biep@cs.vu.nl (J. A. "Biep" Durieux) (08/12/87)
Finally there is my promised article.
I don't think I can give a rigorous definition of "methodology", neither of
the discipline, nor of the product. Nevertheless I will give a try, perhaps
there are any takers..
A methodology is a set of rules that (in the ideal case) determine the
conduct of a scientist following it in the face of the facts and currect
hypotheses and theories of the (scientific) discipline the methodology
(and the scientist) is about.
That for the abstract point of view. Bob Myers asked me to describe a
methodology for some actual science. I do not have the knowledge to do
so (I do not know when to resort to experiment, etc), but I will try
to describe the form of some of the rules of conduct that a methodology
(for many sciences) will have:
There are rules, stating:
- how to state facts
- how to order facts, givens
- how to relate them and how to find relationships
- how to class them
- how to define concepts (and how to determine, from the facts,
which concepts), and when
- how to do systematics (to relate concepts, to make super-concepts, etc.)
- how to build a taxonomy
- how to choose a terminology
- how to choose a notation, and when to look for another one
- how to describe facts
- how to localize "holes" in our knowledge ("important" holes, that is)
- how and when to try to gather new facts (e.g. observation, introspection,
(controlled) experiment), and what sort of new facts
- how to decide what to observe (so that the result will be useful)
- how to make an observation (e.g. "try to minimize the interference of the
observer with the observed (observee?)", "if possible, do some more
observations than you strictly need - probably it's cheaper (in terms
of time, money, whatever) to do them now than to do them apart later
on")
- how to introspect (perhaps not used in natural sciences?)
- how to set up an experiment
- how to interpret the results of an observation
- how and when to build hypotheses ("how" includes: with which forms
of reasoning)
- when to use which form(s) of reasoning (logic(s), math, statistics,
induction, abduction, heuristic rules, dialectics(?))
- how to describe rules, how to check the adequacy of the description
- how to check hypotheses (e.g. confront with facts (both known and new ones),
choose these facts to cover as broad a spectrum as possible)
- how to value hypotheses (e.g. complexity vs. explanative power, predictive
power, form compared with "related" hypotheses, falsifiability)
- when and how to adapt hypotheses
- when to reject hypotheses
- how to choose between hypotheses (e.g. Occams razor)
- when to introduce "hidden causes"
- when to try to build a theory
- how to describe a theory
- how to check the adequacy of a description (e.g. could I turn this
algorithm into a program - the now-possible check of several
psychological theories)
- how and when to check, value, adapt, expand, restrict, reject theories
- how and when to spit off sub-disciplines
- how and when to merge fields (e.g. some day chemistry might turn into
physics)
Undoubtedly there will be many more aspects to a methodology, but I hope
this makes somewhat clear what I mean by the word. If people either want
to extend this list, or to fill in some "real" rules, by all means do so,
It will probably be very useful for my PhD project! (Cooperative planning
and problem solving, including learning, theory formation, etc.)
One might wish to add "practical methodology":
- how, when and where to apply for money
- how to decide which colleagues to trust (i.e. to accept their theories, etc.
