jeff@aiva.ed.ac.uk (Jeff Dalton) (01/01/70)
In article <94@thirdi.UUCP> sarge@thirdi.UUCP (Sarge Gerbode) writes: >In article <2495@ames.arpa> yamo@orville.UUCP (Michael J. Yamasaki) writes: >>All philosophy is not Western, nor is it logical, [...] >>Please explain in the context of logic the notion of no mind in Zen >>Buddhism or the Tao. Are these not Philosophy? >When you put it that way, I'd say "No. They are religion." I think parts of >Buddhism are philosophical and -- guess what? -- these are the rational parts, >not the mystical parts. To me, this seems to be almost begging the question. If you are willing to call only the rational parts philosophical, then you will of course find no non-logical philosophy in Buddhism. But the question is whether philosophy should be so narrowly defined, not whether Buddhism fits a given notion of philosophy ... That is: the distinction between the philosophic and religious aspects of Buddhism doesn't match all that neatly with that between rational (logical) and mystical.
jeff@aiva.ed.ac.uk (Jeff Dalton) (01/01/70)
In article <2734@hoptoad.uucp> laura@hoptoad.UUCP (Laura Creighton) writes: > [...] There were a small but very vocal number of people who were >convinced that Buddhism (any sort) was a religion, and required a >belief in a deity, and therefore was a superstition, [...] I wonder what they thought the deity was. Presumably not the Buddha. By the way, there even seem to be interpretations of Christianity that do not involve belief in a deity in the usual sense: e.g., where "God" means the object of "ultimate concern".
sarge@thirdi.UUCP (Sarge Gerbode) (08/10/87)
In article <120@snark.UUCP> eric@snark.UUCP (Eric S. Raymond) writes: >Beauty tends to be a good heuristic for what's *interesting* in >pure mathematics, but it doesn't tell you what's true. In other fields the >connection is even more tenuous. I think what you say in your submission is correct, so far as it goes -- that we tend to see things as beautiful when we understand them (like F = ma). However, I think beauty *is*, in fact, used as a criterion of truth. Given two theories that equally well explain the facts, I think anyone would pick the one that was the most "elegant", i.e. that had the most aesthetic appeal. I wouldn't go so far as to *define* beauty as truth, as Keats did. But I think it *is* an important criterion for choosing between rival theories. I think part of the reason for this is that, as Aristotle says, "pleasure is a sign of the good". Likewise, aesthetics might be regarded as a "sign of the true". We tend to feel good when we discover truth. From past experience, we have learned that discovery of truth (as in your dx/dt example) is accompanied by an aesthetic sensation. So now, when we have an aesthetic sensation, we tend to regard that as a sign of being on the right track. So I don't think it's a "typical-for-philosophically-naive=westerners misprojection. It could be regarded as "true by induction". At least I get a good aesthetic feeling about it. But then, there's no accounting for tastes. Or is there? :-) -- "Absolute knowledge means never having to change your mind." Sarge Gerbode Institute for Research in Metapsychology 950 Guinda St. Palo Alto, CA 94301 UUCP: pyramid!thirdi!sarge
turpin@ut-sally.UUCP (Russell Turpin) (08/10/87)
In article <86@thirdi.UUCP>, sarge@thirdi.UUCP (Sarge Gerbode) writes: > In article <120@snark.UUCP> eric@snark.UUCP (Eric S. Raymond) writes: > > >Beauty tends to be a good heuristic for what's *interesting* in > >pure mathematics, but it doesn't tell you what's true. In other fields the > >connection is even more tenuous. > > I think what you say in your submission is correct, so far as it goes -- that > we tend to see things as beautiful when we understand them (like F = ma). > > However, I think beauty *is*, in fact, used as a criterion of truth. Given two > theories that equally well explain the facts, I think anyone would pick the one > that was the most "elegant", i.e. that had the most aesthetic appeal. I > wouldn't go so far as to *define* beauty as truth, as Keats did. But I think > it *is* an important criterion for choosing between rival theories. > > I think part of the reason for this is that, as Aristotle says, "pleasure is a > sign of the good". Likewise, aesthetics might be