biep@cs.vu.nl (J. A. "Biep" Durieux) (08/17/87)
I have a lot of work these days, so I may not react to every article that seems to ask for it. I do read them, however. In article <91@thirdi.UUCP> sarge@thirdi.UUCP (Sarge Gerbode) writes: >It seems that Biep is getting awfully complex, here. Is there really a >difference between methods and methodology? Doesn't the "methodology" of a >particular science, or of any activity, consist of a set of systematic >methods for achieving the goals of that activity? To me, "methodology" refers to the study; "a methodology" refers to a framework of methods, means to achieve something. The relation between a "method" and a "methodology" is to me a part-whole relation, where a "methodology" also carries the notion of being the "top". That means: one has "primitive" methods, which can be performed directly, and more complicated methods, defined in (more) primitive ones. Any such method defines a discipline (e.g. "volt-meter reading", or "making the dog happy"), many of which may remain nameless. With respect to this discipline, that "top" method is a methodology. So I think we don't really differ much. Bob Myers had claimed that methodology was not as powerful as I made it, and then asked me for a definition. That, not any disagreement with you, caused me to write this article. Of course, as I have written before, "philosophers aren't ready yet", that is: there is not (yet) such a thing as a (complete) methodology for any complex activity like doing science, and possibly there never will be (either because it isn't possible, or because it's possible but unreachable, or for any other reason). >The "methodology" of any activity seems to me to be simply the means used to >accomplish the purposes of that activity. So painting has a methodology; so >does making love (at least you can buy books about it!). I agree, if "simply the means" includes the context of those means: when to use them, etc. (if there is an "etc."). >The methodologies of science, then, would consist of the means used in >discovering empirical truths. The methodologies of philosophy would consist >of the means used to discover non-empirical truths. Except that I feel that a scientist may take the methodology of its discipline for granted, and a philosopher shouldn't. P.S.: Does "methods" mean something different from "means" to you? - - - - - - To Robin about your definition of philosophy: You can hold your definition, of course, however I think it a pity to see so many, to me core-philosophical, things fall out. I think, however, that the arts and the social sciences (including psychology) cannot take over aesthetics from philosophy. Just like psychology cannot take over the philosophy of truth and logics, it cannot take over that of beauty: there is a way difference between the philosophical notion of truth (below the level where philosophers start disagreeing) and any psychological notion of conviction or whatever. There has to be. About "arts": do you think about people like sculptors, or about "the arts" as given at universities (humanities and the like)? Anyway, I think both have a different point of view than philosophy has. -- Biep. (biep@cs.vu.nl via mcvax) Their extreme materialism is proven by the fact they say "nobody" when they mean "no person".
rjf@eagle.ukc.ac.uk (Robin Faichney) (08/18/87)
Summary: Expires: Sender: Followup-To: In article <854@klipper.cs.vu.nl> biep@cs.vu.nl (J. A. "Biep" Durieux) writes: >[..a reply to Sarge on methodology..] Sarge, in article <91@thirdi.UUCP>, Bob Myers in another article, and myself in email have suggested quite strongly that Biep is using the word `methodology' wrongly, taking it to be much stronger than it really is. Elsewhere, I have admitted to attempting to redefine `philosophy' (see below). Is Biep trying to redefine `methodology' or not? I think we should be told! ;-) >To Robin about your definition of philosophy: >[..] >I think, however, that >the arts and the social sciences (including psychology) cannot take over >aesthetics from philosophy. I'm not talking about anything `taking over' from anything else. I said that the notion of beauty is a fitter subject for the arts and psychology, than for philosophy. Aesthetics in that case would no longer exist. >Just like psychology cannot take over the >philosophy of truth and logics, it cannot take over that of beauty: Did I say the philosophy of anything should be taken over by anything else? There may be aspects of the concept of beauty which are suitable for philosophical analysis. I am not aware of them. Allowing, for the sake of argument, and given the history of aesthetics, that they probably do exist, I would maintain that our reaction to beauty is primarily an emotional one, and that the subject is more suited to those methods which are explicitly designed to deal with emotions, ie the arts and psychology. Philosophy might still be used to deal with those aspects (few, if any, in my opinion) of beauty to which it is suited. >there is a way difference between the philosophical notion of truth (below the >level where philosophers start disagreeing) and any psychological notion >of conviction or whatever. There has to be. Not only is there a difference between them - the connection is extremely tenuous. A psychologist might investigate a philosophers conviction about truth. That is about as far as it goes. Did I say that the study of truth should be taken over by psychology? >About "arts": do you think about people like sculptors, or about "the arts" >as given at universities (humanities and the like)? Both. >Anyway, I think both >have a different point of view than philosophy has. Couldn't agree more. Thank goodness for that. Like most people, I'm basically quite lazy, and *HATE* having to repeat myself, but: philosophy is not primarily a subject area, but a method for application to other subjects. So there is no question of `taking over'. Philosophy is meta-everything else. It is like an intellectual equivalent of Lapland, which is not a sovereign state in itself, but comprises the northern parts of a number of sovereign states. When a new subject is borne, it almost inevitably derives from