without checking them)
- how often and when to rest
- how much, and in which direction, to specialise
--
Biep. (biep@cs.vu.nl via mcvax)
To be the question or not to be the question, that is.sarge@thirdi.UUCP (Sarge Gerbode) (08/13/87)
In article <850@klipper.cs.vu.nl> biep@cs.vu.nl (J. A. "Biep" Durieux) writes: >A methodology is a set of rules that (in the ideal case) determine the >conduct of a scientist following it in the face of the facts and currect >hypotheses and theories of the (scientific) discipline the methodology >(and the scientist) is about. > >[Biep goes on at great length with specifics.] It seems that Biep is getting awfully complex, here. Is there really a difference between methods and methodology? Doesn't the "methodology" of a particular science, or of any activity, consist of a set of systematic methods for achieving the goals of that activity? The "methodology" of any activity seems to me to be simply the means used to accomplish the purposes of that activity. So painting has a methodology; so does making love (at least you can buy books about it!). The methodologies of science, then, would consist of the means used in discovering empirical truths. The methodologies of philosophy would consist of the means used to discover non-empirical truths. -- "Absolute knowledge means never having to change your mind." Sarge Gerbode Institute for Research in Metapsychology 950 Guinda St. Palo Alto, CA 94301 UUCP: pyramid!thirdi!sarge
steve@hubcap.UUCP (08/14/87)
> In article <850@klipper.cs.vu.nl> biep@cs.vu.nl (J. A. "Biep" Durieux) writes: >> >>[Biep goes on at great length with specifics.] > in article <91@thirdi.UUCP>, sarge@thirdi.UUCP (Sarge Gerbode) says: >> The methodologies of science, then, would consist of the means used in >> discovering empirical truths. The methodologies of philosophy would consist >> of the means used to discover non-empirical truths. I think both sides need exploring. All this started (I think) over the question of the role philosophy in science. [I don't like to dwell too much on "methodology" - it too often has a "mechanistic" quality about it]. I think Sarge has a good point. But the development of methodology relies on list of questions to focus on. Two thoughts come to mind (I hope these are not _non sequitors_). Thomas Aquinas was master of a methodology call "disputatio" (sp?). Latin was standardized to deny him that tool. [Food for thought]. That got me interested in kindred concepts (methodology of discourse). Hard to come up with any real leads. The counter example to methodology is in Barrett's book _The Illusion of Technique_. On Biep's side, knowing what questions to ask is critical. In this age of the quick fix, it is hard to pin folks down as to what the ultimate questions really are. [This has been particularly annoying in my own discipline.] Anyway, continue on, you two. -- D. E. (call me Steve) Stevenson steve@hubcap.clemson.edu Department of Computer Science, (803)656-5880.mabell Clemson University, Clemson, SC 29634-1906
sarge@thirdi.UUCP (08/15/87)
In article <385@hubcap.UUCP> steve@hubcap.UUCP ("Steve" Stevenson) writes: >On Biep's side, knowing what questions to ask is critical. In this age of the >quick fix, it is hard to pin folks down as to what the ultimate questions >really are. [This has been particularly annoying in my own discipline.] Good point, and I didn't mean to denigrate Biep's presentation. I think, however, that you can't specify the questions, nor the methodology, in advance. Both evolve with the science. -- "Absolute knowledge means never having to change your mind." Sarge Gerbode Institute for Research in Metapsychology 950 Guinda St. Palo Alto, CA 94301 UUCP: pyramid!thirdi!sarge
steve@hubcap.UUCP ("Steve" Stevenson) (08/17/87)
in article <97@thirdi.UUCP>, sarge@thirdi.UUCP (Sarge Gerbode) says: > > In article <385@hubcap.UUCP> steve@hubcap.UUCP ("Steve" Stevenson) writes: > [comments about knowing what questions to ask.] > Good point, and I didn't mean to denigrate Biep's presentation. I think, > however, that you can't specify the questions, nor the methodology, in advance. > Both evolve with the science. To some degree you are right. That might be the difference between a mature and an evolving science. A science probably stagnates if it keeps (1) turned inward and (2) asking the same tired questions (long ago answered.). Part of my interest is pedegogical: My students beat on me saying "You never tell us where we're going." I say,"But you were supposed to get that in xxx course." Well, they didn't get it there: so now I have to do it. I used to think them blase and not curious - now I think that they haven't been primed to ask "the usual questions." Biep's list is nice in that respect as it is a list of questions to prime the pump. -- D. E. (call me Steve) Stevenson steve@hubcap.clemson.edu Department of Computer Science, (803)656-5880.mabell Clemson University, Clemson, SC 29634-1906
myers@tybalt.caltech.edu (Bob Myers) (08/20/87)
