biep@cs.vu.nl (J. A. "Biep" Durieux) (07/15/87)
1) I think this discussion belongs in sci.philosophy.tech, and perhaps in
sci.research, but definitely not in any of the other groups. Please let's
move out of the wrong newsgroups. This article is meant as a merger of
two discussions, one in sci.med (and other places), and one in comp.ai.
Followups will go to sci.philosophy.tech *only*.
2) There are multitudes of definitions for science, and even more usages.
Here I talk just about a rather generally accepted stance.
3) There is craft (what engineers and the like do), art (about which I
don't want to speak), science (the methodically unraveling of the
secrets of the world ("world" in a broad sense), and philosophy (the
necessary building of footholds, standing on which science can be done).
4) Philosophy starts with quarreling about whether God exists, then whether
I exist (some say the other way round - for "God" some read "anything at all"),
then whether an outside world exist, then how we should look at that world
(yielding things like epistemology, ethics, aesthetics, etc.), and,
choosing epistemology, which ways of getting knowledge are there and which
ones have which value. One of these methods (as many philosophers hold)
is reason, and there come logic and mathematics around the corner.
Still much dispute (intuitionism for example - could you give us an intro,
Lambert Meertens? - or "what constitutes a proof", "what is `mathematical
rigour'", etc.) and uncertainty (liars paradox) around, as the means of
thinking are still being defined, so they cannot be used freely yet.
Perhaps that is a good working definition of science: thinking there where
the means for thinking are not yet finished.
5) Science starts (or: sciences start) from the results of the philosophers'
work (unhappily the philosophers aren't ready yet, so those results are
not as sure as they should be, and certainly not as sure as they are often
thought to be by non-philosophical scientists) exploring the world.
6) The definition of "science", and of scientific method, is by its very
nature a philosophical, not a scientifical matter. Otherwise one would
get paradoxes like:
Ockhams razor tells us to throw away any non-necessary principles.
The principle of Ockhams razor is non-necessary.
So let's throw away Ockhams razor.
(Happily, the director of the British Museum will not let you touch it,
but anyway, the case is clear.)
7) The above is highly simplified, but I believe that simple introductions
are wanting on usenet. Too often I fall into a discussion which supposes
knowledge I don't have, of I see some participants don't have.
8) If this spawns serious discussion (only in sci.philosophy.tech, please!)
I would be more than pleased.
--
Biep. (biep@cs.vu.nl via mcvax)
Unix is a philosophy, not an operating system. Especially the latter.mojo@reed.UUCP (Eddie [Ex-Delivery Boy]) (07/15/87)
In article <813@klipper.cs.vu.nl> biep@cs.vu.nl (J. A. "Biep" Durieux) writes: >5) Science starts (or: sciences start) from the results of the philosophers' >work (unhappily the philosophers aren't ready yet, so those results are >not as sure as they should be, and certainly not as sure as they are often >thought to be by non-philosophical scientists) exploring the world. I don't think _philosophers_ are a prerequisite for science. While the scientific method itself presupposes a sort of pragmatic rationalist empiricism (hey, I can generate buzzwords! :-), I think this is in many ways the default state for the human mind. Certainly people were trusting their senses, and to a lesser extent their reason, before the concept of philosophy was so much as a gleam in the eyes of Whatever Gods There Be. And I would hazard a guess that the question "Why do I get burned when I stick my hand in the fire to pull out the mammoth steak I dropped" predated "Do I exist". >6) The definition of "science", and of scientific method, is by its very >nature a philosophical, not a scientifical matter. Otherwise one would >get paradoxes like: Think so? I think philosophy is much more prone than science to create paradoxes like the Occam's Razor one you cited. But that could be opening a whole new can of worms. Anyway, Biep, thanks for condensing this whole thing. I was catching fragments of it but not enough to follow the issues, really. > Biep. (biep@cs.vu.nl via mcvax) >Unix is a philosophy, not an operating system. Especially the latter.