regarded as a "sign of the > true". We tend to feel good when we discover truth. From past experience, we > have learned that discovery of truth (as in your dx/dt example) is accompanied > by an aesthetic sensation. So now, when we have an aesthetic sensation, we > tend to regard that as a sign of being on the right track. > > So I don't think it's a "typical-for-philosophically-naive=westerners > misprojection. It could be regarded as "true by induction". > > At least I get a good aesthetic feeling about it. > > But then, there's no accounting for tastes. Or is there? :-) > -- > "Absolute knowledge means never having to change your mind." > > Sarge Gerbode Given two physical theories with the same explanatory power, when do scientists claim one is more elegant or beautiful than the other? Frequently, the criterion for "elegance" is that one theory makes fewer unexplained assumptions about the world. Thus, the more elegant theory is the one that explains as much with less. Certain kinds of assumptions also seem to be preferred over other kinds of assumption. Suppose that two theories were (a) identical in their explanatory power, and (b) identical in their assumptions except for one. For this one assumption, one theory assumes space is homogenous (physical laws are the same everywhere), and the other theory, while not requiring homogeneity, introduces a new force law. Most scientists would find the latter theory less elegant. Both of these criteria for elegance, namely parsimony of assumptions and preference for general principles of symmetry or invariance over the introduction of new forces, can strongly be argued for on philosophical grounds. In short, scientists call theories beautiful because they are more true, or at least, less wrong. What about two theories that have both identical explanatory power and identical assumptions? I think most physicists would view these theories as identical physical theories, but with different mathematical exposition. While one mathematical exposition might be preferred to the other, on whatever grounds some mathematics can be judged more elegant than other, the "physics" is the same. Russell
kube@cogsci.berkeley.edu (Paul Kube) (08/12/87)
In article <8707@ut-sally.UUCP> turpin@ut-sally.UUCP (Russell Turpin) writes: >Both of these criteria for elegance, namely parsimony of >assumptions and preference for general principles of symmetry or >invariance over the introduction of new forces, can strongly be >argued for on philosophical grounds. In short, scientists call >theories beautiful because they are more true, or at least, less >wrong. I find this paragraph a bit hard to parse, but if you're saying you know of strong philosophical arguments for simplicity or elegance of theories being diagnostic of truth, let's hear 'em. People do tend to prefer simple theories, other things being equal; but there are reasons they may have for prefering the simpler theory other than that they think it stands a better chance of being true. For example, someone might find the simpler theory easier to understand, or easier to use to make predictions, or more pleasing to contemplate. I can imagine strong arguments for supposing that these kinds of properties of theories are correlated with simplicity. But *truth*? --Paul kube@berkeley.edu, ...!ucbvax!kube
turpin@ut-sally.UUCP (Russell Turpin) (08/12/87)
In article <20070@ucbvax.BERKELEY.EDU>, kube@cogsci.berkeley.edu (Paul Kube) writes: > In article <8707@ut-sally.UUCP> turpin@ut-sally.UUCP (Russell Turpin) writes: > >Both of these criteria for elegance, namely parsimony of > >assumptions and preference for general principles of symmetry or > >invariance over the introduction of new forces, can strongly be > >argued for on philosophical grounds. In short, scientists call > >theories beautiful because they are more true, or at least, less > >wrong. > > I find this paragraph a bit hard to parse, but if you're saying you > know of strong philosophical arguments for simplicity or elegance of > theories being diagnostic of truth, let's hear 'em... > --Paul kube@berkeley.edu, ...!ucbvax!kube Ockham's razor is a demand for parsimony of assumptions. Whether or not one finds it compelling is a philosophic debate over which much paper has been dirtied (and bits flipped.) But it is a philosophic, as