In article <850@klipper.cs.vu.nl> biep@cs.vu.nl (J. A. "Biep" Durieux) writes: > >- how and when to build hypotheses ("how" includes: with which forms > of reasoning) Where I had problems with your initial comments (way back when) was your statement science is not creative: in particular, that the methodology tells you what hypotheses to consider. (Sorry, I can't quote.) The statement quoted above is the closest thing I found to that earlier comment, but I think it differs in important ways. "How" is not the same as "what". Hypotheses don't have to be built from reasoning, either. Science is not a mechanistic, but a human endeavor. One doesn't go blindly following methodology and come up with full-blown theories. Creativity, most especially in the formation of hypotheses (personal opinion), is a very important part of science. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Well if that's the best there is Then I won't buy it Well if that's the only game Then I won't play Bob Myers myers@tybalt.caltech.edu {rutgers,amdahl}!cit-vax!tybalt.caltech.edu!myers
biep@cs.vu.nl (J. A. "Biep" Durieux) (08/23/87)
[Non-related question to Sarge Gerbode: what is meta-psychology?] In article <3692@cit-vax.Caltech.Edu>, myers@tybalt.caltech.edu.UUCP (Bob Myers) writes: >Where I had problems with your initial comments (way back when) was >your statement science is not creative: in particular, that the >methodology tells you what hypotheses to consider. ... >Science is not a mechanistic, but a human endeavor. One doesn't go >blindly following methodology and come up with full-blown theories. >Creativity, most especially in the formation of hypotheses (personal >opinion), is a very important part of science. OK, three points. 1) I think I have good reasons to keep playing the devil's advocate. Not that I don't believe scientific behaviour is creative, but my current task is to build a system in which actors (say robots) solve problems and make plans. One of the hopes I have with this discussion is to find rules of behaviour that are absolute (= programmable). If I now just admitted you are right, I might never find any such rules. So let me challenge you to point out something which is or was really creative in science. Then I'll try to find a general rule catching that case. I'll promise to avoid any conscious use of the hindsight criterion in the use of the rule (but not in stating it, of course). I only hope I will know something about the field you'll choose. 2) At the moment scientific behaviour is certainly creative, as (as I have said) "philosophers aren't ready yet". You may hold they never will be, and I don't disagree beforehand. But I do feel it's possible to formalize scientific methodology much more than is usually done (and I am trying to do so - see point 1). I had hoped many people would have attacked (or commented on) specific rules from my list, so that I might have refined or changed them. 3) This is just a question of definition, of course, but I think that if a scientist makes conscious ("externalizes" ?) a methodo- logical rule (or simply: a method, a way to do something), he is doing philosophy. This is not true if he just uses some conscious or unconscious rule. Now a methodology may contain rules that state that a scientist should do so, i.e. that he stops and reflects about how he has been trying to get things done, and to find out which ways worked and which ways didn't. At that point the scientist is doing meta-<discipline>. (The prefix "meta-" is much used, but to my knowledge ill-defined. Does anyone have a better def than the (conflicting) - meta-X == X of X - meta-X == the science studying X as object ? ) Please keep those objections and counter-arguments coming... -- Biep. (biep@cs.vu.nl via mcvax) As the NSA is now skipping last lines of articles, let's discuss our anti-american conspiracy over here.
myers@tybalt.caltech.edu (Bob Myers) (08/24/87)
In article <866@klipper.cs.vu.nl> biep@cs.vu.nl (J. A. "Biep" Durieux) writes: > > In article <3692@cit-vax.Caltech.Edu>, > myers@tybalt.caltech.edu.UUCP (Bob Myers) writes: >>Where I had problems with your initial comments (way back when) was >>your statement science is not creative: in particular, that the >>methodology tells you what hypotheses to consider. > > So let me challenge you to point out > something which is or was really creative in science. Then I'll > try to find a general rule catching that case. I'll promise to > avoid any conscious use of the hindsight criterion in the use > of the rule (but not in stating it, of course). I only hope I > will know something about the field you'll choose. Ok. As I have said, I think the creation of hypotheses is the major source of creativity in science. So... how about the Continental Drift hypothesis in Geology, thought up to explain the fit of the continents across the Atlantic. Where does it come from? How do you get it out of the methodology? Don't like it? Try Evolution. The idea that all present-day species are descended from earlier, different ones. The idea in its simplest form is what I'm talking about -- never mind