mps@duke.cs.duke.edu (Michael P. Smith) (07/26/87)
In article <68@thirdi.UUCP> sarge@thirdi.UUCP (Sarge Gerbode) writes: >The notion of what truly constitutes compulsion in the area of thought is >somewhat unclear (to me). Is logic a form of application of force? Does >demonstration enforce agreement? Or should force be regarded as the >application of pain and duress (or a threat of some kind)? My inclination is >to apply the term to the latter. If anyone has views on the topic of what >consititutes the use of force or coercion, I'd be interested to hear them. You might be interested in the introduction to Robert Nozick's PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS (Harvard 1981). He characterizes typical philosophical argument as coercive, and adopts instead the mode of "philosophical explanation" (hence the book's title). The basic idea is that instead of trying to *prove* philosophical position P true, one should try to *explain* how P is possible. Besides being nicer, Nozick argues (explains?), the explanatory approach tends to produce understanding, as opposed to mere conviction, and so fits better the end of philosophy. Note that both *proof* and *explanation* employ logic, but in different ways. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- "I do not take the skeptic seriously enough to want to teach him; I do take what he says seriously enough to want to learn from it." R. Nozick Michael P. Smith ARPA: mps@duke.cs.duke.edu ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
cliff@rlgvax.UUCP (Cliff Joslyn) (07/28/87)
In article <9962@duke.cs.duke.edu>, mps@duke.cs.duke.edu (Michael P. Smith) writes: > The basic idea > is that instead of trying to *prove* philosophical position P true, > one should try to *explain* how P is possible. Besides being nicer, > Nozick argues (explains?), the explanatory approach tends to produce > understanding, as opposed to mere conviction, and so fits better the > end of philosophy. I believe that this is very similar to something expressed by Kant in the Prolegmonena (although it has been many years since I read it), that explaning how something might be possible is really the task of metaphyics. Wish I could recall more. -- O-----------------------------------------------------------------------> | Cliff Joslyn, Computer Consoles Inc., Reston, Virgnia, but my opinions. | UUCP: ..!seismo!rlgvax!cliff V All the world is biscuit liz1
mps@duke.cs.duke.edu (Michael P. Smith) (07/29/87)
In article <573@rlgvax.UUCP> cliff@rlgvax.UUCP (Cliff Joslyn) writes: [regarding Nozick's favoring of *explanation* over *proof* in philosophy]: > >I believe that this is very similar to something expressed by Kant in the >Prolegmonena (although it has been many years since I read it), that >explaning how something might be possible is really the task of metaphyics. Indeed it is, but Nozick tries to distinguish his method from Kant's in a footnote on page 15. Here's his summation: There is a difference between explaining *p* via *q*, and proving *q* is the correct explanation of *p*. A transcendental argument [Kant's technique] attempts to prove *q* by proving it is part of any correct explanation of *p*, by proving it a precondition of *p*'s possibility. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- "As regards those who adopt a *scientific* method, they have the choice of proceeding either *dogmatically* or *skeptically*; but in any case they are under obligation to proceed *systematically*. I. Kant Michael P. Smith ARPA: mps@duke.cs.duke.edu ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
sarge@thirdi.UUCP (Sarge Gerbode) (07/29/87)
In article <1541@botter.cs.vu.nl> hansw@cs.vu.nl (Hans Weigand) writes: >Consider the sentences: > Please believe me! (Don't believe it!) > *Please know it! (*Don't know it!) >The ungrammaticality of the latter stems from the lack of control >of "knowing". Evidently, this does not apply to the former. > While admittedly, use of "know" in the imperative is rarer that "believe", it is not unheard of. For instance: "Know your multiplication tables by tomorrow!" or "Know ye that He hath come amongst you," etc.. I don't think the difference is all that major. A minor point. >According to Heidegger, logic has its roots in the original Logos >(cf. Heraclitus). This Logos is defined in a rather violent way >("The Logos holds men together not without violence"). Compare >also the view of violence as "ultimate reason". At the >other hand, philosophy (science) has attempted to escape >from violence since the days of Socrates (see in particular the >work of the Frankfurter Schule). I'm going to display my ignorance here, I'm afraid. I find Heidegger rough going, and I'm not at all sure what he means by "the Logos" and whether it has anything to do with logic. My philosophy dictionary gives several definitions for "Logos", the Heracleitean one being something that sounds like "natural law -- that which, in nature, corresponds to reasoning in persons". I'm not sure, though, if this is the meaning you meant to invoke. Nor am I sure what is meant by "violence as ultimate reason". I also don't know what the Frankfurter Schule is. In order to understand and discuss the issue, we need to understand what is being said, and others (especially Americans, who are generally not steeped in phenomenology) probably share my ignorance in this respect. >I think that anybody will agree there is an important practical >difference between the force of brute violence and the force >of logic, or (in general) language. I tend to agree, but what *is* the essential difference, I wonder? >But the relationship >between violence and truth has always been a fundamental and >unresolved problem of philosophy, and it is not likely to be >resolved in this discussion. I have a lot of faith in the notion that fundamental truths are simple and simple to express. I see no reason not to discuss these matters. Practically everythinng that appears in *.philosophy.* is something that is a fundamental unresolved problem of philosophy. >Refusing to accept a logical >argument (not believing it) obviously endangers the communication >possibilities.... An excellent point. It seems to me that communication is endangered in such a case because a person cannot get a clear conception of something that is self- contradictory or otherwise illogical. -- "Absolute knowledge means never having to change your mind." Sarge Gerbode Institute for Research in Metapsychology 950 Guinda St. Palo Alto, CA 94301 UUCP: pyramid!thirdi!sarge