opposed to aesthetic, principle. The term "simpler" is over-used and vague. In my original posting, I made it clear that I was talking about two physical theories which (a) had identical explanatory power and (b) one of which required logically weaker physical assumptions (laws). In short, the other theory is making physical assumptions that provide no additional explanatory power. Since belief in physical laws is justified (in many epistemologies) by reference to their explanatory power (amongst other things), these extra assumptions (putative laws) should be rejected. (This, of course, is just a restatement of a strict version of Ockham's razor.) Russell
laura@hoptoad.uucp (Laura Creighton) (08/13/87)
In article <8727@ut-sally.UUCP> turpin@ut-sally.UUCP (Russell Turpin) writes: >Ockham's razor is a demand for parsimony of assumptions. Whether >or not one finds it compelling is a philosophic debate over which >much paper has been dirtied (and bits flipped.) But it is a >philosophic, as opposed to aesthetic, principle. How do you define philosophic? In my neck of the woods, aesthetics is philosophy. Do you mean epistemologic? -- (C) Copyright 1987 Laura Creighton - you may redistribute only if your recipients may. ``One must pay dearly for immortality: one has to die several times while alive.'' -- Nietzsche Laura Creighton ihnp4!hoptoad!laura utzoo!hoptoad!laura sun!hoptoad!laura
yamo@orville (Michael J. Yamasaki) (08/13/87)
Greetings. Some random comments on recent issues:
All philosophy is not Western, nor is it logical, and certainly formal logic
is not the paramount of philosophy. Please explain in the context of logic
the notion of no mind in Zen Buddhism or the Tao. Are these not Philosophy?
Truth is not necessarily deduced truth, nor is it necessarily the result of
causality. Beauty is as good a criteria for Truth, as deduction and
experimentation is for truth.
Science is a philosophy. Philosophy encompasses science. The bounds of
Truth are not found in science. Explain what Truth
one can know from a singular unique event using science.
Is this not Nothing?
-Yamo-
yamo@ames-nas.arpalaura@hoptoad.uucp (Laura Creighton) (08/14/87)
In article <2495@ames.arpa> yamo@orville.UUCP (Michael J. Yamasaki) writes: > >Greetings. Some random comments on recent issues: > >All philosophy is not Western, nor is it logical, and certainly formal logic >is not the paramount of philosophy. Please explain in the context of logic >the notion of no mind in Zen Buddhism or the Tao. Are these not Philosophy? Good Luck. About 3 years ago, I spent a very frustrating time trying to argue that there are philosophic aspects of any religion, and got nowhere. There were a small but very vocal number of people who were convinced that Buddhism (any sort) was a religion, and required a belief in a deity, and therefore was a superstition, and therefore could be discounted. I hope you do better. >Truth is not necessarily deduced truth, nor is it necessarily the result of >causality. Beauty is as good a criteria for Truth, as deduction and >experimentation is for truth. I know what you mean, but you are running counter to the definitions which I am using, where Truth is epistemological truth -- and thus largely deduced Truth. I have a three-legged stool model of reality, where the first leg is (deduced) truth, and the other two are beauty and (moral) goodness. If Truth is to mean the whole stool, do you have another word for the deduced truth leg? -- (C) Copyright 1987 Laura Creighton - you may redistribute only if your recipients may. ``One must pay dearly for immortality: one has to die several times while alive.'' -- Nietzsche Laura Creighton ihnp4!hoptoad!laura utzoo!hoptoad!laura sun!hoptoad!laura
sarge@thirdi.UUCP (08/14/87)