Natural selection and all that. >1) I think I have good reasons to keep playing the devil's advocate. Not > that I don't believe scientific behaviour is creative, but my > current task is to build a system in which actors (say robots) > solve problems and make plans. One of the hopes I have with this > discussion is to find rules of behaviour that are absolute (= > programmable). Problem solving is one thing. Science is another. In my mind, the purpose of science is to explain phenomena, not solve problems. By "explain phenomena" I mean create an isomorphism between the mind of the scientist and physical reality. I think of hypotheses as "test" isomorphisms. I don't see a link between this and "robots". Incidently, I think this is the source of scientific beauty, too. A beautiful theory is one which I understand (intuitively) and closely approximates reality. Naturally, a simpler theory is easier to understand. For example, planetary positions can be represented by Earth-centered or Sun-centered coordinate systems, with equal accuracy. Which one is the "right" one? I don't think there is a right one. (So much for scientific "Truth".) But clearly, one is easier to understand, to model within your mind. >2) At the moment scientific behaviour is certainly creative, as (as I > have said) "philosophers aren't ready yet". You may hold they > never will be, and I don't disagree beforehand. > >3) This is just a question of definition, of course, but I think that > if a scientist makes conscious ("externalizes" ?) a methodo- > logical rule (or simply: a method, a way to do something), he > is doing philosophy. This is not true if he just uses some > conscious or unconscious rule. Now a methodology may contain > rules that state that a scientist should do so, i.e. that he > stops and reflects about how he has been trying to get things > done, and to find out which ways worked and which ways didn't. > At that point the scientist is doing meta-<discipline>. I think it is silly to differentiate between science and philosophy the way you do. Certainly, it is possible to define away all the creativity in science and call it "philosophy", but what does that gain you? I think it is impossible to completely define the methodology ("they never will be"), and thus I see your distinction between science and philosophy as essentially pointless. For example, I could argue that Continental Drift or Evolution is a framework in which geology or biology is done, i.e., it's part of the methodology in some sense. That it is really meta-geology or meta-biology, since these concepts greatly affect the way geologists and biologists think about their fields. I think this is ridiculous, though, because I think the purpose of these sciences is to explain (create an understanding of, create isomorphisms between the mind of the scientist and physical reality) their subjects (Earth processes and Life, to oversimplify). And these "framework" ideas are certainly part of explaining that. (Actually, I wouldn't say either of these ideas are part of the methodology.) Perhaps when I see how you deal with either of these two ideas I'll understand what you mean better. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Bob Myers myers@tybalt.caltech.edu {rutgers,amdahl}!cit-vax!tybalt.caltech.edu!myers
jeff@aiva.ed.ac.uk (Jeff Dalton) (08/24/87)
In article <866@klipper.cs.vu.nl> biep@cs.vu.nl (J. A. "Biep" Durieux) writes: >1) I think I have good reasons to keep playing the devil's advocate. Not > that I don't believe scientific behaviour is creative, but my > current task is to build a system in which actors (say robots) > solve problems and make plans. You agree that science is creative now, and presumably would agree that we can solve problems and make plans. Therefore, you should agree that the ability to automate science (which we don't yet have) is not necessary for solving problems and making plans, and hence that your robot system can be built without it. So you don't need automatic science even for human-level performance, much less for something like Rodney Brooks' "robot insects". But they would also solve problems and make plans. >2) At the moment scientific behaviour is certainly creative, as (as I > have said) "philosophers aren't ready yet". You may hold they > never will be, and I don't disagree beforehand. But it's not beforehand as far as philosophy is concerned. There have been attempts to develop an inductive logic, effectively to do science automatically, and they have failed. We can't even do deduction (as in automatic theorem proving) fully automatically. Mathematics is still "creative" and likely to remain so. -- Jeff
sarge@thirdi.UUCP (Sarge Gerbode) (08/25/87)
