obnoxio@BRAHMS.BERKELEY.EDU (Obnoxious Math Grad Student) (07/21/87)
In article <2385@ames.arpa>, eugene@pioneer (Eugene Miya N.) writes: >This is why our science can predict the new discoveries of >superconductivity right? Theorists had made speculations about high Tc superconductors long before they were discovered. But since theory people have such limited imagina- tions, they need giant hints from nature in order to identify the correct zeroth order approximation that will kick start their calculations. (I seem to recall reading a survey article on this--meaning conjectures about high Tc, of course--a few years ago in "Physics Today".) > (sorry, I didn't want to sound too sarcastic, >since we don't have a theory.) Well, I *did* want to sound sarcastic. ucbvax!brahms!weemba Matthew P Wiener/Brahms Gang/Berkeley CA 94720
steve@hubcap.UUCP (Steve ) (07/21/87)
in article <8707210421.AA16893@brahms.Berkeley.EDU>, obnoxio@BRAHMS.BERKELEY.EDU (Obnoxious Math Grad Student) says: > > In article <2385@ames.arpa>, eugene@pioneer (Eugene Miya N.) writes: >>This is why our science can predict the new discoveries of >>superconductivity right? This discussion is getting a bit out of hand. The question before us is the of philosophy within the scientific method. Ad hominem arguments aside, there is an interplay. Let's take QM, for example. Many basic changes to the view of the world were required - and even folks like Einstein were not particularly happy about it. (That's the model part). But whether or not one should accept the Copenhaven intrepretation is (I claim) a philosophical issue. Perhaps a clearer distinction is the Brouwer intuitionistic argument - he flat wouldn't accept the idealistic view proposed by Hilbert et. al. Having said so, he proposed to "do it all over," logic and all. Now, do you accept Hilbert or Brouwer? Or both? Steve Stevenson steve@hubcap.clemson.edu (aka D. E. Stevenson), dsteven@clemson.csnet Department of Computer Science, (803)656-5880.mabell Clemson Univeristy, Clemson, SC 29634-1906
litow@uwm-cs.UUCP (07/21/87)
In article <8707210421.AA16893@brahms.Berkeley.EDU>, obnoxio@BRAHMS.BERKELEY.EDU (Obnoxious Math Grad Student) writes: > Theorists had made speculations about high Tc superconductors long before > they were discovered. But since theory people have such limited imagina- > tions, they need giant hints from nature in order to identify the correct > zeroth order approximation that will kick start their calculations. The above point is very well made. I do not agree that theorists have limited imaginations. I rather thought that 'hints from nature' combined with theoretical calculations,etc. were,taken together,what one generally calls Physics. However,the main contribution in the above paragraph is the idea that significance in a derivation may only be discernable to human intellect after just such a kick start (colorful but useful language) which gets the iteration going so to speak. I would like to extend the observation made by M.Wiener to computer science. In brief his remark explains why I do not accept Church's Thesis. I think that if CT were really the case,then the structure of the physical world would not play a role in computing and vice versa. I am not claiming that physics enters into computing in a first order way. The theorems of computational complexity theory e.g. intractability of Pressburger Theory do not depend upon thermodynamics but the actual scope of our ability to compute may indeed depend upon thermo. I am not speaking of bigger and faster but of conceptual changes caused by our understanding of subtle relations between computing and physics. It is just those 'kick starts' that seem to me to deny that computability is subsumed by Turing machines. I expect that such 'kick starts' will shortly be identified in computer science.