I regret having to take issue with one who seems to support my assertion of the importance of aesthetics in deciding which of alternate theories to accept. BUT... In article <2495@ames.arpa> yamo@orville.UUCP (Michael J. Yamasaki) writes: >All philosophy is not Western, nor is it logical, and certainly formal logic >is not the paramount of philosophy. Please explain in the context of logic >the notion of no mind in Zen Buddhism or the Tao. Are these not Philosophy? When you put it that way, I'd say "No. They are religion." I think parts of Buddhism are philosophical and -- guess what? -- these are the rational parts, not the mystical parts. I think it's important, too, to make a distinction between "illogical" and "non-logical". Just because something is non-logical doesn't mean it can't be understood through rational means. For instance, rabbits and planets are non-logical, but reason and logic can be applied to understanding them (as well as perception, which is also non-logical). Fundamental assumptions and perceptions cannot be argued for (ex hypothesi). They are simply accepted for non-logical reasons. Since any body of knowledge rests on some sort of assumptions, one could say that any knowledge has a non-logical base. But that doesn't mean its ILlogical. I think philosophy may contain non-logical components, but I don't think it can survive being ILlogical. >Truth is not necessarily deduced truth, nor is it necessarily the result of >causality. Granted. It may be perceived truth or -- possibly -- intuited truth. I doubt that that was ever in question. I'm not sure I understand the part about causality. A priori truths (like mathematical truths) do not seem to be based on causality, but you appear to be making some other point. >Beauty is as good a criterion for Truth, as deduction and experimentation is >for truth. I would concur that it is a criterion; I wouldn't be so bold as to say that it should have the same weight as experimentation and deduction, in scientific pursuits, though it may have *greater* weight in artistic pursuits. Is that what you meant to imply by using "Truth" in one place and 'truth" in the other? >Science is a philosophy. I don't agree with this assertion, because I see science as going after empirical truths while philosophy goes after non-empirical truths (as in our recent lengthy discussions of this topic). -- "Absolute knowledge means never having to change your mind." Sarge Gerbode Institute for Research in Metapsychology 950 Guinda St. Palo Alto, CA 94301 UUCP: pyramid!thirdi!sarge
turpin@ut-sally.UUCP (Russell Turpin) (08/14/87)
In article <2715@hoptoad.uucp>, laura@hoptoad.uucp (Laura Creighton) writes: > > But it is a philosophic, as opposed to aesthetic, principle. > > How do you define philosophic? In my neck of the woods, aesthetics is > philosophy. Do you mean epistemologic? > > Laura Creighton Mea culpa. Thanks for correcting me. Russell feeder . . . feeder
ej150177@cisunx.UUCP (mukherji a) (08/26/87)
Expires: References: <120@snark.UUCP> <86@thirdi.UUCP> <8707@ut-sally.UUCP> <20070@ucbvax.BERKELEY.EDU> <8727@ut-sally.UUCP> <2495@ames.arpa> <2734@hoptoad.uucp> <151@aiva.ed.ac.uk> Sender: Reply-To: ej150177@cisunx.UUCP (mukherji a) Followup-To: Distribution: sci.philosophy.tech Organization: Univ. of Pittsburgh, Comp & Info Sys Keywords: Deity In article <151@aiva.ed.ac.uk> jeff@uk.ac.ed.aiva (Jeff Dalton) writes: >In article <2734@hoptoad.uucp> laura@hoptoad.UUCP (Laura Creighton) writes: >> [...] There were a small but very vocal number of people who were >>convinced that Buddhism (any sort) was a religion, and required a >>belief in a deity, and therefore was a superstition, [...] > >I wonder what they thought the deity was. Presumably not the Buddha. > >By the way, there even seem to be interpretations of Christianity that >do not involve belief in a deity in the usual sense: e.g., where "God" >means the object of "ultimate concern". I am not an expert on Buddhism, but at least in Mahayana Buddhism it may not be very surprising for some to believe that the "deity" worshipped was the Buddha, or at least the Bodhisattvas. In Tantric Buddhism there are deities or at least demi-gods. I was about to adduce the presence of jade etc. images of the Buddha in countries such as Thailand to prove the point, when I glanced at the last paragrapg of Jeff's note and was reminded at the crucifixes and Pietas I had at my R.C. [Jesuit] school in India: obviously such evidence is far from conclusive!! At any rate the non-deity version of Christianity probably comes from attempts to "philosophise" the religion by grounding its religious faith based doctrines on the pagan Greek philosophers. Clearly, religion and philosophy, even when explicitly conbstructed to lead to the same goal may be inconsistent : which do we take as the chara- acterization? Arijit Mukherji ARIJIT@PITTVMS.bitnet