carnes@gargoyle.UChicago.EDU (Richard Carnes) (07/02/87)
>> we are aware of the world through a `we' before we are through an `I'. >> [Charles Taylor] >This seems more than a little dubious to me. In fact, it seems >blatantly false. I would be interested in an attempt to justify it. >[Frank Adams] If it seems blatantly false, you may have misunderstood what Taylor meant by this ambiguous and suggestive statement. It suggests, for example, the idea that we structure and view the world through language, which is inescapably social or communal. "You learned the concept `pain', when you learned language." How do you know a certain color is `rot'? "Ich habe Deutsch gelernt" (both quotes from Wittgenstein). Language and the culture of which it is a constituent determine our awareness of the world, and in this sense it could be said that we are aware of the world through a `we' (the communal subject of common meanings) before we are through the individual self. This is why different cultures and different historical periods see the world in different ways. Taylor's statement suggests the social nature of knowledge and some ideas advanced by Wittgenstein in the _PI_. In _Understanding Social Science_ (1985), Roger Trigg writes of "...the increasing emphasis on the *social* character of knowledge in general, and science in particular. The very fact that science has been seen as a social institution, in which the notion of objectivity is determined by the structure of the institution, means that it is a fit object of study for the social scientist. It is in this context that the attacks on empiricism have been so important. If knowledge was obtained through the senses, it was clearly an individual matter. Each person could obtain knowledge in isolation. If, on the other hand, it is a product of a community, it is by definition attainable only through education in the ways of that community. Similarly, empiricism seemed to suggest that knowledge came in bits and pieces. Its approach was atomistic, in contrast to the view of knowledge which suggests that it is deeply embedded in the way of life of which it is a part. Thus particular strands cannot be torn away from the wider whole. ... "Wittgenstein provides an example of this kind of philosophical approach, at least in his later work. He emphasized the rule-governed nature of our practices. Human activity is not to be understood as the isolated actions of individuals, and we cannot make sense of what anyone does except in the context of a wider whole.... [This view] stems naturally from Wittgenstein's equation of meaning and use. Words mean what they do because of the context in which they are used. Meaning cannot be privately conferred, and is not, for instance, to be correlated with internal sense-impressions. Wittgenstein's arguments against the possibility of a `private language' are well known, although much of the discussion about them has occurred in the philosophy of mind. How do we learn the word `pain'? We can all communicate with each other about pain and teach the word, but it apparently refers to a private sensation.... "...[Wittgenstein's] quest for public criteria as a basis for meaningfulness leads him to stress the social origins of thought and experience. We are what we are largely because of the practices and institutions in which we are immersed. Knowledge does not come from the atomistic experiences of individuals but is the product of rule-governed activities, which must be public and social. A game of cricket cannot be understood in terms of the private intentions of individual players. What they are doing can gain its sense from the rules of the game in which they are participating. Boys banging a ball around a field with a bat are not necessarily playing cricket. Unless their activities are governed by rules, they are just banging a ball with a bat. "Where, then, do rules come from? They are embedded in society and indeed constitute a society. Rules make a society what it is. Different rules and institutions will by definition produce a different society. Wittgenstein's views provide an invitation to the sociologist to describe the practices and rules of a society. Once again, it looks as if epistemological foundations have been repudiated and only sociological investigation will throw light on the nature of society. "It is hardly surprising that Wittgenstein's views have provided inspiration for sociologists of knowledge, wishing to emphasize the social character of knowledge. Although of very different origin, his notions fit very easily with those of Kuhn. What is at stake, however, is not just a question about epistemology or sociology of knowledge. Wittgenstein's opinions can apparently give support to all who stress the priority of the society over the individual. If the activities of individuals only gain sense through participation in social practices, we have to look at the latter as sources of explanation." [Trigg, pp. 23-26] Richard Carnes
lamaster@pioneer.arpa (Hugh LaMaster) (07/03/87)
In article <681@gargoyle.UChicago.EDU> carnes@gargoyle.uchicago.edu.UUCP (Richard Carnes) quotes Roger Trigg: >Taylor's statement suggests the social nature of knowledge and some >ideas advanced by Wittgenstein in the _PI_. In _Understanding Social >Science_ (1985), Roger Trigg writes of > > "...the increasing emphasis on the *social* character of knowledge in > general, and science in particular. The very fact that science has > been seen as a social institution, in which the notion of objectivity > is determined by the structure of the institution, means that it is a > fit object of study for the social scientist. It is in this context > that the attacks on empiricism have been so important. If knowledge > was obtained through the senses, it was clearly an individual matter. > Each person could obtain knowledge in isolation. If, on the other > hand, it is a product of a community, it is by definition attainable > only through education in the ways of that community. Similarly, > empiricism seemed to suggest that knowledge came in bits and pieces. > Its approach was atomistic, in contrast to the view of knowledge > which suggests that it is deeply embedded in the way of life of which > it is a part. Thus particular strands cannot be torn away from the > wider whole. ... > > "Wittgenstein provides an example of this kind of philosophical > approach, at least in his later work. He emphasized the From the format of the posting, it was not clear whether the poster agrees with or disagrees with Trigg, nor was it clear whether Trigg was arguing in favor of Wittgenstein's (and others) view or was merely representing them. But in any case, the quotation provides a clear summation of some very muddy thinking. Science could be thought of as a "cult", in the sense of shared values and ideas which are passed on to others. Scientists, being people, can also be the subject of sociological study and interpretation. Nevertheless, this is no way validates the kind of philosophical relativism that was quoted. Science rests on a ultimate foundation: That there is an objective reality of which we are a part, and that we can understand part of that reality through the scientific method. No consideration of political or sociological study of the community of scientists will reveal whether or not this foundation is correct. If it is, it is correct regardless of the current sociopolitical state of the scientific community. The beauty of science is that no one has to accept the authority of Scientists for all of his knowledge of science, because anyone may verify pieces of it himself. Hugh "I refute it thus" LaMaster Hugh LaMaster, m/s 233-9, UUCP {seismo,topaz,lll-crg,ucbvax}! NASA Ames Research Center ames!pioneer!lamaster Moffett Field, CA 94035 ARPA lamaster@ames-pioneer.arpa Phone: (415)694-6117 ARPA lamaster@pioneer.arc.nasa.gov "IBM will have it soon" (Disclaimer: "All opinions solely the author's responsibility"Ma