mojo@reed.UUCP (Eddie [Ex-Delivery Boy]) (07/15/87)
| | Moo! | / | / ^ | / ^ ^ / \ | / / \ ^ Nathan Tenny / X \ %%%%% / X \ mojo@reed.UUCP / / \ %%% %%% / \ \ ...!tektronix!reed!mojo / / \%% * * %%/ \ \ / %% %% \ \ "I want to thank all those who made this / %%%%%%%%%%% \ \ night necessary." --Yogi Berra \
steve@hubcap.UUCP (Steve ) (07/16/87)
In article <6617@reed.UUCP>, mojo@reed.UUCP (Eddie [Ex-Delivery Boy]) writes: > In article <813@klipper.cs.vu.nl> biep@cs.vu.nl (J. A. "Biep" Durieux) writes: > >5) Science starts (or: sciences start) from the results of the philosophers' > >work > I don't think _philosophers_ are a prerequisite for science. > > >6) The definition of "science", and of scientific method, is by its very > >nature a philosophical, not a scientifical matter. I don't see why the "scientist" and "philosopher" are disjoint. After all, Leibniz (I'm not opening that mess again) was a philosopher and scientist; as was Newton and a whole host of others. The split is relatively recent. The philosopher's job is to ask such questions as what to believe, accept as truth, etc. The scientist's job is to generate it.
eugene@pioneer.arpa (Eugene Miya N.) (07/16/87)
In article <300@hubcap.UUCP> steve@hubcap.UUCP (Steve ) writes: >I don't see why the "scientist" and "philosopher" are disjoint. They are not, I view them as complementary, but to understand why people think that way see what happens when you stay a net discussion about counting the number of teeth a horse has, or asking how many planets orbit the Sun and why. Try to sustain such a discussion. I liked the reference to Newton, not only a theoretician, but developer of the reflecting telescope and other instruments: physical and wel as mental (flexions). From the Rock of Ages Home for Retired Hackers: --eugene miya NASA Ames Research Center eugene@ames-aurora.ARPA "You trust the `reply' command with all those different mailers out there?" "Send mail, avoid follow-ups. If enough, I'll summarize." {hplabs,hao,ihnp4,decwrl,allegra,tektronix,menlo70}!ames!aurora!eugene
biep@cs.vu.nl (J. A. "Biep" Durieux) (07/17/87)
From several responses I understand I have not been clear in my article about the difference between philosophy and science. I was *not* trying to say the distinction existed in time or in persons: it is only a "logical" distinction. Philosophy is something like "thinking without knowing how to think". This is why all "science" before the Illumination (is that the English word for that period) is philosophy. What I meant to say was, that philosophy is the only thing which may come up with a prescript on how to think (including experi- menting, etc.). People can skip this, and take some intuitive response to philosophic questions (and one has to: how many people decided they were there only after a long philosophic quest?), but that is a philosophic stand too. A problem for philosophy is, that as soon as someone doesn't think methodically, his exposition becomes philosophical. This fact isn't doing much good to the name of philosophy. This is also one of the reasons why several of the younger disciplines are very sensitive to the predicate "science", and are doing much to show they aren't "just philosophies" (esp. social sciences, psychology, etc.). In article <6617@reed.UUCP> mojo@reed.UUCP (Eddie [Ex-Delivery Boy]) writes: >In article <813@klipper.cs.vu.nl> biep@cs.vu.nl (J. A. "Biep" Durieux) writes: >>5) Science starts (or: sciences start) from the results of the philosophers' >>work (unhappily the philosophers aren't ready yet, so those results are >>not as sure as they should be, and certainly not as sure as they are often >>thought to be by non-philosophical scientists) exploring the world. >I don't think _philosophers_ are a prerequisite for science. While the >scientific method itself presupposes a sort of pragmatic rationalist >empiricism (hey, I can generate buzzwords! :-), I think this is in many >ways the default state for the human mind. Certainly people were >trusting their senses, and to a lesser extent their reason, before the >concept of philosophy was so much as a gleam in the eyes of Whatever Gods >There Be. And I would hazard a guess that the question "Why do I get >burned when I stick my hand in the fire to pull out the mammoth steak I >dropped" predated "Do I exist". You are right. I wasn't clear. >>6) The definition of "science", and of scientific method, is by its very >>nature a philosophical, not a scientifical matter. Otherwise one would >>get paradoxes like: >Think so? I think philosophy is much more prone than science to create >paradoxes like the Occam's Razor one you cited. But that could be opening >a whole new can of worms. As philosophers don't know how to