Re: article <866@klipper.cs.vu.nl> (and other recent submissions) biep@cs.vu.nl (J. A. "Biep" Durieux): Some comments on recent submissions by Biep. I enjoy his stuff, and I think he's quite courageous for sticking his neck out. Of course that doesn't stop me from chopping away. >To me, "methodology" refers to the study; "a methodology" refers to a >framework of methods, means to achieve something. The relation between >a "method" and a "methodology" is to me a part-whole relation, where >a "methodology" also carries the notion of being the "top". That means: >one has "primitive" methods, which can be performed directly, and more >complicated methods, defined in (more) primitive ones. Any such method >defines a discipline (e.g. "volt-meter reading", or "making the dog happy"), >many of which may remain nameless. With respect to this discipline, >that "top" method is a methodology. So I think we don't really differ much. In that sense, any method could be considered a methodology, with respect to the "subroutines" contained in it, and any methodology could be called a "method", with respect to any other method of which it is a subroutine. For instance, I have a particular way of startiing a car (put in key, turn to the right, pump gas pedal, when car starts, release key and cease pumping). Biep, it seems, would call this a methodology, and the individual components "methods". But if one considered my way of driving a car as a "methodology" (not one I would necessarily recommend to anyone, by the way), then my way of starting a car would be a "method", as I understand Biep's definition. I don't think we are really talking about anything more exciting than means and ends. An end may be a means in another context or a means may be an end in another context. Why use a ten-letter word with an air of mystery about it when one can use a five-letter word that everyone understands? I am not sure whether or not the concept of a means includes the context in which it is used, or when to use them. The concept of the means probably tells you *something* about the purposes for which it's used. A screwdriver is for screwing screws (though it could be used for other things). But it tends to be rather non-specific. The non-specificness, or independence of context, may be a virtue, as in modular computer programming. >Of course, as I have written before, "philosophers aren't ready yet", that is: >there is not (yet) such a thing as a (complete) methodology for any complex >activity like doing science, and possibly there never will be (either because >it isn't possible, or because it's possible but unreachable, or for any other >reason). Maybe scientists "aren't ready yet", either. If they had their fixed and ideal methodology all figured out, then all the problems of science would be solved in a finite amount of time (the amount of time it took to go through the mechanics of applying the methodology). But, as I said, methodologies (means) grow with the science. I'm not sure a science that had its means worked out in advance would be all that interesting (the only one I can think of is the science of playing tac-tac-toe). In another article (850@klipper.cs.vu.nl) Biep gives a clue about what he's driving at: >One of the hopes I have with this discussion is to find rules of behaviour >that are absolute (= programmable). If I now just admitted you are right, I >might never find any such rules. So let me challenge you to point out >something which is or was really creative in science. Then I'll try to find a >general rule catching that case. I'll promise to avoid any conscious use of >the hindsight criterion in the use of the rule (but not in stating it, of >course). I only hope I will know something about the field you'll choose. That's useful to know, because it puts things in a certain context and raises the question whether what currently passes for creativity might eventually be subsumed under certain fixed rules. What Biep seems to want to do is to work towards relegating tasks defined as philosophical to humans and tasks defined as scientific to machines. My personal feeling is that, heuristically, it's a good thing to look for fixed rules, but humans have a way of breaking rules or making new rules (*improving* rules) when it suits them. I don't know whether this faculty is programmable. I think there may well be a useful distinction between making rules and following them, and this may (or may not) separate man from machine. But I honestly don't think this is the same distinction as the distinction between philosophy and science. I still think the correct distinction is empirical/non-empirical. -- "Absolute knowledge means never having to change your mind." Sarge Gerbode Institute for Research in Metapsychology 950 Guinda St. Palo Alto, CA 94301 UUCP: pyramid!thirdi!sarge
sarge@thirdi.UUCP (Sarge Gerbode) (08/25/87)
