now, the evidence is not nearly so strong as you claim. The principle results on identical twins were those of Cyril Burt's, which is where the conventional figure of 80% heritability comes from. However Burt's data and results were forged. (I don't know if this is mentioned in Gould, but it is well established.) The reason you don't have the statistics at hand for identical twins is because it doesn't exist, apart from Burt's forged data -- there is some data but it is very sparse. >'Intelligence' is a multidimensional composite of aptitudes in several >distinct areas. However, factor analysis on the results suggest that about >half the variance is due to a single 'hidden variable' which some >psychometricians call xxxx's q, where xxxx is a psychometrician's name >that I can't recall right now -- something like Jensen or Ivorsen. This I have a copy of Cattell's classic work on the subject. On the whole one has to be impressed, and I am inclined to believe that there is such a thing as general intelligence, with a reasonably high heredit- ability. However I have a lot of caveats. Firstly, factor analysis is a linear analysis method which can break down if there are nonlinearities in the underlying factors. Secondly the correlation analysis is the isolation of agreement between results on tests (lots of them). The tests themselves, however, are not culture free (if there is such a thing as a culture free test.) This is a notorious problem -- the early workers in IQ testing, Terman, et. al. had no trouble believing that immigrants from Eastern Europe all had abysmally low IQ's because that is what their tests showed. Psychometricians today have a much clearer understanding of these difficulties. Again, the degree of cultural inhomogeneity affects the determination of the heritability figure [which is not a simple fixed number, by the way.] >q factor is about 80% heritable. > >Certain specific talents generally thought of as forms of intelligence -- such >as mathematical and musical ability -- have long been known to be that >heritable. > >All of this data is discussed, from a strongly environmentarian viewpoint, >in Stephen Jay Gould's _The_Mismeasure_of_Man_ -- a book I recommend for >facts and style while disagreeing almost totally with its analysis and >conclusions. Gould is a fine and lucid writer when his Marxist sympathies >are dormant. Marxist sympathies!!?? What an odd thing to say. I will also endorse the book, even though I also have reservations about some of his analysis. > >What seems to be true is that heredity sets a fairly hard upper limit on >the capability of the brain to do particular kinds of information >processing (things like, say, spatial visualization). Whether that >limit is ever pushed depends on the individual's environment. Nearly >all psychometricians agree on this much. Go any further and you get >into controversies with such heavy political overtones that it's hard >to see light through the smoke. > True enough, that there "seem" to be hard limits set by heredity. Since the nature and operation of the underlying factors are unknown it is indeed hard to say much more than that legitimately. The politics arise because people extrapolate wildly from what is actually known and use those extrapolations to buttress preconceived political viewpoints. It's all bad science. We have nothing like a good physical model of general intelligence -- we don't even have a good identification of what is meant by the term. >Environmentarians believe the inherited limits are generally well above >the performance level of typical individuals, so that there's plenty >of room for improving the masses by improving things like richness of >early environment, education, etc. This tends to correlate a more >general beief in human perfectibility and with politics that are >statist-liberal, socialist or Marxist. A relevant point: In Japan there is a 'caste' roughly equivalent to the untouchables of India. Now the segregation of this caste (whose name I don't recall but it starts with an 'h') occurred only a few hundred years ago and was occupationally based. Accordingly there is no good reason to believe that the caste is genetically any different from the population of Japan as a whole. Same gene pool, arbitrary splitting off of an oppressed class. This class, as a group, scores about 15 points lower in IQ tests than the general population of Japan. Oddly enough this is about the same differential as that between whites and blacks in this country. >Hereditarians believe that individuals routinely push their inherited >limits; you can and should train an individual up to maximum, but unless that >person has been lucky in the genetic draw that maximum will be at or below >average for the population. This tends to correlate with conservative, >religious-fundamentalist, reactionary and fascist politics. Your observations on the political correlations are probably correct. One's science in these areas tends to strongly affected by the political views that one holds. More importantly, holders of particular views tend to select "scientific results" that support the views that they hold. Intellectually honest scientists recognize that we don't know enough to legitimately make any such claims. The only correct anwer to "Who are right, the hereditarians or the environmentalists?" is "I don't know". >Historically, psychometrics has swung like a pendulum between hereditarian >and environmentarian extremes, often in a way correlated with the political >ideology of the period's dominant culture. The late 1800s saw an extreme of >hereditarian dogma (the Nazi master-race bulls**t was a sort of degraded pop >version of stuff that was mainstream scholarly anthropology in 1850-1900). >The 1960s saw an extreme of environmentarian dogma, more recently corrected >by the influence of Wilson and the sociobiological school. > If one is inclined to be charitable, the best that can be said for Sociobiology is that it is speculative. In view of the recurrent tendency to set public policy upon ill-founded speculation masquerading as science, I suppose there is something to be said for having a balance of such materials available. -- Richard Harter, SMDS Inc. [Disclaimers not permitted by company policy.]