think, they are very prone to getting stuck in their thoughts. But are you trying to say this shows Occams razor is part of science, or that the definition of scientific method in general is part of science? If so, how does that follow, and if not, what do you mean? [I may miss the "feeling" of your "Think so?", not being a native English speaker] >Anyway, Biep, thanks for condensing this whole thing. I was catching >fragments of it but not enough to follow the issues, really. Well, I know how annoying it is not to be able to follow a seemingly interesting discussion: it happens to me all the time. I have already been pleading in this newsgroup for elementary expositions on the subjects being discussed. Glad you liked my one. -- Biep. (biep@cs.vu.nl via mcvax) I utterly disagree with everything you are saying, but I am prepared to fight to the death for your right to say it. -- Voltaire
smoliar@vaxa.isi.edu (Stephen Smoliar) (07/17/87)
In article <813@klipper.cs.vu.nl> biep@cs.vu.nl (J. A. "Biep" Durieux) writes: >4) Philosophy starts with quarreling about whether God exists, then whether >I exist (some say the other way round - for "God" some read "anything at all"), >then whether an outside world exist, then how we should look at that world >(yielding things like epistemology, ethics, aesthetics, etc.), and, >choosing epistemology, which ways of getting knowledge are there and which >ones have which value. While I may be inclined, in most respects, to agree with this characterization of philosophy, I think it is worth observing that it is highly opinionated. Furthermore, it reflects an assessment of philosophy as it has come to be, as opposed to a historical perspective. For the latter, I feel it might be valuable to bring Bertrand Russell into this discussion by quoting from the final two paragraphs of Chapter IX of his A HISTORY OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY: Democritus--such, at least, is my opinion--is the last of the Greek philosophers to be free from a certain fault which vitiated all later ancient and medieval thought. All the philosophers we have been considering so far were engaged in a disinterested effort to understand the world. They thought it easier to understand than it is, but without this optimism they would not have had the courage to make a beginning. Their attitude, in the main, was genuinely scientific whenever it did not merely embody the prejudices of their age. But it was not ONLY scientific; it was imaginative and vigorous and filled with the delight of adventure. They were interested in everything--meteors and eclipses, fishes and whirlwinds, religion and morality; with a penetrating intellect they combined the zest of children. From this point onwards, there are first certain seeds of decay, in spite of previously unmatched achievement, and then a gradual decadence. What is amiss, even in the best philosophy after Democritus, is an undue emphasis on man as compared with the universe. First comes scepticism, with the Sophists, leading to a study of HOW we know rather than to the attempt to acquire fresh knowledge. Then comes, with Socrates, the emphasis on ethics; with Plato, the rejection of the world of sense in favour of the self-created world of pure thought; with Aristotle, the belief in purpose as the fundamental concept in science. In spite of the genius of Plato and Aristotle, their thought has vices which proved infinitely harmful. After their time, there was a decay of vigour, and a gradual recrudescence of popular superstition. A partially new outlook arose as a result of the victory of Catholic orthodoxy; but it was not until the Renaissance that philosophy regained the vigour and independence that characterize the predecessors of Socrates. I particularly like Russell's phrase: "an undue emphasis on man as compared with the universe." It seems to me (and I recently tried to express this in a review of EPISTEMOLOGY AND COGNITION) that the conceptual gulf which separates the sciences from the humanities is that the humanities place the emphasis on the "human"--what it is that makes man worthy of special consideration--while the sciences regard man as a component of the universe. Because they are, themselves, human, scientists do not consider this view as demeaning as humanists appear to, because they know that components are judged more by the roles they play than by the company they keep. However, I fear that as long as the humanities (and this, sad to say, includes most of philosophy) cling to their insistence that man be regarded as something special, there will continue to be this gulf between the "two cultures;" and as the sciences inquire more and more into the nature of mind, this gulf can only widen.