reflection, which is a *very* loose form of philosophy. Eventually it `graduates' and becomes distinguished from philosophy, except for it's meta-parts, which are suitable for philosophical analysis. It seems to me that we are not at the end of history; a number of graduations from philosophy have yet to take place. When they do, all that will be left is conceptual analysis. This is what has been left by those subjects which have already graduated. Amoung those which have not, it is possible to discern areas which should have, if the philosophers concerned were really up to date and open minded about developments outside philosophy, and areas which have much in common with the graduands, especially a developing method, which will no longer require philosophy when it becomes established and uncontroversial. So, I suppose I should really say, philosophy is the attempt to discover and propagate conceptual truths, and the mother of other subjects. Pure, unmixed philosophy is the former. As the latter, its state is conditional and temporary, ever changing, losing its children as they mature (though hopefully maintaining some kind of relationship with them), conceiving others, *perhaps*, one day, to reach the menopause and conceive no more - though that will not diminish its own, intrinsic value! > Biep. (biep@cs.vu.nl via mcvax) > Their extreme materialism is proven by the fact > they say "nobody" when they mean "no person". Take it easy, Biep! Robin rjf@ukc.ac.uk
biep@cs.vu.nl (J. A. "Biep" Durieux) (08/20/87)
This article consists of two parts: first a (short) description of how I at the moment feel the different disciplines are related, and then a (long) answer to Robin's latest article. This is rather vague, and please add to it wherever you feel you miss things, and change it wherever you don't agree (and let me know!). 1a) There are some very basic questions about the existence of anything, and of specific things (God, I, an outside world). 1b) There are some very basic questions about the nature of questions, their answers, etc. Typical modern western answers: I exist, a more or less independent outside world exists, and for questions the notions "existence", "truth", "beauty", "justness" exist. Existence allows one to ask about essence. A possible other notion: "being-as-it-should-be", "at-home-ness", "one-ness", used by mystics? 2) Which sources for answers (knowledge) are there, and how can they be used. This is (roughly) epistemology, I think. For truth-answers, one of the sources epistemology teaches us is "derivation", logic. But: there are also sources for beauty- and justness-answers (however I think that part of epistemology is less expanded as yet, westerners being very concerned with truth) 3) The theory of truth-derivation is expanded further in the discipline of logic, (and I feel: the application thereof to models in math). As far as I know, such extensive theories don't exist as yet for the other notions. [The theory of applying these sources of truth- knowledge to certain disciplines is methodology (to me), restricted to truth.] --- WARNING: FOR ME PHILOSOPHY STOPS HERE --- 4) The application of these sources to the external world is science. A very peculiar science is psychology, as it takes those sources for correct (at least the "accepted" sources for truth), and then tries to explain the very notions (truth, beauty, etc.) these sources provide away from absolutes into mere sensations. The same it true for neurology. [This is not criticism, just a pointer to a fact which requires philosophical study]. The point is, they so clearly make the notion of a "souvereign mind" impossible, which westerners have normally supposed to deal with the world. My (long) answer to Robin Faichney: In article <3266@eagle.ukc.ac.uk> rjf@ukc.ac.uk (Robin Faichney) writes: >Sarge, in article <91@thirdi.UUCP>, Bob Myers in another article, and myself >in email have suggested quite strongly that Biep is using the word >`methodology' wrongly, taking it to be much stronger than it really is. >Elsewhere, I have admitted to attempting to redefine `philosophy' (see below). >Is Biep trying to redefine `methodology' or not? I think we should be told! ;-) Quite possible, of course. I just try to state what I feel the word means, but that may very well differ from the "generally accepted" sense. If that is so, however, I have two questions: 1) In what way does that sense differ form my "definition"? Till now, I've only heard (as far as I remember) that my one is "too strong". 2) Where do belong the points I stated which do not belong to methodology in the "generally accepted" sense? Which discipline is debating their validity? (They are common to several sciences, so it's not one of them.) Perhaps someone could go through the list I provided and point out which entries shouldn't be there? Or perhaps a simple answer is possible.. >>I think, however, that the arts and the social sciences (including >>psychology) cannot take over aesthetics from philosophy. >I'm not talking about anything `taking over' from anything else. I said that >the notion of beauty is a fitter subject for the arts and psychology, than >for philosophy. Aesthetics in that case would no longer exist. What I meant was: you cannot just say to aesteticists to stop talking and existing. If you "drive them out" of the Academia (or Stoa, or whatever), should they go and live with Apelles? I think neither they, nor Apelles would be happy with that. >>Just like psychology cannot take over the >>philosophy of truth and logics, it cannot take over that of beauty: > >Did I say the philosophy of anything should be taken over by anything else? >There may be aspects of the concept of beauty which are suitable for >philosophical analysis. I am not aware of them. Allowing, for the sake of >argument, and given the history of aesthetics, that they probably do exist, I know next no nothing about aestetics, but I surely feel the philosophical questions the existence of "beauty" imposes on us (me, at least :-)). >I would maintain that our reaction to beauty is primarily an emotional one, >and that the subject is more suited to those methods which are explicitly >designed to deal with emotions, ie the arts and psychology. Philosophy >might still be used to deal with those aspects (few, if any, in my opinion) >of beauty to which it is suited. I would maintain that our notion of truth is primarily an emotional one, too. Psychology should deal with that aspect, like the psychology of conviction and convincing. However, besides that there is a strong feeling that truth (and beauty and morality) have also an absolute sense, outside the psyche of a person. I may deem something false (ugly, bad) while maintainig that I may be wrong and it is really true (beautiful, good). Someone else may be a relativist, and say the psychological aspects are all there is, and then there is a discussion, and I would call that discussion philosophic. >>there is a way difference between the philosophical notion of truth >>(below the level where philosophers start disagreeing) and any >>psychological notion of conviction or whatever. There has to be. >Not only is there a difference between them - the connection is extremely >tenuous. A psychologist might investigate a philosophers conviction about >truth. That is about as far as it goes. Did I say that the study of truth >should be taken over by psychology? No, but I don't really see why you would do so with beauty and goodness, and not with truth. In what respect is truth different than the others? At the moment, I am programming a lot. Programming is very much concerned with beauty, and here at the department we sometimes accuse each other of ugly programming. Then the other starts defending himself, and showing how his program should be seen. Often one party convinces the other that indeed the program is [beautiful/ugly] after all. Now of course there we have a very restricted notion of beauty, but my point is, that beauty and truth don't really act very differently, seen from a reasonable level of abstraction. >>About "arts": do you think about people like sculptors, or about "the arts" >>as given at universities (humanities and the like)? >Both. In the Netherlands, the second class is called "alfa-wetenschappen", "alpha- sciences" ("beta" being the 'real' sciences, and "gamma" the social sciences, with possibly law. Often, however, law is seen as a group in itself) I see no reason why artists would be specially qualified to talk about aestetics, any more than orators about logics (if you want to have aestetics done by artists, you should have logics done by orators too, and not leave logics part of philosophy, that is) [Hans Weigand poses, which sounds defensible, that logic is a part of linguistics (if I don't mistranslate), and not of philosophy.] As far as the alphas are dealing with aestetics (they are, I think, but they do a lot more: they deal as much with the logics and the ethics of their subject of study), they are applying aestetics (besides using "feeling" and intuition). I think building it (which they in fact do, the way sometimes a physicist works out some new math) is not really their terrain. Anyway, I guess my main question is: in what way do you perceive logics to be different from aestetics and ethics, that you suppose the first to belong to philosophy, and not the others. [Of course the same question could be posed for logics, but I trust you understand what I mean] >Philosophy is not primarily a subject area, but a method for >application to other subjects. Philosophy is meta-everything else. I think questions about the existence of oneself, and the world, form a subject area, and form part of philosophy. Some subject areas cannot but remain philosophy, as they are needed to build logic on (like the question for the nature of truth), while others can eventually, when they are well-enough understood, be based on logic, get a logical framework (I would like to write "methodological" here), and become a science (or something else non-philosophical). >When a new subject is >born, it almost inevitably derives from reflection, which is a *very* >loose form of philosophy. Eventually it `graduates' and becomes distinguished >from philosophy, except for it's meta-parts, which are suitable for >philosophical analysis. It seems to me that we are not at the end of history; >a number of graduations from philosophy have yet to take place. When they do, >all that will be left is conceptual analysis. This is what has been left by >those subjects which have already graduated. Here I disagree: I think there is more than conceptual analysis (except if you define that term broadly enough, but in a former posting you restricted it to something very close around logic). There is everything on which logic is based, and then there is everything which is not graspable by logic, as it reaches in another direction. >Among those which have not, it >is possible to discern areas which should have, if the philosophers concerned >were really up to date and open minded about developments outside philosophy, >and areas which have much in common with the graduands, especially a >developing method, which will no longer require philosophy when it becomes >established and uncontroversial. > >So, I suppose I should really say, philosophy is the attempt to discover >and propagate conceptual truths, and the mother of other subjects. >Pure, unmixed philosophy is the former. As the latter, its state is >conditional and temporary, ever changing, losing its children as they mature >(though hopefully maintaining some kind of relationship with them), >conceiving others, *perhaps*, one day, to reach the menopause and conceive >no more - though that will not diminish its own, intrinsic value! >> Their extreme materialism is proven by the fact >> they say "nobody" when they mean "no person". >Take it easy, Biep! I gave a sign-off quote generator, much like the "fortune"-program under unix. I didn't even know it would choose this one, let alone put it there especially. I also don't know what will come below this article... (Besides that: this one was meant for Ussians, not for English people. :-)) Oh, could I change "extreme" into "utter", in that sentence? -- Biep. (biep@cs.vu.nl via mcvax) Unix is a philosophy, not an operating system. Especially the latter.