werner@aecom.YU.EDU (Craig Werner) (06/15/87)
I'd like to point out the difference between heritable and
genetic (or inheritable).
The number of digits a person has is determined by genetic
factors, but that number has a very low heritability.
Skin color in the United States is very heritable. In Sweden
and Japan, it has a very low heritability.
What gives?
Heritability is not a measure of genetics. It is a measure of
variation. It is roughly defined as:
h = Genetic variation / total phenotypic variation
where total variation is
(genetic variation + environmental variation + error of measure)
Ergo, the number of digits, a highly genetically determined
trait, but with the majority of variation due to loss of digits by
accident, shows low heritability.
Since skin color variation in the US (mixture of African
descent and on the opposite extreme Scandanavian descent, and
everyone in between) is extremely genetically determined, heritability
is high. Whereas in Japan, where the gene pool is much more
limited, skin color is more determined by whether one lives in the
city or works as a farmer. The observed phenotypic variability is
due almost solely to number of hours spent in the sun, hence
heritability very low.
IQ scores are heritable trait. No less so than height or weight.
It is not perfectly heritable, and in fact, it's heritability varies
among population groups: it is higher in whites than in blacks in the
US, presumably because there is more environmental variation between
black communites.
Furthermore, as first pointed out by Jensen, attempts to
improve the environment will, paradoxically to some, make IQ scores
MORE heritable, since they will eliminate environmental variation
from the denominator without touching the numerator.
While many would argue this point, that means in an ideal
system, the best possible environment for every person, that IQ
would be 100% heritable.
Stephen J. Gould makes a very good case against those who
equate heritability with genetic determinism. Unfortunately, he
makes the same mistake in most of his rebuttal arguments.
So, I ask you, before comitting yourself to the argument,
think several times about this definition of heritability. It is
definitely a non-trivial point.
Maybe I should dig out my old IQ series, update it, and
repost it. Maybe not? Feedback is requested.
--
Craig Werner (MD/PhD '91)
!philabs!aecom!werner
(1935-14E Eastchester Rd., Bronx NY 10461, 212-931-2517)
"Why is it that half the calories is twice the price?"lincoln@randvax.UUCP (06/16/87)
In article <123@snark.UUCP> eric@snark.UUCP (Eric S. Raymond) writes: >In article <2172@mmintl.UUCP>, franka@mmintl.UUCP (Frank Adams) writes: >> I am curious about why "is intelligence heritable?" > >Intelligence is *extremely* heritable. > >Empirical evidence: the I.Q. and aptitudes of identical twins raised apart are >quite strongly correlated -- sorry, I don't have numerical statistics handy. > >'Intelligence' is a multidimensional composite of aptitudes in several >distinct areas. > >All of this data is discussed, from a strongly environmentarian viewpoint, >in Stephen Jay Gould's _The_Mismeasure_of_Man_ -- a book I recommend for >facts and style while disagreeing almost totally with its analysis and >conclusions. Gould is a fine and lucid writer when his Marxist sympathies >are dormant. . ( .) ((). CAUTION ()(( FLAMES >to see light through the smoke. {\@@/} AT WORK >What seems to be true is that heredity sets a fairly hard upper limit on >the capability of the brain to do particular kinds of information >processing (things like, say, spatial visualization). >Environmentarians believe the inherited limits are generally well above >the performance level of typical individuals, so that there's plenty >of room for improv(ement)... It is interesting that the Japanese have competative categories that lie above the present masters. I believe that the top 35 master categories for the game of GO are empty. We, by contrast grade on a sliding scale.. >Hereditarians believe that individuals routinely push their inherited >limits; It simply defies credulity to suppose that todays couch potatoes are pushing their inherited limits - or any other limits. If we try Toynbee (why not add an historian) - there is some evidence that the best challenge is neither too severe or too easy (usually whatever society that those who write about such things - and feel they are pushing their productive limits - live in represents their parochial estimate). See such books as "Why Jonny can't run". >My personal opinion: the hereditarian claim is unpleasant, but fits the >observed statistical facts better than most versions of the environmentarian >thesis. Well, someone with that opinion who tries to read Stephen Gould is probably pushing his/her limits. |\ /| . {O O} . Its a dog's life, eh Sandy? ( " ) lincoln%iris@rand-unix.arpa `U'