jbn@glacier.STANFORD.EDU (John B. Nagle) (07/17/87)
In "Planning for Conjunctive Goals" (Artificial Intelligence, vol 32, 1987, p. 333-377), David Chapman, while discussing the history of conjunctive planning research, writes "The three main points of this section are that in retrospect all domain-independent conjunctive planners work the same way; that the action representation which they depend on is inadequate for real-world planning, and that desirable extension to this action representation make planning exponentially harder. It is much longer than such sections are in typical AI papers because domain-independent conjunction planning is unusual as a subfield of AI in showing a clear line of researchers duplicating and building on each other's work. Science is supposed to be like that, but for the most part AI hasn't been." I agree. John Nagle
franka@mmintl.UUCP (Frank Adams) (07/18/87)
In article <813@klipper.cs.vu.nl> biep@cs.vu.nl (J. A. "Biep" Durieux) writes: >4) Philosophy starts with quarreling about whether God exists, then whether >I exist ... > >5) Science starts (or: sciences start) from the results of the philosophers' >work (unhappily the philosophers aren't ready yet, ... I think this view of philosophy is fundamentally backward. Philosophy does not *start* with the kind of fundamental questions posed here. It starts with everyday life, and works backwards to more and more fundamental questions. No subject matter is built on its philosophical "foundations"; rather the foundations are built to try to support the existing subject matter. If the philosophical basis is inadequate, we don't change the subject matter, but instead find a better philosophy. Calculus provides a good example. Calculus was originally developed using infinitesimals. This was found to be inadequate, and limits were invented to supplant it. But the body of theorems making up the subject was not changed by this. Nor is there any reason to believe that this is a temporary state of affairs, that the philosophers will someday be "ready". For each question, there is a deeper question; I see no reason to think that some kind of ultimate question will be found. (For example, few philosophers would regard the existence of God (or of self) as the ultimate question; most would want to know what it means for God or self to exist.) Metaphorically, knowledge is not a building, for which a superstructure is built on a foundation, but a tree, which sends roots down and branches up. -- Frank Adams ihnp4!philabs!pwa-b!mmintl!franka Ashton-Tate 52 Oakland Ave North E. Hartford, CT 06108
steve@hubcap.UUCP (Steve ) (07/20/87)
In article <2250@mmintl.UUCP>, franka@mmintl.UUCP (Frank Adams) writes: > In article <813@klipper.cs.vu.nl> biep@cs.vu.nl (J. A. "Biep" Durieux) writes: > >work (unhappily the philosophers aren't ready yet, ... > > I think this view of philosophy is fundamentally backward. Philosophy does > not *start* with the kind of fundamental questions posed here. > > Calculus provides a good example. Calculus was originally developed using > infinitesimals. Once philosophy started, it continued; so where it started is somewhat immaterial. But the whole thing is cyclical - somebody tries something; it gets criticized and some new things are developed .... I agree that there are fundamental elements of philosophy which start with "real life". But the nature of God does not seem to be the subject of this discussion. You're right: calculus is a reasonable example: infinitesimals are back. Also, limits came out by considering failings of the infinitesimal model. But now there are lots of "limits," and each one gives you a bit different system. I think your confusing the model with "reality." Science deals with models and their predictions. Philosophy seems to deal with how to view models in light of the fact that Nature does as She darn well pleases - with or without our understanding.
steve@hubcap.UUCP (Steve ) (07/20/87)
In article <322@hubcap.UUCP>, steve@hubcap.UUCP (Steve ) writes:
...
Steve Stevenson steve@hubcap.clemson.edu
(aka D. E. Stevenson), dsteven@clemson.csnet
Department of Computer Science, (803)656-5880.mabell
Clemson Univeristy, Clemson, SC 29634-1906mct@praxis.co.uk (Martyn Thomas) (07/20/87)
There is a class of discussion which centres round the following steps: 1 Select a loosely-defined term (eg science: systematic and formulated knowledge - OED). 2 Use it to classify something else (eg Physics is a science) 3 Import some emotional content (eg *unscientific* as a perjorative) 4 Start arguing about whether other things fit the classification (eg AI is not a science). Such discussions are always fruitless (with the possible exception of bananas :-), because the issue ostensibly being discussed is unimportant and the *real* issue (whether AI research is conducted professionally, whether AI is a subject worth studying in isolation .....) never gets identified. Martyn Thomas mct%praxis.uucp@ukc.ac.uk <or> Praxis Systems plc ...seismo!mcvax!ukc!praxis!mct 20 Manvers Street, Tel: +44 225 444700 BATH BA1 1PX England. Fax: +44 225 65205 (Groups 2&3)
eugene@pioneer.arpa (Eugene Miya N.) (07/20/87)