sarge@thirdi.UUCP (Sarge Gerbode) (07/30/87)
In a sense, Nosick's approach is similar to that of a scientist. The scientist proposes various hypotheses that would explain present phenomena. These hypotheses are then compared with existing data and with other existing phenomena and scientific theories to see if they "fit". A major difference (and one that makes science empirical, where Nosick's method is not) is that in scientific method, new, previously undiscovered phenomena are predicted that would follow from the hypothesis. Also, in Nosick's approach, the conclusions or phenomena to be explained are conceived as derived by some process of *reasoning* from different possible premisses, while in the scientific approach, they are thought to follow at least partially through some *causal* chain, rather than one of reasoning alone. -- "Absolute knowledge means never having to change your mind." Sarge Gerbode Institute for Research in Metapsychology 950 Guinda St. Palo Alto, CA 94301 UUCP: pyramid!thirdi!sarge
flink@mimsy.UUCP (Paul V Torek) (08/04/87)
What is the difference between proof and explanation supposed to be? Presumably, not in logical form: most of what I would commonly call explanations would take the form of modus ponens; and a proof can certainly have this form. Is it that with explanations one is allowed to reject the premises; but in proofs one is (somehow, but how?) "not allowed"? But no proof can do more than present the choice of either rejecting some of the premises, or accepting the conclusion. And any explanation must assert some premises, if only tentatively. (Further, surely those premises are asserted or entertained because they are thought particularly probable, or plausible.) Understanding a logical discussion provides a kind of freedom, not coercion. If psychologically, one feels "forced" upon reading a proof, why is that? Perhaps because one is attached to inconsistent beliefs. But one has the option to release that attachment, and reconsider things afresh. Arguments can be put forward with hostile or with benevolent intent, of course, and they can hurt, or not. But these are different issues --right? -- Paul Torek torek@umix.cc.umich.edu
mps@duke.cs.duke.edu (Michael P. Smith) (08/05/87)
In article <7836@mimsy.UUCP> flink@mimsy.UUCP (Paul V Torek) writes: >What is the difference between proof and explanation supposed to be? >Presumably, not in logical form: most of what I would commonly call >explanations would take the form of modus ponens; and a proof can >certainly have this form. Proofs and explanations differ in *epistemic direction*. (The phrase and the following explanation come from Michael Dummett's "The Justification of Deduction," although I doubt that he would claim to be the originator of either.) Consider a proof and an explanation both having the logical form of *modus ponens*: Proof: Explanation: 1. A -> B A' -> B' 2. A A' --- --- 3. B B' In a proof, the direction of *inference* coincides with that of *logical consequence*. That is, 1 & 2 are epistemically warranted independently of the proof, and 3 inherits some of that warrant through the proof. Put simply, we know 1 and 2 in advance, we don't know 3 in advance, and we come to know 3 by proving it from 1 and 2. In an explanation, there may be no inference (in the sense of fixation of belief) at all. But often there is, and the direction of the inference runs *counter* to that of the logical consequence involved. That is, 3 will be better known than either 1 or 2, and these logical premises will be warranted (or have their epistemic weight increased) through providing an explanation of the known fact 3. A stereotypical, if not necessarily typical, case involves subsumption of an individual case under a general rule: 1. Anyone holding an emerald survives the glance of a basilisk. 2. I am holding an emerald. 3. So I survive the glance of a basilisk. Before my confrontation with the basilisk, I may run through this bit of reasoning to assure myself of the truth of its logical conclusion. But we can imagine also this syllogism occurring to me after a chance meeting with the beast, when the conclusion is evident, as a way of confirming either of the premises. For Charles Peirce, there were three types of inference possible above. I may *deduce* 3 from 1 & 2. By *induction*, I derive 2 from 1 & 3. Finally, *abduction* allows one to ascend to general principles like 1 from particulars like 2 & 3. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Michael P. Smith ARPA: mps@duke.cs.duke.edu "Tu ne me chercherais pas si tu ne m'avais trouve." Pascal ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
cliff@rlgvax.UUCP (Cliff Joslyn) (08/11/87)
In article <10001@duke.cs.duke.edu>, mps@duke.cs.duke.edu (Michael P. Smith) writes: > In article <7836@mimsy.UUCP> flink@mimsy.UUCP (Paul V Torek) writes: > >What is the difference between proof and explanation supposed to be? > >Presumably, not in logical form: most of what I would commonly call > >explanations would take the form of modus ponens; and a proof can > >certainly have this form. > > [ discussion of deduction, induction, and abduction ] So, to summarize: 1: A->B 2: A 3: B Deduction: { 1,2 } -> 3 Induction: { 1,3 } -> 2 Abduction: { 2,3 } -> 1 Now return to the original question. Presumably proof is deduction. Is explanation induction, abduction, or perhaps either (i.e. ~deduction)? -- O---------------------------------------------------------------------------> | Cliff Joslyn, Computer Consoles Inc., Reston, Virginia, but my opinions. | UUCP: ..!seismo!rlgvax!cliff Phone: (703) 648-3346 - W (703) 524-1962 - H V All the world is biscuit shaped