eddy@boulder.Colorado.EDU (Sean Eddy) (06/16/87)
In article <1142@aecom.YU.EDU> werner@aecom.YU.EDU (Craig Werner) writes: > I'd like to point out the difference between heritable and >genetic (or inheritable). > The number of digits a person has is determined by genetic >factors, but that number has a very low heritability. > Skin color in the United States is very heritable. In Sweden >and Japan, it has a very low heritability. > Heritability is not a measure of genetics. It is a measure of >variation. It is roughly defined as: > > h = Genetic variation / total phenotypic variation > >where total variation is > (genetic variation + environmental variation + error of measure) Now hold on. Heritability sure is a measure of genetics; otherwise it wouldn't be in every genetics textbook I've ever owned. I'm not being facetious. Heritability is a measure that is very helpful in agriculture (where you can ethically breed organisms to be 'better'). The higher the heritability for a particular trait, the easier it is for one to 'improve' that trait through breeding programs. Such a program not only depends on the trait being genetically determined, but also on the capability of the trait to be varied. This is the reason for the invention of the number called 'heritability'. Choosing examples such as 'number of digits' are unfair, since there is little variation. But IQ scores are distributed on that classical (artifactual?) Gaussian curve. That's why heritability is indeed a legitimate measure to discuss; because if the heritability of IQ is high, one can imagine that the IQ of the race can be improved through careful breeding. Not a pleasant concept, but that's why the issue is controversial. - Sean Eddy - MCD Biology; U. of Colorado at Boulder; Boulder CO 80309 - eddy@boulder.colorado.EDU !{hao,nbires}!boulder!eddy - - "Don't drink and drive. You might hit a bump and spill your drink."
janw@inmet.UUCP (06/16/87)
[franka@mmintl.UUCP ] >In article <160200002@inmet> janw@inmet.UUCP writes: >>Can machines be made to think? Is intelligence heritable? Is >>overpopulation imminent? -- These are examples of interesting >>nonscientific questions, >I am curious about why "is intelligence heritable?" was included in this >list. Because intelligence is undefined; perhaps undefinable; but certainly far from being defined in any scientific sense. Also because of the way the question is actually being asked and "answered" : very unscientific. Usage determines the character of the question, just as it determines the meaning of words. I don't deny that some day a question containing these words *may* be scientifically asked; but it will not be the same question. Jan Wasilewsky
benson@alcatraz.UUCP (06/18/87)
In article <123@snark.UUCP> eric@snark.UUCP (Eric S. Raymond) writes: >In article <2172@mmintl.UUCP>, franka@mmintl.UUCP (Frank Adams) writes: >> I am curious about why "is intelligence heritable?" was included in this >> list. This seems to me to be very much a scientific question, albeit one we >> can't really answer yet. > >Intelligence is *extremely* heritable. The results that show this are solid >but not as well known as they might be due to the fact that hereditarianism >in general is out of fashion and 'politically incorrect'. > >Empirical evidence: the I.Q. and aptitudes of identical twins raised apart are >quite strongly correlated -- sorry, I don't have numerical statistics handy. > That is, Cyril Burt, who invented his data, as documented in the Gould book and elsewhere. >All of this data is discussed, from a strongly environmentarian viewpoint, >in Stephen Jay Gould's _The_Mismeasure_of_Man_ -- a book I recommend for >facts and style while disagreeing almost totally with its analysis and >conclusions. Gould is a fine and lucid writer when his Marxist sympathies >are dormant. > I'm not a statistician, but I know enough about it to find Gould and a host of other plausible. You might considered submitting a CV for consideration. In any case, I'll throw a different two cents in: I'll believe that some intelligence is inheritable. I won't believe, and am strongly convinced of the pseudo-scientific quality of the "studies" that "prove", that blacks (or any other 'race') as a class are less intelligent. Most of the heat of the heredity versus environment debate is generated by the curious fact that the publishing hereditatians keep "proving" such racial factoids. Herrenstein and Burt were/are grinding axes, so they have no one else to blame if they get the same in return. --benson Benson I. Margulies Kendall Square Research Corp. harvard!ksr!benson All comments the responsibility ksr!benson@harvard.harvard.edu of the author, if anyone.