In article <388@hubcap.UUCP> steve@hubcap.UUCP ("Steve" Stevenson) writes: >in article <97@thirdi.UUCP>, sarge@thirdi.UUCP (Sarge Gerbode) says: >> >> I think, >> however, that you can't specify the questions, nor the methodology, in >> advance. Both evolve with the science. > >To some degree you are right. That might be the difference between a mature >and an evolving science. A science probably stagnates if it keeps (1) turned >inward and (2) asking the same tired questions (long ago answered.). By this definition of "mature", I think I prefer "immature sciences"! "Overripe" might be a better term. The only science I can think of that's fully mature, in this sense, is the science of playing tic-tac-toe. And that's not much fun anymore. >Part of my interest is pedegogical: My students beat on me saying "You never >tell us where we're going." I say,"But you were supposed to get that in >xxx course." Well, they didn't get it there: so now I have to do it. I >used to think them blase and not curious - now I think that they haven't >been primed to ask "the usual questions." Biep's list is nice in that respect >as it is a list of questions to prime the pump. Agreed, with bells on. I think what Biep is aiming at is very worthwhile. My only point is that it isn't a definition of "methodology". -- "Absolute knowledge means never having to change your mind." Sarge Gerbode Institute for Research in Metapsychology 950 Guinda St. Palo Alto, CA 94301 UUCP: pyramid!thirdi!sarge
steve@hubcap.UUCP ("Steve" Stevenson) (08/25/87)
in article <108@thirdi.UUCP>, sarge@thirdi.UUCP (Sarge Gerbode) says: > Re: article <866@klipper.cs.vu.nl> (and other recent submissions) > biep@cs.vu.nl (J. A. "Biep" Durieux): I don't remember where I saw it [ Wickelgren's book, *How to Solve Problems*, I think], but doesn't "methodology" have a component which says that an "outside" observer must be able to discern the "method." I know that sounds circular, but the gist of it was that methodology can be transmitted between people and can be faithfully reapplied by someone other than the originator. How does this fit into the discussion. -- D. E. (call me Steve) Stevenson steve@hubcap.clemson.edu Department of Computer Science, (803)656-5880.mabell Clemson University, Clemson, SC 29634-1906
steve@hubcap.UUCP ("Steve" Stevenson) (08/25/87)
in article <152@aiva.ed.ac.uk>, jeff@aiva.ed.ac.uk (Jeff Dalton) says: > There have > been attempts to develop an inductive logic, effectively to > do science automatically, and they have failed. We can't even do deduction > (as in > automatic theorem proving) fully automatically. Mathematics is still > "creative" and likely to remain so. The problem with both of the above is the power of the model with which you are trying to use in "automating" the proofs. I think you are using creative in two senses: *de novo*, and *to solve in a non-Turing computable way*. I think "inductive" here is the *de novo* sense. Since the Herbrand procedure is a semi-decision procedure, we're "half way" there :->. -- D. E. (call me Steve) Stevenson steve@hubcap.clemson.edu Department of Computer Science, (803)656-5880.mabell Clemson University, Clemson, SC 29634-1906
sarge@thirdi.UUCP (08/27/87)
In article <408@hubcap.UUCP> steve@hubcap.UUCP ("Steve" Stevenson) writes: >I don't remember where I saw it [ Wickelgren's book, *How to Solve Problems*, >I think], but doesn't "methodology" have a component which says that an >"outside" observer must be able to discern the "method." I know that sounds >circular, but the gist of it was that methodology can be transmitted between >people and can be faithfully reapplied by someone other than the originator. Interesting thought, but then I wonder if "methodology" is possible, in some cases. If we are to believe Kuhn's ideas, a person who is too far outside the paradigm (and certainly someone who is insufficiently trained) will not be able to understand the methods, unless the description of "the methodology" contained a whole explication of the field of study and its paradigm. A simple way of putting the above proposed definition is that a methodology is an understandable *description* of a method. What methodology *should* mean, I think is "the study of methods", though I'm not sure what this would mean. I think it's generally used as a fancy-sounding word for "method" or "methods", as doctors, when they are being pompous, speak of "symptomatology" when they mean "symptoms" or "pathology" when they mean illness". -- "Absolute knowledge means never having to change your mind." Sarge Gerbode Institute for Research in Metapsychology 950 Guinda St. Palo Alto, CA 94301 UUCP: pyramid!thirdi!sarge
steve@hubcap.UUCP ("Steve" Stevenson) (08/27/87)
in article <118@thirdi.UUCP>, sarge@thirdi.UUCP (Sarge Gerbode) says: > .... If we are to believe Kuhn's ideas, a person who is too far outside the > paradigm (and certainly someone who is insufficiently trained) will not be > able > to understand the methods, unless the description of "the methodology" > contained a whole explication of the field of study and its paradigm. I'll drink to that! I've had that happen several times. The medical analogy is very apt, at least in my experience. But isn't this the societal aspect of something like math. I can certainly have a background sufficient to understand the material, but one still has to read the stuff. But that's humans protecting their turf, I guess. -- D. E. (call me Steve) Stevenson steve@hubcap.clemson.edu Department of Computer Science, (803)656-5880.mabell Clemson University, Clemson, SC 29634-1906