gsmith@BRAHMS.BERKELEY.EDU (Gene Ward Smith) (06/30/87)
In article <103@snark.UUCP> eric@snark.UUCP (Eric S. Raymond) writes: >Richard Carnes writes: There is no such animal as `the scientific >> definition of knowledge' or `the scientific epistemology'. >I think it's quite fair to speak of `the scientific epistemology', >since in order to believe that science is anything but futile >you must at some level be an empiricist and/or operationalist. Unless the definitions you are using are vague or non-standard (which I suspect is the case) this does not follow. In particular, you seem to be implicitly employing a pragmatic epistemolgy to support your claim that one must be an empiricist or (not the same thing, fella) an operationalist. >Yes, there are scientists who profess to have other philosophies >in connection with their religious beliefs or whatever -- but >*in the lab* they must function as operationalists or give up. This is complete rubbish. Why can't they function just as well as rationalists or pragmatists? Most scientists think they are finding out truths about how the world really is, and I believe this helps motivate them and so is a Good Thing. >Knowledge is instrumental. Humans gather knowledge in order to >*predict* things and *do* things. This is one motivation, but is not the only one. Even if it was, it would not prove that all knowledge was merely instrumental. >Humans form beliefs (including philosophical beliefs) in order >to organize knowledge so they can *do* things and *predict* things. >Therefore, the choice between empiricism and anything else as a >philosophical stance is *not* ultimately a 'philosophical question' >(i.e. one addressable via a debate on the high-order abstractions >we study in philosophy) it is an *instrumental* question: what >works? What maximizes our ability to predict and do? This is pragmatism you are talking here, Buster. Extreme empiricisms have trouble explaining mathematical knowledge. Do you view this as "instrumental" (whatever you really mean by that?) >The philosophical revolution that came with experimental science gave us the >Universe's answer. Empiricism, verificationism, and operationalism *work*. You mean physics, biology and chemistry work, not some philosophical theory about *how* they work works. There is a difference though it appears you don't see it. >I therefore invite Mr. Carnes (and through him, Charles Taylor >and anti-empiricists in general) to put up or shut up. Show us >how a non-empiricist epistemology can yield a model with *instrumental* >success exceeding that of empiricism. If you think instrumental >success is somehow the wrong criterion, pick another criterion >and defend it. Mathematics "works". Mathematics does not require an empiricist epistemology to support it, quite the reverse I would say. So put up or shut up. ucbvax!brahms!gsmith Gene Ward Smith/Brahms Gang/Berkeley CA 94720 ucbvax!weyl!gsmith "Slime is the agony of water" -- Jean-Paul Sartre
eric@snark.UUCP (Eric S. Raymond) (07/03/87)
In article <8706301520.AA01304@brahms.Berkeley.EDU>, Gene Ward Smith writes: > In article <103@snark.UUCP> eric@snark.UUCP (Eric S. Raymond) writes: > Unless the definitions you are using are vague or non-standard > (which I suspect is the case) this [notion of scientic philosophy > as necessarily empiricist/operationalist] does not follow. In particular, > you seem to be implicitly employing a pragmatic epistemolgy to > support your claim that one must be an empiricist or (not the > same thing, fella) an operationalist. The definitions I'm using are the ones I learned when I minored in philosophy, thank you. Let's review those definitions informally just so we know what language we're speaking: rationalist = "I believe what my reason tells me" empiricist = "I believe what my senses tell me" pragmatist = "I do what works" verificationist = "'Truth' is what independent observers can agree on." operationalist = "'Truth' is what one can predict experimental results with." In informal usage, 'empiricist' tends to imply some implicit sort of operationalism (there are good historical and formal reasons for this) and is more readily connotative to people who haven't studied epistemology. That's why I used the term in my attack on Taylor's fulminations. Out of respect for your evident knowledge of the technicalities I am now being more formal. And yes, my epistemology is 'implicitly pragmatist'. The whole line of argument in my posting is that anything other than 'implicit pragmatism' is sterile -- that unless philosophy is grounded in its utility as an organizer of effective knowledge and action it fades off into meaningless abstract jibber-jabber. > >*in the lab* they must function as operationalists or give up. > > This is complete rubbish. Why can't they function just as well > as rationalists or pragmatists? Most scientists think they are > finding out truths about how the world really is, and I believe > this helps motivate them and so is a Good Thing. Notice that I said 'function as' operationalists. I meant that very precisely. In order to function as scientists, scientists must *act as if* what's 'true' or 'real' is defined by what's accessible by experiment and operational test in the strict sense. When the hypotheses suggested by experiment are what is called 'counterintuitive' it is actively harmful to be a a rationalist. In extreme cases such as QM it may even be harmful to stay attached too strongly to what we usually understand as empiricism. As for motivation -- O.K., many scientists are *psychologically* pragmatists or rationalists -- granted. And yes, believing that you're getting a handle on what 'really is' may be wonderful motivation. So what? How one believes and how one functions may have little to do with each other. > >Knowledge is instrumental. Humans gather knowledge in order to > >*predict* things and *do* things. > > This is one motivation, but is not the only one. Even if it was, > it would not prove that all knowledge was merely instrumental. O.K., humans gather knowledge because knowledge is pretty, too. No problem. But when you *test* knowledge -- when you are trying to demonstrate that a proposition is true or false -- beauty isn't proof (though it may help you find one). The relation between truth and beauty is a question for cognitive psychology, not epistemology. I'll repeat my earlier question in different terms: yes, there are