In article <322@hubcap.UUCP> steve@hubcap.UUCP (Steve ) writes: >I think your confusing the model with "reality." Science deals with models and >their predictions. Philosophy seems to deal with how to view models in >light of the fact that Nature does as She darn well pleases - with or without >our understanding. This is why our science can predict the new discoveries of superconductivity right? (sorry, I didn't want to sound too sarcastic, since we don't have a theory.) I think science works best at its boundaries (also works it worst). When we don't really understand things is where the definition of science begins to fall down (e.g., QM, superconductivity, etc.), it's not a static definition, so prediction is a desirable, but not necessary trait. Here is where the play between theory and experiment come in. It was a peculiarly American trait that we emphasized experiment to a fanatic degree (until recently). Consider many of the past great American men of science: Franklin, Edison, and even Lawrence. This analogy is largely Feigenbaum's rehashed with an addition. Kuhn has a lesser know work entitled "The Essential Tension" which is also suggested reading (after Structure of Scientific Revolutions). From the Rock of Ages Home for Retired Hackers: --eugene miya NASA Ames Research Center eugene@ames-aurora.ARPA "You trust the `reply' command with all those different mailers out there?" "Send mail, avoid follow-ups. If enough, I'll summarize." {hplabs,hao,ihnp4,decwrl,allegra,tektronix,menlo70}!ames!aurora!eugene
rjf@eagle.ukc.ac.uk (R.J.Faichney) (07/21/87)
hilosophers aren't ready yet.. > >As philosophers don't know how to think, they are very prone to getting >stuck in their thoughts. OK, so which philosopher frightened your mother while she was pregnant? Seriously, though, folks, this may be a linguistic problem, but it looks like the philosophers need some defending. They think without knowing how to? Anything unmethodical is philosophical? All I can say is, that I only learned how to think [rationally|logically|methodically] when I studied philosophy, and if I'd never done so, I'd be a lot less use (if possible ;-)) in my present job - research in software tools. Ask anyone who has done philosophy to any substantial extent (at least a minor) - no matter how logical, and capable of spotting a falacious argument, you were capable of being before, you'd be moreso after. Biep, I suggest that you either make sure you know something about a subject, or phrase your arguments much more carefully, rather than contribute such an overweening, pontificating (do you have an English dictionary?) article to the net. Robin
turpin@ut-sally.UUCP (07/21/87)
In article <930@newton.praxis.co.uk>, mct@praxis.co.uk (Martyn Thomas) writes: > There is a class of discussion which centres round the following steps: > 1 Select a loosely-defined term (eg science: systematic and formulated > knowledge - OED). > 2 Use it to classify something else (eg Physics is a science) > 3 Import some emotional content (eg *unscientific* as a perjorative) > 4 Start arguing about whether other things fit the classification (eg > AI is not a science). > Such discussions are always fruitless (with the possible exception of > bananas :-), because the issue ostensibly being discussed is unimportant > and the *real* issue (whether AI research is conducted professionally, > whether AI is a subject worth studying in isolation .....) never gets > identified. > Martyn Thomas mct%praxis.uucp@ukc.ac.uk <or> I almost agree with this, but... Consider, for example, creationism. I don't mind it being taught in schools, providing it is in the context of a class on comparative religion, or reactionary philosophy, or similar subject. But it should not be taught in a science class, except perhaps an example of what science is NOT. The reason is simple. Part of what students learn in a science class, through the subject matter as a series of examples, is what science is and how it is done. Including creationism is paving the road for lousy methodology and sloppy thought in future scientests. This is not to say that the currently popular ideas on what constitues science are final, or should not be questioned in the classroom. But like most philosophic knowledge, it cannot be questioned well until it is understood and appreciated. Ignoring current standards results only in nonsense, such as creationism. (If some form of creationism does indeed succeed current scientific thought, an extremely unlikely event, it will not be the twaddle that is currently in vogue.) Russell
turpin@ut-sally.UUCP (Russell Turpin) (07/23/87)
In article <2385@ames.arpa.R>, eugene@pioneer.arpa (Eugene Miya N.) writes: > This is why our science can predict the new discoveries of > superconductivity right? (sorry, I didn't want to sound too sarcastic, > since we don't have a theory.) > --eugene miya The prediction of a discovery, which is a human act, would be more of a historical, rather than scientific, nature. (I do not pretend to address the issue of whether history can be done scientifically, or how much historical logic is required to do science, etc.) Russell
mack@inco.UUCP (Dave Mack) (07/29/87)