howard@cpocd2.UUCP (Howard A. Landman) (06/18/87)
Please followup to rec.games.go only, since this isn't really a bio topic. In article <301@iris.randvax.UUCP> lincoln@iris.UUCP (Tom Lincoln) writes: >It is interesting that the Japanese have competative categories that lie >above the present masters. I believe that the top 35 master categories >for the game of GO are empty. We, by contrast grade on a sliding scale.. It would be interesting if it were true, but I've been playing for 20 years and I've never heard this. The top "normal" Japanese rank is 9 dan, and there are many players of this rank. (I've had the privilege of watching my game get ripped apart by a couple of them!) The rank of 10 dan is reserved for the winner of a particular tournament; if you win it enough you can get to be "honorary 10 dan" like Sakata Eio. This doesn't mean that the Japanese believe that they are playing perfect Go. Every professional game has at least one or two known mistakes, and probably many more unknown ones. And if 19x19 Go is ever perfected, there are always larger boards ... -- Howard A. Landman ...!{oliveb,...}!intelca!mipos3!cpocd2!howard howard%cpocd2%sc.intel.com@RELAY.CS.NET "Half a mile from Tuscon, by the morning light"
janw@inmet.UUCP (06/20/87)
[werner@aecom.UUCP ] > I'd like to point out the difference between heritable and >genetic (or inheritable). > The number of digits a person has is determined by genetic >factors, but that number has a very low heritability. > Skin color in the United States is very heritable. In Sweden >and Japan, it has a very low heritability. >[...] > So, I ask you, before comitting yourself to the argument, >think several times about this definition of heritability. It is >definitely a non-trivial point. The distinction *is* non-trivial, and Craig's caveat is useful. A counter-caveat: when Craig speaks of what "heritable" "is", he means a technical definition of the term in a special field. In general usage, heritable means the same thing as inheritable (e.g., Webster's New Collegiate: "heritable 1: capable of being inherited or of passing by inheritance 2: hereditary"). The technical usage has merit because it makes an important dis- tinction; still, it cannot claim to be the only one - any more than the mathematical definition of "group" or the physical definition of "charm" can. Whichever definition we choose, the answer to whether "heritability", or "inheritability" of intelligence is a scien- tific issue, remains the same. It is not a scientific issue, as long as there's no scientific definition of intelligence. Moreover, it is obvious from the technical definition that any trait can be "heritable" in an appropriately selected population, and not "heritable" in another one. Therefore, as Mary K. Kuhner writes in sci.misc, "it is very easy to draw nasty false conclusions from heritability statistics". One of them is the popular assertion that "intelligence is 80% nature, 20% nurture", which is triply misleading: # it is based on long-discredited data; # it is totally dependent on how much "nurture" varies in the population described (it is as if physicists believed that "according to statistical studies, 80% of conductor resistance depends on the material, and only 20% on the cross-section"); # and it substitutes for "intelligence" some indicator whose con- nection with the vague but important concept of "intelligence" is arbitrary and counter-intuitive. The first flaw can be corrected by producing honest data, the other two are more profound. The history of this myth ought to be relevant to the question of academic credibility. Jan Wasilewsky