other motivations for gathering knowledge than the instrumental. Care to propose one that you seriously want to get a privileged role in epistemology? > >Humans form beliefs (including philosophical beliefs) in order > >to organize knowledge so they can *do* things and *predict* things. > > >Therefore, the choice between empiricism and anything else as a > >philosophical stance is *not* ultimately a 'philosophical question' > >(i.e. one addressable via a debate on the high-order abstractions > >we study in philosophy) it is an *instrumental* question: what > >works? What maximizes our ability to predict and do? > > This is pragmatism you are talking here, Buster. Yup. No apologies for that, either. For the third time: care to propose an alternative that doesn't reduce to navel-gazing, circularity or sheer babble? > Extreme empiricisms > have trouble explaining mathematical knowledge. Do you view this > as "instrumental" (whatever you really mean by that?) I think you may have been misled by my (admittedly inexact) use of the term 'empiricism', but I'll answer the question anyhow (and, BTW, I was majoring in math while I was minoring in philosophy, with concentrations in logic and foundational mathematics). Mathematical 'knowledge' isn't knowledge about the 'reality' epistemologists and ontologists worry about at all; it's 'knowledge' about games played with marks on paper (evolved with the instrumental goal of causing pleasure in other mathematicians :-)). The fact that mathematical 'knowledge' is useful in forming predictive hypotheses about 'reality' is interesting, but of very little interest to epistemology -- because the map is not the territory; we throw away a lot of information in making the exceedingly complex mapping from, say, falling cannonballs to F=ma. > >The philosophical revolution that came with experimental science gave us the > >Universe's answer. Empiricism, verificationism, and operationalism *work*. > > You mean physics, biology and chemistry work, not some philosophical > theory about *how* they work works. There is a difference though it appears > you don't see it. No, I see the difference all right (I have a feeling you're just being splenetic here). I was arguing (and you haven't yet countered) the proposition that *because* physics, biology and chemistry work, empiricism/verificationism /operationalism must be considered to *work* also -- that the overwhelming success of science gives the philosophical stances of science a claim to describing the 'truth' about 'truth' that is a good deal solider than the self-serving vaporings of Charles Taylor and his ilk. > >I therefore invite Mr. Carnes (and through him, Charles Taylor > >and anti-empiricists in general) to put up or shut up. Show us > >how a non-empiricist epistemology can yield a model with *instrumental* > >success exceeding that of empiricism. If you think instrumental > >success is somehow the wrong criterion, pick another criterion > >and defend it. > > Mathematics "works". Mathematics does not require an empiricist > epistemology to support it, quite the reverse I would say. So put > up or shut up. I believe I have answered your challenge above. Mathematics doesn't require *any* epistemology to support it, nor can it support an epistemology (it's now a century after Kant and the synthetic a priori is quite dead, thank you very much). The fact that it encourages a rationalist attitude is no more evidence against 'empiricism' (really, operationalism) than the 'attitude' of a belief in giant purple bats would be evidence for their existence. > ucbvax!brahms!gsmith Gene Ward Smith/Brahms Gang/Berkeley CA 94720 -- Eric S. Raymond UUCP: {{seismo,ihnp4,rutgers}!cbmvax,sdcrdcf!burdvax}!snark!eric Post: 22 South Warren Avenue, Malvern, PA 19355 Phone: (215)-296-5718
mps@duke.cs.duke.edu (Michael P. Smith) (07/04/87)
In article <108@snark.UUCP> eric@snark.UUCP (Eric S. Raymond) writes: > >The definitions I'm using are the ones I learned when I minored in philosophy, Imagine a discussion on computer science with the summary line "I know what I'm talking about" and the reason given was that "I minored in computer science." Remember, computer science is maybe fifty years old, whereas brilliant people have contributed to the questions Mr. Raymond is snapping off the answers to for 2,000 years. Some of them would have agreed with Mr. Raymond, most of them would not. But none of them would have taken the sophmoric know-it-all tone exhibited in this article. >it's now a century after Kant and the synthetic a priori is quite dead, Immanuel Kant: 1724 - 1804. (OK, this is a cheap shot. But you did claim to speak from authority.) >-- > Eric S. Raymond > UUCP: {{seismo,ihnp4,rutgers}!cbmvax,sdcrdcf!burdvax}!snark!eric > Post: 22 South Warren Avenue, Malvern, PA 19355 > Phone: (215)-296-5718 ____________________________________________________________________________ "There are in us seeds of knowledge, as [sparks] in a flint: philosophers extract them by way of reason, but poets strike them out by imagination, and then they shine more bright." R. Descartes Michael P. Smith ARPA: mps@duke.cs.duke.edu ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
laura@hoptoad.uucp (Laura Creighton) (07/12/87)
In article <108@snark.UUCP> eric@snark.UUCP (Eric S. Raymond) writes: >The relation between truth and beauty is a question for >cognitive psychology, not epistemology. Isn't that begging the question? > >Mathematical 'knowledge' isn't knowledge about the 'reality' epistemologists >and ontologists worry about at all; it's 'knowledge' about games played with >marks on paper (evolved with the instrumental goal of causing pleasure in >other mathematicians :-)). The fact that mathematical 'knowledge' is useful >in forming predictive hypotheses about 'reality' is interesting, but of >very little interest to epistemology -- because the map is not the territory; >we throw away a lot of information in making the exceedingly complex mapping >from, say, falling cannonballs to F=ma. But why is the exceedingly complex mapping so beautiful? F=ma is not complex; on the contrary it is very simple. awe inspiringly, beautifully, simple. -- (C) Copyright 1987 Laura Creighton - you may redistribute only if your recipients may. ``One must pay dearly for immortality: one has to die several times while alive.'' -- Nietzsche Laura Creighton ihnp4!hoptoad!laura utzoo!hoptoad!laura sun!hoptoad!laura