Science: uses a formal language (mathematics) which is susceptible to analysis. deals with observable phenomena. proceeds from a relatively small number of explicitly stated axioms. examples: physics, chemistry, mathematics (?) Parascience (for lack of a better word): violates one or more of the conditions for "science." examples: psychology, social science, parapsychology Philosophy: uses an informal (natural) language which is not susceptible to analysis. does not necessarily deal with observable phenomena proceeds from an arbitrary number of explicit and implicit axioms. Of course, this is merely my philosophy. Feel free to disagree with me. -- ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Dave Mack (from Mack's Bedroom :<) McDonnell Douglas-Inco, Inc. DISCLAIMER: The opinions expressed 8201 Greensboro Drive are my own and in no way reflect the McLean, VA 22102 views of McDonnell Douglas or its (703)883-3911 subsidiaries. ...!seismo!sundc!hadron!inco!mack ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
cliff@rlgvax.UUCP (Cliff Joslyn) (07/30/87)
In article <329@inco.UUCP>, mack@inco.UUCP (Dave Mack) writes: > > Science: > uses a formal language (mathematics) which is susceptible > to analysis. > deals with observable phenomena. > proceeds from a relatively small number of explicitly > stated axioms. Howdy neighbor. I must disagree with this. A physicist approaching the world is working perhaps on a specific problem, but with a whole wealth of perhaps even unconscious assumptions about the world and how it works. However, I do believe that he/she is trying to determine those axioms (first principles, fundamental forces, natural laws) from which that whole can be deduced, which is almost exactly the converse of the above. > Philosophy: > uses an informal (natural) language which is not susceptible > to analysis. Only some kinds of philosophy. There is a great deal of "analytical" philosophy of mind and language which is constantly developing novel formal languages. Indeed, logic itself was originally a philosophical endeavor. Of course, what we're talking about is the relation between philosophy and mathematics. However, I'd grant that Kierkegaard and Sartre do not work in formalism (well, maybe Sartre, if you pushed it just right. . .) -- O-----------------------------------------------------------------------> | Cliff Joslyn, Computer Consoles Inc., Reston, Virgnia, but my opinions. | UUCP: ..!seismo!rlgvax!cliff V All the world is biscuit shaped
rjf@eagle.ukc.ac.uk (Robin Faichney) (07/31/87)
as humanists appear to, because they know that components are >judged more by the roles they play than by the company they keep. However, >I fear that as long as the humanities (and this, sad to say, includes most >of philosophy) cling to their insistence that man be regarded as something >special, there will continue to be this gulf between the "two cultures;" >and as the sciences inquire more and more into the nature of mind, this >gulf can only widen. "Scientists do not consider this view as demeaning as humanists appear to". People who work in the humanities are all humanists? Either of these groups generally views objectivity as demeaning? "Components are judged more by the roles they play than the company they keep." What on earth does this mean? Why spoil a clear and fascinating exposition of the history of philosophy with an attempt to start a "My discipline's better than your's" controversy. If the humanities are characterised by their attitude to man, what would they do if they gave that up? Shouldn't serious people try to deal with issues which (in principle, not just because we haven't found the formula yet) require value judgements, as well as matters of fact? Do you really believe that all subjectivity is wrong, and should be discarded without a second thought? Can't we use intellect to explore and understand our feelings from the inside, instead of always trying to explain them away, from the outside? What is needed, to narrow the gulf between the two cultures, is people who appreciate both, for their different aims and achievements. Not a blind and bland insistence that objectivity (or subjectivity) will save the universe. Science may be able to provide the food, but only a humanitarian can argue that we should empathise with the starving, and send it out there. Robin ..!mcvax!ukc!rjf PS If anyone thinks this inappropriate for this group - sue me.
mack@inco.UUCP (Dave Mack) (07/31/87)
Hi, Cliff! How's things at CCI? In article <586@rlgvax.UUCP>, cliff@rlgvax.UUCP (Cliff Joslyn) writes: > In article <329@inco.UUCP>, mack@inco.UUCP (Dave Mack) writes: > > > > Science: > > uses a formal language (mathematics) which is susceptible > > to analysis. > > deals with observable phenomena. > > proceeds from a relatively small number of explicitly > > stated axioms. > > Howdy neighbor. I must disagree with this. A physicist approaching the > world is working perhaps on a specific problem, but with a whole wealth > of perhaps even unconscious assumptions about the world and how it > works. However, I do believe that he/she is trying to determine those > axioms (first principles, fundamental forces, natural laws) from which > that whole can be deduced, which is almost exactly the converse of the > above. We're talking about a different set of axioms here. The axioms I was referring to were of a more general nature. Examples: What we (and our instruments) perceive is the "actual" universe. Physical laws are universal and invariant over time. Physical laws can be represented mathematically. > > Philosophy: > > uses an informal (natural) language which is not susceptible > > to analysis. > > Only some kinds of philosophy. There is a great deal of "analytical" > philosophy of mind and language which is constantly developing novel > formal languages. Indeed, logic itself was originally a philosophical This is why I included the section on parascience. What start out as philosophical endeavors may eventually become parascientific, then scientific. Consider the evolution of alchemy into chemistry. It's a matter of how you choose to define philosophy and science. The fact that chemistry has its roots in the philosophies of Democritus and Aristotle doesn't mean that it is a field of philosophy, rather than a science. > endeavor. Of course, what we're talking about is the relation between > philosophy and mathematics. However, I'd grant that Kierkegaard and > Sartre do not work in formalism (well, maybe Sartre, if you pushed it > just right. . .) I guess I would have to contend that mathematics is not necessarily the *only* formal language imaginable. Philosophy begins where the proper formalism breaks down or has not yet been invented, and we have to fall back to natural language to describe and discuss the topic. I regard about 90% of philosophy as semantic confusion coupled with wishful thinking. Sartre is a good example. For me, "Philosophy" is typified by the lecture Martin Buber gave at the University of Chicago many years back, in which he presented a concise argument against birth control and then ended the lecture by saying that this did not apply to India. -- ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Dave Mack (from Mack's Bedroom :<) McDonnell Douglas-Inco, Inc. DISCLAIMER: The opinions expressed 8201 Greensboro Drive are my own and in no way reflect the McLean, VA 22102 views of McDonnell Douglas or its (703)883-3911 subsidiaries. ...!seismo!sundc!hadron!inco!mack ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
jeff@aiva.ed.ac.uk (Jeff Dalton) (08/03/87)
In article <333@inco.UUCP> mack@inco.UUCP (Dave Mack) writes: >> > Science: proceeds from a relatively small number of explicitly >> > stated axioms. [...] Examples: > What we (and our instruments) perceive is the "actual" universe. > Physical laws are universal and invariant over time. > Physical laws can be represented mathematically. Well, here's a contrasting position: Rules of this sort are more often implicit, not explicit. Making them explicit is Philosophy of Science, rather than Science. Science does not require a philosophical foundation of this sort. It is Science itself that determines what exists, what we can observe, and what representations are useful. We can even imagine discovering that physical laws are not, say, invariant over time. (You could say, I suppose, that then they're not (really) physical laws, but it's not very enlightening to debate merely what we're going to call various things; and it's wrong to suppose that Science starts with a definite notion of "physical law": like "rigorous proof", this is a notion that has been developed over time.)
smoliar@vaxa.isi.edu (Stephen Smoliar) (08/04/87)
In article <3240@eagle.ukc.ac.uk> rjf@ukc.ac.uk (Robin Faichney) writes: > >Why spoil a clear and fascinating exposition of the history of >philosophy with an attempt to start a "My discipline's better than your's" >controversy. If the humanities are characterised by their attitude to man, >what would they do if they gave that up? Shouldn't serious people try to >deal with issues which (in principle, not just because we haven't found >the formula yet) require value judgements, as well as matters of fact? >Do you really believe that all subjectivity is wrong, and should be >discarded without a second thought? Can't we use intellect to explore >and understand our feelings from the inside, instead of always trying to >explain them away, from the outside? > MEA MAXIMA CULPA! I'm afraid I let my comments get out of hand after a somewhat unpleasant run-in with a philosopher, and I should not have let that experience color this discussion. I certainly do not believe that all subjectivity is wrong, but I have been wrestling with why the two cultures gulf should be as problematic as it is. Perhaps the problem arises from attempts to apply subjective attitudes to objective reasoning and vice versa. Thus, an epistemologist may very well object if someone in artificial intelligence attempts to interpret his work in terms of mechanistic models of human thought. His objection may take the form that it is precisely the NON-mechanistic elements of such thought that concern him, and he may even resent the intrusion of artificial intelligence. This will inevitably lead to an exchange which will yield more heat than light . . . all because a practicioner of artificial intelligence was trying to interpret the epistemologists arguments in terms he could grasp. (This is all a thinly-veiled attempt to render a past experience in an unbiased manner . . . as if anyone could really do that!) >What is needed, to narrow the gulf between the two cultures, is people >who appreciate both, for their different aims and achievements. Not a >blind and bland insistence that objectivity (or subjectivity) will save >the universe. I agree entirely. Any thoughts as to how our current approach to education might be ammended to encourage such mutual appreciation would be worthy of appreciation in its own right.
franka@mmintl.UUCP (Frank Adams) (08/04/87)
In article <329@inco.UUCP> mack@inco.UUCP (Dave Mack) writes: > > Science: > proceeds from a relatively small number of explicitly > stated axioms. > examples: physics, chemistry, mathematics (?) Of the sciences, only physics ever even *seems* like it is proceeding from a relatively small number of explicitly stated axioms. Even there, I believe this appearance is an illusion; I doubt any significant number of physicists would find that an apt description of their discipline. I do *not* regard mathematics as a science, but neither is it a branch of philosophy. It falls into a category by itself. It is tempting to describe mathematics as proceeding from a relatively small number of explicitly stated axioms; but it doesn't. There is a large body of mathematical knowledge, but the underlying axioms are in dispute. -- Frank Adams ihnp4!philabs!pwa-b!mmintl!franka Ashton-Tate 52 Oakland Ave North E. Hartford, CT 06108
steve@hubcap.UUCP (Steve ) (08/07/87)
in article <122@aiva.ed.ac.uk>, jeff@aiva.ed.ac.uk (Jeff Dalton) says: > .... Making them explicit is Philosophy of Science, rather than Science. > It is Science itself that determines what exists, what we can observe, > and what representations are useful. Whoa. I thought that was the senses and perception and measurement etc. This is/was the purview of philosophy. Science "determined" that "aether" was real until another "science" decided it was not. What you are calling "Science" I would call modeling. -- Steve Stevenson steve@hubcap.clemson.edu (aka D. E. Stevenson), dsteven@clemson.csnet Department of Computer Science, (803)656-5880.mabell Clemson University, Clemson, SC 29634-1906
jeff@aiva.ed.ac.uk (Jeff Dalton) (08/11/87)
In article <369@hubcap.UUCP> steve@hubcap.UUCP (Steve ) writes: >in article <122@aiva.ed.ac.uk>, jeff@aiva.ed.ac.uk (Jeff Dalton) says: >> .... Making them explicit is Philosophy of Science, rather than Science. >> It is Science itself that determines what exists, what we can observe, >> and what representations are useful. >Whoa. I thought that was the senses and perception and measurement etc. >This is/was the purview of philosophy. Science "determined" that "aether" >was real until another "science" decided it was not. What you are calling >"Science" I would call modeling. Senses tell you various things, but what's actually going on (photons, etc.) is not something that philosophy tells you. The reliability of the senses (and the extent to which they are reliable) was something people had to discover (think, e.g., of various optical illusions), not something they needed before they could begin. Philosophy comes along after and trys to figure out what happened. I don't see the significance of your aether example. Do you think there's some better idea of what's real than what science gives us? A wrong answer doesn't mean that it wasn't science. And you seem to be using "modeling" in the way Creationists use "theory". There was a proposed axiom: > What we (and our instruments) perceive is the "actual" universe. Well, is it? There are various notions of actual. Some would say that all of this world (that we seem to live in) is illusion and that actual reality is quite different. Do we need this view to be false before we can do science? The world we (and our instruments) perceive is the world investigated by science, but the notion of "actual" important to science is one that is developed by this investigation, not something that starts it off.
steve@hubcap.UUCP (Steve ) (08/11/87)
in article <147@aiva.ed.ac.uk>, jeff@aiva.ed.ac.uk (Jeff Dalton) says: > > In article <369@hubcap.UUCP> steve@hubcap.UUCP (Steve ) writes: >>in article <122@aiva.ed.ac.uk>, jeff@aiva.ed.ac.uk (Jeff Dalton) says: > I don't see the significance of your aether example. Do you think > there's some better idea of what's real than what science gives us? I was merely trying to point out that "Science" is not an absolute. It was Philosophy which decided ('way back with Leibniz) that one must demonstrate the consequences of ones theory. There are historically lots of examples of the absolute view prevailing for a time. > A wrong answer doesn't mean that it wasn't science. Never said that it did - it is not a personal attack on science. > And you seem to be using "modeling" in the way Creationists use "theory". Definition. A model is a set of assumptions. Ah, the emotive words "creationist" and "theory." [Y'all ought to live in South Carolina if y'all want to get in this one :-) ]. But you're right - under the above definition it is similar. What makes my use of the term model a cut above is that one might assume the following scenerio: challenge ------------------------- \/ \/ observation -> model -> hypotheses -> experimentation -> conclusions /\ /\ /\ /\ | | | | -----><------------><------------><------- So, aether was a model - a set of assumptions. I believe - may the physicists not strike me dead - that the final word is not in on photons yet. So it's a model. -- D. E. (call me Steve) Stevenson steve@hubcap.clemson.edu Department of Computer Science, (803)656-5880.mabell Clemson University, Clemson, SC 29634-1906